Opinion
No. 96 C 5056
February 1, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant Bank of Montreal's ("the Bank") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 1, 1999. For the following reasons, the Bank's motion is GRANTED.
1. Factual Background
The relevant facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party — here, plaintiff David Michael Scallon ("Scallon") — are as follows. On January 17, 1995, Scallon was placed at the Bank as a secretary through a temporary staffing agency. Scallon's tour at the Bank lasted slightly over four months until June 1, 1995, when the Bank terminated his assignment. Shortly thereafter, on September 13, 1995, Scallon filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC, alleging that he was sexually harassed throughout his tenure at the Bank, that the Bank failed to hire him because he is male, and that the Bank terminated him both because he is male and because he complained about the harassment. Scallon was issued a right to sue letter on May 17, 1996, and on August 14, 1996, Scallon timely filed a complaint in federal district court.
In his complaint, Scallon alleges that because he is male, and in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Bank (1) subjected him to a hostile work environment; (2) failed to hire him as a Bank employee; and (3) terminated his assignment. Scallon also alleges that the Bank (4) terminated his assignment in retaliation for his internal complaints about the harassment. On April 1, 1999, the Bank moved for summary judgment, and on April 21, 1999, Scallon moved for an extension of time to respond to that motion. This court granted Scallon's motion, giving him until June 14, 1999 to respond. At that point, Scallon had already moved for and been granted three re-openings of discovery. On June 14, 1999 — the date his response was due pursuant to his extension — Scallon moved for another extension of time and moved to reopen discovery for the fourth time. On July 16, 1999, this court denied Scallon's fourth request to reopen discovery, but once again granted his motion to extend, giving Scallon " one last chance" to respond by July 30, 1999.
Unfortunately for Scallon, and due to an unusually long delay between when the extension order was signed and when it was docketed, the July 16 order granting Scallon up to and including July 30 to respond to the Bank's summary judgment motion was not officially docketed until July 27. Rather than being prepared to respond to the Bank's motion should his motion to extend have been denied, however, Scallon was apparently working under the assumption that his motion would be granted. As such, Scallon was not prepared to respond by July 30, despite the fact that it was indeed an extension — albeit shorter than the two weeks he would have preferred — of the time for filing his response. Instead, Scallon chose to appeal this court's denial of his fourth motion to reopen discovery to the Seventh Circuit. That appeal was dismissed on October 11, 1999 for lack of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, this court indicated that it would neither entertain any further requests from Scallon for extensions of time, nor any response to the Bank's motion for summary judgment. As such, Scallon never did file a response.
2. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the movant is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see King v. Preferred Technical Group , 166 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1999). In order to determine whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists, this court must view the record and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Scallon. See Silk v. City of Chicago , 194 F.3d 788, 198 (7th Cir. 1999). This court is not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record in favor of Scallon; rather, the court need draw only those inferences that are reasonable. See id . Further, Scallon must introduce more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position, as there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for Scallon. See id . at 198 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). With that in mind, the court turns to the current motion.
3. Analysis
In its motion, the Bank argues that no reasonable jury could find that it subjected Scallon to a hostile working environment, failed to hire Scallon or terminated Scallon's temporary assignment because he is male, or terminated Scallon's assignment because he complained internally. The court will take each in turn.
A. Scallon's Hostile Environment Claim
Title VII's "ban on gender discrimination is violated when `discrimination based on sex . . . creates a hostile or abusive work environment.'" Hardin v. S.C. Johnson Son, Inc ., 167 F.3d 340, 345 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mentor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986)). In order to meet this standard, it is up to Scallon to establish that his workplace was both subjectively and objectively hostile. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc ., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). In its motion, the Bank assumes that Scallon has satisfied the subjective prong of this standard, and the court will do the same. The Bank contends that Scallon has failed to satisfy the objective prong of the standard, and the court agrees.
Harassment which creates an objectively hostile environment is harassment which is "sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and to create an abusive working atmosphere." Doe v. R.R. Donnelley Sons, Co ., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). In determining whether Scallon has established that an objectively hostile environment existed, the court will consider all of the circumstances, including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris , 510 U.S. at 23. Scallon alleges that the following rather exhaustive list of events (culled by the court from Scallon's deposition testimony), when taken together, constitute an objectively hostile work environment:
Though he is proceeding in this matter pro se, Scallon was represented by counsel at his deposition.
