Opinion
No 38488.
April 3, 1944. Rehearing Denied, May 2, 1944.
INSURANCE: Insane Persons: Disability Through Insanity: Failure to Submit Proofs: Literal Compliance Excused by Impossibility of Performance. The insurance policy provided disability payments and waiver of premiums after a six months waiting period, but provided that such benefits would not commence until proof of total permanent disability had been furnished by the insured. The policy literally required the proofs to be furnished by the insured himself, which would be impossible in the case of an insane person, and so literal performance should be excused. Though proofs were not submitted until several years after the insured became insane, he is entitled to recover disability benefits commencing six months after insanity commenced, including the return of premiums paid after said six months period.
Appeal from Cape Girardeau Court of Common Pleas. — Hon. J. Henry Caruthers, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED ( with directions).
J. Grant Frye and J.L. London for appellant.
The Missouri courts and the overwhelming weight of authority hold that insanity excuses notice and proof of total and permanent disability where such are required by policies of insurance, whether as conditions precedent or subsequent, and, under such circumstances, disability payments are due from the time of disability. Hablutzel v. Home Life Ins. Co., 332 Mo. 920, 59 S.W.2d 639, affirmed 52 S.W.2d 480; Magill, Conservator, etc., v. Travelers Ins. Co., 133 F.2d 709; Hayes v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 235 Mo. App. 1261, 150 S.W.2d 1113; Roseberry v. Amer. Benevolent Assn., 142 Mo. App. 552, 121 S.W. 785; Hayes v. Continental Cas. Co., 98 Mo. App. 410, 72 S.W. 135; Randolph v. City of Springfield, 257 S.W. 449, 302 Mo. 33; Johnson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 41, and 293 U.S. 335, expressly recognizing such to be the law and citing Roseberry v. Amer. Benev. Assn., 142 Mo. App. 552; Swan v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 159 S.E. 192, 156 Va. 852; McCoy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 258 N.W. 320; John Hancock v. DeCosta, 88 F.2d 479; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Heilbronner, 116 F.2d 855; Pfeiffer v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 174 Ark. 783, 297 S.W. 847; Rhyne v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 196 N.C. 717, 147 S.E. 6, 199 N.C. 419, 154 S.E. 749; Levan v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 138 S.C. 253, 136 S.E. 304; Reed v. Legal Protective Assn., 154 Mich. 161, 117 N.W. 600; Marti v. Midwest Life Ins. Co., 108 Neb. 845, 189 N.W. 388; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 209 Ky. 522, 273 S.W. 54; Comstock v. Fraternal Acc. Assn., 116 Wis. 382, 93 N.W. 22; Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. LeFevre, 10 S.W.2d 267; Trippe v. Provident Fund Society, 140 N.Y. 23, 35 N.E. 315; Ins. Companies v. Boykin, 12 Wall. 433; Restatement of the Law of Contracts, American Law Institute, sec. 301; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Carneal, 90 S.W.2d 1010, 262 Ky. 665; Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 53 P.2d 266, 175 Okla. 543; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Felton, 71 S.W.2d 1049, 59 A.L.R. 611; Levitt v. New York, 297 N.W. 888; Guy v. U.S. Casualty Co., 151 N.C. 465, 66 S.E. 437; Schlintz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 226 Wis. 255, 276 N.W. 336; Bean v. Ins. Co., 190 A. 131, 88 N.H. 416; American United Life Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 146 S.W.2d 907, 201 Ark. 634; Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 74 S.W.2d 408; Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Case, 71 S.W.2d 199; Hickman v. Ins. Co., 173 So. 742, 186 La. 997; Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Holt, 55 S.W.2d 788, 186 Ark. 672; Nelson v. Jefferson, etc., Ins. Co., 154 S.E. 752, 199 N.C. 443; Ray v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 28 F. Supp. 988; Halliday v. United States, 315 U.S. 94, 62 Sup. Ct. 438, 86 L.Ed. 393, reversing 116 F.2d 812; Whetstone v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 182 S.C. 150, 188 S.E. 793; Mid. Cont. L. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 32 S.W.2d 701; State Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 58 S.W.2d 189; Porto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 196, 180 A. 289; Old Colony, etc., Ins. Co. v. Julian, 175 Ark. 359, 299 S.W. 366; Neill v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 119 W. Va. 694, 195 S.E. 860; Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Brackett, 108 Ind. App. 442, 27 N.W.2d 103; Hallowes v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 133 Fla. 872, 184 So. 7; Baylor v. Assur. Co., 113 N.J.L. 398, 174 A. 526; State Life Ins. Co. v. Fann, 269 S.W. 1111; Columbia Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Zammar, 178 Okla. 207, 62 P.2d 63; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v Tharpe, 130 Fla. 546, 178 So. 300; Reliance L. Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 144 Fla. 50, 197 So. 723; Berry v. Acacia Mut. Life Assn., 49 Ariz. 413, 67 P.2d 478; Rand v. Home Life Ins. Co., 206 N.C. 760, 174 S.E. 749; Woodell v. Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 496, 199 S.E. 719; Minnesota Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 29 F.2d 977.
Fordyce, White, Mayne, Williams Hartman, Walter R. Mayne and Rush H. Limbaugh for respondent.
(1) By the provisions of the policy the furnishing of proof of disability of the insured was a condition precedent to liability of the insurer to waive premium payments and pay disability benefits. Adams v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 74 S.W.2d 899, 228 Mo. App. 915; Moss v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 84 S.W.2d 395, 230 Mo. App. 70; Grafe v. Fid. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 84 S.W.2d 400; Farmers v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 85 S.W.2d 235; Martin v. Ill. Bankers L. Ins. Co., 91 S.W.2d 646; Clinton v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 94 S.W.2d 1080; Sapaw v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 94 S.W.2d 1082; Anderson v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 96 S.W.2d 631; Sutherland v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 99 S.W.2d 111; State ex rel. Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 100 S.W.2d 487; Winkleman v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 101 S.W.2d 736; Rowan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 124 S.W.2d 577; Feinberg v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 127 S.W.2d 82; Brown v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 S.W.2d 91; Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U.S. 489; Columbian National v. Goldberg, 138 F.2d 192; Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Ghio, 111 F.2d 307; Reingold v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 85 F.2d 776; Saul v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.2d 665; Orr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 64 F.2d 561; Avery v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 67 F.2d 442; New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 83 F.2d 163; Lando v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc., 11 F. Supp. 729; Armstrong v. K.C. Life Ins. Co., 12 F. Supp. 817; All States Life v. Steward, 5 So.2d 784; New England Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 116 So. 151, 217 Ala. 307; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Sinquefield, 163 So. 812, 231 Ala. 185; Home. Life v. Couch, 141 S.W.2d 20; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Farrell, 63 S.W.2d 520, 187 Ark. 984; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 65 S.W.2d 904, 188 Ark. 292; Cochens v. Prudential Ins. Co., 40 P.2d 902, 4 Cal.App.2d 172; Morris v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 43 P.2d 572, 6 Cal.App.2d 30; Clark v. Equitable Life, 68 P.2d 541; Mass. Mutual v. Montague, 10 S.E.2d 279; McLendon v. Jefferson Standard, 1 S.E.2d 75; N.W. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Dean, 157 S.E. 878; Penn Mut. v. Milton, 127 S.E. 80; Bennett v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 121 P.2d 551; Moscov v. Mutual Life, 50 N.E.2d 970; Ferguson v. Penn Mutual, 305 Ill. App. 537, 27 N.E.2d 548; Hanson v. Northwestern Mutual, 229 Ill. App. 15; Jabara v. Equitable Life, 280 Ill. App. 147; Bozich v. Metropolitan, 155 Kan. 573; Smith v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 7 P.2d 65, 134 Kan. 426; Bott v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc., 78 P.2d 860, 147 Kan. 671; Compton v. Amicable Life Ins. Co., 162 So. 751, 182 La. 991; McKenna v. N.Y. Life, 23 N.E.2d 88; Sherman v. Met., 297 Mass. 330, 8 N.E.2d 892; Burke v. N.Y. Life, 293 N.W. 248; Andrews v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 268 N.W. 415; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 157 So. 902, 171 Miss. 396; Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 142 So. 445, 165 Miss. 405; McAndrews v. Prudential, 132 Neb. 332, 271 N.W. 857; Goldman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 171 A. 541, 545, 115 N.J. Eq. 535; Epstein v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 257 N.Y.S. 772; Levitt v Prudential Ins Co., 270 N.Y.S. 39; Yohalem v. Columbian Natl. Life, 240 N.Y.S. 666; Mullaney v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc., 264 N.W. 663; Western Southern Life v. Smith, 41 Ohio App. 197, 180 N.E. 749; Gunter v. Prudential, 100 P.2d 851; Mid-Cont. Life v. Walker, 260 P. 1109; Mid-Cont. Life v. Skye, 240 P. 631; Farmers' Trust Co. v. Reliance Life, 140 Pa. Super. 115, 13 A.2d 111; Perlman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 161 A. 752, 105 Pa. Super. 413; Lucas v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 176 A. 514, 116 Pa. Super. 298; Courson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 145 A. 530, 295 Pa. 518; Lyford v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 184 A. 469; Jenkins v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 198 A. 486; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. McCausland, 200 A. 85; Parker v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 155 S.E. 617, 158 S.C. 394; Binder v. General American Life, 282 N.W. 521; Gordinier v. Cont. Assur. Co., 7 N.W.2d 298; Hall v. Acacia Mut. Life Assn., 46 S.W.2d 56, 164 Tenn. 93; Walters v. Jefferson St. Life, 20 S.W.2d 1038; Bank Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Milan, 70 939 S.W.2d 294; Steele v. New York Life Ins. Co., 48 P.2d 436, 87 Utah, 63; Reynolds v. Travelers, 176 Wn. 36, 28 P.2d 310; Kearns v. Penn Mutual, 178 Wn. 235, 34 P.2d 888; Bloss v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 28 P.2d 303, 176 Wn. 1; Jones v. New York Life Ins. Co., 290 P. 333, 158 Wn. 12; Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 824, 114 W. Va. 323; Iannarelli v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 748, 114 W. Va. 88; Jenkins v. New York Life Ins. Co., 7 S.E.2d 343, 122 W. Va. 73. (2) The law of Missouri does not prohibit insurance companies from issuing policies containing provisions to the effect that furnishing proof of disability is a condition precedent to the accrual of liability for disability benefits or premium waiver, and where policies contain such provisions the courts enforce them. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 217 Ala. 307, 116 So. 151; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Farrell, 63 S.W.2d 520; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 65 S.W.2d l.c. 905; Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Etoch, 174 Ark. 409, 295 S.W. 376; Cochens v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 40 P.2d 902; Dean v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 165 S.E. 235; Bennett v. New York Life Ins. Co., 121 P.2d 551; Jabara v. Equitable Life, 280 Ill. App. 147; Fairgrave v. Illinois Bankers Life Assn., 233 N.W. 714; Smith v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 134 Kan. 426, 7 P.2d 65; Muse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 192 So. 72; Sherman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 Mass. 330, 8 N.E.2d 892; Andrews v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 268 N.W. 415; Maryland Cas. Co. v. American Lbr, Wrecking Co., 282 N.W. 806, 119 A.L.R. 1269; Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 165 Miss. 405, 142 So. 445, 887; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 185 So. l.c. 575; Feinberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 233 Mo. App. 707, 127 S.W.2d 82; Moss v. Metropolitan, 230 Mo. App. 70, 84 S.W.2d 395; Conlon v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 108 Mont. 473, 92 P.2d 284; Thomas v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 131 Neb. 274, 267 N.W. 446; Goldman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 115 N.J. Eq. 553, 171 A. 541; Whiteside v. North American Accident, 200 N.Y. 320, 93 N.E. 948; Levitt v. Prudential, 270 N.Y.S. 39; Fulton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 210 N.C. 394, 186 S.E. 486; Mullaney v. Equitable Life, 66 N.D. 235, 264 N.W. 663; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 164 Okla. 193, 23 P.2d 151; Courson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 295 Pa. 518, 145 A. 530; Lucas v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 176 A. 514, 116 Pa. Sup. 298; Farmers Trust v. Reliance Life, 13 A.2d 111; Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 186, 180 S.E. 37; Binder v. General American Life Ins. Co., 66 S.D. 305, 282 N.W. 521; Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 168 Tenn. 690, 80 S.W.2d 662; Bank Saving Life Ins. Co. v. Milan, 70 S.W.2d 295; Steel v. New York Life Ins. Co., 87 Utah, 63, 48 P.2d 436; Jones v. New York Life Ins. Co., 158 Wn. 12, 290 P. 333; Reynolds v. Travelers, 28 P.2d 310; Kearns v. Penn Mutual Ins. Co., 34 P.2d 888; Wick v. Western Union Life Ins. Co., 175 P. 953; Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Wellrich, 124 P.2d 950, 142 A.L.R. 1; Isaacson Iron Works v. Ocean Accident Guar. Corp., 70 P.2d 1026; Innarelli v. Kansas City Life, 171 S.E. 748; Da Corte v. New York Life, 171 S.E. 248; Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Stossel, 175 So. l.c. 805; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Litzke, 179 A. 493. (3) The provisions of the policy under consideration are clear and unambiguous. Courts cannot construe such provisions contrary to their plain and ordinary meaning and hold that liability accrues regardless of whether proof of disability is furnished, for in doing so they destroy the contract made by the parties and make and enforce a new contract. This the law forbids. 29 Am. Jur., sec. 157, p. 173; State ex rel. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Shain, 344 Mo. 623, 127 S.W.2d 675; Henderson v. Mass. Bonding Ins. Co., 337 Mo. 1, 84 S.W.2d 922; State ex rel. St. Louis v. Public Serv. Comm., 335 Mo. 448, 73 S.W.2d 393; Prange v. International Life Ins. Co., 329 Mo. 651, 46 S.W.2d 523; State ex rel. Commonwealth Casualty Co. v. Cox, 14 S.W.2d 600; Wendorf v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 363, 1 S.W.2d 99; State ex rel. American Fire Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 269 Mo. 410, 190 S.W. 879; State ex rel. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Trimble, 306 Mo. 295, 267 S.W. 876; Suess v. Imperial Life Ins. Co., 198 Mo. 564, 91 S.W. 1041; Lumbermen's Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kansas, Fort Scott Memphis R. Co., 149 Mo. 165, 50 S.W. 281; Keim v. Home Mutual Fire Marine Ins. Co., 42 Mo. 38, l.c. 42; Home Trust Co. v. Shapiro, 228 Mo. App. 266, 64 S.W.2d 717; Bergholm v. Peoria Life, 284 U.S. 489; Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498; Jeffries v. The Economic Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22 Wall. 47; Hawkeye Commercial Men's Assn. v. Christy, 294 F. 208, 40 A.L.R. 46; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. St. Paul Ry. Co., 70 F. 201; Mack v. Liverpool L. G. Ins. Co., 329 Ill. 158, 160. N.E. 222, 57 A.L.R., 1039; American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Dusenberg, 214 Ind. 488, 14 N.E.2d 919, 16 N.E.2d 698, 117 A.L.R. 1293; Jones v. Continental Casualty Co., 189 Iowa 678, 179 N.W. 203, 18 A.L.R. 1329; Taylor v. United States Cas. Co., 269 N.Y. 360, 270 N.Y. 611, 199 N.E. 620, 1 N.E.2d 354, 115 A.L.R. 822; Tischendorf v. Lynn Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 33, 208 N.W. 917, 45 A.L.R. 856. (4) Where, as in this case, a policy of life insurance, which also contains provisions for disability benefits, expressly requires that proof of disability of the insured be furnished the insurer as a condition precedent to liability for disability benefits, insanity of the insured does not excuse the furnishing of such proof. Egan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 67 F.2d 899; Chambers v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 80 F.2d 339; Reingold v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 85 F.2d 776; New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 116 So. 151, 217 Ala. 307; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 157 S.E. 878, 43 Ga. App. 67, affirmed 165 S.E. 235, 175 Ga. 321; Bennett v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 121 941 P.2d 551; Moscov v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.E.2d 970; Continental Natl. Bank Trust Co., Conserv. of Spilkey, v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 257 Ill. App. 651; Hanson v. N.Y. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 229 Ill. App. 15; Smith v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 7 P.2d 65, 134 Kan. 426; Sherman v. Met. Life Ins. Co., and Bruce v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. (consolidated cases), 8 N.E.2d 892, 297 Mass. 330; Columbian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Eaves, 185 So. 557, 185 Miss. 127; Berry v. Lamar Ins. Co., 142 So. 445, 145 So. 887, 165 Miss. 405; N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 85 So. 93, 122 Miss. 813; Goldman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 171 A. 541, 115 N.J. Eq. 535; Mutchnick v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 284 N.Y.S. 565; Yohalem v. Columbian Natl. Life, 240 N.Y.S. 666; Gottlieb v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 126 Misc. 194, 240 N.Y.S. 568; Whiteside v. North American Acc. Ins. Co., 93 N.E. 948, 200 N.Y. 320; Farmers Trust Co. v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 13 A.2d 111, 140 Pa. Super. 115; Courson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 145 A. 530, 295 Pa. 518; Pac. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 80 S.W.2d 662, 168 Tenn. 690; Hall v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 46 S.W.2d 56, 164 Tenn. 93; Iannarelli v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 748, 114 W. Va. 88; Da Corte v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 248, 114 W. Va. 72; Jenkins v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 7 S.E.2d 343, 122 W. Va. 73. (5) The cases which apparently invoke the contrary rule are, in most instances, distinguishable, and where they are not distinguishable they are incorrectly ruled. In some instances the cases involved policies where either the liability arose at the instant disability occurred or the language of the policy was ambiguous, thus giving the court power to fix liability by construction. Hablutzel v. Home Life, 332 Mo. 920, 59 S.W.2d 639; Hayes v. Equitable Life, 235 Mo. App. 1261, 150 S.W.2d 1113; Minn. Mutual v. Marshall, 29 F.2d 977; Mutual Life v. Heilbronner, 116 F.2d 855; Pfeiffer v. Missouri State Life, 174 Ark. 783, 297 S.W. 847; Metropolitan v. Carroll, 209 Ky. 522, 273 S.W. 54; Baylor v. Assur. Co., 113 N.J.L. 398, 174 A. 171; Levitt v. New York Life, 297 N.W. 888; McCoy v. New York Life, 258 N.W. 320; Mid-Continent Life v. Harrison, 175 Okla. 543, 53 P.2d 266. (6) In other instances the cases involved accident, or accident and health, policies containing provisions that liability shall accrue upon the happening of an event such as an accident or the beginning of an illness, and requiring the giving of notice as a condition to be performed after liability accrues. Roseberry v. American Benev. Assn., 142 Mo. App. 552, 121 S.W. 785; Hayes v. Cont. Cas. Co., 98 Mo. App. 410, 72 S.W. 135; Magill v. Travelers, 133 F.2d 709; Reed v. Loyal Protec. Assn., 154 Mich. 161, 117 N.W. 600; Marti v. Midwest Life, 108 Neb. 845, 189 N.W. 388; Trippe v. Provident Fund Soc., 140 N.Y. 23, 35 N.E. 316; Rhyne v. Jefferson Standard Life, 196 N.C. 717, 147 S.E. 6, 199 N.C. 419, 154 S.E. 749; Nelson v. Jefferson, etc., Ins. Co., 154 S.E. 752, 199 N.C. 443; Guy v. United States Casualty Co., 151 N.C. 465, 66 S.E. 437; Rand v. Home Life Ins. Co., 206 N.C. 760, 174 S.E. 749; Woodell v. Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 496, 199 S.E. 719; Comstock v. Frat. Acc. Assn., 116 Wis. 382, 93 N.W. 22; Levan v. Met. Life, 138 S.C. 253, 136 S.E. 304; Whetstone v. New York Life, 182 S.C. 150, 188 S.E. 793; Guardian Life v. Brackett, 108 Ind. App. 442, 27 N.E.2d 103. (7) In other instances the cases involved policies containing provisions similar to the one here, but the cases were ruled for other reasons. Magill v. Travelers, 133 F.2d 709; Johnson v. Mutual Life, 293 U.S. 335; Swann v. Atlantic Life, 159 S.E. 192, 156 Va. 852; Hickman v. Ins. Co., 186 La. 997, 173 So. 742; Ray v. New York Life, 28 F. Supp. 988; Berry v. Acacia Mutual, 49 Ariz. 413, 67 P.2d 478; American United Life v. Goodman, 146 S.W.2d 907, 201 Ark. 634; Reliance Life v. Lynch, 144 Fla. 50, 197 So. 723; Northwestern Mutual v. Carneal, 90 S.W.2d 1010, 262 Ky. 665; Columbian Natl. v. Zammar, 178 Okla. 207, 62 P.2d 63; Pan American Life v. Welch, 74 S.W.2d 408; Schlintz v. Equitable Life, 226 Wis. 255, 276 N.W. 336. (8) In other instances the cases cited involved other issues. Randolph v. City of Springfield, 257 S.W. 449, 302 Mo. 33; Insurance Companies v. Boykin, 12 Wall. 433; Porto v. Metropolitan, 120 Conn. 196, 180 A. 289; Halliday v. United States, 315 U.S. 94; Bean v. Insurance Co., 190 A. 131, 88 N.H. 416. (9) The essential points of distinction have been illustrated and discussed by the courts of Missouri and by those of many other jurisdictions. Schoen v. American National Ins. Co., 167 S.W.2d 423; Feinberg v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 233 Mo. App. 707, 127 S.W.2d 82; Winkelmann v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 101 S.W.2d 736; Moss v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 230 Mo. App. 70, 84 S.W.2d 395; New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 217 Ala. 307, 116 So. 151, 59 A.L.R. 1075; Jenkins v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 7 S.E.2d 343, 122 W. Va. 73; Sherman v. Met. Life Ins. Co. and Bruce v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. (consolidated cases), 297 Mass. 330, 8 N.E.2d 892; Reynolds v. Travelers Ins. Co., 176 Wn. 36, 28 P.2d 310; Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 165 Miss. 405, 142 So. 445, 145 So. 887. (10) Even under decisions where insanity may be held to be an excuse for giving notice plaintiff would not be entitled to recover, and the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff did not make a case of insanity sufficient to excuse, because it was not shown that his condition was such as to make the giving of notice impossible. 13 C.J. 778, sec. 978; Whiteside v. North American Acc. Ins. Co. of Chicago, 200 N.Y. 320, 93 N.E. 948; Smith v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 134 Kan. 426, 7 P.2d 65; Bergholm v Peoria Life Ins. Co. of Peoria, 284 U.S. 489, 52 S.Ct. 230, 76 L.Ed. 416; Egan v. New York Life Ins. Co, 67 F.2d 899; Lough v. State Industrial Acc. Comm., 104 Or. 313, 207 P. 354; In re Bearden, 86 S.W.2d 585. (11) But whether plaintiff was insane, or whether his condition was such as to make the giving of notice impossible, he cannot recover, because his right to recover accrued only upon the furnishing of notice, and his inability to furnish notice did not discharge his contractual duty to give it. Restatement of the Law of Contracts (American Law Institute), sec. 455; Buchanan v. Louisiana Purchase Exposition, 245 Mo. 337, 149 S.W. 26; Harrison v. Mo. Pac. Railroad Co., 74 Mo. 364; Lewis v. Atlas Mutual Life Ins. Co., 61 Mo. 534; Pratt Grain Co. v. Schreiber, 213 Mo. App. 268, 249 S.W. 449; St. Joseph Hay Feed Co., 195 S.W. 71; Cluley-Miller Coal Co. v. The Freund Package Mfg. Co., 138 Mo. App. 274, 120 S.W. 658; Ward v. Haren, 139 Mo. App. 8, 119 S.W. 446; Clough v. Stillwell Meat Co, 112 Mo. App. 177, 86 S.W. 580.
Jones, Hocker, Gladney Grand and Vincent L. Boisaubin, amici curiae.
(1) Where a policy of life insurance provides for the waiver of premiums and the payment of disability benefits after the receipt of due proof of disability, or if the insured shall furnish such proofs, or where it otherwise appears that no such benefits are intended to accrue prior to the submission of such proof, then the furnishing of proof of disability is a condition precedent to the accrual of liability for the disability benefits, and the liability does not arise until and unless said proofs are furnished. Adams v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 74 S.W.2d 899, 228 Mo. App. 915; Moss v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 84 S.W.2d 395, 230 Mo. App. 70; Grafe v. Fid. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 84 S.W.2d 400; Farmers v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 85 S.W.2d 235; Martin v. Ill. Bankers L. Ins. Co., 91 S.W.2d 646; Clinton v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 94 S.W.2d 1080; Sapaw v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 94 S.W.2d 1082; Anderson v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 96 S.W.2d 631; Sutherland v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 99 S.W.2d 111; Rowan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 124 S.W.2d 577; Feinberg v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 127 S.W.2d 82; Brown v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 S.W.2d 91; Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U.S. 489; Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Ghio, 111 F.2d 307; Reingold v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 85 F.2d 776; Saul v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.2d 665; Orr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 64 F.2d 561; Avery v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 67 F.2d 442; Johnson v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 41; New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 83 F.2d 163; Lando v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc., 11 F. Supp. 729; Armstrong v. K.C. Life Ins. Co., 12 F. Supp. 817; New England Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 116 So. 151, 217 Ala. 307; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Sinquefield, 163 So. 812, 231 Ala. 185; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Farrell, 63 S.W.2d 520, 187 Ark. 984; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 65 S.W.2d 904, 188 Ark. 292; Cochens v. Prudential Ins. Co., 40 P.2d 902, 4 Cal.App.2d 172; Morris v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 43 P.2d 572, 6 Cal.App.2d 30; N.W. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Dean, 157 S.E. 878; Penn Mut. v. Milton, 127 S.E. 80; Bennett v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 121 P.2d 551; Smith v. Mo. St. Life Ins. Co., 7 P.2d 65, 134 Kan. 426; Bott v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc., 78 P.2d 860, 147 Kan. 671; Compton v. Amicable Life Ins. Co., 162 So. 751, 182 La. 991; Andrews v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 268 N.W. 415; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 157 So. 902, 171 Miss. 396; Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 142 So. 445, 165 Miss. 405; Goldman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 171 A. 541, 545, 115 N.J. Eq. 535; Epstein v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 257 N.Y.S. 772; Levitt v. Prudential Ins. Co., 270 N.Y.S. 39; Yohalem v. Columbian Natl. Life, 240 N.Y.S. 666; Mullaney v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc., 264 N.W. 663; Mid-Cont. Life v. Walker, 260 P. 1109; Mid-Cont. Life v. Skye, 240 P. 631; Perlman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 161 A. 752, 105 Pa. Super. 413; Lucas v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 176 A. 514, 116 Pa. Super. 298; Courson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 145 A. 530, 295 Pa. 518; Lyford v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 184 A. 469; Jenkins v. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 198 A. 486; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. McCausland, 200 A. 85; Parker v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 155 S.E. 617, 158 S.C. 394; Hall v. Acacia Mut. Life Assn., 46 S.W.2d 56, 164 Tenn. 93; Walters v. Jefferson St. Life, 20 S.W.2d 1038; Bank Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Milan, 70 S.W.2d 294; Steele v. New York Life Ins. Co., 48 P.2d 436, 87 Utah, 63; Bloss v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 28 P.2d 303, 304, 176 Wn. 1; Jones v. New York Life Ins. Co., 290 P. 333, 158 Wn. 12; Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 824, 114 W. Va. 323; Iannarelli v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 748, 114 W. Va. 88; Jenkins v. New York Life Ins. Co., 7 S.E.2d 343, 122 W. Va. 73. (2) The clause in a life insurance policy requiring the furnishing of due proof of disability as a condition precedent to liability for disability benefits is necessary and proper to enable the insurer to know what claims are being made on outstanding policies, to make the necessary actuarial calculations as to its liabilities, to investigate the claim, and to prevent fraud and deception; and hence compliance with this provision by the insured is a material part of the consideration moving to the insurer in support of the promise of the company to provide the benefits. Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 142 So. 445, 165 Miss. 405; Courson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 145 A. 530, 295 Pa. 518; Lucas v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 176 A. 515, 116 Pa. Super. 298; Jenkins v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 198 A. 486; Parker v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 155 S.E. 617, 158 S.C. 394; Goldman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 171 A. 541, 115 N.J. Eq. 535; Mullaney v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc., 264 N.W. 663; Bott v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc., 78 P.2d 860, 147 Kan. 671. (3) Where a policy of life insurance which also provides for disability benefits for total and permanent disability is unambiguous as to the intention of the parties that the furnishing of proof is a condition precedent to liability, then the furnishing of proof, being a part of the consideration which supports the promise to provide the disability benefits, is a necessary prerequisite to the accrual of liability for the disability benefits, and the insanity of the insured does not excuse the furnishing of proof of disability. The insured is limited in his recovery to such disability benefits as arise after the furnishing of said proof. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 116 So. 151, 217 Ala. 307; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 157 S.E. 878, 43 Ga. App. 67, affirmed 165 S.E. 235, 175 Ga. 321; Iannarelli v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 748, 114 W. Va. 88; Da Corte v. New York Life Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 248, 114 W. Va. 172; Jenkins v. New York Life Ins. Co., 7 S.E.2d 343, 122 W. Va. 73; Smith v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 7 P.2d 65, 134 Kan. 426; Reynolds v. Travelers Ins. Co., 28 P.2d 310, 176 Wn. 36; Farmers Trust Co. v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 13 A.2d 111, 140 Pa. Super. 115; Courson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 145 A. 530, 295 Pa. 518; Sherman v. Met. Life Ins. Co. and Bruce v. New York Life Ins. Co. (consolidated cases), 8 N.E.2d 892, 297 Mass. 330; Hanson v. N.W. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 229 Ill. App. 15; Continental Natl. Bank Trust Co., Conserv. of Spilkey, v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 257 Ill. App. 651; Bennett v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 121 P.2d 551; Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 80 S.W.2d 662, 168 Tenn. 690; Hall v. Acacia Mut. L. Ins. Co., 46 S.W.2d 56, 164 Tenn. 93; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 85 So. 93, 122 Miss. 813; Berry v. Lamar Ins. Co., 142 So. 445, 145 So. 887, 165 Miss. 405; Columbian Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Eaves, 185 So. 557, 185 Miss. 127; Whiteside v. N. Am. Acc. Ins. Co., 93 N.E. 948, 200 N.Y. 320; Mitchnick v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 284 N.Y.S. 565; Goldman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 171 A. 541, 115 N.J. Eq. 535; Egan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 67 F.2d 899; Chambers v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 80 F.2d 339; Reingold v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 85 F.2d 776. (4) A breach by the promisor of his unconditional promise, which is a part of the consideration which supports a promise by the other party, is not to be excused because of the impossibility of its performance, where the impossibility of the performance is not due to the nature of the performance, but to the inability of the individual promisor. Restatement of the Law, Am. Law Inst., "Contracts," sec. 455; Lewis v. Atlas Mut. Life Ins. Co., 61 Mo. 534; Harrison v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 74 Mo. 364; Buchanan v. La. Purch. Ex., 149 S.W. 26, 245 Mo. 337; Clough v. Stillwell Meat Co., 86 S.W. 580, 112 Mo. App. 177; Cluley-Miller Coal Co. v. The Freund Pkg. Mfg. Co., 120 S.W. 658, 138 Mo. App. 274; Ward v. Haren, 119 S.W. 446, 139 Mo. App. 8; Pratt Grain Co. v. Schreiber 249 S.W. 449, 213 Mo. App. 268; St. Joseph Hay Feed Co. v. Brewster, 195 S.W. 71. (5) Unequivocal language in an insurance contract is to be given its plain meaning, and the contract is to be construed and enforced as written like any other contract. State ex rel. Prud. Ins. Co. v. Shain, 127 S.W.2d 675, 344 Mo. 623; Wendorf v. Mo. St. Life Ins. Co., 1 S.W.2d 99, 318 Mo. 363; State ex rel. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Trimble, 267 S.W. 876, 306 Mo. 295; State ex rel. v. Cox, 14 S.W.2d 600; Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U.S. 489; Williams v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 170. (6) Courts are without authority to rewrite contracts. They discharge their full duty when they ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties, as disclosed by the contract which they have themselves made. Prange v. Int. Life Ins. Co., 46 S.W.2d 523, 329 Mo. 651; State ex rel. v. Trimble, 267 S.W. 876, 306 Mo. 295.
Phineas Rosenberg and J.L. London, amici curiae.
The Missouri courts, as well as the overwhelming weight of authority, hold that insanity excuses notice and proof of total disability where such are required by policies of insurance as a condition precedent or subsequent and that, under such circumstances, disability payments are due from the time of disability. Magill, Conservator, etc., v. Travelers Ins. Co., 133 F.2d 709; Roseberry v. Amer. Benevolent Assn., 142 Mo. App. 552, 121 S.W. 785; Hayes v. Continental Cas. Co., 98 Mo. App. 410, 72 S.W. 135; Randolph v. City of Springfield, 257 S.W. 449, 302 Mo. 33; Johnson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 41, affirmed 293 U.S. 335, expressly recognizing such to be the law and citing Roseberry v. Amer. Benev. Assn., 142 Mo. App. 552; Swan v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 159 S.E. 192, 156 Va. 852; McCoy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 258 N.W. 320; John Hancock v. DeCosta, 88 F.2d 479; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Heilbronner, 116 F.2d 855; Pfeiffer v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 174 Ark. 783, 297 S.W. 847; Rhyne v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 196 N.C. 717, 147 S.E. 6, 199 N.C. 419, 154 S.E. 749; Levan v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 138 S.C. 253, 136 S.E. 304; Reed v. Loyal Protective Assn., 154 Mich. 161, 117 N.W. 600; Marti v. Midwest Life Ins. Co., 108 Neb. 845, 189 N.W. 388; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 209 Ky. 522, 273 S.W. 54; Comstock v. Fraternal Acc. Assn., 116 Wis. 382, 93 N.W. 22; Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. LeFevre, 10 S.W.2d 267; Trippe v. Provident Fund Society, 140 N.Y. 23, 35 N.E. 315; Ins. Companies v. Boykin, 12 Wall. 433; Restatement of the Law of Contracts, American Law Institute, Dec. 301; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Carneal, 90 S.W.2d 1010, 262 Ky. 665; Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 53 P.2d 266, 175 Okla. 543; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Felton, 71 S.W.2d 1049, 59 A.L.R. 611; Levitt v. New York, 297 N.W. 888; Guy v. U.S. Casualty Co., 151 N.C. 465, 66 S.E. 437; Schlintz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. 226 Wis. 255, 276 N.W. 336; Bean v. Ins. Co., 190 A. 131, 88 N.H. 416; American United Life Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 146 S.W.2d 907, 201 Ark. 634; Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 74 S.W.2d 408; Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Case, 71 S.W.2d 199; Hickman v. Ins. Co., 173 So. 742, 186 La. 997; Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Holt, 55 S.W.2d 788, 186 Ark. 672; Nelson v. Jefferson, etc., Ins. Co., 154 S.E. 752, 199 N.C. 443; Ray v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 28 F. Supp. 988; Hablutzel v Home Life Ins. Co., 332 Mo. 920, 59 S.W.2d 639, affirming 52 S.W.2d 480; Halliday v. United States, 315 U.S. 94, 62 Sup. Ct. 438, 86 L.Ed. 393, reversing 116 F.2d 812; Hayes v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 235 Mo. App. 1261, 150 S.W.2d 1113; Whetstone v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 182 S.C. 150, 188 S.E. 793; Mid. Cont. L. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 32 S.W.2d 701; State Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 58 S.W.2d 189; Porto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 196, 180 A. 289; Old Colony, etc., Ins. Co. v. Julian, 175 Ark. 359, 299 S.W. 366; Neill v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 119 W. Va. 694, 195 S.E. 860; Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Brackett, 108 Ind. App. 442, 27 N.W.2d 103; Hallowes v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 133 Fla. 872, 184 So. 7, 12; Baylor v. Assur. Co., 113 N.J.L. 398, 174 A. 526; State Life Ins. Co. v. Fann, 269 S.W. 1111; Columbia Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Zammar, 178 Okla. 207, 62 P.2d 63; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Tharpe, 130 Fla. 546, 178 So. 300; Reliance L. Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 144 Fla. 50, 197 So. 723; Berry v. Acacia Mut. Life Assn., 49 Ariz. 413, 67 P.2d 478; Rand v. Home Life Ins. Co., 206 N.C. 760, 174 S.E. 749; Woodell v. Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 496, 199 S.E. 719; Minnesota Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 29 F.2d 977.
Henry I. Eager, amicus curiae; Kenneth E. Midgley and Michaels, Blackmar, Newkirk, Eager Swanson of counsel.
(1) Under the provisions of this policy the furnishing of proofs of disability was a condition precedent to the accrual of liability for disability income benefits or premium waiver. All States Life v. Steward, 5 So.2d 784; Home Life v. Couch, 141 S.W.2d 20; Clark v. Equitable Life, 68 P.2d 541; Mass. Mutual v. Montague, 10 S.E.2d 279; McLendon v. Jefferson Standard, 1 S.E.2d 75; Ferguson v. Penn. Mutual, 305 Ill. App. 537, 27 N.E.2d 548; Hanson v. Northwestern Mutual, 229 Ill. App. 15; Jabara v. Equitable Life, 280 Ill. App. 147; Bozich v. Metropolitan, 155 Kan. 573; McKenna v. N.Y. Life, 23 N.E.2d 88; Sherman v. Metropolitan, 297 Mass. 330, 8 N.E.2d 892; Burke v. N.Y. Life, 293 N.W. 248; McAndrews v. Prudential, 132 Neb. 332, 271 N.W. 857; Western Southern Life v. Smith, 41 Ohio App. 197, 180 N.E. 749; Gunter v. Prudential, 100 P.2d 851; Farmers' Trust Co. v. Reliance Life, 140 Pa. Super. 115, 13 A.2d 111; Binder v. General American Life, 282 N.W. 521; Gordinier v. Cont. Assur. Co., 7 N.W.2d 298; Reynolds v. Travelers, 176 Wn. 36, 28 P.2d 310; Kearns v. Penn. Mutual, 178 Wn. 235, 34 P.2d 888; Columbian National v. Goldberg, 138 F.2d 192. (2) Insanity does not excuse the furnishing of proofs of disability, where the submission of proofs is clearly made (as here), a condition precedent to liability. State ex rel. Prudential v. Shain, 344 Mo. 623, 127 S.W.2d 675; Walker v. General American Life, 141 S.W.2d 785; Henderson v. Mass. Bonding Ins. Co., 337 Mo. 1, 84 S.W.2d 922; Restatement of the Law of Contracts (American Law Institute), sec. 455; Wheeler v. Connecticut Mutual, 82 N.Y. 543; Klein v. Insurance Co., 104 U.S. 88; Iannarelli v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 88, 171 S.E. 748; Reynolds v. Travelers Ins. Co., 176 Wn. 36, 28 P.2d 310; New England Mutual v. Reynolds, 116 So. 151, 217 Ala. 307; Bennett v. New York Life, 121 P.2d 551; Reingold v. New York Life, 85 F.2d 776. (3) The authorities holding that insanity or incapacity does not excuse the furnishing of proofs where the policy expressly provides for liability only upon receipt of proofs. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 116 So. 151, 217 Ala. 307; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 157 S.E. 878, 43 Ga. App. 67, affirmed 165 S.E. 235, 175 Ga. 321; Brown v. New York Life, 188 S.E. 293; Iannarelli v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 748, 114 W. Va. 88; DaCorte v. New York Life Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 248, 114 W. Va. 172; Jenkins v. New York Life Ins. Co., 7 S.E.2d 343, 122 W. Va. 73; Smith v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 7 P.2d 65, 134 Kan. 426; Reynolds v. Travelers Ins. Co., 28 P.2d 310, 176 Wn. 36; Farmers Trust Co. v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 13 A.2d 111, 140 Pa. Super. 115; Courson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 145 A. 530, 295 Pa. 518; Sherman v. Met. Life Ins. Co. and Bruce v. New York Life Ins. Co. (consolidated cases), 8 N.E.2d 892, 297 Mass. 330; Hanson v. N.W. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 229 Ill. App. 15; Continental Natl. Bank Trust Co., Conserv. of Spilkey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 257 Ill. App. 651; Moscov v. Mutual Life of New York, 50 N.E.2d 970; Bennett v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 121 P.2d 551; Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 80 S.W.2d 662, 168 Tenn. 690; Hall v. Acacia Mut. L. Ins. Co., 46 S.W.2d 56, 164 Tenn. 93; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 85 So. 93, 122 Miss. 813; Berry v. Lamar Ins. Co., 142 So. 445, 145 So. 887, 165 Miss. 405; Columbian Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Eaves, 185 So. 557, 185 Miss. 127; Whiteside v. N. Am. Acc. Ins. Co., 93 N.E. 948, 200 N.Y. 320; Mutchnick v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 284 N.Y.S. 565; Yohalem v. Colum. Nat'l, 240 N.Y.S., 666; Gottlieb v. New York Life, 136 Misc. 194, 240 N.Y.S. 568; Goldman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 171 A. 541, 115 N.J. Eq. 535; Egan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 67 F.2d 899; Chambers v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 80 F.2d 339; Reingold v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 85 F.2d 776. (4) The following cases appear to decide the question on substantially similar policy provisions: Johnson v. Mutual Life, 293 U.S. 335; Swann v. Atlantic Life, 159 S.E. 192, 156 Va. 852; Hickman v. Ins. Co., 186 La. 997, 173 So. 742; Ray v. New York Life, 28 F. Supp. 988; Berry v. Acacia Mutual, 49 Ariz. 413, 67 P.2d 478; American United Life v. Goodman, 146 S.W.2d 907, 201 Ark. 634; Reliance Life v. Lynch, 144 Fla. 50, 197 So. 723; Northwestern Mutual v. Carneal, 90 S.W.2d 1010, 262 Ky. 665; Columbian Natl. v. Zammar, 178 Okla. 207, 62 P.2d 63; Pan American Life v. Welch, 74 S.W.2d 408; Schlintz v. Equitable Life, 226 Wis. 255, 276 N.W. 336. (5) The following cases cited in support of the proposition involve accident or accident and health policies (with marked distinctions in the contract provisions, as previously pointed out) or rely, as their authority, largely upon previous accident cases without noting any distinction in the policy terms or in the principles applicable: Roseberry v. American Benev. Assn., 142 Mo. App. 552, 121 S.W. 785; Hayes v. Cont. Cas. Co., 98 Mo. App. 410, 72 S.W. 135; Magill v. Travelers, 133 F.2d 709; Reed v. Loyal Protec. Assn., 154 Mich. 161, 117 N.W. 600; Marti v. Midwest Life, 108 Neb. 845, 189 N.W. 388; Trippe v. Provident Fund Soc., 140 N.Y. 23, 35 N.E. 316; Rhyne v. Jefferson Standard Life, 196 N.C. 717, 147 S.E. 6, 199 N.C. 419, 154 S.E. 749; Comstock v. Frat. Acc. Assn., 116 Wis. 382, 93 N.W. 22; Levan v. Met. Life, 138 S.C. 253, 136 S.E. 304; Whetstone v. New York Life, 182 S.C. 150, 188 S.E. 793; Guardian Life v. Brackett, 108 Ind. App. 442, 27 N.E.2d 103. (6) In the following cases, the policy provisions either fixed the accrual of liability as of the date of the inception of the disability, or were ambiguous, thus permitting such a construction. Minn. Mutual v. Marshall, 29 F.2d 977; Hablutzel v. Home Life, 332 Mo. 920, 59 S.W.2d 639; Mutual Life v. Heilbronner, 116 F.2d 855; Pfeiffer v. Missouri State Life, 174 Ark. 783, 297 S.W. 847; Metropolitan v. Carroll, 209 Ky. 522, 273 S.W. 54; Baylor v. Assur. Co., 113 N.J.L. 398, 174 A. 526; Levitt v. New York Life, 297 N.W. 888; McCoy v. New York Life, 258 N.W. 320; Mid-Continent Life v. Harrison, 175 Okla. 543, 53 P.2d 266; Hayes v. Equitable Life, 235 Mo. App. 1261, 150 S.W.2d 1113.
This is an action on an insurance policy for disability benefits (Count 1) and to recover premiums paid (Count 2) after commencement of disability. Plaintiff had a verdict on both counts, for the full amount claimed but later entered a remittitur to cover the six months waiting period of the policy and certain items of interest. The court sustained defendant's motion for new trial on the grounds that it should have directed a verdict for defendant and because of error in plaintiff's instructions. (However, the same legal question is involved on all grounds.) Plaintiff has appealed from this order.
The appeal went to the St. Louis Court of Appeals but the case was certified here on dissent. [Schoen v. American National Ins. Co., 167 S.W.2d 423.] We adopt the statement of facts (agreed by stipulation and shown by evidence) appearing in the majority opinion and make reference thereto for all facts not herein stated.
The question presented is whether or not plaintiff (guardian of insured) can recover under the disability provisions of the policy [58] for any of the period between January 1, 1938 (when it is claimed insured became totally and permanently disabled by reason of insanity) and January 15, 1941, when proof of disability was submitted to defendant.
The policy contained the following provisions:
"(Page one) Subject to the conditions and provisions set forth under this heading on page two thereof, the company will grant Benefits for Total Permanent Disability as follows:
"Waiver of Premium — The Company will during the continuance of such disability, waive payment of each premium as it thereafter becomes due, commencing with the premium due on first policy anniversary after receipt of said due proof of disability.
"Life Income to Insured — Six months after the receipt of said due proof of disability the Company will pay to the Insured, if then living and such disability still continued, the sum of Twenty-five Dollars, and a like sum monthly thereafter during the life of the Insured and the continuance of said Insured's disability."
"(Page two) The Company will grant the benefits for total permanent disability set forth on page one hereof only after one full year's premium shall have been paid and before default in the payment of any subsequent premium hereon if the Insured, prior to the policy anniversary nearest the date of attaining the age of sixty years and while this Policy is in full force, shall furnish due proof to the Company at its Home Office that said Insured has become totally and permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease, so that said Insured is, and presumably will be permanently, continuously and wholly prevented thereby for life from performing any work for compensation, gain or profit, or from following any gainful occupation, and that such disability has then existed continuously for not less than sixty days, no benefits for such total permanent disability to accrue however prior to the submission of due proof as above provided. . . .
"Although the proof of total permanent disability may have been accepted by the Company as satisfactory, the Insured shall at any time thereafter, and from time to time, but not oftener than once a year on demand, furnish to the Company due proof of the continuance of such disability, and if the Insured shall fail to furnish such proof, or if it shall appear to the Company that the Insured is able to perform any work or follow any occupation whatever for compensation, gain or profit, no further premiums shall be waived and no further income shall be paid. . . .
"Although the proof of total permanent disability may have been accepted by the Company as satisfactory, the Insured shall at any time thereafter, and from time to time, but not oftener than once a year on demand, furnish to the Company due proof of the continuance of such disability, and if the Insured shall fail to furnish such proof, or if it shall appear to the Company that the Insured is able to perform any work or follow any occupation whatever for compensation, gain or profit, no further premiums shall be waived and no further income shall be paid. . . . The additional premium stated on page one hereof in consideration of which these disability benefits are granted, is payable until the prior termination of the provisions of these benefits. The premium stated on the face of the Policy includes such additional premium, and the premium payable, if any, after the provision for these benefits terminate with will be the premium stated on the face of the Policy less the amount of such additional premium." (Our italics.)
It is apparent that these provisions literally mean that the insured himself must furnish proof of disability due to his insanity; and so, if he becomes so disabled, and his insanity continues until after he reaches the age of sixty, he could never collect any disability insurance even though all premiums had been paid throughout the whole period. Cases cited in the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals (167 S.W.2d l.c. 430) would uphold this result but it is not the majority rule. [See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 335, 55 S.Ct. 154, 79 L.Ed. 398, affirming (U.S.C.C.A. 4th Cir.), 70 F.2d 41; notes 142 A.L.R. 852, 68 A.L.R. 1389.] It is argued that a guardian or relative could furnish the proof of disability. While that might be accepted, it would be by the company's voluntary waiver or by the court's insertion of such an exception by construction. The policy is a contract between the company and the insured and the requirement for such proof is a duty imposed upon him. Thus the policy literally requires an impossibility in case of disability due to insanity. Therefore, while the policy insures disability due to insanity, if literally [59] construed and enforced no such insurance could ever be collected. It seems reasonable as suggested in the opinion by Justice Cordozo in the Johnson case, that there might be "a liberal construction of a requirement that is merely modal or procedural", so that "the insurer will not be deemed, in respect to matters of that order, to have exacted the impossible." At least, many courts have held that impossibility excuses literal compliance.
In Harris v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 137 F.2d 272, plaintiff, as administratrix, brought suit on a policy with provisions similar to those herein involved. No proof of disability had ever been given the company prior to the death of the insured. Recovery was sought for a period beginning October 1, 1933 when it was claimed insured's disability began to the date of his death in 1937. Plaintiff contended that the insured's failure to furnish due proof was caused by his mental incapacity which made it impossible for him to do so. The trial court overruled this contention and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed this judgment of dismissal and remanded the case for trial, saying: "The sole question presented is whether failure to furnish due proof of total and permanent disability of the insured is excused when such disability renders him unable to furnish such proof. . . . The furnishing of due proof of disability was a condition precedent to the Insurance Company's obligation to waive the payment of future premiums and to pay the disability benefits, but it was not the event insured against. It was a condition imposed to protect the Insurance Company against spurious claims. The insured had incurred total and permanent disability, the risk insured against; inability to furnish such proof grew out of that disability; and to deny recovery would work a forfeiture. Impossibility that would discharge the duty to perform a promise excuses a condition precedent if the existence or occurrence of the condition is no material part of the exchange for the promisor's performance and the discharge of the promisor will operate as a forfeiture. Under the holdings of most of the American courts, the facts here alleged would excuse performance of the condition precedent." [Citing Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 3, Secs. 676, 808; Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 301(b); Johnson v. Mutual Ins. Co. (U.S.C.C.A. 4th Cir.), 70 F.2d 41, 44, 45.]
We consider this to be sound reason and good law. It is argued that the provision for waiver of premiums is a part of the consideration because it provides an additional way to pay premiums. However, the payment of the life insurance part of the premium is only a part of the "Benefits for Total Permanent Disability" according to this provision of the policy itself. It has long been the rule in this state on accident and health policies that impossibility excuses failure in furnishing a required notice of disability. [Hayes v. Continental Casualty Co., 98 Mo. App. 410, 72 S.W. 135; Roseberry v. American Benevolent Assn., 142 Mo. App. 552, 121 S.W. 785; Hayes v. Equitable Life Assur. Assn., 235 Mo. App. 1261, 150 S.W.2d 1113; Magill v. Travelers Ins. Co. (U.S.C.C.A. 8th Cir.), 133 F.2d 709.] Defendant, and amici curiae, seek to put accident and health policies in a separate classification. But what is disability insurance? Surely it is and can be only a form of accident and health insurance. When it is combined with life insurance, as here, the insured pays an additional separate premium for it. The disability it insures against could only result from accident or ill health. The lack of any real basis for such distinction is made plain by Section 5800, (this and all other references are to R.S. 1939 and Mo. R.S. 1939 and Mo. R.S. Ann.) which authorizes incorporation of life insurance companies with authority to provide "weekly or other periodic indemnity for disability occasioned by accident or sickness to the person of the insured." Surely this was intended to authorize all forms of disability insurance. (Section 6003 authorizes licensing of foreign insurance companies and Section 6004 requires compliance "with all provisions of the laws of this state governing the business of insurance.") While the disability insurance, herein involved, is more limited in character than other forms of accident and health insurance, what is insured in all of them is loss resulting to the insured from his own sickness or accidental injury. In either case, the event which causes the loss to the insured, is the occurrence of an accident or the beginning of a period of illness and not the giving of notice. We see no good reason why the same rules should not apply to impossibility of performance of provisions for notice.
[60] The order granting a new trial is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the verdict and enter judgment thereon, for plaintiff, less the amount of remittitur.
All concur except Gantt, J., who concurs in result only.