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Saylor v. Green Tree Fin.

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Jan 28, 2002
No. 1-522 / 00-1005 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002)

Opinion

No. 1-522 / 00-1005.

Filed January 28, 2002.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, JOEL D. NOVAK, Judge.

The plaintiffs challenge the district court's ruling that Green Tree had abandoned its security interest and was no longer a lienholder liable for past due rent on an abandoned mobile home. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Fred J. Kreykes, Pella, for appellants.

Chip Lowe of Howe, Cunningham Lowe, P.L.C., Urbandale, for appellee.

Heard by HUITINK, P.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.


The plaintiffs, Jerry and Mary Saylor, filed a small claims action seeking past due lot rent and late charges from defendant Green Tree Financial, lienholder of an abandoned mobile home. The court ruled against the Saylors. On appeal, the district court affirmed. The Saylors appeal, contending (1) because of its status as a lienholder, Green Tree is a "claimant" under Iowa Code section 562B.27(2)(a) (1997), and as such, is liable for the past due rent which accrued during the period defined in that statute, (2) the discharge in bankruptcy of the mobile home owner of the debts owed to the Saylors and Green Tree has no effect upon Green Tree's liability for the unpaid rent which accrued during the period set forth in section 562B.27, and (3) Green Tree owes a duty to the Saylors derived from quantum meruit principles. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.

As a preliminary matter, we note that there was no transcript of the proceedings on appeal to the district court, and the tape recording of the small claims hearing was destroyed. Therefore, we rely on the district court's ruling on the Saylors' statement of evidence and proceedings and Green Tree's objections and proposed amendments to the statements pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c).

The Saylors are the owners of a mobile home park. Kate Carson was the prior owner of the park. Shirley Collins, a named defendant but not a party to this appeal, owned a mobile home in the park. Her son and daughter-in-law were the tenants. Green Tree held a first security interest in Collins's home. Collins's son and daughter-in-law abandoned the mobile home and ceased paying lot rent. Collins filed for bankruptcy and discharged her debts to the Saylors and Green Tree.

Carson notified Green Tree that she was having problems with Collins's lot, that she was seeking lost rent from Green Tree, and that she was demanding the mobile home be removed from the lot. A Green Tree employee advised Carson that Green Tree believed it had no obligation for the rent since it had abandoned its interest in the mobile home and was releasing Green Tree's lien.

The Saylors became the owners of the park in December 1998. Jerry Saylor had several conversations with Green Tree demanding payment. Green Tree responded that it believed it had no obligation to pay because it intended to abandon the home and release its lien. The district court was of the opinion that the lien was never released because Green Tree had difficulty locating the title to the home. As of January 13, 2000, title to the home listed Green Tree as holder of the first security interest.

The Saylors filed a small claims action on January 28, 2000, seeking to recover past due lot rent and late charges from Green Tree. At the small claims proceeding, no party had any interest in possessing the mobile home. On March 3, 2000, the court dismissed the Saylors' suit. It ruled that Collins's rental obligations discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding and the Saylors were not entitled to past rent. It ordered Green Tree to sign over title to the Saylors so they could reduce their losses.

The Saylors appealed to the district court, which affirmed. The court concluded that "[o]nce Collins went into bankruptcy and discharged Green Tree as a creditor, it no longer held that security interest." It held that Green Tree had not become the owner of the mobile home and was therefore not liable for back rent. Our supreme court granted the Saylors' application for discretionary review.

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW.

This matter appears to have been brought as an action at law. On discretionary review of a law action, this court's review is for the correction of errors at law. D.R. Mobile Home Rentals v. Frost, 545 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 1996).

III. WHETHER GREEN TREE WAS OBLIGATED TO PAY PAST DUE LOT RENT UNDER IOWA CODE SECTION 562B.27.

The Saylors contend on appeal that Green Tree was a lienholder and "claimant" obligated to pay past due rent under Iowa Code section 562B.27(2)(a). In construing statutes, we examine the legislature's intent as evidenced by what the legislature said, as opposed to what it might have said. State v. Guzman-Juarez, 591 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1999). In addition, "[w]hen the text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the court should not search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute. . . ." Henriksen v. Younglove Constr., 540 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Iowa 1995).

The legislature amended section 562B.27(2)(a) effective May 20, 1999. Prior to the amendment the statute read as follows:

If a tenant abandons a mobile home on a mobile home space, the landlord shall notify the mobile home owner or other claimant of the mobile home and communicate to that person that the person is liable for any costs incurred for the mobile home space, including rent and utilities due and owing. However, the person is only liable for costs incurred ninety days before the landlord's communication. After the landlord's communication, costs for which liability is incurred shall then become the responsibility of the mobile home owner or other claimant of the mobile home. The mobile home shall not be removed from the mobile home space without a signed written agreement from the landlord showing clearance for removal, and that all debts are paid in full, or an agreement reached with the mobile home owner or other claimant and the landlord.

Iowa Code § 562B.27(2)(a) (1997). The amendment added the language "[a] claimant includes a holder of a lien as defined in section 555B.2." 1999 Iowa Acts ch. 155, § 11.

