Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-160 (GK).
December 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs, Joseph Scorah, a seventeen-year-old student with emotional disturbances and learning disabilities, and his parents, John and Cecilia Scorah, have filed a Request for Attorney's Fees, seeking to collect attorney's fees and other costs incurred in bringing a successful administrative action under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq.. The total amount requested is $77,114.88. This matter is now before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' Request. See Scorah, et al. v. Dist. of Columbia, et al., No. 03cv160 (GK), Nov. 5, 2004, Mem. Op. and Order. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, Reply, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 11, 2004, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, and directed them to submit a detailed request for all attorney's fees and costs incurred in bringing suit. See Scorah, et al. v. Dist. of Columbia, et al., No. 03cv160 (GK), June 11, 2004, Mem. Op. and Order.
The IDEA gives courts the authority to "award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party" in any action brought under the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Prevailing parents may also recover fees incurred during administrative proceedings. See Calloway v. Dist. of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
On November 5, 2004, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' Request. Specifically, it concluded that Plaintiffs' claim of 129 hours, or more than 3 weeks, to draft a 42 page motion for summary judgment and a 6 page opposition was "a bit high," and reduced these particular line items by 5 percent. Scorah, et al. v. Dist. of Columbia, et al., No. 03cv160 (GK), Nov. 5, 2004, Mem. Op. at 4. The Court thus awarded Plaintiffs $75,739.28 in attorney's fees and costs. See id.
In their instant Motion for Reconsideration, Defendants "seek no change in the substantive determinations made in the Court's November 5 Memorandum Opinion." Def.s' Reply at 4. Instead, they point out that, while the Court's November 5th Memorandum Opinion "awarded" Plaintiffs $75,739.28 in attorney's fees and costs,id., the Order accompanying that Opinion directed them to "pay" Plaintiffs the full amount of such award. Scorah, et al. v. Dist. of Columbia, et al., No. 03cv160 (GK), Nov. 5, 2004, Order at 1. Defendants argue that, because Section 327(1) of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub.L. 108-335, 118 Stat. 1322 (2005), bars the District Government from paying more than $4,000 of the fees awarded, the Court should revise its November 5th Order so as to "remove the inconsistency of its wording with the legislative restriction." Def.s' Reply at 1. Specifically, Defendants request that the Court amend the second ordering paragraph of the November 5, 2004 Order to read: "Ordered that the Defendants shall, within 30 days of this Order, pay Plaintiffs' counsel that much of the $75,739.28 in attorney's fees and costs awarded as is permitted by Section 327 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub.L. No. 108-335, 118 Stat. 1322 (2005)." Def.s' Proposed Order at 2.
Section 327 states, in relevant part,
None of the funds contained in this Act may be made available to pay — (1) the fees of an attorney who represents a party in an action or an attorney who defends an action, including an administrative proceeding, brought against the District of Columbia Public Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ( 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq.) in excess of $4,000 for that action[.]
Section 327(1) of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub.L. 108-335, 118 Stat. 1322 (2005).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for reconsideration should be granted only if the court "finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, the moving party must show "new facts or clear errors of law which compel the court to change its prior position." Nat'l Ctr. for Mfg. Sciences v. Dep't of Def., 199 F.3d 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted).
A motion for reconsideration will not be granted if a party is simply attempting to renew factual or legal arguments that it asserted in its original briefs and that have already been rejected by the court. See State of N.Y. v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995); Assassination Archives and Research Ctr. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 828 F. Supp. 100, 101-102 (D.D.C. 1993); Indep. Petroleum Assoc. of Am. v. Babbit, 178 F.R.D. 323, 324 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Rule 59(e) motions are not to be used to relitigate matters already argued and disposed of; they are intended to permit the court to correct errors of fact appearing on the face of the record, or errors of law.").
III. ANALYSIS
"Though courts have the authority to award attorneys' fees in excess of the statutory caps, Calloway, 216 F.3d at 12, they cannot order the Defendants to violate an act of Congress to pay the total award." Pullins-Graham v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 98cv3065 (CKK), Sept. 16, 2004, Mem. Op. at 7 (citing Armstrong v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 50, 60 (D.D.C. 2004)). Accordingly, the Court's November 5, 2004 Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' Request was based on an error of law. Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration must, therefore, be granted.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' Motion should be denied for two reasons. First, they claim that "[n]o fee cap was in effect for fiscal year 2002, the year in which the due process hearing was held, the Hearing Officer's Determination was issued, and the instant suit was filed." Pl.s' Opp'n at 4. This argument is unconvincing because, as Defendants correctly point out, "[w]hen the services were performed does not govern the applicability of the fee cap. The source of the funds to be used to pay the award is the determinant. In this case, the FY2005 Congressionallyappropriated funds would be used to pay the Court's award, and the expenditure of those funds is specifically restricted by Congress with respect to IDEA attorneys' fee payments." Def.s' Reply at 2.
Plaintiffs in effect concede that the Court's award will be paid for from Congressionally-appropriated FY2005 funds and that those funds are subject to a $4,000 cap on payment of IDEA-related attorneys' fees.
Second, Plaintiffs maintain that "portions of the fees sought were awarded by the Court in August 2003 and cannot now be disputed." Pl.s' Opp'n at 4. Plaintiffs refer the Court to its August 29, 2003 Order, see Scorah, et al. v. Dist. of Columbia, et al., No. 03cv160 (GK), August 29, 2003, Order, which they characterize as having "granted Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs for [the] drafting of the Motion to Compel." Id. at 4-5. Plaintiffs argue that "Defendants never challenged this ruling and have not raised any proper basis to challenge the award at this late date, almost a year and a half later." Id. at 5. This argument is unpersuasive. In its August 29, 2003 Order, the Court simply "awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for this Opposition, which shall be considered at the close of this case."Scorah, et al. v. Dist. of Columbia, et al., No. 03cv160 (GK), August 29, 2003, Order at 2. Thus, as Defendants correctly point out, "the Order awarded nothing to which the Defendants could object at that time, and it directed no payment. No detail supporting any specific amount of fees or expenses had been submitted by the Plaintiffs, the Defendants had nothing to review or challenge, and the Court specified no amount, leaving that determination (and all others, including the matter of fee caps) until the time of the Order that is the subject of the Defendants' current motion." Def.s' Reply at 3.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration is granted.
An Order will issue with this Memorandum Opinion.