Opinion
No. 04 Civ. 5851 (SAS).
November 22, 2004
Thomas M. Burton, Esq., Pleasanton, CA, for Plaintiff.
Barry H. Wolinetz, Esq., David C. Levine, Esq., Baker Hostetler, LLP, Columbus, OH, for Defendant Steven Schottenstein.
Thomas Edward Riley, Esq., Chadbourne Parke LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant M/I Holmes Inc.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
On August 23, 2003, defendant M/I Homes, Inc. ("M/I Homes") filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. In my Opinion dated November 8, 2004, I granted M/I Homes' motion and dismissed all claims against M/I Homes. Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of that Order. For the following reasons, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for reconsideration is governed by Local Rule 6.3 and is appropriate where a court overlooks "controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court." Alternatively, a motion for reconsideration may be granted to "correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice."
Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The standard for granting . . . a motion [for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.").
Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983).
Local Rule 6.3 should be "narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the Court." A motion for reconsideration "is not a substitute for appeal." Courts have repeatedly been forced to warn counsel that such motions should not be made reflexively, "to reargue those issues already considered when a party does not like the way the original motion was resolved." The purpose of Local Rule 6.3 is to "ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters."
Dellefave v. Access Temps., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 6098, 2001 WL 286771, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001).
RMED Int'l, Inc. v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 292, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quotation omitted).
Houbigant, Inc. v. ACB Mercantile, 914 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Carolco Pictures, Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff offers no legitimate grounds for reconsideration. Plaintiff's argument rests on the premise that the Court misconstrued M/I Homes' level of participation in the wrongdoing alleged in plaintiff's Complaint. However, nothing in plaintiff's motion connects M/I Homes in any way to the sole remaining conversion claim against Steven Schottenstein. Rather, plaintiff simply reiterates her allegations against M/I Homes with respect to her purported false imprisonment claim. That claim, as well as all other claims except plaintiff's conversion claim against Steven Schottenstein, was dismissed as to all defendants in my November 8, 2004 Order (the "November 18 Order"). Plaintiff asserts — but makes no argument to support — the position that a false imprisonment claim should lie against M/I Homes even though one does not lie against Steven Schottenstein.
See 11/18/04 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing M/I Homes ("11/18/04 Motion") at 2 ("Sarah's statement of claim against M/I Homes was not based on its failure to reign in [Steven Schottenstein] but upon his implicitly authorized use of M/I Homes assets . . . to keep Sarah confined, and move her about as part of a shell game to hide her from her mother.").
See id. at 2-3.
Plaintiff's argument makes little sense. Plaintiff takes issue with the November 18 Order's construction of plaintiff's claims against M/I Homes, claiming that plaintiff's "claim against M/I Homes was not based on its failure to reign in" Steven Schottenstein, but rather on his "implicitly authorized use" of M/I Homes' resources to falsely imprison plaintiff. However, one page later, plaintiff justifies her "implicit authorization" theory with the observation that "M/I Homes neither intervened, prohibited, [n]or criticized [Steven Schottenstein's] personal use of its aircraft." Plaintiff's distinction between `reigning in' Steven Schottenstein and `intervening, prohibiting or criticizing' him is difficult to discern.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Finally, plaintiff offers a closing argument that, under Second Circuit precedent, the acts of a president and sole stockholder may be held to have been "authorized" by the company itself. First, it should be noted that, in the lone case cited by plaintiff, the Second Circuit never reached the issue of whether such acts were authorized, because that issue was not raised on appeal. Second, Steven Schottenstein is not, as was the president in Field, the sole shareholder in M/I Homes. Finally, even a finding that M/I Homes authorized Steven Schottenstein's conduct would not change the fact that plaintiff's false imprisonment claim would be dismissed against M/I Homes for the same reasons it was dismissed against Steven Schottenstein. Thus, plaintiff's proffered precedent, even if relevant, could not "have reasonably altered the result" originally before the Court.
See id. at 4 (citing Field v. Bankers Trust Co., 296 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1961)).
See Field, 296 F.2d at 110-11.
See Range Road Music, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied. The Clerk is directed to close this motion [#43 on the docket sheet].
SO ORDERED: