Summary
In Buena Vista Special School District et al. v. Board of Election Commissioners of Carroll County et al., 173 Tenn. 198, 201, 116 S.W.2d 1008, 1009, this Court said: "It is quite generally declared that a court of equity will not enjoin the holding of an election.
Summary of this case from State ex Rel. Hammond v. WimberlyOpinion
Opinion filed May 28, 1938.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A legislative act cannot be so framed as that it must derive its efficacy from a popular vote.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A private act authorizing an election by the qualified voters of the Buena Vista School District for purpose of determining whether school district should be managed by county board of education or by old board of directors, and providing that if a majority of the votes were for the change indicated the school district should be operated by the county board of education instead of the old board of directors which should cease to exist, was unconstitutional, since any efficacy of the act would be derived from a favorable popular vote (Priv. Acts 1919, chap. 329; Priv. Acts 1937, chap. 552, section 4).
3. INJUNCTION.
Generally, equity will not enjoin the holding of an election, but may enjoin holding of election under special circumstances.
4. INJUNCTION.
The holding of an election by the qualified voters of the Buena Vista Special School District for the purpose of determining whether the school should be managed by the county board of education or whether the management should continue in the old board of directors was not enjoinable on the ground that the statute authorizing the election was unconstitutional, in absence of showing of special circumstances (Priv. Acts 1919, chap. 329; Priv. Acts 1937, chap. 552, sec. 4).
5. APPEAL AND ERROR.
On the reversal of a decree enjoining the holding of an election for the purpose of determining whether the Buena Vista Special School District should be managed by the county board of education or by the old board of directors on the ground that the statute authorizing the election was unconstitutional, the chancellor was required to proceed with a declaration as to validity of the statute under the Declaratory Judgments Act after the attorney general had been made a party as required by statute (Priv. Acts 1919, chap. 329; Priv. Acts 1937, chap. 552, section 4; Code 1932, sections 8836, 8845).
FROM CARROLL.Appeal from Chancery Court of Carroll County. — HON. TOM C. RYE, Chancellor.
Suit to enjoin an election by the Buena Vista Special School District and others against the Board of Election Commissioners of Carroll County and others. From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill, the defendants appeal. Decree modified and cause remanded with directions.
G.C. CRIDER and W.H. LASSITER, both of Huntingdon, for appellants, Board of Election Commissioners et al.
PEELER PEELER, of Camden, for appellees, Buena Vista Special School District et al.
From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill the defendants have appealed to this court.
By chapter 329 of the Private Acts of 1919, the Buena Vista Special School District was established, the officers consisting of a board of five members who were placed in charge of the schools in said district. Chapter 552 of the Private Acts of 1937 authorized an election to be held by the qualified voters of this school district for the purpose of determining whether or not the school district should be managed by the county board of education or whether management should continue in the old board of directors. The Act provided that if a majority of the votes were for the change indicated "the School District will be operated by the County Board of Education of Carroll County, Tennessee, and be vested with all of the power and authority vested in said Board of Directors of the Buena Vista Special School District," and that the board of directors of the school district "shall cease to function and exist and is abolished." Section 4. The Act provided for the calling of one election only. Accordingly if the election went against the change, the Act was without effect.
In this suit constitutionality of the Act of 1937 was attacked on several grounds and, as stated heretofore, the chancellor overruled a demurrer to the bill.
While the Act is framed somewhat differently from others previously invalidated by the court, it is obvious that the Act will derive any efficacy it may have from a favorable popular vote. An unfavorable vote leaves the Act nugatory. The case, therefore, falls within the authority of Wright v. Cunningham, 115 Tenn. 445, 91 S.W. 293, and Arthur v. State, 148 Tenn. 434, 256 S.W. 437, in which cases it was held that no legislative Act can be so framed as that it must derive its efficacy from a popular vote.
The court has recently gone over this matter in Clark et al. v. State ex rel. Bobo, 172 Tenn. 429, 113 S.W.2d 374, approved the rule stated, and distinguished that particular case from previous cases falling under the rule.
The chancellor was therefore correct in his conclusion that the Act of 1937 was unconstitutional. An injunction was granted, however, restraining the election commissioners from holding the election authorized by said Act. In this we think the chancellor went too far.
It is quite generally declared that a court of equity will not enjoin the holding of an election. Voters ordinarily have no such special interest in the matter as will justify them in seeking an injunction. Further, no one can tell what the result of an election will be and no complainant can say that he will be adversely affected by an election. Some courts refuse an injunction on a broader ground that the power to hold an election is a political power and that equity has no jurisdiction to restrain officers entrusted by law with the duty of holding elections from exercising such power. High on Injunctions, sections 1286, 1316, 1425; 32 C.J., 255; Note, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.), 576; Note, 33 A.L.R., 1376.
Under special circumstances, courts of equity have sometimes enjoined the holding of an election, but such circumstances do not exist here. We think, therefore, an injunction was not properly issued herein. The case, however, is one that seems properly to justify relief under the declaratory judgments statute. Under section 8836 of the Code any person whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute is entitled to a declaration defining same. Inasmuch as the constitutionality of the Act of 1937 is involved herein the Attorney-General of the State should be made a party under section 8845 of the Code.
The decree of the chancellor will therefore be modified and the cause remanded. Upon making the Attorney-General a party to the suit, the chancellor may proceed with the declaration as to the validity of said Act of 1937.
Divide the costs.