Opinion
43563.
ARGUED APRIL 1, 1968.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 24, 1968.
Action for damages. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Harrison.
Richardson, Doremus Karsman, Stanley Karsman, for appellant.
Anestos, Smith Cook, Barnard M. Portman, for appellee.
It is proper to deny a motion for summary judgment where there are genuine issues of material fact for resolution by a jury.
ARGUED APRIL 1, 1968 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 24, 1968.
Ralph Galanti filed his complaint against Seaview Development Company, Inc., alleging that on July 21, 1966, he registered as a guest at defendant's motel; that the room to which plaintiff was assigned contained sliding glass doors as the only means of egress and ingress; that at approximately 5:30 p. m. the following day plaintiff, desiring to leave the room, placed his hand on the door-opening mechanism and attempted to open the door, whereupon the door shattered and he was injured by the falling glass; and that defendant was negligent in (1) not maintaining a safe means of ingress and egress from the room; (2) not complying with the Southern Building Code, as adopted by Chatham County, which prescribes safety measures required in installing glass in buildings; (3) allowing glass to be installed in doors which upon the slightest impact would become a dangerous instrumentality; (4) "failing to maintain and not warning the plaintiff of the difficulty and danger involved in operating the door-opening mechanism"; (5) failing reasonably to anticipate and provide facilities for the safe use of the room occupied by plaintiff for the purpose for which it was rented.
Defendant moved for summary judgment attaching the affidavits of W. E. Jerald, manager of the motel, and Thomas Durnce, a glass company employee, and the deposition of plaintiff. An invoice from a glass company, showing the type of glass used in replacement of the shattered glass, was introduced in evidence at the hearing.
In response plaintiff filed the deposition of Jerald, the affidavit of Jerome Portman, who arrived at the scene shortly after the incident, and the affidavit of Leon Meyer, and architect, with a copy of safety standards attached.
The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment and certified that the denial should be subject to review by direct appeal ( Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h)).
The motion for summary judgment was properly denied. While it is contended that plaintiff either slipped or fell into the glass door as he attempted to open it, and that this state of facts establishes that plaintiff's own negligence solely and proximately caused his own injuries, the evidence is uncertain and inconclusive as to whether the plaintiff simply stumbled into the glass, or whether his hand slipped from the handle because of a defect in the door, or whether the physical circumstances were such that the door could not be safely opened, or whether the glass shattered for some reason not attributable to plaintiff.
Plaintiff testified that shortly before the occurrence he tried to enter the room from the outside but was unable to get the door to slide, whereupon Mr. Jerald, the manager, was able to get the door open with the use of a screwdriver. The door was not opened again until plaintiff attempted to go out of the room. Mr. Jerald, however, stated in his affidavit that there had been no difficulty in operating the sliding glass door either before or after the incident. Jerome Portman stated in his affidavit that he went to the motel room after the occurrence to get plaintiff's personal effects, and that he observed the badly shattered door "and noticed how it was hard to get to the opening mechanism. I tried to slide the door and it moved only with some difficulty." The affidavit of the architect stated that a glass door of more than six square feet which was not equipped with a screen or push bar would not meet current safety standards. It appears that the door was more than twelve square feet, measuring 34" x 76", and that there was no screen or push bar but only a small handle which may have been difficult to reach because of the proximity of a sofa.
From the above there clearly remains a genuine issue of material fact ( Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c)) as to whose negligence, if any, proximately caused the injuries complained of, and the judgment must be.
Affirmed. Felton, C. J., and Whitman, J., concur.