Opinion
A22-1522
09-08-2023
Robyn Amber Seehusen, Respondent, v. David Chandler Farr, Appellant.
Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CV-22-6133
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Cleary, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
Edward J. Cleary, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. On July 27, 2022, respondent Robyn Amber Seehusen petitioned for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against appellant David Chandler Farr, alleging various incidents of harassment between 2017 and 2022. The district court issued an ex parte order granting Seehusen a temporary HRO. Farr requested a hearing to contest the HRO which the district court held on August 18, 2022. Farr was represented by counsel at the hearing while Seehusen appeared pro se. Both parties testified at the hearing, and Farr's counsel cross-examined Seehusen. Neither party attempted to call any other witnesses or enter any exhibits into evidence.
2. Seehusen testified that Farr sent her threatening text messages and phone calls, showed up at her home, slashed her tires, and threatened the lives of her, her boyfriend, and her children. She also testified that she told Farr "many times that he need[ed] to stop," but that he continued to call her hundreds of times. Seehusen stated that on two days before she petitioned for the HRO, she received "over a thousand calls and over 2,000 text messages" from Farr. Seehusen also explained that she had previously sent Farr videos of herself, and that Farr later sent those videos to her current boyfriend. She stated that she could not "specifically remember" what was in the videos, but that "there might have been a video of [her] with [her] shirt off or something." Farr testified that he and Seehusen "had a few disagreements now and then," but that they "usually always talked it out through either text or phone call." He stated that they would text every day, but that he only sent her "a normal amount of text messages that any person would usually send a person" and never texted or called her thousands of times in one day. Farr asserted that Seehusen never told him to stop calling or texting her, that he never intended to cause Seehusen distress, and that he never threatened her boyfriend or children.
3. At the close of the hearing, the district court granted the HRO. In doing so, the district court found that Farr "did engage in unwanted acts by calling when [Seehusen] informed him that he was not to call." The district court also found that "[t]here is an incident that was testified to by Ms. Seehusen where Mr. Farr disseminated private sexual images, according to her testimony, of at least partially nude photographs." The district court then addressed Farr, directly, telling him: "I know that you feel you have a friendship with [Seehusen], but she has indicated quite clearly that she no longer wants contact, and you should honor that if you have concern for her." Following the hearing, the district court issued a form written order memorializing its findings. On the form order, the district court checked the boxes indicating that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Farr had engaged in harassment because he "[m]ade harassing phone calls or sent harassing text messages to the Petitioner" and "[d]isseminated private sexual images of the Petitioner without permission of the Petitioner." Farr appeals.
After receiving the district court's post-hearing order granting the HRO, Farr requested another hearing, claiming that he objected to the HRO and "wish[ed] to have a trial" or modify the order. The district court issued a notice informing Farr that "[t]he trial has already taken place," that he should consult with his attorney about his right to appeal, and that a further hearing would not be held absent an appropriate post-trial motion.
4. On appeal, Farr argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting the HRO against him for the following three reasons: (1) he "was not given the opportunity to defend [his] side of the court case"; (2) the district court's factual findings were not supported by the evidence; and (3) the district court "improperly applied" Minnesota Statutes section 609.748 (2022). Seehusen did not file a brief in this appeal and this court ordered that case would be determined on the merits. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
We cite the most recent version of section 609.748 because it has not been amended in relevant part since the beginning of the harassment alleged in Seehusen's HRO petition. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, "appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on a case"). For the same reason, we also cite the current version of the other statute cited in this opinion.
5. A district court may issue an HRO if it "finds . . . that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment." Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3). Harassment includes "repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship between the actor and the intended target." Id., subd. 1(a)(1); see also Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 566 (Minn.App. 2006) (explaining that "section 609.748 requires both objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser and an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to harassing conduct"), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006). Harassment also includes "a single incident of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images under [Minnesota Statutes section 617.261 (2022)]." Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). Dissemination of private sexual images refers to dissemination of "an image of another person who is depicted in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed, in whole or in part." Minn. Stat. § 617.261.
6. This court reviews a district court's decision whether to issue an HRO for an abuse of discretion. Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn.App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). In doing so, this court reviews the district court's findings of fact for clear error and defers to the district court's credibility determinations. Id.; see also In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-23 (Minn. 2021) (explaining that when reviewing findings for clear error, appellate courts do not engage in fact-finding, reweigh the evidence, or disturb the fact-finder's credibility determinations). This court reviews the district court's interpretation of the HRO statute de novo. Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.App. 2008).
7. Farr argues that he "was not given the opportunity to defend [his] side of the court case." Specifically, he claims that he "was not given a chance to speak" or "present his side of the facts." But the record indicates that Farr was represented by counsel at the hearing, that he testified, and that his attorney cross-examined Seehusen and presented a closing argument. Although Farr did not call any other witnesses or introduce any physical or documentary evidence, nothing in the record indicates that he attempted to do so. Moreover, Farr does not cite any binding authority in support of his argument or explain what facts he was denied the chance to present. See generally Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944) (stating that on appeal, "error is never presumed . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it"). The parties to an HRO hearing have "the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, to produce documents, and to have the case decided pursuant to the findings required by" the HRO statute. Anderson v. Lake, 536 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Minn.App. 1995). Based on this record, we conclude that Farr was not denied any of his rights during the HRO hearing.
Farr cites this court's nonprecedential opinion in Jackson v. Daniel, No. A20-1366, 2021 WL 4259151 (Minn.App. Sept. 20, 2021). This court's nonprecedential opinions, however, are not binding authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). And Jackson is inapposite. In that case, this court reversed the district court's issuance of an HRO because the district court denied appellant his right to testify, did not give appellant "a reasonable opportunity to offer into evidence the exhibits that he had submitted to the court," and made factual findings based on exhibits that were never entered into evidence and as such not part of the record. 2021 WL 4259151, at *3-4. Here, Farr was not denied his right to present evidence and the district court made findings based on witness testimony.
This court's holding in Anderson relied on this court's prior decision in El Nashaar v. El Nashaar, 529 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Minn.App. 1995), which addressed what constituted a "full hearing" in the context of an order for protection (OFP). See Anderson, 536 N.W.2d at 911. In Oberg v. Bradley, 868 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Minn.App. 2015), this court observed that the "full hearing" language discussed in Anderson and El Nashaar has been deleted from the OFP statute. We need not address what effect, if any, Oberg has on what constitutes a hearing in the HRO context because even if Farr was entitled to all the rights listed in Anderson, he was not denied any of those rights.
8. Farr next argues that the district court's factual findings were not supported by the evidence. He contends that the district court "made a mistake in believing . . . Seehusen" and that Seehusen "did not offer enough or any evidence to support" the issuance of a restraining order. We discern no clear error in the district court's factual findings. The district court's findings are supported by Seehusen's testimony; she testified that Farr called her thousands of times after she told him to stop doing so and that Farr sent private videos of her to her boyfriend. See generally Black's Law Dictionary 699 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "evidence" to include "testimony, documents, and tangible objects" that tend to prove or disprove an alleged fact (emphasis added)). Cf. State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (noting that in a criminal case, under the higher beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, "a conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness" (quotation omitted)). Farr testified that he did not make thousands of calls and that Seehusen never told him to stop calling her, but the district court's findings implicitly indicate that it found Seehusen credible and Farr not credible. See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn.App. 2009) (noting that "[t]he district court's findings implicitly indicate that the district court found [the witness's] testimony credible" and deferring to that credibility determination). And on appeal, this court does not reweigh the evidence or disturb the district court's credibility determinations. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-23.
9. Farr also argues that the district court misapplied section 609.748. But apart from this general assertion, Farr does not clarify exactly how the district court did so and does not cite any legal authority in support of his claim. "An assignment of error on mere assertion, unsupported by argument or authority, is forfeited and need not be considered unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection." Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn.App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017); see also State, Dep't of Lab. &Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to reach an issue not adequately briefed). As a pro se litigant, Farr may be "accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules," but "he is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom." Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987). Nothing in an inspection of the record indicates that the district court misapplied the law in its decision. We therefore decline to address Farr's argument further. To the extent that Farr's brief can be construed as arguing that his conduct-which Seehusen testified included thousands of unwanted and sometimes threatening phone calls and texts-did not constitute harassment, that argument also fails.
10. In sum, nothing in the record indicates that Farr was denied his right to present evidence, that the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, or that the district court committed any legal error.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.