Opinion
H043375
01-31-2017
In re X.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.P., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JD22083)
I. INTRODUCTION
A.P. is the mother of X.P., the child at issue in this juvenile dependency matter, in which the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing after denying the mother's section 388 petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. --------
On appeal, the mother challenges both the denial of her section 388 petition and the termination of her parental rights. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the juvenile court's orders.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Initial Proceedings
This court reviewed the proceedings in this case from the filing of the initial dependency petition through the termination of the mother's reunification services at the 12-month hearing, in an opinion issued after the mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ. (A.P. v. Superior Court (Aug. 25, 2015, H042379) [nonpub. opn.].) This court granted respondent's request for judicial notice of the prior writ proceeding. We briefly set forth those facts.
On September 10, 2013, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children's Services (the Department) filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b) [failure to protect] alleging that the three-week-old child came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The concerns described by the petition included the mother's drug and alcohol use, the mother's mental health and cognitive delays, and the mother's failure to provide safe and appropriate care for the child, who had a heart condition.
The juvenile court sustained the petition and returned the child to the mother on family maintenance services, but in February 2014, the mother relapsed, committed shoplifting, and said she could not care for the child, so the Department filed a section 387 petition and the child was removed from the mother's care. Reunification services were ordered, which included supervised visitation.
By the time of the 12-month review hearing, the child was in a concurrent home. The child presented with developmental concerns that required services, but the mother did not believe the child had any developmental delays. The mother needed close supervision and coaching during her visits with the child, and she had been using synthetic marijuana ("Spice"). Just before the hearing, the child had been hospitalized with failing kidneys. She would need specialized medical care going forward.
At the 12-month review hearing held in May 2015, the juvenile court terminated the mother's reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing. This court denied the mother's petition for extraordinary writ, in which she argued that the evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that returning the child to her custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child's safety.
B. Visitation Review
In an addendum report dated June 10, 2015, the Department described the child's medical needs. The child, who was 22 months old, had been released from the hospital but was underweight and had been refusing solid food. She also gagged on liquids and required a feeding tube. Her pancreas was non-functional, so she needed her blood sugar monitored every four hours, at least four insulin shots per day, and one Epogen shot per day.
The social worker wanted the mother's visits reduced to one hour instead of two hours, concerned that the child was "unable physically" to have a two-hour visit. At a visitation review hearing held on June 10, 2015, the juvenile court ordered the mother's visits to be one hour long, at least twice a month, supervised.
C. Section 388 Petition
The mother filed a section 388 petition on September 23, 2015. She alleged that she had been sober for four months, that she had been attending AA meetings and recovery circles, that she had completed 37 weeks of a 52-week child abuse treatment program, and that she had regularly visited the child. The mother sought to have the child returned to her on family maintenance services or to have reunification services reinstituted for three months.
The mother attached a number of letters and other documents to her petition, including a progress report from the child abuse treatment program. The program therapist saw "no significant cognitive barriers to parenting" for the mother. However, she did notice that the mother often made decisions by deferring to the father's judgment, despite his incarceration and past abuse. The therapist found it "sad" that the mother had not been able to maintain her sobriety sooner. The mother received a three out of five in all assessment areas, indicating she demonstrated understanding of the concepts and a minimum application of new skills.
The juvenile court ordered a hearing on the mother's section 388 petition.
In the Department's response to the mother's section 388 petition, the social worker pointed out that the mother had previously relapsed after periods of sobriety. The social worker summarized information she had obtained regarding the child's developmental delays. The child was delayed in gross motor skills but within normal range for fine motor skills. She was delayed in cognitive skills and communication but within normal range for expressive skills. Her limited eating habits were a major concern, since she was diabetic. The child needed a speech assessment, orthotics, a feeding therapy assessment, physical therapy, and occupational therapy.
The child was "very attached" to her caregivers, often clinging to them, and it was highly likely she would be adopted.
During a recent visit, the mother made a comment about how she would "get in trouble" if she did not play with the child, and the social worker had to coach her in talking to the child. During that same visit, the mother had hugged and kissed the child, and the child had put her arms up to be held by the mother and crawled onto the mother's lap when the mother offered to read her a book.
The mother told the social worker that she did not read the court reports, which discussed the child's developmental and medical issues, because they were too upsetting to her.
D. Section 388 Hearing
A hearing on the mother's section 388 petition commenced on December 17, 2015.
The mother testified that in addition to staying sober and meeting with her sponsor, she was meeting regularly with a doctor and taking medication for depression and sleep. She had permanent housing through the Bill Wilson Center, and the center had committed to helping her with any classes she needed and with paying for any medication the child needed. The mother knew that the child was diabetic, and she acknowledged that type 1 diabetes is genetic. However, the mother blamed the foster parents for the illness that caused the child's hospitalization, saying that "they didn't watch her good enough." The mother also acknowledged that, according to the Department, the child had special needs, but she could not identify those needs. The mother asserted that she had not seen any special needs when the child was with her and that the child did not "look[] like a special needs child." The mother was aware that the child was "with FIRST 5 or something like that." During visits, the mother saw the child as "perfectly normal."
According to the mother, the child called her "mom" during visits. They would play together during visits, but the mother did not bring her any food because she did not know what the child could eat due to her diabetes. The mother was prepared to take classes in order to learn how to care for a child with diabetes, as well as to learn about any other special medical needs. She had already obtained some information from a diabetes association.
The mother brought proof of her attendance at AA meetings and claimed to be on step eight. She met with her sponsor weekly. Having stable housing made her less stressed out, and she took her medication regularly, so it was easier for her to stay sober.
The mother's sponsor confirmed that the mother was on step eight of her recovery and that they met weekly. She believed the mother was learning and changing. She believed the mother could stay sober if she continued to put work into her recovery.
The mother's mental health case manager testified that he provided the mother with community resources and helped her take the steps necessary to achieve her goals. They had been discussing parenting classes and classes about diabetes.
The site services supervisor for the Bill Wilson Center confirmed that the mother had permanent housing and financial support for education, transportation, food, and medical classes. The mother had been a responsible tenant and was not suspected of drinking alcohol or doing drugs. The mother had been "moving forward" and consistently checking in.
The social worker testified as an expert in risk assessment, placement, and reunification of dependent children. The mother consistently visited with the child twice a month, but the child did not have any trouble separating from the mother at the end of visits. The social worker had tried to educate the mother about the child's special needs, but the mother denied that the child had any special needs. The social worker believed the child would be at risk if she was returned to the mother.
The juvenile court denied the mother's section 388 petition at hearing on January 15, 2016. The juvenile court found that the mother had met her burden to show a change of circumstances, noting that the mother had completed the child abuser's treatment program, obtained stable and permanent housing, maintained sobriety for almost a year, and completed all of the terms and conditions of her probation. However, the mother had not met her burden of showing that it would be in the best interest of the child to return the child to the mother or continue reunification services. The juvenile court found that the mother failed to acknowledge, understand, or appreciate the extent of the child's special needs and developmental delays, which placed the child at risk. The juvenile court also found that even if additional services were offered, there was not a likelihood of return, and that the "overriding need" at that point in time was to establish a permanent plan for the child.
E. Section 366.26 Report and Hearing
In the Department's section 366.26 report, the social worker noted that the child was attached to the foster parents and "goes to them for emotional support." The foster parents could understand the child despite her delayed verbal skills. They were committed to adopting her and taking her to the services she needed.
A contested section 366.26 hearing was held on January 28, 2016.
The social worker testified as an expert on adoptability. In determining the child's adoptability, she considered the child's age, physical and emotional health, and well-being. The social worker described how the child had a loving relationship with her foster parents, who she called "Mommy" and "Daddy," and how she went to them for reassurance. She could closely communicate with them and was bonded to them. The foster parents were committed to providing the child with medical treatment.
The social worker noted that the mother had not advanced beyond supervised visits with the child. The mother had not played a parental role in the child's life since 2014. The child considered the mother "as a friendly visitor."
The mother argued that the juvenile court should not terminate her parental rights, so that the child could "continue to have a beneficial relationship with [the] mother." The Department argued that parental rights should be terminated and the child freed for adoption. Counsel for the child asked the juvenile court to adopt the Department's recommendations, arguing that the child "deserves permanency as soon as possible."
The juvenile court found that none of the exceptions to the statutory preference for adoption had been proven and adopted the Department's recommendations, terminating parental rights and referring the child for adoption.
