Opinion
Cause No: 1:02-CV-383-TS.
September 28, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 21], filed on May 13, 2004. The Defendants argue that they did not violate Plaintiff Joseph Christopher Sargent's Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested him pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. The Plaintiff contends that although a valid warrant existed for his arrest, the police actually relied on a warrant, out of the same county, for Christopher Joseph Sargent, who is not the Plaintiff.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 8, 2002, the Plaintiff, Joseph Christopher Sargent, filed a complaint in Jay Superior Court against Officer Robert Brown and Does 1-6 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was falsely arrested without probable cause on September 17, 2001, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Plaintiff also asserted a state law false arrest and detention claim. After removing the case to federal district court, the Defendants filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses. On May 27, 2003, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint to add Defendants Curtis Compton, an employee of the Jay County Prosecutor's Office, Todd Penrod, the Jay County Sheriff, and Nathan Keever, a Jay County Sheriff deputy. On October 2, 2003, the newly-named Defendants filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses.
On May 13, 2004, the Defendants moved for summary judgment. The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for ruling.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Rule 56(c) further requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate — in fact, is mandated — where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing a court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party may discharge its "initial responsibility" by simply "`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. When the non-moving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials and thereby shift to the non-moving party the burden of showing that an issue of material fact exists. Kaszuk v. Bakery Confectionery Union Indus. Int'l Pension Fund, 791 F.2d 548, 558 (7th Cir. 1986); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 617 (7th Cir. 1982).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e) establishes that "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party must do more than raise some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts; the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In addition, only an issue the resolution of which affects the outcome of the case will bar summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Doe, 42 F.3d at 443.
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). Under Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 56.1(b), the Court is to assume that the facts claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except to the extent such facts are controverted in a "Statement of Genuine Issues" filed in opposition to the motion and supported by admissible evidence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff's Response to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment does not contain a "Statement of Genuine Issues" as required by Local Rule 56.1(a). Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the "Facts" section of the Plaintiff's brief but does not find any disputed material facts. Accordingly, the Statement of Facts in this Memorandum of Decision and Order is taken largely from the Defendants' Statement of Facts presented in their memorandum in support of summary judgment. These facts are supported by admissible evidence and are uncontroverted by the Plaintiff.
The facts of this case stem from the fact that both Joseph Christopher Sargent and Christopher Joseph Sargent had outstanding warrants for their arrest in Delaware County.
On June 13, 2001, April Sargent reported to the Albany, Indiana, Police Department that she had been in a fight with her husband, Joseph Christopher Sargent, who is the Plaintiff in this case. The next day, an officer of the Albany Police Department completed a Battery Affidavit regarding the incident, which detailed the events that led to bruising on the inside of April Sargent's right arm. Four days later, the state filed a two-count Information against the Plaintiff in the Muncie City Court, Delaware County, for battery resulting in bodily injury and disorderly conduct.
The Initial Case Report indicates that the Plaintiff and a friend went to Albany to fish and that April Sargent followed her husband to Albany where the alleged battery then occurred.
An initial hearing was set in the battery and disorderly conduct case for July 23, 2001. The Plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing and the Clerk of the Delaware County Court issued a warrant for the Plaintiff's arrest on the battery and disorderly conduct charges:
The State of Indiana, to any Police Officer, Constable, or Sheriff of Delaware County, Greetings:
You are hereby commanded to arrest Sargent, Joseph Christopher if he/she may be found in your bailiwick, so that you have his/her body before the judge of the MUNCIE CITY COURT, instantor, then and there to answer the State of Indiana, on a charge of: FTA I/H BATTERY DC
The warrant indicates that no bond was to be posted. The Warrant Data attached to the Arrest Warrant provides information about Joseph Christopher Sargent as height 6' 04", weight 185, brown eyes, and brown hair. The Warrant Data also included a date of birth and social security number, which the Plaintiff agrees is his correct identifying information.
On September 3, 2001, April Sargent reported to the Dunkirk, Indiana, Police Department that, while in their home, her husband pushed and shoved her and hit her in the leg with a leather belt. Officer Arnold Clevenger of the Dunkirk Police Department went to the Sargent residence. April Sargent signed a Battery Affidavit and Officer Clevenger prepared a Probable Cause Affidavit. The Probable Cause Affidavit includes information about the fact that there were battery charges pending in Delaware County "for battery on same victim."
On September 17, 2001, the Jay County Prosecutor filed an Information for domestic battery in the Jay Superior Court. The paperwork regarding this charge was forwarded to Curtis Compton, the Investigator for the Jay County Prosecutor's office. Compton receives all incoming cases that require an investigation or arrest. As part of his typical practice, Compton reviewed a computer database to determine if there were other pending criminal charges against the Plaintiff. Compton discovered the domestic battery case pending against the Plaintiff in Muncie City Court.
