Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:18-2543-BHH-KFM
10-04-2018
Micahel L. Seabrooke, Plaintiff, v. Jennifer Hairsine, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights (doc.1 at 4). Pursuant to the provisions of Section 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d)(D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Pickens County Detention Center ("PCDC") in Pickens, South Carolina. He filed this civil rights action on September 13, 2018 against Jennifer Hairsine, the C.E.O. of Southern Health Partners ("the defendant") asserting claims for medical neglect and denial of medical treatment (doc. 1 at 2 and 4). He states that he is suing the defendant in her individual capacity (Id. at 2). The plaintiff asserts that he broke a tooth, that it became infected, and it later required surgery (Id. at 5-6). He alleges that the surgery was necessary because he was denied medical treatment by Southern Health Partners (Id. at 6). Notably, the plaintiff does not claim that the plaintiff denied him medical care. Instead, he alleges that Dr. Way and the Nursing Staff denied him "proper medical care" while working under the authority of the defendant (Id. at 4-5). As relief, he seeks monetary damages (Id. at 6).
The plaintiff has alleged a claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against Dr. Way in another lawsuit (C/A No. 6:18-1066-BHH) which is pending before the court.
On September 18, 2018, the undersigned issued an order advising the plaintiff that his complaint was subject to dismissal as it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (doc. 7). The plaintiff was given 14 days to correct the defects identified in the court's order by filing an amended complaint. The time provided in the court's order to file an amended complaint has passed, and the plaintiff failed to do so. As such for the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that the case be dismissed.
DISCUSSION
The complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se complaint and the plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the complaint, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory).
Failure to State a Claim
The standard for reviewing medical claims of pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially the same as that for a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment—deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992). The government is required to provide medical care for incarcerated individuals. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). However, not "every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the [Constitution]."Id at 105. However, to establish deliberate indifference, the treatment "must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990) (overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1970)).
In order to state a claim, "[a] plaintiff must satisfy two elements . . . : he must show a serious medical need and he must prove the defendant's purposeful indifference thereto." Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987). "[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." Farmer, 511 U.S. 835. See also Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that "the subjective component requires proof of more than mere negligence but less than malice"). The failure to treat all medical problems to a prisoner's satisfaction is insufficient to support a claim under § 1983. See Petersen v. Davis, 551 F.Supp. 137, 146 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1453 (4th Cir. 1984). Liberally construing the complaint, the plaintiff fails to state a claim for medical indifference against the defendant because the plaintiff fails to allege facts to show the defendant was purposefully indifferent to a serious medical need.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "[l]iability under § 1983 . . . requires personal involvement." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. A plaintiff must plead facts indicating that a defendant acted personally in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977); Faltas v. South Carolina, 2012 WL 988105 (D.S.C.), adopted by 2012 WL 988083 (D.S.C.), aff'd by 489 F. App'x. 720 (4th Cir. 2012). When a complaint contains no personal allegations against a defendant, that defendant is properly dismissed. See, e.g., Reaves v. Richardson, C.A. No. 4:09-820-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 2119318, *6 (D.S.C.) ("without such personal involvement, there can be no liability under section 1983"), adopted by 2011 WL 2112100 (D.S.C. May 27, 2011).
Here, the plaintiff has not alleged how the defendant personally participated in the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Instead the plaintiff merely states that other Southern Health Partner employees, who are not named as defendants in this action, worked under the authority of the defendant (doc. 1 at 4). As the plaintiff has failed to allege how the defendant personally violated his constitutional rights, there is nothing from which this Court can liberally construe any type of plausible cause of action arising from the complaint against this defendant.
To the extent the plaintiff is attempting to allege that the defendant is liable on a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of other Southern Health Partner employees, that doctrine is generally inapplicable to Section 1983 claims. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) ("Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability.") (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1977) (doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under § 1983). To hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an "affirmative causal link" between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir .1994). Here, the plaintiff fails to present any factual allegations to even suggest that the defendant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's dental problem. Thus, the defendant cannot be held liable under a supervisory liability theory under § 1983 for the plaintiff's alleged lack of medical care.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued September 18, 2018, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment. The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided. Accordingly, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, this action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (in a case where the district court had already afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, directing the district court on remand to "in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order") (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. October 4, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).