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finding that plaintiff's tort claims "begin and end in a domestic dispute" and state courts are better suited to that adjudication
Summary of this case from Chadee v. KaufmanOpinion
No. 06-1577-cv.
February 2, 2009.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appearing for Appellant: James W. Schottel, Jr., Schottel Associates, P.C., St. Louis, MO.
Appearing for Appellees Debra E. Guston, Guston Guston, L.L.P., Piotr Kutyba Helen Kutyba: Glen Rock, NJ.
Plaintiff-appellant Wioleta Schottel appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Mukasey, J.), dismissing Schottel's complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history.
Schottel argues that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint because she asserted tort claims that are not subject to the domestic relations exception, which "divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). In Ankenbrandt, the Court held the exception to be inapplicable to a former wife's state-law tort claims for monetary damages against her ex-husband and his female companion who had allegedly committed child abuse. Id. at 704. The status of the domestic relationship in Ankenbrandt was "determined as a matter of state law," and had "no bearing on the underlying torts alleged." Id. at 706.
Although Schottel asserts a fraud claim for monetary damages, the district court correctly concluded that "the gravamen of her claim involves a dissolution of marriage — an area at the core of the domestic relations exception." Schottel v. Kutyba, No. 05-3759 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2005) (order of dismissal). Her complaint makes clear that her tort claim for monetary damages is, at heart, a dispute surrounding the custody of her child. In particular, the complaint alleges that the defendants (1) fraudulently misrepresented to the court the former couple's residences in order to file divorce proceedings in New York; (2) forged Schottel's signature on documents relating to the divorce proceeding; and (3) coerced Schottel, "a foreign citizen of the Country of Poland . . . without . . . counsel," into signing divorce-related documents whose contents were unknown to her. The complaint states that, as a result of this fraud and coercion, Schottel has been deprived of custody and visitation rights, resulting in emotional distress, expenses arising from her challenges to the divorce decree and "other substantial damages."
Schottel argues that her complaint should not have been dismissed because it mirrored one filed in another case, Moore v. Golden, 93-3499 (S.D.N.Y.). But that case settled before the filing of any substantive motions and was never appealed to this Court.
Unlike Ankenbrandt, where the tort claims were distinct from the domestic relationship, Schottel's tort claims begin and end in a domestic dispute, as evidenced by the request in Schottel's original complaint to have the divorce judgment declared void ab initio. States are better suited to that adjudication. See, e.g., Aguirre v. Aguirre, 245 A.D.2d 5, 7-8, 665 N.Y.S.2d 638, 640 (1st Dep't 1997) (vacating judgment of divorce where the plaintiff had obtained, through fraudulent misrepresentations, his illiterate wife's signature on a legal document). Even if Schottel had only requested monetary damages (as was the case in her proposed amended complaint), federal jurisdiction would still be lacking. Although we recognize that the domestic relations "exception is very narrow," Williams v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1275, 1283 (2d Cir. 1995), a plaintiff cannot obtain federal jurisdiction merely by rewriting a domestic dispute as a tort claim for monetary damages. Cf. American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990) ("A federal court presented with . . . issues `on the verge' of being matrimonial in nature should abstain from exercising jurisdiction so long as there is no obstacle to their full and fair determination in state courts.").
Accordingly, the district court properly denied Schottel's motion to set aside the court's order based on her proposed amended complaint.
There is no indication that Schottel, who has continued to litigate her child's custody in state court, was denied a full and fair determination at the state level.
We have reviewed plaintiff-appellant's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.