F. Appeal
The mother filed a notice of appeal on February 18, 2016, indicating she was appealing from the termination of parental rights order. The mother listed a number of hearings, including the hearings on her section 388 petition, as pertaining to her appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Section 388 Petition
The mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her section 388 petition. Specifically, she contends that the juvenile court failed to consider the proper factors in determining the best interest of the child.
1. Scope of Appeal
The Department contends this court should disregard the mother's argument because the mother's notice of appeal did not indicate that she was appealing from the order denying her section 388 petition.
Both parties direct us to In re Madison W. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1447 (Madison W.). In that case, the mother filed a notice of appeal from the order terminating parental rights, but did not refer to a previous order denying her section 388 petition. (Madison W., supra, at pp. 1450-1451.) The appellate court held that it would "liberally construe a parent's notice of appeal from an order terminating parental rights to encompass the denial of the parent's section 388 petition, provided the trial court issued its denial during the 60-day period prior to filing the parent's notice of appeal." (Id. at p. 1451.) The court noted that the denial of a section 388 petition is an appealable order; that a parent's notice of appeal is entitled to our liberal construction; that appellate jurisdiction to review an appealable order depends upon a timely notice of appeal; that the notice of appeal would have been timely as to the denial of the parent's section 388 petition because it had been filed within 60 days of the order; and that the respondent was not prejudiced. (Madison W., supra, at p. 1450.)
The reasoning and holding of Madison W. apply to the present case. Although the mother did not refer to the denial of her section 388 petition in her notice of appeal, she did specify the hearing dates encompassing the section 388 petition. The mother's notice of appeal was filed on February 18, 2016, within 60 days of the January 15, 2016 order denying her section 388 petition. The Department has addressed the section 388 issue in its respondent's brief and is not prejudiced by a liberal construction of the notice of appeal. Thus, we will liberally construe the notice of appeal to include the mother's challenge to the order denying her section 388 petition, and we will proceed to consider the mother's contention that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition.
2. Legal Standards: Section 388 Petitions
A parent or "other person having an interest" in a dependent child may petition for a change of orders "upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence" pursuant to section 388, subdivision (a)(1). The procedure provided by section 388 "accommodate[s] the possibility that circumstances may change after the reunification period that may justify a change in a prior reunification order." (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 (Marilyn H.).) Section 388 provides an " 'escape mechanism' " that allows the court to consider new information before a hearing on termination of parental rights. (Marilyn H., supra, at p. 309.)
When a section 388 petition is brought after the termination of reunification services, "the predominant task of the court [is] to determine the child's best interest. . . ." (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 320 (Stephanie M.).) "After the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability' [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 317.)
The standard of review for an order denying a section 388 petition is abuse of discretion. "The petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]" (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415-416.)
3. Analysis
The mother directs us to In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519 (Kimberly F.), where the court discussed the meaning of the best interest standard in the context of a section 388 petition filed after reunification services were terminated. The Kimberly F. court set forth a list of factors to be considered in determining the merits of a section 388 petition: (1) the seriousness of the problem leading to dependency and the reason that problem was not overcome by the final review; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers and the length of time a child has been in the dependency system in relationship to the parental bond; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. (Kimberly F., supra, at pp. 530-532.)
The mother contends that the juvenile court failed to consider the three Kimberly F. factors and that those factors supported a finding that the best interest of the child would be served by granting the mother's section 388 petition, which sought an order that the child be returned to her on family maintenance services or an order that her reunification services be reinstituted. Before analyzing the mother's arguments, we note that the Kimberly F. court's list of factors was "not meant to be exhaustive" (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 532) and that at least one other Court of Appeal has "decline[d] to apply the Kimberly F. factors," finding that "they do not take into account the Supreme Court's analysis in Stephanie M., applicable after reunification efforts have been terminated." (See In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 (J.C.).) According to the J.C. court, "a parent's petition for either an order returning custody or reopening reunification efforts must establish how such a change will advance the child's need for permanency and stability." (Ibid.)
With respect to the first factor, the problem leading to the dependency, the mother notes that she had maintained sobriety for eight months and, according to her sponsor, had been incorporating the teachings of her 12-step meetings. The mother also notes that she had been taking her medication and receiving mental health services. However, the mother acknowledged at the section 388 hearing that it was easier for her to stay sober when she was less stressed out. In light of the child's serious medical issues, which included type 1 diabetes, kidney problems, developmental delays, and feeding issues, the juvenile court could reasonably determine that the mother would be at risk of relapsing due to the stress of taking care of those needs.
With respect to the second factor, the relative bonds between the child and both the mother and caregivers, the mother asserts that the child was attached to both the caregivers and to the mother. However, the social worker testified that the child had no problem separating from the mother at the end of visits, whereas the Department had previously reported that the child was "very attached" to the caregivers and would cling to them. "[T]he disruption of an existing psychological bond between dependent children and their caretakers is an extremely important factor bearing on any section 388 motion. [Citation.]" (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.) The juvenile court could reasonably find that this factor weighed in favor of finding that the child's need for permanency and stability would not be promoted by being returned to the mother or by a resumption of reunification services.
With respect to the third factor, the degree to which the problems had been ameliorated, the mother contends that her substance abuse and mental health problems had been addressed. Again, however, the juvenile court could reasonably determine that the mother would be at risk of relapsing due to the stress of taking care of the child's significant medical needs. Notably, the mother had not yet engaged in the process of learning about how to care for the child. Prior to the section 388 hearing, the mother had declined to read the court reports containing information about the child's developmental and medical issues. At the hearing, the mother expressed an understanding that the child was diabetic, but her testimony showed that she was unclear about what the child's other medical issues and needs were, and she was unwilling to even acknowledge that the child had any special needs. The record therefore supports the juvenile court's finding that the child would be at risk of harm if placed with the mother. The juvenile court could also reasonably determine that in light of the mother's prior reluctance to learn about or acknowledge the child's special needs and her claim that the child had no special needs, it would not be in the child's best interest to order additional reunification services, such as medical training. And the juvenile court could reasonably find that despite the mother's apparently successful efforts to treat her substance abuse and mental health issues, her section 388 petition did not show how a return of the child or resumption of reunification services would "advance the child's need for permanency and stability." (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.)
As noted above, we may reverse the juvenile court's decision only if we find that the juvenile court " ' "exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations]." ' [Citations.]" (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.) We may not substitute our decision for that of the juvenile court. (Id. at pp. 318-319.) On this record, we conclude that the juvenile court did not make an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination in finding that changing its prior order was not in the child's best interest.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
The mother challenges the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights. She contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by determining that the benefits of adoption outweighed the preservation of the beneficial relationship between herself and the child.
1. Legal Background
The California Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he objective of the dependency scheme is to protect abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within a prescribed period of time. [Citations.]" (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 307.) "When the child is removed from the home, the court first attempts, for a specified period of time, to reunify the family. [Citation.]" (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52 (Celine R.).) Where reunification efforts have failed, " 'the court must terminate reunification efforts and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. [Citation.]' " (Ibid.)
"The court has four choices at the permanency planning hearing. In order of preference the choices are: (1) terminate parental rights and order that the child be placed for adoption . . . ; (2) identify adoption as the permanent placement goal and require efforts to locate an appropriate adoptive family; (3) appoint a legal guardian; or (4) order long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).)" (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) "When the juvenile court finds that the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights unless it finds one of four specified circumstances in which termination would be detrimental (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(D))." (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 852.) "The specified statutory circumstances—actually, exceptions to the general rule that the court must choose adoption where possible—'must be considered in view of the legislative preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed.' [Citation.]" (Celine R., supra, at p. 53.)
The parent/child relationship exception is set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Under that statutory provision, parental rights cannot be terminated where the juvenile court "finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The requirement of benefit from continuing the relationship means that "the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
2. Standard of Review
This court has determined that there is a two-part standard of review for a juvenile court's ruling regarding the application of the parent/child relationship exception. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315 (Bailey J.).)
First, "[s]ince the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court's determination. Thus, . . . a challenge to a juvenile court's finding that there is no beneficial relationship amounts to a contention that the 'undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.' [Citation.] Unless the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, a substantial evidence challenge to this component of the juvenile court's determination cannot succeed." (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)
"The other component of . . . the parental relationship exception . . . is the requirement that the juvenile court find that the existence of that relationship constitutes a 'compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental.' (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.) A juvenile court finding that the relationship is a 'compelling reason' for finding detriment to the child is based on the facts but is not primarily a factual issue. It is, instead, a 'quintessentially' discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption. [Citation.] Because this component of the juvenile court's decision is discretionary, the abuse of discretion standard of review applies." (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315; accord, In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123 (C.B.).)
