Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99CV-621-H
October 23, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant, Borden Chemical, Inc. ("Borden") has moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The Court has thoroughly reviewed the motion and the various responses to it. The Court concludes that a number of reasons support sustaining the motion, but the Court will focus on one: Plaintiff has not established that he is disabled as defined by ADA.
The Court notes that Defendant has raised serious questions whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision as defined by the ADA, whether Defendant had reason to know that Plaintiff is affected by a disability as defined by the ADA and whether Plaintiff has successfully rebutted Defendant's nondiscriminatory reason for not retaining Plaintiff as a shift supervisor. The Court need not consider these issues due to the conclusions in this Memorandum Opinion.
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Plaintiff must show that (1) he is disabled; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the position of shift supervisor with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision; (4) Defendant knew or had reason to know the disability; and (5) Plaintiff was replaced in his current position. Plant v. Morton Intern., Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 936 (6th Cir. 2000). The first requirement is that Plaintiff be disabled within the meaning of the ADA. An individual is considered to have a "disability" if either (1) he has an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) there is a record of such impairment, or (3) he is regarded by his employer as to having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
Plaintiff is afflicted with Reiter's Syndrome, which is a chronic arthritic-like condition of the bones and soft tissue. Plaintiff had surgery in 1990 and 1994 to correct problems associated with that condition, but neither surgeon imposed any restrictions on work after his recovery. He does not make the argument that either arthritis or Reiter's Syndrome are inherently disabling. Indeed, whether a person has a disability is based upon the effect of the impairment on the life of the individual. Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 884 n. 15 (6th Cir. 1996). This inquiry is necessarily a fact intensive one.
The Court has carefully examined Plaintiff's best evidence for any reasonable inferences that he is disabled under the ADA. Plaintiff says that his condition causes him difficulty walking and that it has worsened since his 1994 surgery. Plaintiff says that he experiences swelling daily. He complains of aches and limping and that his hip hurts. However, Plaintiff never stated that his condition substantially limited his ability to walk or to perform the requirements of his job. In January, 1997, he asked for a golf cart and a cell phone to reduce his walking at the Borden plant. Defendant provided a golf cart and a cell phone and granted Plaintiff's request to park his car inside the plant facility. Even when Plaintiff asked for the golf cart, he did so not on the basis of a doctor's request or because he could not perform his job, but rather to "prolong his knees." Clearly, Plaintiff had some trouble walking around the facility. Nevertheless, the sum and substance of Plaintiff's own testimony is that while Reiter's Syndrome caused him difficulty, the condition did not limit his walking, working, lifting or bending in any particular or specified manner. Plaintiff's own testimony does not support a holding that he had a substantial limitation on his ability to walk.
The medical evidence is consistent with Plaintiff's testimony. Dr. Sara Cherian and Dr. George Quill provide the most favorable testimony for Plaintiff. At no time did Dr. Cherian either recommend an accommodation or impose a specific restriction at work. Plaintiff relies on two written notes from Dr. Cherian. The first note, dated January 20, 1997, merely states the existence of the chronic condition, that he takes medications to control the pain and swelling, and that his condition could deteriorate again. It contained no limitations on any of Plaintiff's activities. The second note, dated October 28, 1998, stated that "prolonged weight bearing aggravates his problems" and advised him to do "only limited walking so as not to exacerbate his feet and knee problems." Neither of these medical notes imposed a physical restriction. Dr. Quill performed surgery in 1992 and 1994 for problems related to the Reiter's Syndrome. Other than temporary post-surgery restrictions, Dr. Quill did not limit Plaintiff's activities whatsoever.
Plaintiffs only possible claim of disability arises from the substantial limitation of the major life activities of walking and working. However, the record does not support a claim that Plaintiff's medical problems substantially limit these major life activities. That Plaintiff may experience pain and discomfort while walking is insufficient to classify him as disabled under the ADA. Rather, he must show that he is "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration" in performing a major life activity as compared to "an average person in the general population." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2000). Plaintiff presented insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could make such a finding. See, e.g., Moore v. J.B. Hunt Trans., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding severe rheumatoid arthritis insufficiently limiting to rise to the level of disability); Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a limp and walking "at a significantly slower pace than the average person" was not a substantial impairment under the ADA); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 99 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that an individual who could not walk significant distances and moved slower than most people was not substantially limited in the major life activity of walking). For similar reasons, Plaintiff cannot establish that his ability to work was significantly impaired. Neither physician imposed any restrictions upon his work, so there is no evidentiary basis for finding a work impairment, let alone a significant one.
While Plaintiff's condition is expected to be permanent, at the time of the events at issue his medical problems were not severe enough to qualify as a disability under the ADA. Plaintiff presented no evidence concerning the extent to which his condition might worsen. In any event, Plaintiff's future impairment is irrelevant under the ADA unless Defendant considered such a possibility in perceiving him disabled. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendant thought he might be disabled in the future.
The Court will enter an order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
ORDER
Defendant has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in its Memorandum Opinion and being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is SUSTAINED and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This is a final and appealable order.