Opinion
2:22-cv-903-TSZ-TLF
10-05-2022
JOSUE SEIJO, Plaintiff, v. REBECCA BRADLOW, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THERESA L. FRICKE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and proposed amended complaint. Dkt. 1, 12. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter. This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Mathews, Sec'y of H.E.W. v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Local Rule MJR 4(a)(4). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court should deny plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and proposed complaint. Dkt. 1-1. Plaintiff's initial complaint alleged that plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee facing criminal prosecution in state court. Dkt. 1-1. The proposed complaint alleged that plaintiff's public defenders violated plaintiff's rights by stating that plaintiff was incompetent, attempting to impose an unwanted mental health evaluation on plaintiff, agreeing to continuances over plaintiff's objections and disregarding plaintiff's confidentiality. Dkt. 1-1.
The Court issued an order explaining that plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the named defendants because the named defendants were not people acting under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983. Dkt. 7. The Court also informed plaintiff that plaintiff's complaint appeared to be barred under the doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). Dkt. 7. The Court directed plaintiff to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed or file a proposed amended complaint to cure, if possible, the deficiencies identified in the Court's order. Dkt. 7.
Plaintiff has filed a proposed amended complaint attempting to correct the deficiencies identified in the Court's order. Dkt. 12.
The proposed amended complaint raises claims against three defendants: Rebecca Bradlow, Reid Burkland, and Pedro Melesio. Dkt. 12 at 3. Plaintiff contends that these three defendants acted as plaintiff's public defenders in plaintiff's criminal trial. Dkt. 12 at 3.
The proposed amended complaint raises the same claims as the original complaint - that the defendants violated plaintiff's rights during plaintiff's criminal trial by: 1) raising a competency issue, 2) stating that plaintiff was not capable of assisting in the defense, 3) attempting to impose an unwanted mental health evaluation of plaintiff, 4) discussing plaintiff's case with another person without plaintiff's consent, and 5) filing unwanted continuances over plaintiff's objections. Dkt. 12 at 3-10. Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint also adds a claim that defendant Melesio denied plaintiff's right to trial by delaying transport, and also violated plaintiff's right to direct cross-examination by sealing records without plaintiff's knowledge. Dkt. 12 at 10.
DISCUSSION
The district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if the complaint on its face is frivolous or without merit. See O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616-617 (9th Cir. 1990); Kittleson v. Washington, 683 Fed.Appx. 639, 2017 WL 1046218 (9th Cir. 2017) (unpublished). A complaint is frivolous when it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984).
A magistrate judge may issue an order granting IFP, but has no authority to issue a dispositive order denying in forma pauperis status, unless the parties have consented to having the magistrate judge decide their civil case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Tripati v. Rison, 847 F.2d 548, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1988); Woods v. Dahlberg, 894 F.2d 187, 188 (6th Cir. 1990) (observing that denial of IFP status is the equivalent of an involuntary dismissal). The magistrate judge is authorized to issue an order granting IFP status; however if the proposed decision would be a denial of IFP status, then the magistrate judge would only be authorized to submit a report and recommendation. Id. A plaintiff is not entitled to submit an objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation that IFP status should be denied. Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) as amended (September 9, 1988). Denial of a motion to proceed IFP is an immediately appealable order. Tripati v. Rison, 847 F.2d at 548-549.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 8(a), a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) A short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support.
(2) A short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) A demand for relief sought which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
While the pleading standard under FRCP 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The pleading must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertions[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancements.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
When a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, “the court must construe the pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). Yet this lenient standard does not excuse a pro se litigant from meeting the most basic pleading requirements. See, American Ass'n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2000).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must allege: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) the conduct deprived a person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Section 1983 is the appropriate avenue to remedy an alleged wrong only if both of these elements are present. Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985). Vague and conclusory allegations of officials participating in a civil rights violation are not sufficient to support a claim under Section 1983. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982).
A. Person Acting Under Color of State Law
Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint fails to allege a factual basis upon which plaintiff can state a viable Section 1983 complaint because the named defendants in the complaint are not persons acting under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.
To state a claim under Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendant must be a person acting under color of state law, and the defendant's conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). A plaintiff may only bring a Section 1983 action against a private individual if the private individual conspired or entered into a joint action with a state actor. Radciffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 783 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001). Public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing the functions of representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).
For the conduct of a private party to be under color of state law the conduct must be fairly attributed to the State. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 1989). Conduct is fairly attributable to the state when 1) the deprivation is caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state by a person for whom the state is responsible, or 2) when the party charged with the deprivation may fairly be said to be a state actor. Collins, 878 F.2d at 1151.
Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint adds a new defendant, yet all three named defendants are plaintiff's public defenders. Further, the alleged violations stem from the defendants' decisions made while representing and defending plaintiff in a criminal trial. As the court's previous order explained, these allegations are insufficient to allege a Section 1983 complaint because a public defender does not act under color of state law while performing the function of representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Dkt. 7 at 5. Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint does not add additional factual allegations explaining how any defendant acted under color of state law.
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff's proposed amended complaint fails to cure the deficiencies identified in the Court's previous order.
B. Younger Doctrine
Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint also appears to be subject to dismissal under the doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris.
Federal courts must abstain from interfering in pending state criminal prosecution absent extraordinary circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). The Younger abstention doctrine applies when “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding. Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2019)).
The proposed amended complaint claims alleged violations stemming from plaintiff's pending criminal trial and the decisions made by plaintiff's public defenders. Plaintiff's criminal proceedings implicate an important state interest - enforcing and prosecuting state laws - and plaintiff is represented by counsel in the state proceeding. The proposed amended complaint does not raise any new facts explaining how plaintiff is unable to raise his concerns to the judge presiding over plaintiff's criminal trial. Further, the relief sought in the proposed amended complaint would require the court to interfere in plaintiff's pending state criminal trial.
Based on the foregoing, it appears that plaintiff's claims are barred under the Younger doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Because plaintiff has been granted the opportunity to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing an amended complaint - but the amended complaint remains fatally deficient the Court should deny the motion for IFP. A plaintiff is not entitled to submit written objections to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation that IFP status should be denied. Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998)(per curiam). Denial of a motion to proceed IFP is an immediately appealable order. Tripati v. Rison, 847 F.2d 548, 548-549 (9th Cir. 1988).
The Court should direct plaintiff to pay the Court filing fee within 21 days of adoption of this order if he wishes to proceed with this action. If plaintiff fails to pay the Court filing fee, the Clerk of the Court should be directed to close the case. Plaintiff should be aware that if he pays the filing fee, and if the case is later dismissed by the Court (with or without prejudice) for failure to state a claim, or because it is frivolous or malicious, then the dismissal would be counted as a strike under the PLRA. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721, 1726-1727 (2020).