Opinion
99 CV 4614 (RR).
March 4, 2002.
Edgar Santos, Pro Se, Stormville, New York
Honorable Charles J. Hynes, Kings County District Attorney, by Cynthia Kean, Assistant District Attorney, Brooklyn, New York, for Respondents
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Edgar Santos, proceeding pro Se, petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 Supp. IV 1998). Santos is presently incarcerated, serving a prison term of twenty years to life, as a result of his 1996 conviction after a jury trial in Kings County of murder in the second degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25[2] (McKinney 1998). Santos challenges his conviction on the grounds that the trial court's decision to admit a post-arrest inculpatory statement violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Having carefully reviewed the submissions of the parties, as well as the record of the proceedings in the state courts, this court finds that Santos's petition must be denied as without merit.
Factual Background
1. The Murder of Maria Ascencio
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on November 12, 1995, petitioner Edgar Santos and his girlfriend, Maria Ascencio, returned to their Brooklyn apartment after a night of drinking. An argument ensued, which prompted Ms. Ascencio to leave the apartment. Santos pursued her to the lobby where, as he subsequently told police, he pushed her hard against a wall, causing Ms. Ascencio to slump to the floor. Frightened by his actions, Santos went back to his apartment. A few minutes later, he returned downstairs to find Ms. Ascencio lying in the street surrounded by a pool of blood. Picking the injured woman up by her shirt, Santos dragged her back into the lobby. When Ms. Ascencio began screaming, Santos again threw her against the wall and returned to his apartment. Some minutes later, when Santos again came downstairs, he found Ms. Santos, dressed only in her underwear, bleeding in the street. Pulling on the woman's arm, Santos dragged Ms. Ascencio into the building, up the stairs, and onto the living room floor of their apartment.
Some of these actions were observed by police officers who, in response to a citizen's complaint that a woman was being assaulted, responded to the scene. Upon seeing Santos outside his apartment building dragging a woman's limp, half-clad body, the officers quickly gave chase. Following a trial of blood and assisted by neighbors, the officers found the Santos/Ascencio apartment. Inside, they saw Santos bent over Ms. Ascencio's brutally beaten body. Immediately, they placed him under arrest and arranged for Ms. Ascencio to be taken to Lutheran Medical Center in Brooklyn. At approximately 11:15 that morning, she died from multiple injuries to her skull and brain.
2. The Arrest and Questioning of Edgar Santos
Upon arresting Santos, Officer John Wagner advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Santos indicated that he understood each right, whereupon Wagner asked, "Now that I have advised you of your rights, are you willing to answer questions?" Santos, who was crying at this time, answered, "No." Trial Trans. at 64. Immediately, Wagner ceased speaking with Santos, who was then transported by emergency medical service personnel to Lutheran Medical Center for treatment of certain superficial cuts to his wrists that petitioner had inflicted moments before police entered his apartment.
At the hospital, Santos was placed on a stretcher in the emergency room. There, at approximately 8:00 a.m, Detective Trent Turner and his partner attempted to ask certain pedigree questions. Finding Santos tired, smelling of alcohol, and uncooperative, the detectives did not re-administer Miranda warnings or otherwise question petitioner.
Approximately an hour later, at 9:15 a.m., Detective Alfred Smith and his partner, who were formally assigned to investigate the Ascencio case, also visited Santos at the hospital. Finding him rear-handcuffed lying on a gurney, the detectives arranged for Santos to be re-handcuffed by one hand to the gurney. Smith then introduced himself and asked Santos if anyone had advised him of his Miranda rights. When Santos replied that this had been done by a police officer at his apartment, Smith advised that he was going to do it again. Using a standard advice of rights card, Smith went through each right with Santos who, as before, stated that he understood. When Smith asked, "Now that I've advised you of your rights, are you willing to answer any questions?," Santos answered, "Yes." Id. at 130. He proceeded to give the detectives a detailed account of his attack on Ms. Ascencio.
Later, at approximately 11:55 a.m., the detectives asked Santos for permission to reenter his apartment to retrieve a knife then thought to have been used in the attack on Ms. Ascencio. Santos orally gave his consent. Smith then read Santos his Miranda rights for a third time, this time from a waiver form. Asked if he understood each right, Santos marked an "x" in the box on the form designated "yes." To the question, "Now that I've advised you of your rights, are you willing to answer any questions," Santos also placed an "x" in the "yes" box. He then signed the form and noted the date and time. On another piece of paper, Smith then handwrote a statement granting the officers permission to enter petitioner's apartment to search for the knife. Santos signed and dated this document.