After learning that the Plaintiff was charged with domestic battery in Delaware County, Compton verified that the Delaware County case involved the same J. Christopher Sargent by confirming his date of birth and social security number. He also confirmed that the Plaintiff's wife, April Sargent, was the victim in both cases. Compton then contacted the Muncie City Court Clerk who confirmed there was an active arrest warrant because the Plaintiff failed to appear in the Delaware County battery case. During this call, Compton confirmed the Plaintiff's identifying information and the identity of the victim. Compton advised the Muncie City Court Clerk that he would provide the Jay County Sheriff's Department with information about the outstanding warrant, as the Plaintiff had an initial hearing set in Jay Superior Court for September 17, 2001 at 6:00 p.m. Compton did not request a faxed copy of the outstanding warrant from the Muncie City Court Clerk.
After Compton learned that the Plaintiff failed to appear at the July 23, 2001, initial hearing in Muncie City Court and confirmed the existence of the outstanding Arrest Warrant in Delaware County, he called the Jay County Sheriff's Department and spoke with Sheriff Penrod. Sheriff Penrod recalls that he received the call sometime before noon. Compton told Sheriff Penrod about the active warrant in Delaware County and requested that the Jay County Sheriff's Department pick the Plaintiff up on the outstanding Delaware County warrant when he appeared in the Jay Superior Court on September 17, 2001 at 6:00 p.m. Compton also advised Sheriff Penrod that the Muncie City Court Clerk had orally confirmed the Arrest Warrant.
According to Sheriff Penrod, the Jay County Sheriff's Department dispatcher also contacted Delaware County to confirm that the Arrest Warrant for the Plaintiff was still active. Delaware County verbally confirmed that there was an outstanding warrant for the Plaintiff. The Jay County Sheriff's Department frequently relies on oral information about outstanding arrest warrants. After receiving Compton's telephone call, Sheriff Penrod notified the jail staff that someone needed to be in Jay Superior Court for the Plaintiff's initial hearing to detain him on the Muncie City Court arrest warrant. Sheriff Penrod often works with Compton and had no reason to believe the information he provided was inaccurate.
Sheriff Penrod does not know which member of the Jay County Sheriff's Department went to the Jay Superior Court to arrest the Plaintiff. No transport order was issued for the Plaintiff because there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. On September 17, 2001, as the Plaintiff was leaving the Jay County Courthouse courtroom, an officer came up to him and said that he was under arrest. The Plaintiff contends that the officer told him he was under arrest because he missed a court date in a IV-D court case in Delaware County. According to the Plaintiff, the officer did not ask about his height, weight, hair color, eye color, or social security number. The Plaintiff did not ask the arresting officer any questions. The Plaintiff was handcuffed and taken to the Jay County Jail. The Plaintiff never spoke with Sheriff Penrod while at the Jay County Jail.
Assuming the Plaintiff's account is accurate, the arresting officer would have been referring to a warrant for Christopher Joseph Sargent, not the Plaintiff, who is Joseph Christopher Sargent. This warrant was out of the IV-D Court in Delaware County for failure to appear.
Compton was not present when the Plaintiff was taken into custody and had no further involvement after advising the Jay County Sheriff's office about the outstanding warrant in Delaware County. Defendant Robert Brown, a deputy sheriff with the Jay County Sheriff's Department was not working on September 17, 2001, and has no personal knowledge of the Plaintiff's arrest on September 17, 2001.
The Delaware County Jail booking data references "Brown" as the arresting department. The Plaintiff does not present any explanation of this document or any evidence that Deputy Brown was involved in the Plaintiff's arrest or detention on September 17, 2001.
Defendant Nathan Keever of the Jay County Sheriff's Department transported the Plaintiff from the Jay County Jail to the Delaware County Jail. Keever does not recall who gave him the order to transport the Plaintiff. It was Keever's understanding that the Plaintiff had been arrested on an outstanding warrant out of Delaware County and therefore needed to be transported to the Delaware County Jail. He had no knowledge of an outstanding warrant for Christopher J. Sargent, a different person with the same last name as the Plaintiff. When Keever arrived at the Delaware County Jail with the Plaintiff, he was handed a copy of a warrant for Christopher J. Sargent out of Delaware County, IV-D Court. Keever signed this warrant. Keever did not carefully review the personal information on the paperwork he signed because he had no reason to believe that the paperwork was for someone other than the man he was transporting.
The Defendants admit that the IV-D Court warrant was not for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff admits that he should have been arrested pursuant to the City Court warrant in the Muncie City Court case. The Plaintiff pled guilty to battery and disorderly conduct in the Muncie City Court case on October 22, 2001.
