Opinion
Case No. 3:19-cv-541-SMD
2020-12-01
SECURITY PEST CONTROL, INC., Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant.
Andrew Phillip Campbell, Erin Gail Godwin, Yawanna N. McDonald, Campbell Partners Law, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff. Victor Lee Hayslip, Benjamin Brock Coulter, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.
Andrew Phillip Campbell, Erin Gail Godwin, Yawanna N. McDonald, Campbell Partners Law, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.
Victor Lee Hayslip, Benjamin Brock Coulter, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.
ORDER
Stephen M. Doyle, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Security Pest Control, Inc. ("Security Pest Control"), brings this action against Defendant Wells Fargo Bank National Association ("Wells Fargo") for conversion of instrument, wrongful deprivation of property, payment on unauthorized signature, negligent hiring/supervision/training, concealment, and conspiracy. (Doc. 36, pp. 6–10, ¶¶ 19–44). Before the Court is Wells Fargo's motion for the Court to partially alter, amend or vacate the Court's November 2, 2020, Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. (Doc. 52). Security Pest Control largely opposes Defendant's Motion. (Doc. 57). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion (Doc. 52) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual allegations relevant to Plaintiff's Motion are summarized as follows. Security Pest Control is a pest control service company. (Doc. 36, p. 2, ¶ 3). Wells Fargo is a banking corporation with a branch in Alexander City, Alabama ("Alexander City Branch"). (Doc. 36, pp. 2–3, ¶¶ 4, 7). In 2016, one of Plaintiff's then-employees, Curtia Moon ("Moon"), began depositing checks, cash and money orders rightfully belonging to Plaintiff into her personal bank accounts. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10. Although the checks and money orders directed Defendant to deposit the items into Plaintiff's bank accounts, Wells Fargo nonetheless deposited the funds into Moon's accounts. (Doc. 36, p. 3, ¶ 9).
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 36). The Court emphasizes that it is merely summarizing Plaintiff's factual allegations to provide context for this Order. The Court is not making any findings of fact.
In 2019, Plaintiff contacted Defendant's Alexander City Branch and corporate offices to notify Defendant of the improperly deposited items. (Doc. 36, p. 5, ¶ 17). Defendant, however, continued to allow Moon to deposit and use the funds belonging to Plaintiff. Id. As a result, Plaintiff lost several hundred thousand dollars. (Doc. 36, p. 5, ¶ 18). Plaintiff demanded the return of the funds, but Defendant refused. (Doc. 36, p. 6, ¶ 23). Accordingly, Plaintiff initiated the instant action against Defendant. (Doc. 1).
In its Second Amendment Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant for conversion of instrument, wrongful deprivation of property, payment on unauthorized signature, negligent hiring/supervision/training, concealment, and conspiracy. (Doc. 36, pp. 6–10, ¶¶ 19–44). On September 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Defendant to provide various discovery responses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(3)(B). (Doc. 40). On November 2, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. (Doc. 50). On November 16, 2020, Defendant moved the Court to partially alter, amend or vacate the Court's November 2, 2020, Order. (Doc. 52). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 57) opposing Defendant's Motion, and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 58).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 defines the general scope of discovery. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(1). Under Rule 26(b)(1), the scope of discovery includes "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ...." Id. Rule 26(b)(1) also provides several factors for a court to consider when defining the general scope of discovery. Id. Those factors include "the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit." Id.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequences in determining the action." FED. R. EVID. 401. In the discovery context, relevance is "construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case." Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., v. Sanders , 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978). The question of whether discovery material is relevant is ultimately a fact-specific inquiry. Dees v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC , 524 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2007). A district court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of discovery materials. Id. The general rule is that a court should permit discovery even when the relevance of the requested material is in doubt. Coker v. Duke & Co., Inc. , 177 F.R.D. 682, 685 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that a district court has great discretion in defining the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) and ruling on a motion to compel under Rule 37(a)(3)(B). See, e.g., Harris v. Chapman , 97 F.3d 499, 506 (11th Cir. 1996) ("District judges are accorded wide discretion in ruling upon discovery motions, and appellate review is accordingly deferential."); Williams v. City of Dothan, Ala. , 745 F.2d 1406, 1415 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that "a district court has broad discretion in shaping the scope of discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P.26(b)").
In addition, "a court's reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary remedy and exercise of this power must, of necessity, be used sparingly." Duval v. L. Offs. of Andreu, Palma & Andreu, PL , 2010 WL 2293138, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2010). The purpose of reconsideration "is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Z.K. Marine Inc. v. M/V Archigetis , 808 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki , 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985) ). To that end, a federal district court will reconsider an order defining the scope of discovery only when: (1) there is an intervening change in controlling law, (2) new evidence is available, or (3) there is a need to correct clear error or manifest injustice. See, e.g., Duval , 2010 WL 2293138, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2010) ; Eisenberg v. Carnival Corp. , 2008 WL 2946029, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
Wells Fargo moves the Court to partially alter, amend or vacate its November 2, 2020, Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel various pieces of supplemental discovery material. (Doc. 52). Specifically, Defendant's Motion seeks relief from having to provide materials responsive to Plaintiff's: (1) Request for Production ("RFP") No. 4 as it relates to documents pertaining to in-person and lockbox deposits; (2) RFP Nos. 8 and 9; (3) RFP No. 48 to the extent it seeks protocols, procedures or guidelines for deposits not made through ATMs or Defendant's mobile deposit application; (4) RFP No. 49; and (5) RFP No. 52. (Doc. 52, p. 5, ¶ 7). The Court will analyze Defendant's Motion based on that organizational framework.
A. RFP No. 4
RFP No. 4 seeks documents containing the protocols and procedures for depositing checks into Wells Fargo accounts that were controlling on or after January 1, 2015. (Doc. 40-1, p. 5, ¶ 4). RFP No. 4 encompasses documents pertaining to "in person deposits, remote deposits, electronic deposits, lockbox deposits and/or mobile deposits." Id. Defendant argues that the Court should limit RFP No. 4 "to exclude documents related to in[-]person deposits and lockbox deposits." (Doc. 52, p. 5, ¶ 7). In support, Defendant provides the Affidavit of Carolyn G. Fuller, an employee of Defendant. (Doc. 52, p. 2, ¶ 3). Fuller's Affidavit reads in pertinent part:
Almost all of the deposits made by Moon were made through automated processes, through the ATM or using the mobile banking application.... The only exceptions to the deposits made using an automated process were one cash deposit and checks made payable to Moon. The only items deposited in a Wells Fargo Branch were are all checks made out to Curtia L. Moon by Security Pest Control, Inc.....
Id. (second alteration in original). Based on Fuller's Affidavit, Defendant reasons that "[a]ll of the items for which Plaintiff has a claim were deposited using automated means, through ATMs and [Defendant's] mobile application." (Doc. 52, p. 1, ¶ 1).
Plaintiff concedes that Defendant need not provide documents pertaining to lockbox deposits, but maintains that documents pertaining to in-person deposits are relevant to its claims. (Doc. 57, pp. 2–4, ¶¶ 2–6, pp. 3–4, ¶ 6 n.2). Because Plaintiff has no opposition, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration as it relates to producing documents pertaining to lockbox deposits in response to RFP No. 4. The Court's November 2, 2020, Order is amended insofar as Defendant is not required to produce documents pertaining to lockbox deposits in response to RFP No. 4.
As for production of documents related to in-person deposits, Defendant does not argue that a change of law or newly discovered evidence necessitates reconsideration of the Court's November 2, 2020, Order. Instead, Defendant appears to argue that the Court has misunderstood Fuller's Affidavit and that this misunderstanding caused the Court to commit clear error when it determined that documents related to in-person deposits are relevant to Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 52, p. 1, ¶ 1). Defendant insists that Fuller's Affidavit makes clear that "[n]o human being reviewed the checks and money orders at issue" in this case. (Doc. 52, p. 2, ¶ 3). Defendant therefore reasons that the Court should not require Defendant to produce the requested materials. (Doc. 52, p. 5, ¶ 7).
Defendant's argument is unpersuasive. Fuller's Affidavit makes clear that Moon made some in-person deposits at one of Defendant's bank branches. Because Moon made in-person deposits, it follows that she had in-person contact with Defendant's employees. Those employees, in turn, had an opportunity to review Moon's account. The Court cannot conclude that documents pertaining to in-person deposits are irrelevant to Plaintiff's claims. Moreover, Wells Fargo's unilateral characterization of the deposits at issue may be explored through the requested discovery. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to show that the Court committed clear error when it determined that documents pertaining to Defendant's protocols and procedures for in-person deposits are relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Thus, the Court denies Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration as it relates to producing documents pertaining to in-person deposits in response to RFP No. 4. Defendant shall produce the documents at issue in accordance with the Court's November 2, 2020, Order.
B. RFP Nos. 8 & 9
RFP Nos. 8 and 9 request certain Wells Fargo employment records. (Doc. 40–1, p. 6, ¶¶ 8–9). Defendant argues that, since the Court entered its November 2, 2020, Order, new evidence has emerged showing that the requested employment records are not relevant to Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 52, p. 6, ¶ 8). Accordingly, Defendant maintains that the Court should not require Defendant to produce materials responsive to RFP Nos. 8 and 9. (Doc. 52, p. 5, ¶ 7). Plaintiff agrees that Defendant need not produce the requested employment records. (Doc. 57, pp. 3–4, ¶ 6 n.2). Thus, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration as it relates to RFP Nos. 8 and 9. The Court's November 2, 2020, Order is amended insofar as Defendant is not required to produce materials responsive to RFP Nos. 8 and 9.
C. RFPs No. 48
RFP No. 48 requests information about Defendant's "guidelines for accepting checks and/or money orders for deposits which were effective between January 1, 2015 and August 1, 2019." (Doc. 40-4, p. 4, ¶ 48). Defendant argues that "[t]he Court should limit the required production under RFP No. 48 to exclude protocols, procedures, or guidelines for deposits not made through ATMs or [the] mobile deposit" application. (Doc. 52, p. 5, ¶ 7). Defendant reasons that no item at issue was deposited in-person. (Doc. 52, pp. 1–2, ¶¶ 1–3). For the reasons set forth above, see supra Section III.A, the Court finds Defendant's argument unpersuasive. The Court therefore denies Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration as it relates to RFP No. 48. Defendant shall produce the materials at issue in accordance with the Court's November 2, 2020, Order.
D. RFP No. 49
RFP No. 49 seeks "copies of documents containing protocols, procedures, and/or [Defendant's] guidelines related to the job duties and functions of the receiving teller which were effective between January 1, 2015 and August 1, 2019." (Doc. 40-4, p. 4, 49). Defendant asserts that "[t]he Court should not require a production in response to RFP No. 49 because it concerns documents related to a receiving teller's job duties and functions, which are irrelevant because the deposits were not made through the teller line. (Doc. 52, p. 5, ¶ 7). For the reasons set forth above, see supra Section III.A, the Court finds Defendant's argument unpersuasive. The Court therefore denies Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration as it relates to RFP No. 49. Defendant shall produce the materials at issue in accordance with the Court's November 2, 2020, Order.
E. RFP No. 52
RFP No. 52 requests "copies of documents containing employee protocols, procedures, and/or training guidelines for tellers related to accepting, cashing, and paying deposits which were effective between January 1, 2015 and August 1, 2019." (Doc. 40-4, p. 4, 52). Defendant contends that "[t]he Court should not require a production in response to RFP No. 52 because it concerns documents related to protocols, procedures, and guidelines for tellers, which are irrelevant because the deposits were not made through the teller line." (Doc. 52, p. 5, ¶ 7). For the reasons set forth above, see supra Section III.A, the Court finds Defendant's argument unpersuasive. The Court therefore denies Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration as it relates to RFP No. 52. Defendant shall produce the materials at issue in accordance with the Court's November 2, 2020, Order.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Partially Alter, Amend or Vacate the November 2, 2020, Order (Doc. 52) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Motion is GRANTED as it relates to producing documents pertaining to lockbox deposits in response to RFP No. 4. The Court's November 2, 2020, Order is amended insofar as Defendant is not required to produce documents pertaining to lockbox deposits in response to RFP No. 4.
The Motion is further GRANTED as it relates to RFP Nos. 8 and 9. The Court's November 2, 2020, Order is amended insofar as Defendant is not required to produce materials responsive to RFP Nos. 8 and 9.
The Motion is DENIED in all other respects.
DONE this 1st day of December, 2020.