Opinion
No. 14-05-00409-CV
Memorandum Opinion Filed March 29, 2007.
On Appeal from the 240th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 02-CV-126907.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices FOWLER and EDELMAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from an order dismissing the case for want of prosecution. In a single issue, appellant asserts that the trial court's notice of its intention to dismiss the case was inadequate. We reverse and remand.
On November 1, 2002, appellant, an inmate incarcerated in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, filed suit against appellees for assault and battery. On January 18, 2005, the trial court dismissed the suit for want of prosecution. Appellant did not file a motion to reinstate the case. He filed a timely motion for new trial, however, which was overruled by operation of law. Appellant then filed a pro se notice of appeal and an affidavit of inability to pay costs on appeal.
Appellant filed a pro se brief in which he raises a single issue asserting that the trial court failed to give him adequate notice that his case was subject to dismissal. The record contains the trial court's notice to appellant that his case was set on the civil dismissal docket for Thursday, December 16, 2004. The notice advised appellant that if he wished to retain the case on the court's docket, he was required to file a motion to retain the case by 4:00 p.m. on the Tuesday immediately preceding the date the case was set on the dismissal docket The notice advised appellant that failure to file a response would result in dismissal for want of prosecution. Appellant acknowledged in his brief that he received the court's notice.
Specifically, the court's notice stated the following:
Court records of the 240th Judicial District Court in Richmond, Fort Bend County, Texas, indicate that you are an attorney of record or a party pro se in the civil case listed above. Judge Tomas R. Culver, III, has set the case on the CIVIL DISMISSAL DOCKET for December 16, 2004, at 9:00 a.m. in the 240th District Courtroom. If you wish to retain said case on the Court's docket, ACTION on your part is required as follows:
1. CASE CURRENTLY SET FOR HEARING: File a sworn Motion to Retain stating the date of the current setting for the case; or
2. DISCOVERY COMPLETED, CASE NOT YET SET FOR HEARING/TRIAL: File a sworn Motion to Retain certifying that:
a. Discovery is completed,
b. Settlement attempts were unsuccessful,
c. The case is ready for trial, and
d. Your estimate as to the length of time for trial of the case in chief; or
3. DISCOVERY NOT COMPLETED: File a sworn Motion to Retain AND a proposed Comprehensive Discovery Plan, which Plan must specifically calendar any remaining discovery. You are required to contact opposing counsel, if any, prior to filing such Plan. The Court will approve such Plan on submission on the date set out above, subject to any necessary modifications, which will be heard at a later date.
Any document required to be filed by you must be filed with the Fort Bend County District Clerk by 4:00 p.m. on the Tuesday immediately preceding the date set out above for the Dismissal Docket. The Court will consider all such documents timely filed and in compliance with these required actions on a submission basis without your appearance being necessary at the call of the Dismissal Docket. Late-filed documents will be considered at the time and date set for the Dismissal Docket. Failure to file any document required herein will result in said case being DISMISSED FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION.
(emphasis in original).
Appellant filed a timely motion to retain on December 13, 2004, the Monday before the dismissal docket. In addition, he asserted that discovery had not been completed and he filed a comprehensive discovery plan, setting a June 16, 2005, deadline for completion of discovery. He certified that he forwarded a copy of the comprehensive discovery plan to opposing counsel on November 22, 2004. Appellant complains the court's notice was defective because it failed to warn him that his case could be dismissed despite his taking the steps outlined in the notice. He cites Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck Equipment, where the Texas Supreme Court held that a dismissal notice was inadequate because it misled appellant to believe that if he complied with the required action set out in the notice, his case would be retained on the docket. 994 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999).
The motion to retain is unsworn, but it is signed under "penalty of perjury." Inmates are permitted to satisfy verification and affidavit requirements by substantially complying with the requirements for an unsworn declaration. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. `132.001 (Vernon 2005) (permitting inmates to substitute unsworn declarations subscribed under penalty of perjury in place of affidavits); Smith v. McCorkle, 895 S.W.2d 692, 692 (Tex. 1995).
We review a trial court's order of dismissal for want of prosecution under an abuse of discretion standard. MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, or when it acts without reference to any guiding principles. Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). A clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion. Id.
