Opinion
No. 1-615 / 00-0815.
Filed December 28, 2001.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, ROBERT J. CURNAN, Judge.
The Iowa Department of Transportation appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review rescinding the revocation of Robert Schilling's driver's license. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David A. Ferree, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Mark Hunecek, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Joseph J. Bitter of Bitter Law Offices, Dubuque, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.
The Iowa Department of Transportation appeals the decision of the district court which determined petitioner's driver's license should not be revoked under Iowa Code section 321.209(7) (1999). The department claims petitioner's deferred judgment should be considered a final conviction for purposes of that section. We affirm.
Robert Schilling was charged with eluding a police officer in violation of section 321.279. He entered a guilty plea and received a deferred judgment. On March 23, 2000, he received notice from the department that his driver's license was revoked for one year under section 321.209(7). This section provides:
The department, upon thirty days' notice and without preliminary hearing, shall revoke the license or operating privilege of an operator upon receiving a record of the operator's conviction for any of the following offenses, when such conviction has become final:
* * *
7.Eluding or attempting to elude a law enforcement vehicle as provided in section 321.279.
Iowa Code § 321.279 (1999).
Schilling filed a petition for judicial review, claiming a deferred judgment was not a final conviction and, therefore, his license should not be revoked. The district court noted a deferred judgment does not become final until probation is revoked, sentence imposed, and any appeal exhausted. The court concluded Schilling had not yet received a final conviction for eluding and section 321.209 was not yet applicable. The court determined the department had no authority to revoke Schilling's license at the present time. The department appealed.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the term "conviction" as used in section 321.209 includes a deferred judgment. We apply rules of statutory construction only when the explicit terms of a statute are ambiguous. Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 1995). Language which is unambiguous will be given its plain and rational meaning in light of the subject matter. Id.
When used in a statute or rule, the word "conviction" may have various meanings, depending on its purpose. State v. Brodene, 493 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Iowa 1992). The meaning of the term "conviction" may be considered a question of legislative intent. Id.; State v. Hanna, 179 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Iowa 1970).
In looking for legislative intent, we are guided by what the legislature actually said, rather than what it should or could have said. State v. Hatter, 414 N.W.2d 333, 337 (Iowa 1987). We may not, under the guise of construction, enlarge or otherwise change the terms of the statute. State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1990). A statute should be construed so that effect will be given to all of its provisions, and no part is superfluous or void. State v. Harrison, 325 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
In considering the meaning of the word "conviction," our supreme court has stated:
In the restricted or technical legal sense in which it is sometimes used, the word "conviction" includes the status of being guilty of, and sentenced for, a criminal offense, whether that status is established after confession of guilt by a guilty plea or after determination by a jury verdict upon an assertion of innocence. Stated otherwise technically the word means the final consummation of the prosecution against the accused including the judgment or sentence rendered pursuant to an ascertainment of his guilt.
In its general and popular sense and frequently in its ordinary legal sense, the word "conviction" is used in the sense of establishment of guilt prior to and independently of judgment and sentence by a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty.State v. Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1986) (quoting State v. Hanna, 179 N.W.2d 503, 507-08 (Iowa 1970)).
We recognize that in some situations a deferred judgment has been considered a conviction. See id. at 372-73 (deferred judgment considered a "conviction" for purposes of ordering restitution under section 910.2); State v. Blood, 360 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Iowa 1985) (deferred judgment may be included in the number of "convictions" for operating while intoxicated, leading to revocation of driving privileges under predecessor to section 321J.4).
These cases, however, address the term "conviction" in other code sections that do not include the phrase "when such conviction has become final," which is found in section 321.209. The interpretation of this phrase was discussed in Maguire v. Fulton, 179 N.W.2d 508 (Iowa 1970), where Terry Maguire was found guilty of drag racing by a justice of the peace. Maguire immediately appealed to the district court. While the appeal was pending, the commissioner of public safety revoked Maguire's driver's license under section 321.209. Maguire appealed, claiming the judgment of the justice of the peace was not a final conviction for purposes of section 321.209. The court held:
Maguire v. Fulton, 179 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Iowa 1970), addressed an earlier version of section 321.209, which provided:
The department shall forthwith revoke the license of any operator or chauffeur, or driving privilege, upon receiving a record of such operator's or chauffeur's conviction of any of the following offenses, when such conviction has become final: . . .
The statute was amended in 1990 to the current language, which also includes the phrase, "when such conviction has become final."
Applying the applicable rules of construction to the words, "when such conviction has become final" in the context in which they are used we conclude they mean that when an appeal is taken the conviction is not final until the avenues of review are exhausted. The commissioner acted improperly in revoking plaintiff's license under section 321.209.Maguire, 179 N.W.2d at 512.
Based on the specific wording of section 321.209, we find the legislature intended a driver's license to be revoked only when a conviction becomes final. The phrase, "when such conviction has become final," should be given effect, and not rendered superfluous or void. See Harrison, 325 N.W.2d at 772. The department's interpretation of the statute would make this phrase meaningless.
A deferred judgment has been determined not to be a final judgment. State v. Anderson, 246 N.W.2d 277, 279 (Iowa 1976). We concur in the district court's conclusion that because Schilling has not yet received a final conviction for eluding, the department does not have authority to revoke his license under section 321.209.
We affirm the decision of the district court.
AFFIRMED.