Opinion
Hearing Granted by Supreme Court Oct. 15, 1928.
Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles County; P. E. Keeler, Judge.
Action by Lois S. Saxton against the Board of Education of Los Angeles City School District and others for a writ of mandate to compel reinstatement of plaintiff as permanent teacher in the public schools of the City of Los Angeles. From a judgment granting the writ, defendants appeal. Reversed.
COUNSEL
Everett W. Mattoon, County Counsel, and C. B. Penn, Deputy County Counsel, both of Los Angeles, for appellants.
W. A. Alderson, of Los Angeles, for respondent.
OPINION
YORK, J.
Respondent, a "permanent" teacher in the public schools of Los Angeles city school district, as defined in section 1609, Political Code, brought this action against the school board of said school district and the members of said school board for writ of mandate against defendants, who are appellants here, to reinstate her and permit her to continue to serve in said public schools as a permanent teacher, and to pay her $286, alleged to be due her as such teacher, and for a judgment that the act of defendants discharging her is null and void. She had been discharged for cause, after a full and fair hearing before said school board, where she was represented by counsel. After a trial in the superior court, it was found by the court in a general finding that the allegations in respondent’s petition that she had been discharged wrongfully, illegally, and without cause were true; but specific findings followed showing that a charge against her had been legally made, that a time was legally set for hearing, that legal notice of the hearing was given, and that all of the proceedings leading up to her discharge were in strict conformity with the law. Specific findings, when in conflict with general findings, control, and hence should be considered as the only findings in determining the appeal of defendants herein.
Under section 1609 of the Political Code, it is provided that boards of education shall have power and it shall be their duty, to dismiss "permanent" teachers for unprofessional conduct-persistent violation or refusal to obey the school laws of California or reasonable rules prescribed for the government of public schools. The dismissal can be made on the proof of any one or more of the charges and by an affirmative vote of a majority of the board present at the hearing.
The superior court, on a hearing on an alternative writ of mandate, made its findings and ordered a peremptory writ of mandate to issue, commanding defendants to reinstate plaintiff as a "permanent" teacher in the public schools of the Los Angeles city school district, and to permit her to continue in the service of said public schools as a teacher, and to pay her $286 accrued salary. The case comes here on the judgment roll. In the absence of a bill of exceptions, we must assume that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the findings.
The principal question to be decided on this appeal is as to whether the superior court, after such a hearing before the board of education and findings by said board (on substantial, though conflicting, evidence), and the teacher’s discharge upon such findings, can by writ of mandate compel a board of education to reinstate said teacher and permit her to continue as a teacher in the schools. Respondent contends that the superior court has that power under the following clause of section 1609 of the Political Code:
"Nothing in this act shall be construed in such manner as to deprive any teacher of his rights and remedies in a court of competent jurisdiction on a question of fact and law." But it does not appear that a teacher at any time has the right to continue as a teacher in the public schools after a legal discharge by the board of education, or that among the "remedies" to which she is entitled is that of obtaining a writ of mandate to overrule the board of education and compel it to reinstate her. None of the cases cited by respondent go to that extent. This case differs from an action for damages for breach of contract, in that the action to recover damages pertains to a property right of a teacher, and the plaintiff’s remedy therein does not interfere with the control and management of the public schools. It is unlike the case of Grigsby v. King et al. (Cal. Sup.) 260 P. 789. In that case a teacher had been discharged without a hearing, and an action for an injunction was held to lie against the school board, the court saying:
"The action becomes, in effect, not one to enforce a contract for personal services, but to restrain action by the board of trustees in excess of its power to the detriment and damage of plaintiff."
In the instant case, the school board did not act in excess of its powers, nor in bad faith.
The action of the superior court, putting it bluntly, was a substitution of the court for the school board in the legitimate exercise of the functions enjoined upon the board by law. The public is entitled to an honest, fair, and efficient exercise of the duties of the school board so imposed upon it, and the law does not contemplate that the board shall be hampered in the exercise of its powers in the interests of the public schools, while acting within the scope of those powers. Where the action of a public officer partakes of a judicial nature and that officer has passed upon the question in good faith, though on substantially conflicting evidence, the writ of mandate will not be granted. It has been settled law in this state for more than seventy years that mandamus will not lie to control the discretion vested in an inferior board or person exercising quasi judicial powers, except where there has been an abuse of discretion of excess of jurisdiction. Declarations to that effect have been sustained from the case of Thomas v. Armstrong, 7 Cal. 286, to the present day. Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483, 105 P. 582; Pacific P. Ass’n v. Huntington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 237 P. 538, 40 A. L. R. 782. Courts should not assume to control the discretion of school boards where the right of such boards to exercise discretion exists. People ex rel. Frank v. Board of Supervisors of City and County of San Francisco, 21 Cal. 697. The teacher had the right to appeal from the action of the school board in ordering her discharge to the county superintendent of schools (section 1698, Pol. Code); and she had a right to appeal from its action in withholding her salary to the superintendent of public instruction (section 1699, Pol. Code).
Although section 1609 of the Political Code provides that nothing in this act shall be construed, etc. (as above quoted), the Code of Civil Procedure provides (section 1086) that a writ of mandate must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Under the facts of this case, such remedy was provided, and the writ of mandate should not be granted.
The judgment is reversed.
We concur: CONREY, P. J.; HOUSER, J.