Opinion
No. CV05-4003279-S
August 23, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #122
On May 6, 2005, the plaintiff, Michael Schoenster, filed a five-count complaint against the defendants, Stevens Ford, Inc. and David Stevens. The complaint consists of claims for fraud, tortious interference with business expectancies, detrimental reliance, and age discrimination pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. The present action arises out of damages sustained by the plaintiff when his employment was terminated by the defendants. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff was hired by the defendants in or around August 1991. In March of 2003, the plaintiff received a job offer from the defendants' competitor, under which he would receive a significant increase in compensation. On March 19, 2003, the plaintiff informed the defendants of the available job offer, and requested a compensation increase if he were to remain in his current position. This request was initially denied by the defendants, and only after the plaintiff tendered his resignation, did the defendants agree to increase the plaintiff's compensation package. An offer was made to the plaintiff on March 21, 2003, whereby Stevens Ford, on behalf of Stevens Ford, Inc., offered to increase the compensation package if the plaintiff would remain an employee. The plaintiff accepted the offer, and subsequently turned down the competing job offer. On April 10, 2003, Steven Ford terminated the plaintiff's employment.
Counts one, two and three are brought collectively against both defendants. Counts four and five are brought only against the corporate defendant, Stevens Ford, Inc.
On December 21, 2006, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that genuine issues of material fact are not in dispute, and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A memorandum of law and extensive documentary evidence were attached thereto. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on August 13, 2007. A reply to the plaintiff's objection was filed on August 17, 2007. Oral argument was heard on this matter on August 20, 2007.
DISCUSSION CT Page 14354
"To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, [t]he movant must show that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . [A] summary disposition . . . should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party . . . [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988). "[T]he `genuine issue' aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). Summary judgment "is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 815.As a preliminary matter, the court notes that two issues are central to the merits of defendants' argument in support of summary judgment on the individual counts: (1) Whether the plaintiff had an offer of employment at the time of his initial resignation or at the time the defendants offered an increase in compensation in order to retain the plaintiff's services; and (2) Whether the defendants knew of a competing job offer at the time they offered the plaintiff an increased compensation package. For the purposes of brevity, the court will address the arguments surrounding these two issues first.
The defendants argue that it is undisputed that the plaintiff did not receive a job offer from the defendant's competitor until after his employment was terminated. In support of this argument, the defendants cite extensively to the plaintiff's deposition testimony, dated February 12, 2007. According to the defendants, this testimony demonstrates the nonexistence of a material issue of fact due to the plaintiff's statement that the job offer received on March 17, 2003, "wasn't a cement thing" and that he was not given a verbal offer until April 16, after he had been terminated by the defendants. The defendants also submit a copy of a letter from Hoffman Auto Group, dated April 17, 2003, which acts to confirm a verbal offer of employment. The defendants argue that the date of the letter is indicative of the plaintiff's lack of an offer in March. In response, the plaintiff submits his own certified affidavit, in which he attests: "On or about March 17, 2003, I received an offer from the Hoffman Auto Group to become its Controller."
Due to the contradictory nature of the evidence offered by both parties, the court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether or not the plaintiff had received a job offer prior to his termination. White the defendants contend that the testimony clearly demonstrates that the facts are undisputed, the court is unwilling to accept the defendants' characterization of the testimony as decidedly clear-cut. At best, the evidence submitted by the defendants is inconclusive as reasonable minds could differ on the interpretation of the deposition testimony. This conclusion is bolstered by the plaintiff's affidavit which states facts in direct contradiction. The plaintiff's deposition testimony merely states that he did not have a "cement offer" at the time. Additionally, a copy of the letter from the competitor, dated after the plaintiff's termination, states that it is intended to confirm a previous verbal offer; thus, the fact that the letter was dated after the plaintiff's termination does not necessarily indicate that an offer was not in existence during the plaintiff's employment. The proffered evidence is insufficient to meet the defendants' burden on summary judgment. Therefore, the determination of whether the plaintiff received a competing job offer during his employment by the defendants remains a disputed issue of fact for a jury to adjudicate.
The second issue central to a majority of the plaintiff's claims is whether or not the defendants knew of the plaintiff's competing offer when they offered to increase his compensation package in order to retain his services. On this issue, the defendants again cite to the plaintiff's deposition testimony, in which he states that he did not tell the defendants about the offer because "it wasn't any of his business." The defendants also submit the affidavit of David Stevens, in which he attests that he was not informed of any competing offer. In response, the plaintiff submits his own affidavit as well as the affidavit of Alan Pouyat, the general manager of Stevens Ford. Both affidavits attest to the defendants' knowledge of the offer. Once again, the contradictory nature of the evidence indicates that a genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute. The determination of whether the defendants knew of a competing offer at the relevant times is a question of fact that must remain for a jury to decide.
The defendants' arguments in support of summary judgment on counts one, two, and three, sounding in fraud, tortious interference with a business expectancy and detrimental reliance, respectively, are based in large part on the conclusion that the plaintiff did not have an offer and that the defendants did not know such an offer existed. As noted above, this court has already found that these issues remain in dispute and must be submitted to the finder of fact. These issues lie at the heart of the claims, and due to their disputed status, summary judgment is inappropriate at this time. Summary judgment as to counts one, two, and three is, therefore, denied.
Regarding counts four and five, sounding in age discrimination pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-60, respectively, the defendants argue that it is undisputed that the plaintiff's discharge was the result of a re-organization of the administrative personnel within the defendants' organization. The defendants further maintain that the individual made responsible for the plaintiff's financial responsibilities is older than the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was never subjected to discrimination on the basis of his age. Accordingly, the defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims.
Regarding the argument that a genuine issue of material fact is not in dispute that the plaintiff was terminated as a result of internal re-organization within the company, the defendants submit the affidavits of Steven Ford, Annette Lerman, and Nancy Grimme. The affiants attest to the reorganization of the company, and the reduction of personnel from 255 employees in 2003 to approximately 110 current employees. This evidence, however, is insufficient to sustain the defendants' burden on summary judgment. Reasonable minds could differ on what grounds constituted the basis for the plaintiff's termination.
The defendants also argue that the person who took over the plaintiff's financial responsibilities within the company is older than the plaintiff, and therefore, the defendants could not have discriminated against the plaintiff due to his age. In support of this proposition, the defendants cite to O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterer's, 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307 (1996). In O'Connor, the Supreme Court recognized "that the prima facie case [for age discrimination] requires evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 312. "In the age-discrimination context, such an inference cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger." Id. According to the affidavits submitted by the defendants, however, a similarly aged employee has just taken over the plaintiff's financial responsibilities. Accordingly, it is important to note that the plaintiff's position has been eliminated, and in essence, he has not been replaced. The fact that his interim replacement is similar in age does not conclusively establish that age was not a factor in his termination. Therefore, this court finds that a genuine issue of material fact relating to the grounds for the plaintiff's termination remains in dispute.
Finally, the defendants cite to the plaintiff's deposition testimony to establish that he was not subjected to discrimination on the basis of his age. This testimony, however, does not conclusively support this argument. Although the plaintiff testified that he did not complain of age discrimination before he was terminated, and that he did not inform the defendants, at the time of his termination, that he thought his termination was a result of his age, this does not conclusively establish that his age discrimination claim is without merit. Furthermore, the plaintiff's testimony that he could not think "off the top of his head" of any references made directly to him regarding his age, is also inconclusive. This evidence is insufficient to sustain the defendant's burden of proof on summary judgment to establish that reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion on the evidence. The motion for summary judgment as to counts four and five is, thereby, denied.
For all the above reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on counts one, two, three, four and five is, hereby, denied.