1. A female Bank employee named Shikha Rehman said to Scallon, whose first name is Dave, "I don't know why I want to call you Steve," and "I don't know why it sounds like you say Steve." Scallon found this offensive because "[s]he was implying that I had a lisp." Scallon believed that Rehman intended to offend him by her remark because "[s]he was rather unfriendly sitting right behind me." (Scallon Dep. at 64-65.)
2. A female Bank superior named Julie Curran reprimanded Scallon, in her office and out of hearing of other Bank employees, for not wearing his shoes while working. Scallon acknowledged that from time to time he didn't wear his shoes at work, but alleged that Curran intentionally timed the reprimand to make him late for a final exam. (Scallon Dep. at 85-87.)
3. Curran asked Scallon if it was time for her to sign his time sheet — an 8" x 3 1/2" piece of paper — by asking Scallon if it was time for her to sign his "little thingy." Scallon testified that although he was not offended by the remark "at the time," he "thought it was inappropriate for the workplace. Later, and at that time to a certain extent, I believe that it was in reference to or was suggestive, referring to my penis . . . [though literally] . . . I knew that we were talking about my time sheet in that conversation. . . . [I]f she wanted to sign my time sheet she could have said `Is it time to sign your time sheet?'" (Scallon Dep. at 97-99.)
4. A female Bank employee named Sharon Walsh excessively used the printer nearest Scallon when she could have opted to use a printer located in a different part of the office. Scallon found this offensive "[b]ecause she would print sometimes as many as 20 times a day, come to my desk, and I would look up and she would always be staring at me." Scallon also found conversations he overheard between Walsh and other Bank employees offensive because Walsh "would often use derogatory terms like `jerk' and `stupid' related to the male individuals who she worked with and who she had as clients." (Scallon Dep. at 102-105.)
5. Once when Scallon was searching for a file at the request of superior Laura Hunt, Hunt stood to Scallon's right, smiled, leaned into and bumped the back of Scallon's chair, touched the back of his neck, put her left hand on his left shoulder, and said, "Can we do it, Dave?," "Let's do it, Dave," and "Why don't we do it, Dave." Scallon found Hunt's use of "sexually suggestive words in a flirtatious manner in a sort of brash and bold way" offensive. (Scallon Dep. at 113-116.)
6. Once when Hunt came to Scallon's desk asking for an envelope, he handed her a "number 10 envelope" and asked, "how about this one?" In response, Hunt smiled at Scallon and asked him if he "had a big one." Scallon responded "in a loud voice, taking into consideration previous conversation [sic] that I had with Laura Hunt and her flirtatious behavior before, I said `This one isn't big enough for you?'" (Scallon Dep. at 117-118.) Scallon also found Hunt's questions and comments regarding weekend plans to be "flirtatious." (Scallon Dep. at 121.)
7. On the other hand, Scallon complained of being ignored by Bank employees:
* * *
Q: Are there any other incidents or remarks relating to Julie Curran that you remember at Bank of Montreal that you found offensive or sexually suggestive before May 19 of `95?
A: Yes. The overall —
Q: I want specific incidents as opposed to overall picture or feeling that you got from it.
A: Specific instances would be not saying hello to me when passing each other in the hallways or saying good morning and then walking over and talking to Betty Schweizer and Laura Hunt for sometimes an hour at a time.
* * *
(Scallon Dep. at 128.)
8. A female Bank employee, who "would frequently use the term `son of a bitch' or `bastard'" when referring to male coworkers or clients, once told Scallon that he was "stupid for working here." Scallon did not ask her what she meant because "I didn't want to know." (Scallon Dep. at 131-133.)
9. Scallon found it offensive when a female Bank employee asked him whether he "had time for a quickie": "It was obvious she was — she intended to mean a letter, however, if she intended me to write a letter she should have used the words `Do you have time to write a letter?'" (Scallon Dep. at 134-135.)
10. Scallon testified that Curran was having difficulty with "men in general" as a result of the trouble Scallon surmised Curran was experiencing in her marriage:
* * *
Q: Why do you have this in your letter to the EEOC? Are you trying to imply that Julie Curran was treating you coldly because she didn't like her husband? What is the point of your [sic] including that in your letter?
A: I believe that they were — I believe that she was having difficulties in her marriage.
Q: And why is that relevant to your EEOC charge and your letter to the EEOC?
A: Because Julie Curran treated me incredibly coldly and hostilely I believe because I am a male in a position that typically would be occupied by a female. I believe she didn't want to let me stay there, and this was exhibited by the way she treated me.
Q: But what does that have to do with her husband?
A: She was having difficulty in her marriage, perhaps with men in general.
* * *
(Scallon Dep. at 160-161.)
11. Scallon found Curran's opinion that O.J. Simpson "is guilty as hell. I hope they fry the son of a bitch" hostile, though he did not find that statement to mean that Curran believed men are inferior to women. (Scallon Dep. at 168-169.)
12. Female Bank employee Betty Schweizer was once "impolite" to Scallon:
* * *
Q: She was one of the product marketing team members who could give you tasks to do, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You did typing for her, right?
A: Yes.
Q: You answered phone calls for her if they came to your desk, right?
A: Yes.
Q: Don't you think it was reasonable for her to ask you to do things? Wasn't that the whole relationship?
A: As you can read further along in the sentence, quote, unquote, "Betty ordered me around as an inferior even though I was teaching her how to use Microsoft Excel and Word."
Q: So, you think the fact that even though you were teaching her to use these programs that should have changed the relationship?
A: Certain amount of courtesy.
Q: You thought she was discourteous to you?
A: Yes.
Q: How so?
A: The way she treated me.
Q: Can you be more specific than that?
A: By ordering me around.
* * *
(Scallon Dep. at 171-172.)
13. Angelica Vasquez, a female Bank receptionist, once said, "Boy, is he weird" when Scallon was "lightly conversing with" Vasquez and another receptionist after Scallon walked by Vasquez' desk upon picking up the mail. Scallon does not know what the remark was about. (Scallon Dep. at 178-180.)
14. Scallon testified that two female bank receptionists "would often be rude to people on the telephone and slam the phone down and say `What a jerk,' or generally treated men that would call, I believe, less preferentially than the women that they dealt with on a day-to-day basis." When asked how he knew the gender of the caller, Scallon testified:
* * *
A: In the case in point which I just mentioned of them calling the caller a jerk, that was a male.
Q: How do you know that?
A: Because they wouldn't have called a female a jerk.
Q: That's your personal belief'?
A: Yes.
* * *
(Scallon Dep. at 196-197.)
Though the record is riddled with other picayune comments and events that Scallon for one reason or another found to be "discourteous," "disrespectful," or "offensive," the court is utterly satisfied that none of these, either alone or in conjunction with one another, approach the level of a hostile work environment. Not only are these incidents lacking in severity, but there is also no evidence that Scallon found these incidents to be either physically threatening or humiliating, no evidence that these incidents unreasonably interfered with Scallon's work performance, and no evidence of any gender-based animus toward Scallon or toward males in general.
These include Scallon finding Julie Curran sitting in his desk chair on his first day of work after he returned from picking up the mail, which Scallon felt "was a slight invasion of privacy" (Scallon Dep. at 90-91); a female Bank employee physically touching Scallon in a crowded elevator in which "at least three other persons" were riding (Scallon Dep. at 136-138); Laura Hunt saying to Scallon, "What are you doing to me?" (Scallon Dep. at 181-182); a female Bank employee calling Scallon "Little Dave" (Scallon Dep. at 183-184); Curran being "short" with Scallon over the telephone by responding "Oh" rather than "Oh, I would like to leave a message," "I'll call back later," or "Please have him call me" after Scallon informed Curran that the employee for whom she was calling was either away from the office or on the phone (Scallon Dep. at 185-186); and Bank receptionists calling Scallon "temp" (Scallon Dep. at 195).