ANALYSIS
The Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested when the arresting officer told him he was under arrest for missing a court date in a IV-D Court case and Keever signed an arrest warrant for Christopher Joseph Sargent, not for the Plaintiff, who is Joseph Christopher Sargent. The Plaintiff does not dispute that on September 17 he should have been arrested pursuant to an outstanding and valid warrant.The Defendants argue that Keever's signing the warrant for Christopher J. Sargent, instead of one for the Plaintiff, does not invalidate the arrest. The Defendants submit that the Plaintiff's guilty plea collaterally estops him from raising false arrest claims in this subsequent civil rights action. They also argue that they are entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity because they were carrying out a valid court order. In the alternative, they submit that they are entitled to summary judgment under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
As to the municipal defendants, the Defendant argue that there is no basis for municipal liability if the individual officers are not liable on the underlying substantive claims. The Defendants contend that summary judgment is proper on the state law false arrest claim because probable cause existed for the Plaintiff's arrest. In the alternative, the Defendants argue that they are entitled to the protections of the good faith defense recognized in Indiana.
The Plaintiff does not address the Defendants' legal arguments. In fact, the Plaintiff does not cite to a single case or other legal authority in either of his response briefs. Instead, he argues that the officers did not follow proper procedures when they arrested him on an outstanding warrant. The Plaintiff argues, "There may have been a basis to arrest the Plaintiff on September 17, 2001, by the Jay County officers, but they were lacking essential information. Their actions were improper in the instant matter, where the Plaintiff was illegally arrested and detained." (Pf.'s Supp. Resp. at 2.)
False Arrest under Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), forbids unreasonable searches and seizures. Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 1987). "The arrest of a person named in a valid warrant, . . . will not violate the Fourth Amendment unless the arresting officer acted unreasonably." White v. Olig, 56 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 168-69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855 (1987); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-05 (1971)).
In this case, it is undisputed that when Compton discovered a pending case against the Plaintiff with an outstanding arrest warrant, he verified the critical information, such as name, date of birth, and social security number with the clerk of the court where the charges were pending. He also determined that the Plaintiff's wife, April Sargent, was the same alleged victim as in the cause in Jay County. It is also undisputed that Compton called Sheriff Penrod to tell him about the outstanding warrant from Delaware County and to let him know that the Plaintiff would be in Jay County court on the evening of September 17. Further, the Jay County Dispatcher verified with Delaware County that an arrest warrant for the Plaintiff was indeed outstanding.
The Plaintiff makes much of the fact that Compton did not request a facsimile of the arrest warrant. However, Compton verified the personal data and it is undisputed that the warrant he discovered was a valid warrant for the Plaintiff's arrest. Compton was not even aware of the second warrant, for Christopher Joseph Sargent. The Court does not see how Compton receiving a fax copy of the warrant would have changed the facts of this case.
The existence of a second warrant entering the picture, either before the Plaintiff was arrested or after the Plaintiff was arrested and transferred to Delaware County, did not negate the existence and reliability of the first warrant. Thus, the Plaintiff may not prevail on his false arrest claim:
"It is well settled that the actual existence of probable cause to arrest precludes a § 1983 suit for false arrest." Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 349 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also Fernandez v. Perez, 937 F.2d 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that probable cause to arrest "serves as an absolute bar to the plaintiff's claim for false arrest/imprisonment"). Simply stated, "a person arrested with probable cause cannot cry false arrest. . . . [a]nd without a predicate constitutional violation, one cannot make out a prima facie case under § 1983." Juriss, 957 F.2d at 349 n. 1 (internal citations omitted). Consequently, if there was probable cause to arrest [the plaintiff], it serves as a bar to his § 1983 false arrest claim.Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2003). Compton's and Sheriff Penrod's actions were reasonable, based on probable cause, and did not violate the Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
In addition, because the Jay County Sheriff deputy who actually arrested the Plaintiff on September 17 relied on the information from Compton and Sheriff Penrod, the Plaintiff's suit is also barred against the arresting deputy. The arresting deputy was not required to personally know all the facts that constituted the probable cause if he reasonably acted at the direction of another officer or police agency. United States v. Randall, 947 F.2d 1314, 1319 (7th Cir. 1991). "In that case, the arrest is proper so long as the knowledge of the officer directing the arrest, or the collective knowledge of the agency he works for, is sufficient to constitute probable cause." Id. (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 831 F.2d 162, 165-66 (7th Cir. 1987)). Here, the "collective knowledge" came from a valid arrest warrant that the plaintiff admitted in his deposition authorized his arrest:
Q. But you do agree that there was this warrant, Exhibit C, which had been issued and was pending on September 17th of 2001 for you; right?
A. I agree.
Q. And there was a warrant so you could and should have been arrested on this warrant; correct?
A. I should have.
Q. And taken to the Delaware County Jail.
A. That's what I think they tried to do.
Q. That's what should have happened; correct?
A. Right.
(Sargent Dep. at 49.) Thus, the Plaintiff cannot claim that his arrest was without probable cause and unlawful.
