Opinion
Case No.: 03:18-CV-00729-AC
09-17-2018
JOHNNY L. SEIB, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., and ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION :
Introduction
Pro se plaintiff Johnny L. Seib ("Seib") filed this lawsuit in state court against defendant Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA"), asserting multiple state law claims stemming from what Seib alleges are wrongful foreclosure proceedings against him. BANA timely removed the action to this court on diversity jurisdiction grounds. Seib now moves to remand the case back to state court. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to remand should be denied.
Background
On March 23, 2018, Seib initiated this action in the Washington County Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, asserting claims for common-law fraud, "innocent misrepresentation," breach of contract, "theft by deception," and unlawful trade practices under ORS 646.607. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at 13-26.) Liberally construing his pro se complaint, Seib alleges that BANA withheld information about his mortgage lender, fraudulently induced him to stop making payments on his mortgage with the false promise of loan modification, and then wrongfully pursued foreclosure on the property securing the loan. He seeks economic damages in the amount of $4,000,000; injunctive and declaratory relief; and to quiet title to his property. (Id. at 31.)
On April 25, 2018, BANA filed a notice of removal with this court, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, at 1.) Seib then filed the instant motion to remand the suit back to state court. (Pl.'s Mot. for Remand, ECF No. 4, ("Motion").)
Legal Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." Such removal can be based on either diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and (c).
A plaintiff who believes an action has been improperly removed to federal court may file a motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides:
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.The removal statute is strictly construed and any doubt about the right of removal is resolved in favor of remand. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The presumption against removal jurisdiction means "the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Id.
Additionally, courts generally have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally and "afford the [pro se] plaintiff the benefit of any doubt." Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988); accord. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." (internal citations and quotations omitted)). This duty applies to both pro se complaints and pro se motions. Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003).
Discussion
BANA removed the case to this court on diversity jurisdiction grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 endows district courts with original jurisdiction over civil actions in which "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and is between" parties of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). When a case is removed to federal court based on diversity, jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 291 (1938). The amount in controversy is determined "from the face of the pleadings" as they exist when a petition for removal is filed. Crum v. Circus Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000); Rea v. Michaels Stores Inc., 742 F.3d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Both of the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met here. First, the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. In his complaint, Seib requests $4,000,000 in economic damages, in addition to the injunctive and declaratory relief sought, which is quantified as the value of the object of the litigation — here, the subject property. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977) ("In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.") Therefore, the amount in controversy requirement is met.
Second, the parties in this case are completely diverse from one another. At the time of removal, Seib was, and appears to remain, a citizen domiciled in Oregon. (Notice of Removal ¶ 5 a; Compl., Ex. 1, ¶ 3.) As set forth in its articles of incorporation, BANA was and remains a national bank with its main office in North Carolina. (Notice of Removal ¶ 5b.) For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, national banks are considered citizens of "the State designated in its articles of association as its main office." Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006). Thus, the complete diversity requirement also is met here.
Seib does not dispute the amount in controversy or the diversity of the parties involved. Rather, he points to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 — which confers upon district courts supplemental jurisdiction to hear claims sufficiently related to those over which the court has original jurisdiction — and argues remand is necessary because the case involves complex issues of state law that disqualify it from supplemental jurisdiction.
Seib is correct that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), "district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, [or if] the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction . . . ." But his argument functions under the flawed assumption that this court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over this action. Rather, as explained supra, because the requirements of diversity jurisdiction are met, the court has original — not supplemental — jurisdiction to hear the claims. As such, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) does not apply.
Seib also invokes Landmark Nat. Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528 (2009), to argue that the "unique national and state climate of predatory lending, mortgage fraud, record foreclosure rates," among other wrongdoings, pose novel issues for "state courts and legislators to decide . . . ." (Motion at 10.) That case is inapposite for several reasons. In Landmark Nat. Bank v. Kesler, a state supreme court addressed whether a non-lender should be joined as a contingently necessary party to a foreclosure suit. See Landmark Nat. Bank, 289 Kan. at 530, 533-44. It did not, however, discuss the state-specific nature of predatory lending or wrongful foreclosure claims or raise any issues of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The case is, therefore, not only non-binding on this court, but also irrelevant to the question posed here — whether the requirements of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 are met.
Furthermore, the claims raised in Seib's complaint are not the type of novel or complex issues 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) contemplates. Indeed, federal courts routinely hear cases involving state law claims for fraud, wrongful foreclosure, and unfair trade practices. See e,g., Tjaden v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n, 681 F. App'x 641, 643-44 (9th Cir. 2017); Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 1998); Seegers v. CIT Bank N.A., No. CV 17-00399 LEK-KSC, 2018 WL 1558550, at *1-*8 (D. Haw. Feb. 28, 2018); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n for Greenpoint Mortg. Funding Tr. Pass Through Certificates Series 2006-AR4 v. Edwards, No. 3:16-CV-1307-AC, 2017 WL 1396047, at *2 (D. Or. Feb. 23, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n for GreenPoint Mortg. Funding Tr. Pass Through Certificate Series 2006-AR4 v. Edwards, No. 3:16-CV-01307-AC, 2017 WL 1393048 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 2017); Ochoa v. Capital One NA, No. 6:11-CV-6077-HO, 2012 WL 2921373, at *2-*3 (D. Or. July 16, 2012). Again, because this court has diversity jurisdiction over the claims, that state law issues are involved does not affect the court's original jurisdiction to hear the case.
Conclusion
BANA has met its burden to establish that removal to this court was proper. Both parties are residents of different states and Seib has alleged damages in excess of $75,000. Therefore, the court has diversity jurisdiction and, consequently, original jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, the action is properly before this court , and Seib's motion to remand (ECF No. 4), should be DENIED. \\\\\ \\\\\ \\\\\ \\\\\ \\\\\ \\\\\ \\\\\
Scheduling Order
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge for review. Objections, if any, are due October 1, 2018. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.
DATED this 17th day of September, 2018.
/s/_________
JOHN V. ACOSTA
United States Magistrate Judge