Opinion
NO. 14-16-00586-CV
04-24-2018
JOAQUIN SAUCEDA, Appellant v. MICHAEL HESS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 80th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2013-12416
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A plaintiff in a personal-injury case appeals a judgment awarding him some, but not all, of the relief he sought. He asserts there is a conflict in the jury's findings awarding him money for his past medical expenses but giving zero damages for past and future physical pain and mental anguish. He also challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting those findings. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant/plaintiff Joaquin Sauceda was riding a tricycle with an attached cart when appellee/defendant Michael Hess's truck hit Sauceda's tricycle. Sauceda filed suit against Hess, asserting a negligence claim. The jury found that both Sauceda and Hess were negligent. After finding Hess 51% responsible and Sauceda 49% responsible for the accident, the jury awarded Sauceda zero damages for past physical pain and mental anguish, zero damages for future physical pain and mental anguish, $3,750 in past medical expenses, and zero damages for future medical expenses. Sauceda did not object to any conflict in the jury's answers before the trial court discharged the jury. In a motion for new trial, Sauceda asserted (1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to reconcile its allegedly conflicting findings and (2) the jury's findings were not supported by factually sufficient evidence. The trial court denied Sauceda's motion for new trial.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
On appeal, Sauceda asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial because the jury's findings conflicted and the jury's award of zero damages for past and future physical pain and mental anguish is not supported by factually sufficient evidence.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
When reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the entire record, considering both the evidence in favor of, and contrary to, the challenged finding. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex. 1998). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599, 615-16 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). We may not substitute our own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if we would reach a different answer on the evidence. Maritime Overseas Corp., 971 S.W.2d at 407. The amount of evidence necessary to affirm a judgment is far less than that necessary to reverse a judgment. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d at 616. Sauceda challenges the jury's findings of zero damages as to two damage categories that do not overlap. In this context, the trial evidence is factually insufficient if, considering the evidence unique to the challenged damage category, the jury's failure to award damages for that category is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, shock the conscience, or clearly demonstrate bias. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761, 773, 775 (Tex. 2003).
Sauceda asserts that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's findings of (1) zero damages for past physical pain and mental anguish and (2) zero damages for future physical pain and mental anguish. Sauceda does not contend that the evidence shows he suffered any mental anguish, but Sauceda argues that the evidence shows he suffered physical pain and that the jury's verdict shows the jury believed Sauceda was injured in the accident because the jury awarded Sauceda $3,750 for medical expenses incurred in the past.
The presence or absence of pain is an inherently subjective question for which the plaintiff bears the burden of production and persuasion. Enright v. Goodman Distribution, Inc., 330 S.W.3d 392, 397 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Some objective injuries are so significant that the law mandates an award of damages for physical pain. Id. Examples of serious, objective injuries that will support an award of damages for subjective complaints of pain include bone fractures, severe burns, and lacerations. Id. If the evidence of pain is conflicting, scant, or more subjective, the nature of the evidence favors upholding the jury's findings of no damages for past pain and mental anguish. In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 483 S.W.3d 249, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.). The law does not always mandate a damage award for physical pain when medical expenses are awarded. Enright, 330 S.W.3d at 397. With respect to an undisputed injury that is less serious and accompanied only by subjective complaints of pain, a jury reasonably may believe that the injured party should be compensated for seeking enough medical care to ensure that the injury is not serious, yet still conclude that the injured party did not suffer pain warranting a money award. Id.
In charging the jury, the trial court propounded the following questions and instructions:
What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Joaquin Sauceda for his injuries, if any, that resulted from the occurrence in question?
Consider the elements of damages listed below and none other. Consider each element separately. Do not award any sum of money on any element if you have otherwise, under some other element, awarded a sum of money for the same loss. That is, do not compensate twice for the same loss, if any. Do not include interest on any amount of damages you find.
Answer separately, in dollars and cents, for damages, if any. Do not reduce the amounts, if any, in your answers because of the negligence, if any, of Joaquin Sauceda. Any recovery will be determined by the court when it applies the law to your answers at the time of judgment.
1. Physical pain and mental anguish sustained in the past by Joaquin Sauceda.
Answer: __________
2. Physical pain and mental anguish that, in reasonable probability, Joaquin Sauceda will sustain in the future.
Answer: __________
3. Physical impairment sustained in the past.
Answer: __________
4. Physical impairment that, in reasonable probability, Joaquin Sauceda will sustain in the future.
Answer: __________
5. Medical care expenses incurred in the past.
Answer: __________
6. Medical care expenses that, in reasonable probability, Joaquin Sauceda will incur in the future.
Answer: __________
Sauceda argues that his testimony provided objective evidence of injury. Sauceda testified that Hess's truck hit "the rear tire" of Sauceda's tricycle, but Hess's truck did not contact Sauceda. The contact between Hess's truck and Sauceda's tricycle caused Sauceda to fall. According to Sauceda, when he fell, he felt pain in his head, shoulder, and hip. Sauceda testified that he was bleeding from those areas. According to Sauceda, paramedics responded to the accident scene and bandaged his head, but Sauceda told the paramedics that he was fine and Sauceda did not seek medical treatment at the time of the accident. Sauceda testified that he did not take any medications on the day of the accident.
