Opinion
J-S32014-15 No. 1722 WDA 2014
08-05-2015
JASON SENSENIG AND JANET SENSENIG, HIS WIFE, ARTHUR BECQUET, JR., DAVID SPEICHER AND CARLA SPEICHER, HIS WIFE, TED BECQUET AND SHERRY BECQUET, HIS WIFE, LANDON HENRY AND PEG HENRY, HIS WIFE, BRUCE BECQUET AND PENNY BECQUET, HIS WIFE, BARRY CALHOUN, AND T. WAYNE FEIGHT, Appellees v. KARL GREENLEAF AND MARY GREENLEAF, HIS WIFE, Appellants
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 14, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 977 for the year 2009
BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:
Appellants, Karl Greenleaf and Mary Greenleaf ("the Greenleafs"), appeal from the judgment entered on December 14, 2014, following the trial court's denial of their motion for post-trial relief. We affirm.
This matter involves a dispute between neighbors over the width, location, and the right to use a private lane known as Old Henry Path Road ("OHPR"). While the underlying facts are relatively straightforward, the matter has a protracted procedural history.
On August 20, 2009, thirteen plaintiffs, including Appellees herein, Jason Sensenig and Janet Sensenig ("the Sensenigs"), filed an action against the Greenleafs seeking equitable relief, inter alia, to preclude the Greenleafs from interfering with plaintiffs' use of the subject roadway. Relative to the instant matter, the Sensenigs also requested the trial court to declare that they were not required to relocate a right-of-way and that the roadway may remain in its present location.
The Sensenigs admitted that the present location of the roadway encroached slightly on the Greenleafs' property, but averred that the location of the roadway has not changed since the 1970s, years prior to their ownership. Sec. Am. Compl. at ¶ 58.
The Greenleafs filed an answer, new matter, and a counterclaim in the nature of a quiet title action and a count in trespass. The Greenleafs requested that the trial court determine the respective plaintiffs' rights in the roadway and to fix the locations and widths of the road. Greenleafs' Countercl. at ¶ 105 (a)-(d). The Greenleafs also sought an order to compel the Sensenigs to remove an encroachment along the edge of the right-of-way and for a judgment in the amount of $1,416.00, for expenses incident to the Sensenigs' interference with the Greenleafs' right to possession of their property. Id. at ¶¶ 105 (e), 109.
The trial court conducted a nonjury trial on January 15, 2010. On March 29, 2010, the trial court resolved the dispute between the Greenleafs and Sensenigs as follows:
Given a review of the testimony and evidence presented, we find the location and width of the roadway transversing [the Greenleafs'] property from OHPR to the thirty (30) foot right-of-way leading to the Sensenig property to be as shown on the survey marked as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 45 ("the revised 2009 Steele survey") . . . . We find that the roadway is located as depicted on [the revised 2009 Steele survey] . . . . As such, we find that the Sensenigs are required to relocate that portion of the roadway that encroaches on the properties of [the Greenleafs.]Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/10, at 8-10.
* * *
As to the location of the roadway in the thirty (30) foot right-of-way from [the Greenleafs'] property to the Sensenigs' property[,] . . . [t]he parties seem to agree as to the location and length of the right-of-way. Therefore, we find the location and length of the thirty (30) foot right-of-way to be shown as on [the revised 2009 Steele survey].
Also, the parties agree that a portion of the cartway over this right-of-way encroaches on [the Greenleafs'] property by three (3) feet. As we find that the Sensenigs are bound by the unambiguous language of the express easement, they are required to maintain the roadway to their property within the bounds of this express grant. Therefore, we find that the Sensenigs must relocate that portion of the roadway that encroaches on [the Greenleafs'] property beyond the thirty-foot (30) right-of-way.
Regarding the Greenleafs' quiet title and declaratory judgment counterclaim against the Sensenigs, the trial court decided:
With regard to [the Greenleafs'] requests, we have addressed all of the issues hereinabove with the exception of the maintenance issue.Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/10, at 16-17.
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As to the roadway transversing [the Greenleafs'] property and the thirty (30) foot right-of-way leading from [the Greenleafs'] property to the Sensenig property along the line of the Lon Gates property, we find that as the Sensenigs are the only dominant estate holders with regard to these roadways the Sensenigs are solely responsible for their maintenance.
