Summary
granting of summary judgment based on contractual indemnification clause upheld as defendant owner had no control and did not supervise the work site
Summary of this case from Fiske v. Church of St. Mary of the AngelsOpinion
February 2, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Monroe County, Willis, J.
Present — Callahan, J.P., Denman, Green, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs and plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment granted and defendants' cross motion granted. Memorandum: Plaintiff Francis Schwalm was injured when he fell from an elevated worksite while building forms and erecting tubular metal framework. Plaintiffs established that there were no railings or other safety devices in place to prevent a worker from falling off the planking on which he was working. Thus, plaintiffs were entitled to partial summary judgment on liability under section 240 (1) of the Labor Law (see, Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 N.Y.2d 513, 524; Heath v Soloff Constr., 107 A.D.2d 507).
Supreme Court also erred in denying the cross motion for summary judgment by the City of Rochester (City) against the County of Monroe (County) and the Rochester Pure Waters District (District) for contractual indemnification. A 1971 lease agreement provides for such indemnification. The City's liability to plaintiffs in the primary action is based solely on its status as owner of the property, and the City had no control or supervision of the worksite (see, Kosiorek v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 145 A.D.2d 935, 936; Conway v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 141 A.D.2d 957, 959-960).
Plaintiff was working as an employee of John P. Bell Sons, Inc. (Bell) at the time of the accident. Since Bell is ultimately and vicariously responsible for plaintiff's injuries, it was error for the court to deny the cross motions of the County and the District for common-law indemnification (see, McDermott v City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211). The cross motions were not premature since it is permissible for a party to obtain a conditional judgment of indemnification without awaiting actual payment (see, Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v Austin Powder Co., 68 N.Y.2d 465, 470, n 2; McCabe v Queensboro Farm Prods., 22 N.Y.2d 204, 208).