Opinion
No. 13-05-329-CV
Opinion delivered and filed February 28, 2008.
On appeal from the 343rd District Court of Bee County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices YAÑEZ and BENAVIDES.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from the dismissal of appellant's pro se in forma pauperis action. Appellant, Michael Scott, is an inmate in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ). He sued TDCJ for personal injuries alleging that prison guards injured him by their negligent use of handcuffs. The trial court found that the suit was frivolous and dismissed the claim with prejudice. We affirm.
In his third amended petition, appellant claimed that he sustained injury when prison guards placed handcuffs on him too tightly. The handcuffs were placed on appellant because he was being transported to a different holding facility. Appellant claims he was tightly restrained for three and a half hours, and as a result, he "experienced physical pain, suffered from cuts and bruises on his wrist, numbness of one of the hands, and permanent bruises or discoloration on his wrist." In his petition, appellant raised a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act and a claim for civil assault and battery under the Texas Constitution. Following a January 11, 2005 telephone hearing, the trial court dismissed the suit in its entirety with prejudice upon finding it "frivolous pursuant to Chapter Fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code."
Trial courts have broad discretion to determine whether a case should be dismissed under Chapter 14. We will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent proof the trial court abused its discretion, acting arbitrarily or unreasonably in light of all the circumstances in the case, without reference to any guiding rules and principles. A trial court may dismiss an inmate's claim, either before or after service of process, if the court finds that the claim is frivolous. In determining whether a claim is frivolous, the court may consider whether (1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts.
Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Montana v. Patterson, 894 S.W.2d 812, 814-15 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1994, no writ).
Lewis v. Johnson, 97 S.W.3d 885, 886-87 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a) (Vernon 2002).
Id. § 14.003(b).
Appellant alleged that prison guards' negligent use of handcuffs caused his injuries. By asserting that he was injured by the guards' use of personal property, appellant pleaded a viable cause of action under the Texas Tort Claims Act. We therefore consider whether his cause of action has any arguable basis in fact. We find that it does not. "The acts complained of are common and necessary incidents of the prison environment. To the extent the guards' actions in this case caused injuries exceeding the usual level of discomfort experienced by inmates, the injuries suffered by the appellant were de minimis."
Id. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 2005).
Thomas v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 848 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (making this statement in response to inmate's claim that guards' negligent use of leg irons and a lock bar caused him injury); see Birdo v. Ament, 814 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex.App.-Waco 1991, writ denied) (stating that the trial court could have concluded that inmate's physical and mental injuries — incurred as a result of being burned by hot coffee that was served to him — were de minimis). The phrase "doctrine of de minimis non curiat lex" can be construed as meaning that the law cares not for small things. See Smith v. Stevens, 822 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of appellant's lawsuit.