Finally, the trial court addressed the Greenleafs' trespass counterclaim against the Sensenigs requesting damages in the amount of $1,416.00 due to the Sensenigs' temporary interference with the installation of posts and fencing for the pasturing of the Greenleafs' cattle. The Greenleafs claimed that as a result of their inability to pasture their cows from June 16, 2009, through August 14, 2009, they were required to use their winter bales to feed the cattle. The trial court denied the damages claim because "it is clear that the fencing was placed within the bounds of OHPR." Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/10, at 19.
In summary then, as between the Greenleafs and the Sensenigs, the trial court determined: 1) the locations of the ten-foot right-of-way crossing the Greenleafs' property and the thirty-foot right-of-way along the southern boundary of the Greenleafs' property leading to the Sensenigs' property were as depicted by the revised 2009 Steele survey; 2) the Sensenigs were required to relocate that portion of the roadway that encroached on the Greenleafs' property; and 3) the Sensenigs were solely responsible for the maintenance of the roadway traversing the Greenleafs' property and the thirty (30) foot right-of-way leading from the Greenleafs' property to the Sensenigs' property. Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/10, at 22-25. In a subsequent order dated May 25, 2010, the trial court added a provision directing that "all parties shall have sixty (60) days from the date of this Order in which to take any action required by the Court's decision." Order, 5/25/10, at unnumbered 1.
On November 18, 2010, the Greenleafs filed a petition for contempt and further equitable relief and damages against nine of the original plaintiffs, now respondents, alleging that those parties were in contempt of the trial court's March 29, 2010 order. The Greenleafs then filed an amended petition against the Sensenigs only claiming, inter alia, that the Sensenigs: 1) constructed and modified the roadway outside the boundaries of the previously adjudicated right-of-way; 2) graded the road in such a way as to cause storm water run-off to flow onto the Greenleafs' property resulting in damage to the land and other possessions; 3) failed to remove shale from the Greenleafs' property as previously ordered; and 4) were improperly using the right-of-way for commercial purposes.
In the interim, on May 18, 2010, the Sensenigs filed a petition for contempt naming the Greenleafs as respondents. The trial court granted the petition in part and denied it in part. Order, 6/8/10, at unnumbered 1.
After the pleadings closed, the trial court conducted a site view of the properties, and held evidentiary hearings on July 26, 2012, September 26, 2012, and February 27, 2013. On November 13, 2012, the Sensenigs filed a petition to modify the trial court's March 29, 2010 order to the extent that the order utilized the revised 2009 Steele survey to fix certain boundaries. The petition was reasoned by testimony elicited from Richard Steele during the evidentiary hearing wherein he acknowledged that his revised 2009 survey did not accurately depict the location of the centerline of the roadway because it was based merely upon an instruction from Karl Greenleaf and did not represent the roadway's actual centerline. N.T. 9/28/12, at 15.
The trial court denied the motion to modify finding that the discrepancy was revealed during trial and the court had given substantial consideration to the matter. The trial court also noted that it was mindful "that at some point contested lawsuits must be regarded as having ended[,]" and concluded that the facts did not constitute extraordinary cause requiring modification of its order. Trial Court Opinion, 6/10/2013, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
On June 27, 2013, the trial court denied the Greenleafs' petition for equitable relief, reasoning as follows:
We will address the issues raised in this proceeding in the order they are raised in the amended pleading. First, [the Greenleafs] raise issues relating to the thirty (30) foot right of way in the area of the sharp curve and for an approximate four hundred (400) foot stretch as one travels toward the Sensenig home. In the area of the sharp curve, we addressed an issue raised by [the Sensenigs]. Except for that ruling we do not intend to order the Sensenigs to make other changes to the thirty (30) foot right of way in this area. It does appear that nearer the Sensening home the right of way encroaches the [Greenleafs'] property for a distance. If a correction to this matter has not already been made, the [Sensenigs] shall do so within sixty (60) days of the date of the filing of this memorandum.Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/13, at 1-3. The trial court also denied the Greenleafs' request for attorneys' fees. Id. at 4.
With regard to the issue of storm run-off, a resolution of the matter is more difficult. The thirty (30) foot right of way runs a significant distance up a grade making storm run-off an
almost certain problem. We have no doubt, having viewed the area, that run-off during a storm is a problem in the area of [the Greenleafs'] shed and barn. We will order [the Sensenigs] to take all reasonable measures to minimize the run-off on this portion of the right of way, recognizing that it may be difficult to completely correct the problem. We also recognize that this provision is general and gives no specific direction. However, we do not believe there was testimony of an expert nature from which we could make more specific conclusions.
With regard to the shale averred to be on the property of [the Greenleafs], we believe some has been removed. In any event we viewed the area in question and see no reason to take further action.
* * *
[The Greenleafs] finally aver that [the Sensenigs] have only a private right of way but use it for commercial purposes. It does appear from the testimony that the Sensenigs operate a landscape business and drive vehicles used in that business over the right of way.
Generally, the rights conferred by an express easement are ascertained from the language of the granting document. PARC Holdings, Inc. v. Killian 785 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. 2001). When the grant of an easement is ambiguous or unrestricted, the grantee is given such rights as are necessary for the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the grant and the easement must be construed in favor of the grantee. Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp.[,] 657 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1995). Here the granting document makes no reference to the extent of use. Our understanding is that Mr. Sensenig owns a landscaping business and traverses the right of way with vehicles used in that business and kept at his residence. We find that this is a reasonable and proper use of the right of way.
On July 8, 2013, the Greenleafs filed a motion for post-trial relief. Before the trial court ruled on the motion, on July 24, 2013, the Greenleafs filed a notice of appeal to this Court docketed at No. 1202 WDA 2013. On August 26, 2013, the Greenleafs filed a Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal and on November 26, 2013, the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). In that opinion, the trial court addressed the challenges to its rulings as follows: 1) it declined to direct the Sensenigs to relocate the roadway in the area of the Greenleafs' barn because it had already decided against this outcome in its June 10, 2013 memorandum denying the Sensenigs' motion to modify its order; 2) it previously resolved the problems concerning storm water run-off, commercial use of the right-of-way, and shale removal in its June 27, 2013 memorandum denying the Greenleafs' petition for equitable relief; 3) it did not make a finding of contempt against the Sensenigs because the Greenleafs did not ask for such relief in its amended petition; and 4) it found no basis justifying an attorneys' fees award. Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/13, at 1-2.
On April 17, 2014, this Court entered an order in 1202 WDA 2013 granting the parties' joint application for a remand to afford the trial court an opportunity to address the Greenleafs' post-trial motion. We then relinquished jurisdiction in that matter. Order, 1202 WDA 2013, 4/17/14.
After hearing argument, the trial court denied the Greenleafs' motion for post-trial relief on September 25, 2014, for the following reasons:
We have dealt with the issues raised in the Motion for Post Trial Relief in our Memorandum and Order filed June 27, 2013 and in our Rule 1925 Statement filed following [the Greenleafs'] initial appeal. After hearing argument on the Motion and considering the briefs presented, we are not inclined to change our ruling, except to address one matter raised at argument.Trial Court Opinion, 9/25/14, at unnumbered 1-2. In the order accompanying its memorandum, the trial court directed the Sensenigs to change the location of the subject roadway in compliance with its decision filed March 29, 2010, within sixty days. The Greenleafs filed a notice of appeal from this order on October 24, 2014. On October 31, 2014, the Greenleafs filed a subsequent Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
[The Greenleafs] contend we failed to direct [the Sensenigs] to change the location of the roadway in the area of the sharp curve near their barn. We believe our decision filed March 29, 2010 addressed this matter, although we did not provide a time frame. We indicated at argument that a 60-day period would be set which will begin on the date of filing of this Memorandum.
The purpose of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal "is to specify the particular issues which appellant intends to present on appeal in order to permit the trial court an opportunity to provide the appellate court with a focused and meaningful explanation for any challenged actions in its opinion." Commonwealth v. Blystone , 617 A.2d 778, 781 (Pa. Super. 1992) (quotation omitted). We observe, but do not today hold, that a 1925(b) statement filed after the trial court files a Rule 1925(a) opinion could be considered a legal nullity.
On December 2, 2014, this Court issued a per curiam order informing the Greenleafs that because judgment had not been entered, their appeal was interlocutory. Accordingly, the Greenleafs were directed to provide proof of entry of judgment to this Court within fourteen days.
On December 14, 2014, the Greenleafs filed a praecipe for entry of judgment, and judgment against the Greenleafs was entered on that date. Upon notice that judgment had now been entered, this Court informed the Greenleafs that the appeal would proceed.
The Greenleafs present the following issues for appellate review:
I. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in failing to find [the Sensenigs] in contempt of its prior orders in this case, in failing to set forth specific directives to enforce said orders, and in failing to enjoin [the Sensenigs] from traversing the subject roadway outside the previously-established boundaries of the rights-of-way crossing [the Greenleafs'] property.Greenleafs' Brief at 4-5.
II. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in failing to specifically direct [the Sensenigs] to take any and all actions as may be necessary to prevent the storm water run-off from flowing onto [the Greenleafs'] property by redirecting the said run-off to the ditch on the opposite side of the right-of-way from [the Greenleafs'] property.
III. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in failing to enter an order prohibiting [the Sensenigs] from any use of the said right-of-way for commercial purposes and/or restricting the [Sensenigs'] use of the said right-of-way to ingress, egress and regress for private residential purposes only.
IV. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in failing to direct [the Sensenigs] to remove any and all shale from [the Greenleafs'] property that does not constitute the subject roadway.
V. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in denying [the Greenleafs'] request for attorney's fees.
The Greenleafs first argue that the trial court erred when it failed to hold the Sensenigs in contempt of its prior orders, failed to set forth specific directives enforcing its prior orders, and failed to enjoin the Sensenigs from traversing the subject roadway outside the established boundaries of the right-of-way. As the Greenleafs' issue regarding attorneys' fees (Issue V) is dependent upon the resolution of the contempt issue, we will decide these two issues in tandem.
The Greenleafs complain that the Sensenigs' failure to relocate the portion of the roadway outside the parameters of the previously-adjudicated right-of-way and their continued travel on the road in a manner that encroaches on their property are actions and/or inactions in defiance of the trial court's orders dated March 29, 2010 (directing the Sensenigs to relocate a portion of the roadway), May 25, 2010 (directing that the Sensenigs comply with its directive within sixty days), and June 4, 2013 (denying the Sensenigs' petition to modify its March 29, 2010 order with respect to the location of the roadway). While the Greenleafs fault the trial court for its historical lack of clarity in addressing the extent of the Sensenigs' obligation to modify the location of the right-of-way, they acknowledge that the trial court's September 25, 2014 order denying the Greenleafs' motion for post-trial relief did direct the Sensenigs to change the location of the roadway within sixty days. In essence then, the Greenleafs are arguing that the Sensenigs should have been found in contempt because they did not take the action required by the court's orders of March and May 2010 during the previous four and one-half years. They further aver that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to "set forth specific directives by which [the Sensenigs] might purge themselves of the contempt adjudication. . . ." Greenleafs' Brief at 14.
We will reverse a trial court's order denying a civil contempt petition only upon a showing that the trial court misapplied the law or exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner. MacDougall v. MacDougall , 49 A.3d 890, 892 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Harcar v. Harcar , 982 A.2d 1230, 1234 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted)). We have further observed that:
Each court is the exclusive judge of contempt against its process. The contempt power is essential to the preservation of the court's authority and prevents the administration of justice from falling into disrepute. When reviewing an appeal from a contempt order, the appellant [sic] court must place great reliance upon the discretion of the trial judge.Harcar , 982 A.2d at 1235 (quoting Langendorfer v. Spearman , 797 A.2d 303, 307 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted)).
We can readily dismiss the Greenleafs' claim that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to issue a directive to the Sensenigs to purge themselves of the contempt adjudication. Simply, there was no contempt adjudication against the Sensenigs.
Whether the trial court erred in denying the Greenleafs' petition to hold the Sensenigs in contempt for their non-compliance with the trial court's earlier orders, however, requires some discussion. Although the trial court expressed doubt as to whether the contempt allegation was justiciable because its "decision addressed the relief requested in [the Greenleafs' amended petition for equitable relief], which did not include contempt[,]" it concluded, without elaboration, that "there was no basis for entering a contempt finding against [the Sensenigs]." Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/13, at 2.
The trial court was incorrect in its recollection that the Greenleafs did not preserve the contempt issue. At the nonjury trial held on July 26, 2012, the parties stipulated that the Greenleafs' requests for a contempt adjudication and attorneys' fees as set forth in its petition for equitable relief filed on November 10, 2010, were to be carried over to the amended petition. N.T. (Trial), 7/26/12, at 5-6.
Our review is somewhat hampered by the trial court's summary disposition of the contempt allegation. However, given the trial court's extended history with these parties and its prior decisions on the subject matter underlying the contempt request, it is not necessary to remand the matter for further explanation. The trial court's lengthy involvement with this litigation positioned it in such a way to evaluate capably whether the Sensenigs' behavior violated its orders and whether they acted with wrongful intent. See MacDougall , 49 A.3d at 892 (civil contempt is proven when: (1) the contemnor had notice of the specific order he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) the act constituting the contemnor's violation was volitional; and (3) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent). We are required to afford substantial deference to the court's determination as to whether there was contempt against its process. Harcar , 982 A.2d at 1235.
Additionally, the trial court's decision against a contempt adjudication is adequately supported by the record. Although the Greenleafs asserted that the Sensenigs failed to take any action to relocate the roadway, that contention is belied by the record. During the nonjury trial held on September 28, 2012, Jason Sensenig testified that after the trial court's March 24, 2010 order, he engaged the original surveyor of the subject roadway, Richard Steele, to assist him in complying with the order. N.T. (Trial), 9/28/12, at 122-123. Mr. Sensenig also testified that he shifted the location of the roadway in the barn area as "close to compliance as we possibly could to be able to still access our property." Id. at 126. Apparently, the trial court viewed these actions as mitigating against a contempt adjudication. We discern no abuse of discretion in the court's decision in this regard.
The conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on the contempt issue also resolves the Greenleafs' claim that the trial court erred when it did not award them attorneys' fees. The denial of a request for attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the trial court, reversible only for a clear abuse of that discretion. Lesoon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company , 898 A.2d 620, 635 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quotation omitted).
The Greenleafs averred that they accrued attorneys' fees occasioned by the Sensenigs' violation of the trial court's orders, and for the same reasons underscoring their contempt argument, they were entitled to reimbursement of these costs. Considering that the trial court decided the contempt issue against the Greenleafs, a determination we upheld, the trial court likewise did not abuse its discretion in denying their request for attorneys' fees.
The Greenleafs' next argument is that the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion when it failed to direct the Sensenigs to divert the storm water run-off currently flowing onto the Greenleafs' property to a ditch on the opposite side of the right-of-way. The trial court agreed with the Greenleafs that the water run-off was problematic and ordered the Sensenigs "to take all reasonable measures to minimize the run-off on this portion of the right of way . . . ." Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/13, at 2. The trial court recognized that its ruling was imprecise, but declined to craft a more specific directive without the benefit of expert testimony. Id.
The Greenleafs posit that the trial court failed to acknowledge the severity of the water run-off problem and the extent of the resulting damage to their property. They also assert that the trial court erroneously concluded that there was insufficient expert testimony to support a more detailed instruction regarding the run-off problem. The Greenleafs propose that the testimony of Ronald Stauffer, who appeared on their behalf and was accepted as an expert in land surveying, aptly described appropriate action which could be taken to divert the run-off from the Greenleafs' property. Finally, the Greenleafs submit that the history of this case suggests that the trial court's non-specific edict to the Sensenigs will be ineffective. Accordingly, it urges this Court to direct the trial court to issue explicit directives to the Sensenigs to correct the water run-off problem.
Initially, we address the Greenleafs' request that we order the trial court to refashion its order to avoid an anticipatory breach by the Sensenigs. Such an action is well beyond our jurisdictional reach, and it implicates a ripeness issue. Thus, we will not further consider this invitation.
The remainder of the Greenleafs' challenge to the trial court's water run-off decision requires scrutiny of the trial court's role in a nonjury case. In such instances, our review is:
limited to a determination of whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed error in the application of law. Findings of the trial judge in a non-jury case must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as a verdict of a jury and will not be disturbed on appeal absent error of law or abuse of discretion. When this Court reviews the findings of the trial judge, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the victorious party below and all evidence and proper inferences favorable to that party must be taken as true and all unfavorable inferences rejected.
Shaffer v. O'Toole , 964 A.2d 420, 422-423 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Christian v. Yanoviak , 945 A.2d 220, 224-225 (Pa. Super. 2008)).
Hart v. Arnold , 2005 PA Super 328, 884 A.2d 316, 330-331 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 695, 897 A.2d 458 (2006) (citations omitted). "The [trial] court's findings are especially binding on appeal, where they are based upon the credibility of the witnesses, unless it appears that the court abused its discretion or that the court's findings lack evidentiary support or that the court capriciously disbelieved the evidence." Id. (citations omitted). "Conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine whether there was a proper application of law to fact by the
lower court." Tagliati v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 720 A.2d 1051, 1053 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal denied, 559 Pa. 706, 740 A.2d 234 (1999).
Contrary to the Greenleafs' assertion, we conclude that the trial court understood and duly considered the problems created by the storm water run-off and the impact that its flow had on the Greenleafs' property. Of particular significance is the fact that the trial judge conducted a site view and personally observed the area in question. Additionally, there was no legal error in the trial court's assessment concerning the quality of Ronald Stauffer's testimony. The Greenleafs offer no authority for the proposition that a witness qualified as an expert in land surveying is competent to offer an expert opinion addressing storm water run-off. Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion or error of law in this aspect of the trial court's decision.
The Greenleafs' third argument is that the trial court erred when it concluded that the Sensenigs' use of the right-of-way to operate a commercial landscaping business was permissible. The trial court reasoned that because the language of the granting document did not restrict the use of the easement, the easement was construed in favor of the Sensenigs and afforded them rights "necessary for the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the grant." Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/13, at 2 (citing Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation , 657 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1995)). By virtue of this authority, the trial court determined that the Sensenigs' use of the right-of-way for commercial purposes was acceptable.
The Greenleafs do not dispute the correctness of the trial court's legal reasoning; rather, they propose that the physical characteristics of the subject right-of-way, i.e., its narrow width and the sharp turn in the road, contraindicate that it was intended for commercial use. The Greenleafs aver that private passenger vehicles, as opposed to commercial equipment, would not have difficulty navigating the turn. The Greenleafs thus submit that the intent was for the ten-foot right-of-way to permit access to the adjoining landowner's residence, not to facilitate a commercial enterprise.
Notably, though, the Greenleafs do not point to any finding by the court that is not supported by the evidence or identify any legal error in the court's conclusion that the Sensenigs' use of the easement was reasonable and proper. Nor do the Greenleafs advocate that the wording of the easement was ambiguous, which could potentially open the door to admission of evidence concerning the easement's intended use at the time of creation. See PARC Holdings v. Killian , 785 A.2d 106, 111 (Pa. Super. 2001) (if language of granting deed is ambiguous regarding its purpose, the intent of the parties as to the original purpose of a grant is a controlling factor in determining the extent of an easement; moreover, the intention of the parties may be shown by reference to the attending circumstances known to the parties at the time the grant was made) (citations omitted). Therefore, the Greenleafs' assumptions concerning the intent in creating the easement cannot override the explicit language of the granting document. As the Greenleafs have not identified a reviewable basis for reversal of the trial court's determination on the use of the easement, no relief can be afforded.
The Greenleafs' final argument is that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in failing to direct the Sensenigs to remove all the shale from the Greenleafs' property. The Greenleafs represented that in the course of plowing and maintaining the subject road, the Sensenigs caused shale to be dispersed on the Greenleafs' property that adversely impacted the Greenleafs' ability to mow and maintain their property. After viewing the property, the trial court observed that some of the shale had been removed and "saw no reason to take further action." Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/13, at 2.
On appeal, the Greenleafs contend that the trial court should have commanded the Sensenigs to remove all the shale so that the Greenleafs' full enjoyment to the property could be restored. This is again a situation where, without reference to an inaccurate factual finding or erroneous legal conclusion, the Greenleafs express disagreement with the trial court's decision. Basically, the Greenleafs are displeased with the outcome of this aspect of the nonjury trial; however, disappointment in the result is not grounds for reversal.
For the above reasons, the judgment against the Greenleafs is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/5/2015