A trial court's authority to dismiss for want of prosecution stems from the express authority of rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as well as from the court's inherent power to manage its own docket. Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at 630; 3V, Inc. v. JTS Enterprises, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 533, 541 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). A trial court may dismiss under Rule 165a on the "failure of any party seeking affirmative relief to appear for any hearing or trial of which the party had notice," Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(1), or when a case is "not disposed of within the time standards promulgated by the Supreme Court. . . ." Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(2). In addition, under the common law, the trial court has the inherent power to dismiss independently of the rules of procedure when a plaintiff fails to prosecute his or her case with due diligence. Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at 630.
A party must be provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court may dismiss a case for want of prosecution under either Rule 165a or its inherent authority. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(1) ("Notice of the court's intention to dismiss and the date and place of the dismissal hearing shall be sent by the clerk to each attorney of record, and to each party not represented by an attorney. . . ."); General Elec. Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, Joint Venture, 811 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tex. 1991). The failure to provide adequate notice of the trial court's intent to dismiss for want of prosecution requires reversal. Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at 630.
Appellees respond to appellant's assertion that the notice was inadequate by arguing that the trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing the case because appellant had not complied with the time guidelines set forth in the Texas Rules of Judicial Administration, which require district and statutory county judges to ensure that civil cases are tried or disposed within 18 months of the appearance date. See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6(b), reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit.2, subtit. F app. (Vernon 2005). Appellant filed his petition in November 2002, appellees answered in April 2003, and the case was dismissed in January 2005 for want of prosecution. Appellees argue that Villarreal does not control because in contrast to this case, there was no assertion in Villarreal that the case should be dismissed for violation of the Texas Supreme Court time standards. See Villarreal, 994 S.W.2d at 935, n. 4. We reject appellees' contention. Although violation of time standards was not urged in Villarreal, the Supreme Court noted that "adequate notice of the court's intent to dismiss on this ground is also required." Id. No such notice was provided in this case.
Following Villarreal, this court held in 3V, Inc. that a notice of dismissal must specify the basis for the dismissal and inform a plaintiff if the court is considering dismissal under the court's inherent power for failure to prosecute. 40 S.W.3d at 543 (citing Villareal, 994 S.W.2d at 632) (holding trial court abused its discretion by invoking its inherent authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute diligently after appellant complied with the requirements of the dismissal notice). We found that the dismissal notice in 3V, Inc. was indistinguishable from the notice in Villarreal." Like the Villarreal order, it notifies the plaintiff that only one act can remove the case from the dismissal docket. In Villarreal, that one act was announcement of ready for trial; here, that one act was the filing of a final order." 3V, Inc., 40 S.W.3d at 543. Similarly, the notice in this case advised appellant that to retain his case on the docket, he was required to file a motion to retain and a discovery plan, if discovery had not been completed in his case. Appellant complied with the notice. Therefore, we hold the trial court's notice was inadequate to advise appellant that the case could be dismissed despite his compliance with the requirements of the dismissal notice.
Courts of appeal, including this court, have held that if a trial court conducts a hearing on a motion to reinstate, an appellant's due process rights are satisfied, curing an insufficient notice of intent to dismiss. See, e.g., Polk v. Southwest Crossing Homeowners Ass'n, 165 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding that any notice error was cured because appellant ultimately received notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection with her motion to reinstate); Texas Sting, Ltd. v. R.B. Foods, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding that plaintiff was afforded his due process rights because he received actual notice of the dismissal order in time to file a motion to reinstate and a hearing was held on the motion); Franklin v. Sherman I.S.D., 53 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (holding that no harmful error is shown when a hearing on a motion to reinstate is held, providing appellant an opportunity to satisfy the same burden of proof he would have had before the order of dismissal was signed).
In this case, appellant filed only a motion for new trial instead of a motion to reinstate. No hearing was held on the motion, and it was overruled by operation of law. Appellant was not afforded an opportunity to be heard. Thus, the trial court's defective notice was not cured.
Unlike a motion to reinstate, a trial court is not required to conduct a hearing on a motion for new trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(3) ("The clerk shall deliver a copy of the motion [to reinstate] to the judge, who shall set a hearing on the motion as soon as practicable."); TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c) (permiting motions for new trial to be "determined" by written order or overruled by operation of law).
Accordingly, we sustain appellant's sole issue. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.