An amendment to a statute does not necessarily indicate a change in the law. Guzman-Juarez, 591 N.W.2d at 3. Amendments may either clarify or modify existing legislation. Id. We construe revisions as altering a statute if the intent to change the law is clear and unmistakable. Id. Moreover, we presume that any material change in the language of a statute alters the law. Id. This presumption is not conclusive, however: "the time and circumstances of the amendment . . . may indicate that the legislature merely intended to interpret the original act by clarifying and making a statute more specific." Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress v. Iowa Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 461 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Iowa 1990). This exception is recognized "when the law is amended as to minor details and some disputed question is made clear by the amendment. In such a case the amendment can be said to cast light on the legislature's earlier intent." Slockett v. Iowa Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist., 359 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1984).

We believe the exception applies here. The amendatory language does not evidence a clear and unmistakable intent to change the law. See State ex rel. Schuder v. Schuder, 578 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1998) (concluding amendment did not evidence a clear and unmistakable intent to change the law). Nor does the amendment materially change the law so as to give rise to a presumption that the legislature intended to alter the law. See Guzman-Juarez, 591 N.W.2d at 3. We believe the amendment merely clarifies the legislature's original intent to include lienholders as claimants.

Therefore, we must next consider whether Green Tree was a lienholder, and thus a claimant under section 562B.27(2)(a), during the times relevant to this appeal. Neither party has claimed on appeal that Green Tree was not a lienholder of the mobile home as defined in section 555B.2 at one time, so we proceed upon the assumption that Green Tree fit that definition. Green Tree argues that it is not liable for past due lot rent because it waived its interest in the mobile home in December 1998. See Zimmerman v. Kile, 443 N.W.2d 99, 101 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (wavier is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right). In support thereof, Green Tree relies on its verbal statements to Carson that it abandoned its interest in the mobile home and was releasing its lien and to Jerry Saylor that it intended to abandon the home and release its lien.

We believe that these verbal statements were not sufficient to release Green Tree's lien on the mobile home. The Saylors could not follow the procedure under chapter 555B to dispose of the mobile home while Green Tree held a lien on the mobile home. Iowa Code § 562B.27(2)(b). The statements did not provide Carson and the Saylors with certainty that the lien had been released, see section 321.50(4) (when a security interest is discharged, the holder shall note cancellation of same on the face of the certificate and deliver it to the county treasurer), so that they could proceed under chapter 555B. Therefore, we conclude Green Tree did not waive its lien in December 1998.

The Saylors contend that Green Tree should not be allowed to release its lien, and it should be liable for past due lot rent and costs from September 10, 1998 through May 24, 2000, the date of the district court's ruling on appeal. Even if Green Tree validly released its lien, they argue, section 562B.27 should be interpreted as continuing the lienholder's duty to pay rent accruing until the mobile home is removed and as requiring the lienholder to pay for removal of the home.

As previously mentioned, we examine the legislature's intent as evidenced by what the legislature said, as opposed to what it might have said. Guzman-Juarez, 591 N.W.2d at 2. The legislature has not restricted a lienholder's release of its security interest under section 562B.27, nor has it continued the obligations of a lienholder beyond the release of its security interest. We do not believe the legislature intended the construction of section 562B.27 urged by the Saylors.

It appears from the record that Green Tree did not release its lien until March 2000, when the ruling was entered in small claims court. Therefore we conclude that Green Tree is responsible for past due lot rent and late charges under section 562B.27(2)(a) incurred until the lien was released in March 2000.

IV. WHETHER COLLINS'S DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY HAD AN EFFECT ON GREEN TREE'S OBLIGATION TO PAY PAST DUE LOT RENT.

The Saylors contend that the district court erred in finding that Collins's discharge in bankruptcy of the debts owed to them and to Green Tree have no effect upon Green Tree's liability for the unpaid rent which accrued during the period set forth in section 562B.27(2)(a). The district court determined that once Collins went into bankruptcy and discharged Green Tree as a creditor, it no longer held that security interest, and since it was not the mobile home's owner, it was not liable for past due lot rent.

Under Iowa law, a discharge in bankruptcy does not affect or prevent the enforcement of valid liens existing prior to discharge. Conklin v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 482 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Iowa 1992); Moad v. Neill, 451 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). There is no contention or finding that Green Tree's lien was other than a valid lien that existed prior to discharge. Thus, the discharge did not affect Green Tree's lien, and the district court erred in holding otherwise.

V. WHETHER PRINCIPLES OF QUANTUM MERUIT APPLY.

The Saylors claim that Green Tree owes them a duty derived from quantum meruit principles based upon their maintenance of the mobile home. Green Tree argues that this claim was not preserved, as it was not raised before the lower courts. We agree. The Saylors have failed to state how error was preserved. Iowa R. App. P. 14(a)(5). Our review of the record shows this claim was not raised in the small claims court or the district court on appeal. Issues must be presented to and ruled upon by the trial court before they can be raised and decided on appeal. Metz v. Amoco Oil Co., 581 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1998); Conner v. State, 362 N.W.2d 449, 457 (Iowa 1985). Therefore, we conclude the Saylors have failed to preserve error on this issue.

VI. CONCLUSION.

We conclude that the district court erred in finding that Green Tree had no interest in the mobile home and that its interest was discharged in Collins's bankruptcy. Therefore, we reverse the district court's ruling, and we remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.


Summaries of

Saylor v. Green Tree Fin.

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Jan 28, 2002
No. 1-522 / 00-1005 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002)
Case details for

Saylor v. Green Tree Fin.

Case Details

Full title:JERRY SAYLOR and MARY SAYLOR, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GREEN TREE…

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Jan 28, 2002

Citations

No. 1-522 / 00-1005 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002)