Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-644-M.
March 9, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Background
Plaintiff Stanley Schwartz ("Schwartz") is a former Administrative Law Judge of the United States Department of Labor's Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission ("Commission"). In a prior action, Schwartz sued the Commission, the United States Department of Labor and the United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), claiming he suffered severe emotional distress during his employment as an Administrative Law Judge. Schwartz alleged he was subjected to a "pattern of outrageous conduct" by his supervisors, in which his case assignments were inappropriately manipulated, he was investigated by his supervisors without cause, he was subjected to undue criticism, and his requests for reimbursement of his travel and relocation expenses were handled improperly.
By Order dated August 7, 2002, the Court dismissed Schwartz's claims. The Court found that a substantial question existed as to whether Schwartz's injuries were covered by the Federal Employees Compensation Act ("FECA"). Ordinarily, FECA is the exclusive remedy for a federal employee injured in the performance of his official duties. See White v. United States, 143 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1998). When FECA applies, the statute expressly precludes claims against the government under the FTCA or any other cause of action. See 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (2004). The Court, expressing uncertainty as to whether FECA applied to emotional distress claims, found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Schwartz's FTCA claims until the Secretary of Labor determined whether FECA coverage existed. The FTCA claims were dismissed without prejudice, so that Schwartz could reassert them if his injuries were deemed to be outside the scope of FECA.
On March 31, 2003, the Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ("OWCP") issued a decision denying Schwartz's FECA claims. The decision held that Schwartz's injuries arose from "non-compensable factors of employment". Schwartz asserts that the OWCP's initial decision was sufficient to authorize him to reassert his FTCA claims in this Court. However, before he filed suit, the OWCP vacated its decision on its own motion. According to the OWCP, the initial decision was issued prematurely, since Schwartz's employing agency had not been given a proper opportunity to respond to his emotional distress claims. On May 15, 2003, the OWCP issued a revised decision, finding that Schwartz's allegations were not "supported by specific, substantive or probative evidence." Schwartz requested reconsideration of the revised decision. After reconsidering its decision, the OWCP again revised its decision on February 9, 2004. The third decision plainly stated that Schwartz's claims were being denied on their merits, and thereby implied that the claims were within the scope of FECA. The OWCP advised Schwartz that he had the right to appeal the decision to the Employees' Compensation Appeals Board within 90 days, and that the appeals period could be extended to one year upon a showing of good cause.
Schwartz filed the instant action on March 26, 2004, reasserting his claims under the FTCA. Schwartz also added a due process claim, alleging that the OWCP's revision of its initial decision was caused by improper contact between the Department of Labor's Solicitor's Office and the OWCP. He alleges that the Department of Labor intentionally interfered with the FECA claims process in order to preclude him from asserting his FTCA claims in federal court. By Order dated August 30, 2004, the Court dismissed Schwartz's FTCA claims with prejudice. The Court found that the OWCP's February, 2004 decision deprived the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Commission and the United States of America from this action. However, the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with respect to Schwartz's due process claim against the Department of Labor. Before the Court are Defendant's second Motion to Dismiss, which the Court construes as a Motion for Summary Judgment on the due process claim, and Schwartz's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
Analysis
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). The burden is on the moving party to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Latimer v. Smithkline French Labs., 919 F.2d 301, 302 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, without making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). However, bare allegations in the briefs and pleadings of the nonmoving party are insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Alizadeh v. Safety Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1986).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who must produce evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-22 (1986). If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, and on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is mandatory. Id. at 322-24.
The Court must make two independent determinations when evaluating a plaintiff's claim that he was deprived of a property interest without due process of law. It must determine whether the property interest at issue is constitutionally protected, and whether the deprivation of that interest occurred in compliance with the constitutional requirements for due process. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982). For purposes of the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court will assume that the OWCP's third decision, denying Schwartz's FECA claim on its merits, deprived Schwartz of a constitutionally protected property interest. See Stuto v. Fleishman, 164 F.3d 820 (2nd Cir. 1999) (recognizing property interest in FECA benefits). The Court will also assume, without deciding, that the third decision was promulgated as a direct result of improper influence asserted by the Department of Labor's Solicitor's Office over the OWCP. The question before the Court is whether the Department of Labor's alleged interference with Schwartz's FECA claim contravened the due process requirements imposed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Court concludes that it did not. The Supreme Court has held that when a plaintiff alleges he was intentionally deprived of his property by a government actor, the deprivation "does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The Supreme Court reasoned that a post-deprivation remedy is constitutionally sufficient in such cases, because the government cannot be expected to predict when one of its officers will engage in random and unauthorized conduct. See id. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant notes that FECA provides Schwartz a right to appeal the OWCP's decision to the Employees' Compensation Appeals Board ("ECAB"). Defendant argues that the ECAB appeals process is a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the OWCP's improper denial of a FECA claim, and therefore, Schwartz's due process claim is precluded as a matter of law. The great weight of authority to have addressed the issue supports Defendant's argument. See Raditch v. United States, 929 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1991) (OWCP's improper deprivation of the plaintiff's disability benefits did not violate due process because FECA provided the plaintiff with a meaningful post-deprivation remedy); Stuto, 164 F.3d at 825 (same); Lepre v. Dep't of Labor, 275 F.3d 59, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (FECA's reconsideration and appeal provisions are "sufficient avenues of redress and rectification to meet the requirements of due process").
Although Plaintiff's claims against Defendant arise under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the same principles guide the interpretation of both constitutional provisions. See Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642, 665 (5th Cir. 2001).
Schwartz, in his Response, argues that Defendant has misstated the standard by which he must prove his due process claim. He argues that trial courts must conduct subjective inquiries into the particularities of every due process claim, balancing the governmental and private interests at stake in order to determine whether the deprivation at issue in each case rises to the level of a constitutional violation. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (2004). Schwartz's argument is without merit. While Schwartz accurately cites the Court's starting-point for a typical due process analysis, the Supreme Court has substantially narrowed the Court's inquiry in cases such as this. The Supreme Court has plainly and unmistakably held that "an intentional deprivation of property does not give rise to a violation of the Due Process Clause if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy," and the Court is not at liberty to disregard this precedent. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 n. 14. Therefore, Schwartz cannot prevail on his due process claim without asserting that FECA's post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Schwartz has not done so. In light of his failure to assert or produce any evidence in support of this essential element of his case, and in light of the decisions of every other court to have addressed the issue, the Court holds that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the adequacy of FECA's post-deprivation remedy, and Defendant has met its burden of proving that FECA's appellate provisions preclude Schwartz's due process claim.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED.