Opinion
Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1931
Hearing Granted by Supreme Court March 19, 1931.
Appeal from Superior Court, San Bernardino County; F.A. Leonard, Judge.
Action by the Seaboard Acceptance Company against W.A. Shay, as Sheriff, and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
COUNSEL
Nichols, Cooper & Hickson and A.L. Hickson, all of Pomona, for appellants.
Clement L. Shinn, of Los Angeles, and Leland S. Davidson, of Ontario, for respondent.
OPINION
BARNARD, P.J.
One King sold 45 dairy cows to one Beard under three conditional sales contracts, dated respectively November 4, 1926, February 5, 1927, and July 28, 1927. On the date each of these contracts was executed it was assigned by King to the plaintiff herein. On November 15, 1927, a new conditional sales contract was executed by King, as seller, and Beard, as buyer, for the purpose, among other things, of combining all three of these transactions into one contract. This new contract covered only 42 cows, including 5 which had not been covered in the original contracts. Immediately after its execution this contract was assigned to the plaintiff herein by King, but was not recorded until December 10, 1927. In the meantime, on November 19, 1927, in a suit brought by one Loubet against Beard, who had possession of the cows at all times after the original contracts were executed, the sheriff of San Bernardino county attached most of these cows and later sold them to satisfy a judgment in that action, although the plaintiff herein had filed a third party claim. Each of the contracts mentioned provided that title to the cattle should remain in the seller until the stipulated price was fully paid. This action was brought to recover the value of the cattle sold by the sheriff, and from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendants have appealed.
Appellants ask for a reversal of this judgment upon the ground that the last-mentioned conditional sales contract is void, as against this attaching creditor of Beard, under the terms of section 2980 of the Civil Code, which went into effect July 29, 1927 (St.1927, p. 1567). This section reads as follows:
"Conditional Sales of Livestock and Poultry. Any conditional sales contract creating or reserving any interest in or lien upon livestock or poultry not in the possession of the person having such interest or lien shall be void against all others than the parties to the agreement unless acknowledged and recorded in the same manner as mortgages on livestock are required to be acknowledged and recorded.
"Sections 2959 and 2965 of the Civil Code, and sections 408, 4130, 4140 and 4300c of the Political Code, are hereby made applicable to conditional sales contracts involving livestock and poultry in the same manner as to mortgages on livestock."
The manner in which mortgages on live stock are required to be acknowledged and recorded is set forth in section 2957 of the Civil Code.
Respondent seeks to sustain the judgment upon two grounds, with which we cannot agree, but a discussion of which is rendered unnecessary by our views upon a third point. This is, that section 2980 of the Civil Code is unconstitutional, being in violation of article 1, § 11, of the Constitution of California, in that it is not uniform in its operation, which point we think must be sustained.
In Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 266, 82 P. 956, 958, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 813, 113 Am.St.Rep. 236, 7 Ann.Cas. 475, the rule is thus stated: "A law which applies alike to all the subjects upon which it acts, or, in other words, a law which applies equally to all persons or things within a legitimate class to which, alone, it is addressed, does not violate the provision requiring laws of a general nature to have a uniform operation, and is neither local nor special." Citing cases.
In Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 44 P. 915, 918, 45 P. 1057, the court said: "It is only laws of a general nature which must have a uniform operation. And it has been uniformly held that a law is general which applies to all of a class, the classification being a proper one, and that the requirement of uniformity is satisfied if it applies to all of the class alike. In [People ex rel.] Smith v. Judge Twelfth District, 17 Cal. 547, it was said: ‘The word "uniform" in the constitution does not mean "universal." The section intends simply that the effect of general laws shall be the same to and upon all persons who stand in the same relation to the law; that is, all the facts of whose cases are substantially the same.’ "
In the case of In re Sumida, 177 Cal. 388, 170 P. 823, 824 the court said: "The sole question, therefore, is whether or not this ordinance is discriminatory, and class legislation within the principles of constitutional law applying to the subject. The rules upon the subject are well established by many decisions in this state. ‘From necessity it has been held that the Legislature may classify in order that it may adapt its legislation to the needs of the people. If this cannot be done, laws will not always bear equally upon the people. This classification, however, must be founded upon differences which are either defined by the Constitution or natural, and which will suggest a reason which might rationally be held to justify the diversity in the legislation. It must not be arbitrary, for the mere purpose of classification, that legislation really local or special may seem to be general, but for the purpose of meeting different conditions naturally requiring different legislation.’ Darcy v. City of San Jose, 104 Cal. 645, 38 P. 501. ‘A law is general and uniform in its operation when it applies equally to all persons embraced within the class to which it is addressed, provided such class is made upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction between the persons composing it and others not embraced in it. *** The difference on which the classification is based must be such as, in some reasonable degree, will account for or justify the peculiar legislation.’ Ex parte Miller, 162 Cal. 698, 124 P. 430. Other decisions supporting these propositions are cited in that case and need not be repeated here."