Additionally, in Patton v. Pryzbylski, the Seventh Circuit considered whether an officer's arrest of the wrong person under analogous circumstances was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Officer Pryzbylski pulled over the plaintiff, Alexander Patton, in a routine traffic stop and discovered that an arrest warrant for Alexander Patton was outstanding. The warrant identified Patton as a black, male, resident of Chicago, with a date of birth of June 30, 1959. The plaintiff was also black, but had a Wisconsin driver's license that listed his residence as Milwaukee and his date of birth as July 27, 1959. Officer Przybylski arrested the plaintiff over his protest that he was the wrong man. The plaintiff filed suit under § 1983 for false arrest.
The Seventh Circuit, upholding the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim found:
[N]o reasonable finder of facts could, we think, infer that Pryzbylski acted unreasonably in arresting Patton and transporting him to the Schaumburg police station. No more is necessary to exonerate Pryzbylski. The Fourth Amendment forbids only unreasonable seizures; the arrest of Patton was not unreasonable. Further support for this conclusion is supplied by Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S. Ct. 1106, 28 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1971). The police had probable cause to arrest Hill, but mistakenly arrested Miller instead, thinking he was Hill — though he told the officer he was Miller, and he was. The mistaken arrest was "a reasonable response to a situation facing them at the time," id. at 804, so the Fourth Amendment was satisfied. 822 F.2d at 700. See also Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 42 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The execution of a warrant by an officer who if he were more careful might have noticed that the warrant had been issued by mistake is not the stuff out of which a proper federal case is made.").
The plaintiffs in Patton and Johnson, like the Plaintiff here, were arrested on warrants that did not apply to them. Unlike those cases, however, here the catalyst for the arrest was Compton's research and discovery of a warrant that was valid against the Plaintiff for a battery charge in Muncie City Court. After it was verified that the Plaintiff would be in Jay County court for battery against the same victim, a warrant for a different person with almost the identical name and from the same county entered the picture. Considering Compton's direct contact with the Jay County Clerk and his call to Sheriff Penrod informing him that the Plaintiff would be in court on September 17, it was reasonable for the arresting deputy to not take notice of the discrepancy in the name on the warrant. That the deputy did not verify the Plaintiff's social security number or birth date upon arresting him is also not unreasonable. The deputy had no reason to believe that the Sargent he was arresting was not the same Sargent for whom an arrest warrant remained outstanding. The Court does not believe that any finder of fact would think the Defendants acted unreasonably.
A valid warrant existed for the Plaintiff's arrest. Even if the officers making the arrest relied upon a different warrant for a different person named Sargent, they did not act unreasonably. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot sustain his § 1983 claim for false arrest and detention against the individual Defendants. Municipal Liability Claims
Because the Defendants' conduct does not set out a constitutional violation, the Court need not address whether the individual defendants are entitled to immunity. White v. Olig, 56 F.3d 817, 821 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1995).
Although the Plaintiff has not named any government entities or agencies in his Amended Complaint, one paragraph in his Amended Complaint may be construed as a claim against the Jay County Sheriff's Department: "The Plaintiff's arrest on that warrant out of the Delaware County court was contrary to the law and an omission of basic policy training and/or policy." (Amd. Cplt., ¶ 13.)
The claims against the county fail as a matter of law because a municipality's liability for a constitutional injury "requires a finding that the individual officer[is] liable on the underlying substantive claim." Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 477 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Tesch). The "Sheriff's Department cannot be found liable because [the officers'] actions did not constitute, nor did they cause, a constitutional tort." Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 494 (7th Cir. 1997).
Because the individual Defendants did not commit any constitutional violations, summary judgment in favor of the municipal, or county, Defendant is appropriate.
State Law Claims
The Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate on the Plaintiff's state law claims for false arrest and detention because probable cause existed to arrest the Plaintiff. The Defendants also contend that they are entitled to the good faith defense. The Court agrees.
In false arrest cases, "a standard less stringent than probable cause exists — the good faith of the police officer." Garrett v. City of Bloomington, 478 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985). Under this standard, the test "is not whether the arrest was constitutional or unconstitutional, or whether it was made with or without probable cause, but whether the officer believed in good faith that the arrest was made with probable cause and that such belief was reasonable." Id. The plaintiff has the burden to prove the officer's lack of good faith or the lack of reasonable cause to believe he was acting constitutionally. Id.
The Plaintiff has not met his burden in this case. As discussed above, the Defendants acted reasonably and had a good faith belief that they were acting pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for the Plaintiff. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted to the Defendants on the Plaintiff's state law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 21] is GRANTED. Judgment is to be entered in favor of the Defendants, Robert Brown, Curtis Compton, Todd Penrod, Nathan Keever, and Does 1-6, and against the Plaintiff, Joseph Christopher Sargent.
SO ORDERED