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upholding directed verdict in design defect case where "the appellant's own testimony does not support her [expert's] theory"
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Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Argued and Submitted Aug. 11, 1989.
C.D.Cal.
AFFIRMED.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; John G. Davies, District Judge, Presiding.
Before FLETCHER and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and PHILIP M. PRO , District Judge.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
MEMORANDUM **
Plaintiff-Appellant Claude E. Saunders appeals pro se from a grant of summary judgment by the United States District Court for the Central District of California in favor of Defendant-Appellee Northrop Aircraft Corporation, and the court's granting of separate motions to dismiss filed by Defendants-Appellees Northrop, State of California and County of Los Angeles. We affirm.
This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment and motion to dismiss de novo. Ford v. Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corp., 831 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir.1987); First American Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 848 F.2d 969, 970 (9th Cir.1988).
I.
Saunders had been previously employed by Northrop from 1952 until his termination for misconduct on March 20, 1956. Saunders contends that on August 27, 1984, he was denied reemployment at Northrop Corporation (Aircraft Division) on account of his race and his age.
In September 1984, Saunders filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that he was denied employment because he is black. However, the EEOC found no reasonable cause for such a claim and issued Saunders a right-to-sue letter.
Saunders, appearing pro se, filed his original complaint on December 2, 1985, charging racial and age discrimination. Named as Defendants were Northrop, the State of California and the County of Los Angeles. The County of Los Angeles filed a motion to dismiss on December 19, 1985, and the State of California filed a motion to dismiss on December 27, 1985. On February 3, 1986, the district court granted both motions without leave to file an amended complaint.
Northrop filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on January 23, 1986. On March 3, 1986, the district court granted Northrop's motion to dismiss Saunders' racial discrimination claim with prejudice, and granted Northrop's motion to dismiss Saunders' age discrimination claim without prejudice. Saunders filed an amended complaint against Northrop on March 13, 1986, alleging a claim for age discrimination. On October 10, 1986, Northrop moved for summary judgment. Although given ample opportunity to do so by the district court, Saunders filed no opposition to Northrop's motion for summary judgment and instead filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on November 24, 1986. On December 11, 1986, the district court granted Northrop's motion for summary judgment and denied Saunders' motion for summary judgment.
II.
The Court must give liberal construction to pro se pleadings, particularly where they involve civil rights claims. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir.1985). A court may dismiss a complaint alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it contains conclusory allegations. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir.1980); Finley v. Rittenhouse, 416 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir.1969). A governmental entity may not be held liable for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory absent allegations that the alleged constitutional violation was the product of governmental custom or usage. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
With regard to his claim against the State of California, Saunders fails to state with any detail how any action, custom or policy of the State of California caused him injury. We affirm the district court's conclusion that Saunders' unsubstantiated allegations fail to state a claim against the State of California upon which relief can be granted.
III.
Saunders' original complaint also contains no specific allegations against Los Angeles County.
Saunders asserts that the County of Los Angeles is liable by virtue of its status as an "agent of the state," that the County of Los Angeles aided and abetted the State of California in perpetuating discrimination, and that it committed a constitutional violation by being the site of an allegedly improper Superior Court decision. Saunders fails to substantiate any of these claims with either supportive facts or substantive law. Accordingly, we find that the district court's dismissal of Saunders' claims against Los Angeles County must be upheld.
IV.
We also affirm the district court's grant of Northrop's motion to dismiss. Saunders appears to assert race discrimination claims based on alleged conduct of Northrop occurring both prior to and at the time of Saunders' submission of his application for reemployment. Saunders' race discrimination claims concerning alleged practices of Northrop prior to application for reemployment are time-barred. The record indicates that Saunders failed to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged acts of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
Saunders' claims dealing with Northrop's refusal to rehire him in 1984 were also properly dismissed. Saunders does not claim that Northrop's prior discharge of him was racially motivated and therefore could not legally have been grounds for refusing him reemployment. However, as we discussed above, any claims Saunders may have had arising from his original discharge are time-barred. Saunders did not assert that Northrop's policy of refusing to rehire employees who were previously fired for misconduct was pretextual.
V.
Northrop's motion for summary judgment maintains that Saunders' claim for age discrimination should be rejected due to the fact that he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and because Northrop has a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to rehire Saunders.
As an alternative ground for awarding summary judgment in favor of Northrop, the district court found that Saunders had failed to present any evidence to counter Northrop's assertion that its reason for not rehiring Saunders was Northrop's non-discriminatory policy of not hiring employees who had previously been fired for misconduct. Saunders presented no evidence to the district court that Northrop's rehiring policy was pretextual. Therefore, the district court's grant of summary judgment in Northrop's favor was appropriate. Streckl v. Motorola, 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.1983).
AFFIRMED.
FN* Honorable Philip M. Pro. United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
(b) [B]efore instituting any action under this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance with the requirements of this chapter through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.
* * *
(d) No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed
(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or
(2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier.
Upon receiving such a charge, the Commission shall promptly notify all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.