In his testifying about his condition after the accident, Sauceda stated:
• The day after the accident he went to a clinic because he was not feeling well, and a doctor prescribed physical therapy. He was told his treatment would stop whenever he felt better. He attended several sessions before stopping.
• He has been limping since the accident, but it does not cause him any pain.
• Sauceda has had trouble sleeping because he can sleep only on one side of his body.
• He worked riding the tricycle, selling goods out of the cart on a daily route. It now takes him longer to complete the route than it did before the accident.
• He was sixty-five years old on the day of the accident and was seventy years old on the day of trial.
On cross-examination, Sauceda stated that he lost consciousness after the accident, but then contradicted himself before ultimately agreeing that he did not ever lose consciousness. Sauceda also admitted that when he met with Hess's attorney, Sauceda told Hess's attorney that Sauceda was fine and that Sauceda had never mentioned a limp before trial. Sauceda acknowledged that he did not have any broken bones and never received any type of medical diagnosis. On cross-examination, Sauceda confessed that he initially claimed it cost him $550 to replace his tricycle, yet at trial Sauceda testified that the replacement cost was $800.
The testimony regarding Sauceda's alleged injury was brief and subjective. See Grant v. Cruz, 406 S.W.3d 358, 365 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (holding jury was free to reject witness's uncontroverted testimony regarding pain even while awarding damages for medical expenses). Sauceda stated that he had pain, but he did not have any medical diagnosis describing any injury. Sauceda acknowledged that he did not take medication the day of the accident, and he did not testify in detail about his problems. Cross-examination revealed inconsistencies in Sauceda's accounts of his condition over time and other matters related to the accident.
On this record, the jury reasonably could have believed that Sauceda's complaints of pain were "motivated by interests other than obtaining treatment for legitimate injuries." See Enright, 330 S.W.3d at 402 (noting that evidence suggesting subjective pain complaints motivated by interests other than getting treatment for legitimate injuries supports a jury's decision to award zero damages for physical pain). The jury rationally could have evaluated Sauceda's inconsistent testimony regarding the cost to repair his tricycle as evidence that he was seeking financial gain rather than mere compensation for damaged property. See Lamb v. Franklin, 976 S.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, no pet.). Or, the jury reasonably could have concluded, based on the record evidence, that Sauceda did not suffer physical pain warranting a damages award. See Grant, 406 S.W.3d at 365. The jury reasonably could have awarded Sauceda $3,750 for medical expenses incurred in the past to ensure that his injuries were not serious, but also concluded that Sauceda did not suffer pain warranting a damages award. See Enright, 330 S.W.3d at 402. Considering the evidence unique to past physical pain and mental anguish, the jury's failure to award damages for that category is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, shock the conscience, or clearly demonstrate bias. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 75-77; Enright, 330 S.W.3d at 402. Likewise, considering the evidence unique to future physical pain and mental anguish, the jury's failure to award damages for that category is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, shock the conscience, or clearly demonstrate bias. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 75-77; Enright, 330 S.W.3d at 402. We reject Sauceda's factual-sufficiency challenges.
B. Alleged Conflicts in the Jury Findings
Under his sole issue, Sauceda also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to ask the jury to resolve the alleged conflict in the findings that Sauceda was not entitled to damages for past physical pain and mental anguish and future physical pain and mental anguish, and the jury's awarding Sauceda of $3,750 for medical expenses incurred in the past. Sauceda did not request that the trial court ask the jury to resolve conflicts in its findings before the jury was dismissed, so Sauceda did not preserve error on this complaint. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 295; Meek v. Onstad, 430 S.W.3d 601, 605-06 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Cressman Tubular Products Corp. v. Kurt Wisemail Oil & Gas Ltd., 322 S.W.3d 453, 462 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Even if Sauceda had preserved error on this argument, we would conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury to resolve conflicts in the findings because the jury reasonably could have concluded that Sauceda was entitled to recover for his past medical expenses but did not have any pain warranting a damages award. See Enright, 330 S.W.3d at 402. We overrule Sauceda's conflict-in-the-jury-findings issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's findings of zero dollars in damages for past physical pain and mental anguish and future physical pain and mental anguish. Sauceda did not preserve error on his complaint that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to resolve alleged conflicts in the jury's findings. Having overruled all of the arguments Sauceda has raised on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Kem Thompson Frost
Chief Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Busby and Wise.