Opinion
No. 2230 C.D. 2011
08-08-2012
Schuylkill Valley Sewer Authority v. Lee S. Yom and Michele M. Yom, Appellants
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
Appellants, Lee S. Yom and Michele M. Yom, proceeding pro se, appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County (trial court) denying Appellants' motion to set aside sheriff's sale for gross inadequacy of the sale price. We affirm.
Appellants owned an apartment building located at 12-18 Wiggan Street in the Borough of New Philadelphia, Schuylkill County. On April 18, 2007, the Schuylkill Valley Sewer Authority (the Authority) commenced a civil action against Appellants, alleging that they failed to file a written sewer connection application. The Authority sought an order directing them to file a written application or, in the alternative, permitting the Authority to make the connection solely at their costs, and ordering them to pay sewer charges unpaid through February 2007, totaling $11,619.10. In March 2008, the Authority filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on April 18, 2008, and awarded the Authority $11,943.40 for the unpaid sewer charges. Appellants did not appeal the trial court's order.
The Authority filed a praecipe for entry of judgment in May 2008 and a praecipe for writ of execution in January 2009. Appellants then filed a pro se "petition to strike and/or open judgment and counterclaim" on March 5, 2009, alleging that they filed the petition timely and had a meritorious defense to the judgment. The Authority filed an answer to the petition and preliminary objections to the counterclaim. On April 8, 2009, the trial court denied the petition and dismissed the counterclaim. Appellants appealed the trial court's order to the Commonwealth Court.
At a subsequent sheriff's sale held on April 24, 2009, the Authority, as the sole bidder, purchased Appellants' property for $893.06, the amount of its costs. On April 30, 2009, Appellants filed a motion to set aside the sheriff's sale, contending that the fair market value of the property was more than $75,000, and that the sale price was grossly inadequate. The trial court denied the motion and Appellants appealed. This Court sua sponte consolidated Appellants' appeals from the denial of the petition to strike and/or open a judgment and counterclaim and from the denial of the motion to set aside the sheriff's sale.
This Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition to strike and/or open a judgment and dismissal of Appellants' counterclaim. See Schuylkill Valley Sewer Auth. v. Yom (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 776 and 1131 C.D. 2009, filed Dec. 18, 2009). The Court then vacated the order denying the motion to set aside the sheriff's sale and remanded for further proceedings on the issue of whether the sheriff's sale should be set aside due to the gross inadequacy of the sale price. The Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion without affording Appellants an opportunity to present evidence to establish the gross inadequacy of the sale price. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellants' petition for allowance of appeal from the Court's order.
On remand, the trial court issued a rule to show cause upon the Authority to show why Appellants are not entitled to have the sheriff's sale set aside due to gross inadequacy of the sale price. The trial court stated that the issue would be decided under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 206.7, which governs procedures after the issuance of a rule to show cause. The trial court ordered that depositions should be completed within sixty days of October 26, 2010, i.e., December 27, 2010. On November 2, 2010, Appellants filed a motion seeking the recusal of the Hon. Charles M. Miller from further proceedings. The trial court denied the motion. On November 25, 2010, Appellants' counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw appearance. On December 10, 2010, the trial court issued a rule to show cause why Appellants' attorney should not be allowed to withdraw his appearance and set the rule returnable date for January 4, 2011. The trial court stayed further proceedings of the case, stating "[a]ll proceedings to stay meanwhile." The trial court granted counsel's petition to withdraw on January 17, 2011.
On July 18, 2011, the Authority filed a motion to make a judicial determination on Appellants' motion to set aside sheriff's sale. Citing Rule 206.7, the trial court granted the Authority's motion for judicial determination and denied Appellants' motion to set aside sheriff's sale due to gross inadequacy of sale price. The trial court held that the entry of the January 17, 2011 order lifted the stay of proceedings and that Appellants' failure to take depositions or other discovery in the permitted time period required a grant of the Authority's motion for judicial determination and a denial of the motion to set aside sheriff's sale. This appeal followed.
Appellants argue that the stay imposed by the December 10, 2010 Rule was never lifted and the trial court was biased against Appellants and abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside sheriff's sale.
Appellants' argument that the trial court never lifted the stay is without merit. The stay of proceedings was issued pending the trial court's determination on the petition to withdraw his appearance filed by Appellants' counsel. The December 10 rule to show cause set a rule returnable date and stated that proceedings were stayed "meanwhile." The rule unambiguously stayed the proceedings pending resolution of the petition to withdraw as counsel. Under the trial court's order, the stay was lifted when the trial court granted the petition to withdraw as counsel on January 17, 2011.
Appellants' argument that the trial court was biased and abused its discretion by granting the Authority's motion for judicial determination is also without merit. It is plaintiff's burden to advance its case. Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 1136 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rule 206.7(c) provides that:
If an answer is filed raising disputed issues of material fact, the petitioner may take depositions on those issues, or such other discovery as the court allows, within the time set forth in the order of the court. If the petitioner does not do so, the petition shall be decided on petition and answer and all averments of fact responsive to the petition and properly pleaded in the answer shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of this subdivision.The purpose of the remand order was to allow Appellants the opportunity to take depositions or other discovery on the disputed issue of whether the sale price was grossly inadequate. Appellants failed to complete depositions and other discovery in the time period allotted by the trial court or in the six months thereafter. As a result of this failure, the trial court was required by Rule 206.7(c) to base its decision upon the pleadings before it. This course of action is simply not indicative of an abuse of discretion or a manifestation of ill will or bias against Appellants.
It is presumed that the price received at a duly advertised public sale is the highest and best obtainable. Pa.R.C.P. No. 3132; Vend-A-Matic, Inc. v. Frankford Trust Co., 442 A.2d 1158 (Pa. Super. 1982). Whether a sale price is grossly inadequate is not determined by "any given amount or any percentage amount of the sale;" rather, each case is determined on its own facts. Scott v. Adal Corp., 509 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa. Super. 1986). The trial court's ruling on a petition to set aside a sheriff's sale will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Shevlin, 897 A.2d 1241 (Pa. Super. 2006). The trial court did not rule upon the adequacy of the sale price. Before this Court, Appellants only asserted that the stay was never lifted and therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside sheriff's sale. Consequently, we do not opine on the adequacy of the sale price. --------
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of August, 2012, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge