Opinion
UWYCV156028225
04-07-2017
Elizabeth Searles v. Renee Longo et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SET ASIDE #138
Barbara Brazzel-Massaro, J.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff filed an action in negligence as a result of an automobile accident. The defendant, Renee Longo was the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident with Elizabeth Searles. Before the jury trial commenced, the defendant admitted liability but denied that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the accident with her. The jury trial commenced on October 26, 2016 and each party presented testimony and evidence.
On October 27, 2016, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict arguing that the verdict should be set aside because liability was admitted and there was uncontroverted evidence, including evidence of the defendant's expert testimony that plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the motor vehicle accident. The defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to set aside arguing that the credibility of the plaintiff was at issue and that the credibility was a factor in the jury decision. The parties argued the motion and objection on January 3, 2017.
DISCUSSION
On a motion to set aside the verdict, " [t]he evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and to sustaining the verdict . . . and indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of its correctness . . . [The court] must determine whether the jury reasonably could have concluded, on the basis of the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, that the verdict . . . was improper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McDermott v. Calvary Baptist Church, 68 Conn.App. 284, 293-94, 791 A.2d 602 (2002). A court is empowered to set aside a jury verdict when, in the court's opinion, the verdict is contrary to law or unsupported by the evidence. A verdict will be set aside and judgment directed only if this court can determine that the jury could not reasonably and legally have reached their conclusion. Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 610, 662 A.2d 753 (1995). " A jury verdict should not be disturbed unless it is against [the weight of the] evidence or its manifest injustice is so plain as to justify the belief that the jury or some of its members were influenced by ignorance, prejudice, corruption, or impartiality. [T]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable." (Citations omitted.) Kalleher v. Orr, 183 Conn. 125, 126-27, 438 A.2d 843, (1981). " A verdict should not be set aside, however, where it is apparent that there was some evidence on which the jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 294.
In Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 189, 745 A.2d 789 (2000), the court addressed the implications of the court stepping forward in the place of a juror when asked to rule upon a motion to set aside. The court recognized that " although the trial court has a broad legal discretion in this area, it is not without its limits. 'Because in setting aside a verdict the court has deprived a litigant in whose favor the verdict has been rendered of his constitutional right to have disputed issues of fact determined by a jury, Rickert v. Fraser, 152 Conn. 678, 681, 211 A.2d 702 (1965); the court's action cannot be reviewed in a vacuum." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " [I]n passing upon a motion to set aside a verdict, the trial judge must do just what every juror ought to do in arriving at a verdict. The juror must use all his experience, his knowledge of human nature, his knowledge of human events, past and present, his knowledge of the motives which influence and control human action, and test the evidence in the case according to such knowledge and render his verdict accordingly . . . The trial judge in considering the verdict must do the same . . . and if, in the exercise of all his knowledge from this source, he finds the verdict to be so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, then it is his duty to set aside that verdict and to grant a new trial . . . A mere doubt of the adequacy of the verdict is an insufficient basis for such action . . . A conclusion that the jury exercised merely poor judgment is likewise insufficient . . . The ultimate test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether the jury's award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury were influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption." (Citations omitted.) Birgel v. Heintz, 163 Conn. 23, 27-28, 301 A.2d 249 (1972).
The plaintiff requests that the court set aside the verdict in the instant matter because she contends that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and that the verdict was contrary to the law.
The parties agreed at the conclusion of the evidence in this case that the jury would be provided with two verdict forms, one for the plaintiff and one for the defendant. The parties also included interrogatories outlining the medical damages that the plaintiff alleged were proximately caused by the negligent actions of the plaintiff. Throughout the trial, the defendant denied that the injuries claimed by the plaintiff were proximately caused by the plaintiff's negligent acts. Therefore, the jury was entrusted with making a decision and rendering a verdict as to whether the defendant was legally responsible for the injuries and damages.
The plaintiff argues that there was testimony from the defendant's expert, which they interpret as supporting the plaintiff's position. The defendant argued in her memorandum in opposition to the motion to set aside that the testimony of the plaintiff was not credible and was the crux of the decision of the jury to find against her claims of injury. The plaintiff's testimony about her injuries was the linchpin to supporting the expert and to a finding in favor of the plaintiff. In doing so, the jury had the right to believe or disbelieve all, some or none of the testimony. The issue of credibility was tantamount to deciding the issue of damages. The testimony of Dr. Italia relied on the subjective complaints of the plaintiff and therefore, if the jury did not believe the plaintiff's testimony was credible, it would follow that the verdict would not be favorable. The plaintiff without addressing any of the defendant's arguments simply argues that because the defendant admitted liability there can be no finding for the defendant, that is, return a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff ignores completely the burden of proof as to the issue of causation and requests the court to take the place of the jury and support only her argument. The plaintiff has not provided any evidence that the jury returned the verdict for the defendant based upon prejudice, passion, mistake or corruption. Birgel v. Heintz, supra, 163 Conn. 27-28.
It is noted that other than the general statement by the plaintiff as to the basis to set aside, there was no memorandum with supporting law or testimony that more specifically addresses her motion.
If this argument has merit then why present the action at all to the jury. Just award the damages. Obviously this is not the proper procedure when the defendant denies it is responsible for the claimed damages.
Based upon the above, the motion to set aside is denied.