Opinion
3:23-CV-02138
01-26-2024
SCRANTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, v. FREDERICK LITTLE, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUSAN E. SCHWAB, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
On December 26, 2023, Defendant Frederick Little removed to this court an eviction action against him filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County. We recommend that the court remand the case to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County because this court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction.
Little attached to his Notice of Removal an order from the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County dated December 15, 2023, which, among other things, consolidated two casesScranton Housing Authority v. Little, No. 2023-cv-1518 (Lackawanna Cnty.), and Little v. Scranton Housing Authority, No. 2023-cv-1522 (Lackawanna Cnty.). Doc. 1 at 4. The Order consolidated the cases under document number 2023-cv-1518, ordering that all future filings be filed under that docket number. Id. The Order also scheduled a civil bench trial for January 23, 2024. Id. Given this Order, we construe Little as removing 2023-cv-1518 to this court. And given that that action is captioned as Scranton Housing Authority v. Little, that is how we captioned this case.
This is not the first time that Little removed eviction proceedings filed against him by the Scranton Housing Authority. In March 2023, he removed such an action. See Scranton Housing Auth. v. Little, 3: 23-cv-00518 (M.D. Pa.). We recommended that such action be remanded to the Lackawanna County Magisterial District Court from where it came because this court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. See doc. 9 in 3:23-cv-00518. And by an order dated May 15, 2023, Judge Mariani, adopting that report and recommendation, remanded the case to the Lackawanna County Magisterial District Court. See doc.10 in 3:23-cv-00518.
“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (footnote omitted). Little asserts in his notice of removal that this court has federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. That provision provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.
Little also references several provisions regarding removal, including 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), which concerns removal based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. But Little does not assert that there is diversity of citizenship between the parties. Moreover, removal based on diversity is not proper where, as it appears is the case here, a defendant “is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Little also asserts that he wishes to file a complaint under federal law, and he cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. See doc. 1 at 1, 3, 4. But filing a complaint in federal court is different from removing a state court action to federal court, which is what Little has done in this case.
“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule[.]'” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. “Under the well-pleaded-complaint rule, ‘federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.'” Maglioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393, 406 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392). Here, there is no federal question presented on the face of the state court complaint.
Although Little attached to his Notice of Removal the December 15, 2023 Order from the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, see supra. note 1, he has not attached the complaint in that action. Nevertheless, the court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are “generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction” or because they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2). The docket and documents in the Court of Common Pleas are public records of which we can take judicial notice. See Wilson v. McVey, 579 F.Supp.2d 685, 688 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (taking judicial notice of court docket); S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that court “may take judicial notice of another court's opinion-not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity”). The complaint in Scranton Housing Authority v. Little, No. 2023-cv-1518 (Lackawanna Cnty.), is available through Lackawanna County's website. See https://www.lpa-homes.org/LPAPublicInquiries/Views/CAXPYViews/ PYS510D.aspx (last visited Dec. 29, 2023). The complaint presents a state-law claim for eviction and possession. No federal claims are raised on the face of that complaint. Further, Little v. Scranton Housing Authority, No. 2023-cv-1522 (Lackawanna Cnty.), which was consolidated into Scranton Housing Authority v. Little, No. 2023-cv-1518 (Lackawanna Cnty.), appears to be the mechanism for Little's counterclaims to the eviction action. As explained above, such counterclaims do not provide a basis for this court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction.
Little asserts that he was denied due process in the state proceedings. See doc. 1 at 1. He also asserts that he wishes to raise other federal claims. Id. at 3, 4. But “[a] federal defense ‘ordinarily does not appear on the face of the well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, usually is insufficient to warrant removal to federal court.'” Maglioli, 16 F.4th at 406 (quoting Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 1995)). Thus, “[f]ederal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on an actual or anticipated defense[.]” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009). “Nor can federal jurisdiction rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim.” Id. Thus, “counterclaims, even if they rely exclusively on federal substantive law, do not qualify a case for federal-court cognizance.” Id. at 62.
In a case removed to federal court, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Because this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, we recommend that the court remand this case to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.