At approximately 1:00 p.m., Santos was discharged from the hospital and transferred directly to the police precinct. There, Smith typed up Santos's statement admitting his attack on Ms. Ascencio. Santos reviewed this statement and signed it.
3. Suppression Hearing and Trial
Prior to trial, Santos moved to suppress his post-arrest statement on the grounds that he was too intoxicated competently to waive his rights. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, State Supreme Court Justice Alan Marrus found that Santos was not so impaired by alcohol to render hisMiranda waiver involuntary.
Apparently, it was not until trial commenced and Officer Wagner testified that Santos's attorney learned of his client's initial refusal to answer police questions. The court granted a defense request to reopen the suppression hearing but, upon hearing further evidence, adhered to its initial ruling. Justice Marrus found that "[tlhe defendant can change his mind. This defendant did, and it's perfectly appropriate for the police to ask the defendant later on, after he's indicated initially that he doesn't wish to make a statement, that he has changed his mind." Id. at 412.
On July 15, 1996, the jury found Santos guilty of one count of second degree murder. The court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of twenty years to life.
4. Subsequent Proceedings
On direct appeal, Santos argued that his initial refusal to answer police questions effectively invoked his right to counsel, thereby precluding further interrogation. The Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected this claim and, on March 23, 1998, unammously affirmed Santos's conviction. See People v. Santos, 248 A.D.2d 649, 669 N.Y.S.2d 946 (2d Dep't 1998).
Specifically, the court ruled that the record establishes that defendant did not invoke his right to counsel when he was given his first set of Miranda warnings (see, People v. Cyrus, 170 A.D.2d 526; People v. Moore, 168 A.D.2d 463). Accordingly, it was not improper for the police, four hours later, to obtain a statement from the defendant when he waived his right to remain silent after receiving a new set of Miranda warnings (see, Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96; People v. Ates, 157 A.D.2d 786; People v. Gary, 31 N.Y.2d 68).Id. Santos's motion to appeal this ruling to the New York Court of Appeals was denied on June 18, 1998. See People v. Santos, 92 N.Y.2d 860, 77 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1998) (Ciparick, J.).
On July 26, 1999, Santos filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this court, raising the same challenge made to the Appellate Division.
Since a § 2254 petition is deemed to have been filed on or about the date it is delivered to prison officials for transmittal to the court, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), and since this court assumes that Santos's petition was so delivered on the date he signed it, i.e., July 26, 1999, that date is considered the date of filing.
Discussion
I. Standard of ReviewThis court's review of Santos's petition is governed by the standards articulated in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 100 Stat. 1214, 1220 (1996), which signficantly amended the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Subsection (d) of § 2254 provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1994 Supp. IV 1998).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court provided some guidance for lower courts in applying these standards. Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority, stated that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" in subpart (1) should be understood to refer to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. The Court then identified two circumstances under which a state court decision could be deemed "contrary to" clearly established Federal law: when the state court (1) arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law," or (2) "decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413.
As to the alternative "unreasonable application" clause in subpart (1) of § 2254(d), the Court held that habeas relief was warranted only "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. The Court ruled that reasonableness was to be assessed objectively rather than subjectively. See id. Moreover, whatever difficulty there might be in defining the term "unreasonable," courts were cautioned that "an unreasonable application of federal law" did not equate with "an incorrect application of federal law." Id. at 410. Thus, a "federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id at 411; see also Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (cautioning that while "[s]ome increment of incorrectness beyond error is required . . . the increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence" (quotation omitted)). Further, as long as the state court disposes of the federal claim on the merits and reduces its disposition to judgment, the deference demanded of a federal habeas court by § 2254(d)(1) applies "even if the state court does not explicity refer to either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law." Sellan v. Kuhlmann, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001).
Applying these principles to this case, it is apparent that Santos is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
II. Santos's Post-Arrest Statements
Santos asserts that his refusal to answer questions after Officer Wagner advised him of his constitutional rights, in effect, invoked his right to counsel, precluding further interrogation by any officer until an attorney was provided.
Police interrogation is more severely restricted when a suspect specifically invokes his right to counsel rather than generally invokes his right to remain silent. In the former case, not only must the immediate questioning cease see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 473-474, but no further uncounseled interrogation may occur "unless the accused himself initiates further communication," Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); accord Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (holding that accused who has invoked right to counsel may not be questioned further unless counsel is actually present for the interrogation). By contrast, although immediate questioning must also cease when a person in custody invokes his right to remain silent, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 473-474, this does not necessarily prohibit all further questioning. As the Supreme Court ruled in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-03 n. 9 (1975), Miranda cannot "sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent" (citing United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc) ("[W]e do not believe that anything decided in Miranda was meant to prohibit police officers from ever asking a defendant to reconsider his refusal to answer questions".)).
Santos's claim that his case is governed by Edwards rather than Mosley is incorrect. As the Supreme Court has made plain, a "suspect must unambiguously request counsel" to trigger Edwards's strict proscriptions. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). InDavis, the accused's statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was held not to constitute a clear and unequivocal request for an attorney.Id. at 462. Certainly then, Santos's mere refusal to answer Officer Wagner's questions cannot be viewed as a clear assertion of the right to counsel. Indeed, in Michigan v. Mosley, the accused, like Santos, after being given Miranda warnings, stated simply that he did not wish to answer questions. This was viewed as an invocation of the right to remain silent, not a demand for counsel. Similarly, even before Davis, the Second Circuit ruled that a defendant who, after advice of rights, indicated that he did not wish to answer questions, asserted only his right to remain silent, not his right to counsel. See Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that where accused did not "expressly ask for a lawyer," court "will assume that all that he did was to assert his right to remain silent"). In sum, Santos cannot demonstrate that the Appellate Division failed to apply clearly established federal law when it ruled that he had not specifically invoked his right to counsel in the hours after his arrest.
Santos does not suggest — nor could he — that the Appellate Division unreasonably applied the holding in Mosley to his case. InMosley, the Supreme Court ruled that "the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent" must be determined by looking to the totality of circumstances indicating whether the accused's "`right to cut off questioning' was `scrupulously honored.'" Id. at 104. In that case, the accused, after initial advice of rights, stated that he did not wish to discuss certain robberies. The police immediately ceased the interrogation and neither attempted to resume questioning nor otherwise to persuade Mosley to reconsider his decision. More than two hours later, a different officer approached Mosley and, after giving him full Miranda warnings, inquired as to an unrelated murder. The Court ruled that the second interrogation did not violate Miranda:
This is not a case . . . where the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind. In contrast to such practices, the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.Id. at 105-06.
So in this case, when Santos initially told Officer Wagner that he did not wish to answer questions, the policeman did not "refus[e] to discontinue the interrogation" or "persist in repeated efforts to wear down [Santos's] resistance." To the contrary, he "suspended questioning entirely," Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-107, and arranged for Santos to be taken to a hospital for medical treatment. Only after an interval of four hours did another officer, Detective Smith, approach Santos in the hospital and again give him full Miranda warnings before inquiring as to the circumstances of the attack on Maria Ascencio. Like Mosley, Santos "was thus reminded again that he could remain silent and could consult with a lawyer, and was carefully given a full and fair opportunity to exercise these options." Id. at 105. Nothing about Detective Smith's conduct during the advice of rights was hostile, coercive, or in any way calculated to intimidate Santos into waiving his rights. The trial court found that Santos was not so inebriated as to be unable to understand or voluntarily waive his rights. Nothing in the record indicates that this conclusion was unreasonable. Accordingly, the totality of circumstances amply supports the state courts' conclusion that Santos's inculpatory statements were admissible at trial.
Santos's case is factually distinguishable from Mosley in only one respect: in Mosley, the interrogations at issue concerned different crimes, whereas in Santos's case, Officer Wagner and Detective Smith both wished to ask about the same crime. This distinction is of no constitutional significance, however, when considered in light of the above-outhned circumstances. As the Eight Circuit noted in Stumes v. Solem, 752 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1985):
Questioning about the same crime does not of itself prove bad faith or undue pressure on the part of the police, especially where . . . there is a substantial period between interviews and the police immediately terminated the prior interview when the defendant invoked his right to counsel.Accord Brown v. Caspari, 186 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[A] second interrogation is not rendered unconstitutional simply because it involves the same subject matter discussed during the first interview"); United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument that Mosley requires authorities "to restrict reinterrogation to crimes unrelated to any offenses that a suspect has earlier refused to discuss"); Kelly v. Lynaugh, 862 F.2d 1126, 1131 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding "it is not decisive that the interrogations covered the same crime");Grooms v. Keeney, 826 F.2d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he fact that a subsequent interrogation pertains to the same crime is not important");Gagne v. Coughlin, 995 F. Supp. 268, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (Korman, J.) holding that circumstances evidencing scrupulous respect for accused's right to remain silent were not "undermined by the fact that the questioning was with respect to the same crime"), affd sub nom., Gagne v. McClellan, 129 F.3d 254, 255 (2d Cir. 1997).
Because Santos has failed to demonstrate that the admission of his inculpatory post-arrest statements violated Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights as clearly articulated by the Supreme Court, his petition must be denied as without merit.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the court finds that petitioner has failed to show that the admission of post-arrest statements violated any clearly-established constitutional rights. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied as is a certificate of appealability.
SO ORDERED.