In short, Title VII is not a code of civility for the workplace. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc ., 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002 (1998). It exists neither to rid the workplace of behavior which some may subjectively consider to be sexually flirtatious, offensive, or rude, nor to provide a remedy for harassment which falls short of qualifying as gender discrimination. As the Supreme Court recently cautioned in Oncale:
Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at " discrimination . . . because of . . . sex." We have never held that workplace harassment . . . is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations.Id . at 1003 (quoting Harris , 510 U.S. at 25). See also Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co ., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995) ("occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers" does not amount to actionable sexual harassment). Because Scallon has introduced no evidence other than perhaps of "`simple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated incidents" of discourtesy, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998) (quoting Oncale , 118 S.Ct. at 1003), he has failed to carry his burden to establish that his workplace was objectively hostile. As such, summary judgment in favor of the Bank on Scallon's hostile environment claim is appropriate.
B. Scallon's Gender-Discriminatory Termination and Failure to Hire Claims
In his complaint, Scallon alleges that the Bank discriminated against him based on his gender when it terminated his temporary assignment and when it failed to hire him as a permanent employee. Scallon may either directly establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII or may do so indirectly by introducing evidence which establishes that (1) Scallon is a member of a protected class; (2) Scallon was performing according to the Bank's legitimate expectations; (3) Scallon suffered an adverse job action; and (4) similarly situated, female employees were treated more favorably. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). As Scallon has introduced no direct evidence either of discriminatory termination or of discriminatory failure to hire, see Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1170 (7th Cir. 1997) (direct evidence is evidence which not only speaks "directly to the issue of discriminatory intent, it must also relate to the specific employment decision in question"), the court assumes that Scallon is taking the indirect tack.
1. Discriminatory Termination Claim
The Bank does not dispute that Scallon can prove that he is male or that he suffered an adverse employment action, but argues that Scallon is unable to show that he was performing pursuant to the Bank's legitimate expectations. Specifically, the Bank argues that because it legitimately expected Scallon to "handle client telephone calls in a professional manner and to the clients' satisfaction," and because Scallon did not do so, Scallon was not performing according to its legitimate expectations. The court agrees. Both Scallon and the Bank have offered evidence, in the form of deposition testimony, regarding reprimands that Scallon admits to having received from superiors at the Bank regarding the manner in which Scallon dealt with Bank clients over the telephone. Scallon not only admits to having received these reprimands, but offers no contrary evidence to establish that he was performing pursuant to the Bank's legitimate expectations — in fact, Scallon never alleges that his job performance was satisfactory. Scallon has thus failed to establish his prima facie case of gender discrimination.
Assuming that Scallon were able to establish his prima facie case of discrimination, however, the burden would then shift to the Bank, under the McDonnell Douglas approach, to establish that it terminated Scallon's assignment for nondiscriminatory purposes. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-54 (1981) (once plaintiff succeeds in proving prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection," at which point plaintiff must have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that legitimate reasons offered by defendant were a pretext for discrimination.). The Bank asserts that it terminated Scallon because it received more than one client complaint about Scallon. Specifically, Julie Curran testified:
* * *
Q: Did he leave voluntarily, or was he asked to leave?
A: He was asked to leave.
Q: Do you recall whose decision it was to ask him to leave?
A: It was my decision, made with the input of other members of our team.
Q: When did you make the decision to ask Mr. Scallon to leave the bank?
A: On the day he left.
* * *
Q: And was there any input from members of the team upon which you based your decision other than what we have discussed already?
A: Meaning?
Q: Well, what input did you base the decision on?
A: That we received another complaint from a client that he was rude and uncooperative on the phone.
Q: And then you spoke to David Scallon about it?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: And what was said?
A: I told him that we had a major client who complained about his lack of cooperation and his behavior, and that I was basically tired of telling him that he was to treat our clients appropriately on the telephone. Basically that it was a professional — same thing I said in the past, this is a professional organization. This leaves our clients with a very poor perception of us. And I was quite direct.
Q: What did he say?
A: I don't recall the specific words, but he was very defensive and angry and not particularly receptive to what I had to say to him.
* * *
(Curran Dep. at 48, 50-51.)
