Opinion
No. C. 02-4201 VRW
February 24, 2003
ORDER
Before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff Norbert A. Schueller's complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). See Doc. #6. Plaintiff opposes the instant motion. See Pl. Opp. (Doc. #10); Pl. Amended Opp (Doc. #12). The court finds this matter suitable for determination without oral argument and therefore VACATES the March 13, 2003, hearing date. See Civil LR 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss.
I
The following factual summary comes from Schueller's complaint unless otherwise noted. On January 11, 2000, Schueller was the defendant in an unlawful detainer action, Victoria Associates LP dba Victoria Mobile Village v. Schueller, Case No 97766 (Concord branch), which was commenced on January 11, 2000, in Contra Costa superior court. Compl. (Doc. #1), ¶ 1(b).
The following year, on January 22, 2001, Schueller commenced a separate action for breach of contract, fraud and conversion against Ronald J. deGolia, doing business as Victoria Associates, Schueller v. Ronald J. deGolia dba Victoria Associates, Case No 01-145 (Walnut Creek branch). Id., ¶ 1(c). Defendants, who were the Superior Court judges who presided over Schueller's action, allegedly conspired to deprive and actually deprived Schueller of his First Amendment right to petition the courts for redress, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Although Schueller's complaint does not clearly explain the role of each defendant, it is plain that he seeks compensation from defendants as a result of their interference with his right to petition the courts for redress. Specifically, Schueller alleges defendants (1) denied him a fair trial on the merits of his breach of contract, fraud and conversion action, (2) denied him an impartial hearing on appeal at the Appellate Division of Contra Costa superior court and (3) acted out of "disdain, antipathy [and] animus" for pro se plaintiffs. Id., ¶ 4. Schueller contends that defendants acted in contravention of state law and public policy by taking judicial notice of the unlawful detainer action's disposition to sustain a demurrer based on res judicata and subsequently affirming the decision thereof. Id., ¶¶ 5-7. Schueller also asserts that defendant Peter L. Spinetta, in particular, failed to recuse himself from hearing the appeal in Schueller's breach of contract, fraud and conversion case. Id., ¶¶ 7, 15.
II
Defendants argue that Schueller's claims are barred as a matter of law by (1) judicial immunity and (2) Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Defs Mem (Doc. #6), at 3. Schueller contends that neither doctrine applies. See Pl. Amended Opp (Doc. #12).
Under FRCP 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper only when it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). All material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Lit, 183 F.3d 970, 980 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1999). The court may also consider documents attached to the complaint in connection with a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).
If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, "leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).
A
"Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). Judicial immunity "is overcome in only two circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (citations omitted).
There is no question that Schueller's claims are predicated on actions taken by defendants acting in their judicial capacity. He bases his suit on defendants' decision to sustain a demurrer based on a previous detainer action and on their failure to provide fair and impartial proceedings. While Schueller contends that "the intentional deprivation of constitutional rights" is not a judicial act, the Supreme Court has "clearly held" that "as long as a judge has jurisdiction to perform the `general act,' in question, he or she is immune `however erroneous the act may have been, * * * however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff' and irrespective of the judge's motivation." Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985)). Hence, the critical inquiry is not whether defendants exercised. their judicial authority in the correct manner, or even whether they were motivated by ill will, but rather whether they took actions that can fairly be characterized as judicial in nature. Schueller simply fails to allege any specific non-judicial actions by defendants to deprive him of his constitutional rights.
In his opposition, Schueller admits that "[d]efendants * * * violate[d] plaintiff's constitutional rights * * * by way of a judicial act" but contends that the application of judicial immunity "raises the anomalous, fallacious, irrational, ill-founded, and implausible position that state court judges * * * are no longer bound by the provisions and constraints of the U.S. Constitution[.]" Pl. Am Opp (Doc. #12), at 11.
Without passing any judgment whatsoever on the actions of defendants in this action, the court refers Schueller to the Supreme Court's explanation of the vital importance of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) and referenced again in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (specifically finding that section 1983 did not abolish absolute judicial immunity):
It is essential in all courts that the judges who are to administer the law should be permitted to appointed to administer the law should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law, independently and freely, without favor and without fear. This provision of the law is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence, and without fear of consequences.Bradley, 80 U.S. at 349 n. 16 (emphasis in original). Hence, judicial immunity operates to protect society's vital interest in an independent judiciary. While Schueller contends that defendants acted in legal error, and intentionally so, Schueller's claims are barred by judicial immunity. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. #6). Because Schueller's claims are clearly barred by judicial immunity, the court DISMISSES his claims WITH PREJUDICE.
B
In addition, Schueller's claims are barred by the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiff alleges that defendants are employees of Contra Costa superior court. See Compl. (Doc. #1), ¶¶ 2.
Schueller contends that he has not formally sued the State of California or any of its agencies and that defendants did not act as employees thereof because of the illegality of their actions. See Pl. Mem (Doc. #12), at 5. But, as explained above, the alleged illegality of defendants' acts does not overcome the judicial nature of their actions.
The Ninth Circuit has explained that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against not only Contra Costa superior court but also their employees. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 262221, at *3 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Will v. Mich Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (holding that "`arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes" are not liable under § 1983) and Greater LA Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that state courts are arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes)). Because Schueller's claims are predicated on defendants' actions as employees, they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
In addition, Schueller argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits commenced by a state's residents. While the Eleventh Amendment is couched in terms of suits "by citizens of another state or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state," the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought by a state's own residents. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986). Hence, the court also concludes that Schueller's claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
III
In sum, the court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. #6) and DISMISSES Schuellers' claims WITH PREJUDICE. The clerk is directed to close the file and terminate all pending motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.