In Bruch v. Colombet, 104 Cal. 347, 38 P. 45, 47, the court said: "No absolute, inflexible rule has ever been formulated, and probably never will be, by which to determine what departure from uniformity is permissible and what will be fatal. The courts must determine each case as it arises, presuming in favor of the rightful exercise of the legislative power. Yet the inhibition should be enforced unless there is discoverable some reasonable ground for a distinction."
Applying these rules to the statute here in question, although this law applies equally to all persons embraced within the class to which it is addressed, that is to say, to all persons selling live stock or poultry upon conditional sales contracts, when the seller does not retain the possession thereof, on the other hand, we are unable to see that the particular classification is "founded upon some natural or intrinsic or constitutional distinction." We are unable to discover any reasonable ground for the distinction here drawn between live stock and other forms of personal property. It would appear to have been the intention of the Legislature, in adding this section to the Code, to apply to conditional sales contracts covering livestock or poultry, so far as their effect upon third persons is concerned, practically the same rules of law as apply to chattel mortgages upon such property. The section in question applies the recording provisions of section 2957 of the Civil Code to conditional sales contracts covering live stock or poultry, which leave the buyer in possession. But it will be noted that the last-named section applies not only to mortgages upon live stock, but to mortgages upon all kinds of personal property. And while section 2980 also makes applicable to conditional sales contracts covering live stock or poultry, the provisions of sections 2959 and 2965 of the Civil Code, these last-named sections are also very much broader in their scope than the section here in question. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the portions of these sections applying to removal of personal property to another county, or the recording provisions applicable thereto. We are here concerned only with the effect of this section where the property remains in the same county where it is originally sold under a conditional sales contract. It is at once apparent that section 2980, in regulating conditional sales contracts, draws a distinction that is not drawn in regulating chattel mortgages, and that, under its terms, in order to shut out attaching creditors of the party in possession, a conditional sales contract covering live stock or poultry must be recorded, while a similar contract, covering other kinds of personal property, need not be recorded.
While it may be conceded that a distinction may legitimately be drawn between such chattels as may properly be termed "migratory," and other forms of personal property which are not quite so moveable in nature, and while even greater reason might appear for making a separate classification of motor vehicles, in view of their nature and use under modern conditions, we are unable to see any such distinction between live stock or poultry, and for, instance, vehicles or farm implements. In modern business, radios, musical instruments, motor vehicles, furniture, and many other forms of personal property, are customarily sold upon conditional sales contracts. While such a law as we have here under consideration might, with propriety, be made to apply to all forms of personal property so sold, and even conceding that such a law might properly be applied to all such property which could properly be classed as migratory, we are unable to find a natural or intrinsic reason why such a provision should be made applicable to livestock and poultry alone, whether removed from the county or not, and why all other forms of personal property, whether removed from the county or not, and irrespective of whether it is equally susceptible of being removed or even more so, should be relieved from a similar obligation. This section not only gives an attaching creditor a right with reference to property the seller of which has not complied with the terms of the section, which he would not have in reference to other forms of personal property, similarly sold, but does this without regard to whether or not the creditor has relied upon or been misled by the debtor’s possession. It seems to us that in so far as this statute declares void, so far as third parties are concerned, this class of contracts, covering a special limited kind of personal property, which is in fact a part of a much larger class which should be treated alike, it is not uniform and general in its scope, and that it constitutes an unreasonable infringement upon the rights of a part of a general class. And, further, that in so far as it vests in third parties a right to interfere with the performance of contracts covering live stock or poultry, it vests in such third parties rights that are not enjoyed by others in exactly the same position with reference to similar contracts covering other forms of property which are and belong in the same class. As we view it, there is no reasonable ground for placing live stock or poultry in a class separate and distinct from all other forms of personal property, for the purpose of subjecting such property and its owners to requirements and limitations, in the sale thereof, from which all other forms of personal property, and the owners thereof, are excluded. The distinction made by this section appears to us to be arbitrary rather than natural, intrinsic, or constitutional.
Appellants cite a number of decisions from other states, where, it is claimed, statutes similar to the one under consideration were upheld. In each instance cited the statute involved covered personal property in general rather than a named exception from a general class.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MARKS, J.; WARMER, Justice pro tem.