The only evidence Scallon has introduced regarding the reason he feels he was actually terminated is his own deposition testimony, which reads, in relevant part, as follows:
* * *
Q: Do you believe your assignment was ended in retaliation for your complaint on May 19 or because of your gender?
A: Both.
Q: I always have trouble with that. Why do you think it was terminated because of your gender?
A: Because I think that they were not ready to have or hire a male in that position, they being the Bank of Montreal and Julie Curran and Laura Hunt.
* * *
Q: Is there any other reason why you think your assignment was terminated because of your gender?
A: Because of my gender I believe that less qualified females were hired in the position — into positions from temporary positions at the Bank of Montreal.
Q: Let me stop you for a second because that's really a separate issue as far as what jobs people were hired into. I want to focus on why you think your assignment was terminated because of your gender.
A: Again I believe they just were not ready to have a male in a position —
Q: Did anyone ever tell you that?
A: — such as the one I was working at. No.
Q: That's what you surmised from all of the circumstances during your five plus months there?
A: And subsequent to the five month tenure that I was there.
Q: What was subsequent to it that made you think that?
A: Statistical evidence that I was able to obtain regarding the numbers of females and males working at the Bank of Montreal.
* * *
(Scallon Dep. at 258-261.)
Without more, Scallon's own opinion as to whether he "believed" that the Bank was not "ready" to have a male in a position that he felt was more typically occupied by females is insufficient to establish that the Bank's proffered reason for terminating Scallon was a pretext for discrimination. It is thus clear that Scallon has failed to establish his prima facie case of gender discrimination, and that even if he had, he has failed to establish that the Bank's proffered reason for terminating him was pretextual. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the Bank on Scallon's discriminatory termination claim is appropriate.
2. Discriminatory Failure to Hire Claim
Scallon also alleges in his complaint that because he is male, the Bank did not hire him after his temporary assignment ended, in violation of Title VII. Scallon's failure to hire claim fails for two reasons. First, Scallon failed to introduce any evidence indicating that he ever applied for a position with the Bank after he began working there as a temporary employee:
* * *
Q: You are also claiming in this lawsuit, apart from the termination of your assignment, that Bank of Montreal failed to hire you because of your gender, is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: What jobs do you think you should have been hired for?
A: I applied to the Bank of Montreal for many jobs prior to working at the Bank of Montreal. I believe I should have been hired for those positions and for the position I held during the time we have been talking about.
Q: So, the position you were assigned to temporarily from January 17 to June 1 is one job that you think you should have been hired into permanently, right?
A: Offered a position, yes.
Q: And I think we have already talked about the fact that A, you never submitted any formal written application for that job, right?
A: I did not believe it would be considered.
Q: Did you submit a formal written application?
A: No, I did not.
Q: And you never — I think you testified that you never expressly told anybody, hey, I want to be considered for that position, true?
A: I don't have a direct recollection of that, but —
Q: You felt that nevertheless they should have offered you that job?
A: Yes.
Q: That's one job. You also said a second ago that there were many other jobs you applied for at Bank of Montreal I assume before January 17, is that what you were saying?
A: Yes.
Q: January 17 of '95?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you tell me what any of those jobs were?
A: Various positions in finance and accounting, the applications are actually responsive to your previous Request for Documents.
Q: What do you mean by that?
A: You should have the resumes.
Q: Resumes that you submitted to the Bank of Montreal for jobs?
A: Yes.
Q: You don't recall, as you sit here today, what any of those jobs were?
A: There was some in the Harris investment management area.
Q: You are talking about Harris Bank as opposed to Bank of Montreal?
A: Yes.
Q: Let me just clarify. Did you ever submit an application to Bank of Montreal as opposed to Harris Bank?
A: I do not recall at this time.
* * *
(Scallon Dep. at 266-68.)
In light of the fact that Scallon has introduced no evidence that he applied for a job with the Bank, this court cannot find the Bank at fault for not hiring him.
Scallon's discriminatory failure to hire claim also fails because even if Scallon could establish his prima facie case of discriminatory failure to hire, he has introduced no evidence to suggest that the Bank's proffered reason for not hiring him was pretextual. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54. Curran attested in an affidavit that "[t]hroughout 1995, the product marketing team," for whom Scallon worked, "did not have budget approval to hire a secretary or administrative assistant as a Bank employee. Therefore, I did not have authority to hire Mr. Scallon or anyone else as a Bank employee for the position Plaintiff held on a temporary basis." (Curran Aff. ¶ 5.) Scallon has introduced no evidence to refute this. As Scallon has introduced no evidence in support of his discriminatory failure to hire claim, summary judgment in favor of the Bank is appropriate.
C. Scallon's Retaliatory Termination Claim
Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee who opposes an employment practice that is made unlawful by Title VII, or who participates in any charge or investigation under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a). "An actual violation of Title VII by the employer is not a prerequisite for a retaliation claim; the employee need only have a sincere and reasonable belief that [he] is challenging conduct that violates Title VII." Hunt-Golliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997). To establish his prima facie case of retaliation, Scallon must show that "(1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse action by the employer; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action." Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 938-39 (7th Cir. 1996.)
Scallon alleges that in late April 1995, one female Bank receptionist said to another female Bank receptionist when Scallon walked by, "Should I call him a fag?" Scallon concluded that the remark, "[t]aken into context with the other events which led up to this event," referred to him because when the women made the remark, "[t]hey were both looking at me." (Scallon Dep. at 198.) As a result, two weeks later, on May 19, 1995, Scallon lodged an internal complaint with his direct superiors at the Bank complaining that "Desiree called me a fag, apparently because I am working as a secretary. This was a blatant attempt to damage my self-esteem. I think this is one of the worst thing [sic] one can say to a male." (Scallon Ltr. ¶ 3.) Two days later, Scallon met with Gary Hatch, a representative from the Bank's human resources department, who also met with the receptionists involved in the incident. Because Scallon's temporary assignment was terminated approximately ten days after meeting with Hatch, Scallon argues that he was terminated, at least in part, for complaining. Scallon testified:
* * *
Q: Did Gary Hatch during your meeting with him on May 21 tell you that he was going to investigate your allegations in your memo?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you know whether he ultimately met with Desiree and Angelica as part of that investigation?
A: I know that he met with Angelica and Desiree as a result of that investigation.
Q: You were not present for those meetings?
A: No, I was not.
* * *
Q: So, after you met with Gary you never heard another word about it?
A: Never.
Q: Then how do you know that they ultimately believed Desiree and Angelica instead of you?
A: Because they terminated my employment there and Angelica and Desiree continued their employment there.
Q: You think you were terminated for complaining?
A: I do.
* * *
Q: Let me ask you a better question. You have told me, or I implied that the timing led you to believe your assignment was ended in retaliation for the memo, right?
A: Yes.
Q: And you believe that there was no other reason to end your assignment other than the fact that you wrote the memo, right?
A: Yes.
Q: Is there any other reason why you think your assignment was ended in retaliation for complaining about Desiree and Angelica?
A: I do not believe so, no.
* * *
(Scallon Dep. at 246-47, 265.)
The Bank assumes that Scallon can meet his prima facie burden "[b]ecause it terminated Plaintiffs assignment 13 days after he complained about the receptionists' treatment of him," and thus acknowledges its burden to assert a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its decision. The Bank contends once again that it terminated Scallon's temporary assignment because it received multiple complaints about Scallon's telephone manners. The court finds from the record that this is a sufficiently-supported, non-retaliatory reason for the Bank's decision. As such, under McDonnell Douglas, the burden now shifts back to Scallon to introduce evidence that the Bank's reason was a pretext for discrimination. The only evidence Scallon again offers is his opinion that — well, that there just could be no other "legitimate reason." (Scallon Dep. at 264.) Scallon's own opinion that there could be no reason for his termination other than the fact that he complained about being called a fag is, without more, insufficient to raise a question of fact regarding the legitimacy of the Bank's reason for terminating him. Because Scallon has failed to demonstrate that the Bank's proffered reason for terminating him was pretextual, summary judgment in favor of the Bank on Scallon's retaliation claim is appropriate.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT defendant Bank of Montreal's April 1, 1999 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and the clerk is DIRECTED to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of the Bank of Montreal. Plaintiff David Michael Scallon shall take nothing by way of his complaint.
SO ORDERED.