3. Analysis
As noted above, under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), parental rights cannot be terminated where the juvenile court "finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship."
In this case, the Department does not dispute that the mother had maintained regular visitation and contact but argues that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing that the benefit of maintaining the parent/child relationship outweighed the benefit of adoption.
The mother asserts that the records shows she consistently interacted with the child during visits and that the interaction was beneficial for the child. She claims the evidence showed that the child was bonded to the mother. The record does show that the child enjoyed interacting with the mother during visits. However, as noted above, the social worker testified that the child had no problem separating from the mother at the end of visits, and she was "very attached" to the caregivers.
The mother cites to In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38 (Casey D.) for the proposition that a beneficial relationship may exist even if there is no day-to-day contact between the parent and the child. The Casey D. court did acknowledge that "[a] strong and beneficial parent-child relationship might exist such that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child . . . despite a lack of day-to-day contact and interaction," but noted that this will typically occur "in the case of an older child." (Id. at p. 51.) The court also noted that such a showing will be difficult to make when the parent has "essentially never had custody of the child nor advanced beyond supervised visitation" because in such cases, a parent who has failed to reunify will have established only a "caretaker or friendly visitor relationship with the child" rather than a parental relationship. (Ibid.) Those circumstances are present here: the child was removed from the mother's care at age three weeks, then returned to the mother on family maintenance services, and then removed again at age six months. The mother then never progressed beyond supervised visitation.
This case is distinguishable from In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, cited by the mother. In that case, the father had been the child's primary caretaker for three years prior to the dependency proceedings, and he visited with the child three times per week. (Id. at pp. 294, 298.) The child was "unhappy when visits ended and tried to leave with [the father] when the visits were over." (Id. at p. 298.) Here, by contrast, the child, who was two years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, had been out of the mother's care for most of her life. The mother had been visiting the child only two times per month, and the child did not indicate she experienced any emotional detriment when separating from the mother at the end of visits.
The mother also discusses C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 102, but that case is inapposite. In C.B., "the juvenile court implicitly found that there was substantial, positive emotional parent-child attachment despite the lack of day-to-day contact" but found that the benefits of adoption outweighed the benefits of the parental relationship. (Id. at p. 126.) Because the juvenile court's conclusion was "based, at least in part, upon the expectation that the children's aunt and uncle would permit the children to have continued contact with mother after they were adopted," this court reversed and remanded the matter to the juvenile court. (Id. at p. 127.) In the instant case, the juvenile court did not improperly consider "the prospective adoptive parents' willingness to allow the child[] to have continued contact with mother." (Id. at p. 128.) Thus, C.B. does not help the mother.
The case of In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530 (Brandon C.) also does not support the mother's position. In that case, the juvenile court found that the minors would benefit from continuing their relationship with their mother and ordered a legal guardianship instead of adoption. (Id. at p. 1533.) The agency appealed, but the appellate court found substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the children would benefit from continuing the relationship with the mother. (Id. at p. 1537.) In contrast to Brandon C., this case involves a substantial evidence review of the juvenile court's determination that the parental relationship exception did not apply. Moreover, that case is factually distinguishable. In Brandon C., the children had been placed with the paternal grandmother, who testified the children referred to the mother as "Mommy," and who did not think it would be in the children's best interest to terminate their parental relationships. (Id. at p. 1533.) The agency "did not present any evidence to the contrary." (Id. at p. 1537.) Here, there was evidence that the child referred to her foster parents as "Mommy" and "Daddy" and that she considered the mother as "a friendly visitor." Further, the Department presented evidence that it was in the child's best interest to terminate parental rights in order to provide the child, who had special medical and developmental needs, with stability and permanency.
Finally, the mother cites In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681 (Amber M.) for the proposition that a parent need not be "ready for the child[]'s return" in order for the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to apply. In that case, the mother had drug problems and "serious parenting deficiencies," leading to the removal of her three children. (Id. at p. 686.) Although the mother had made progress during the dependency, the appellate court upheld the juvenile court's finding that a return to the mother's custody would not be in the children's best interest. (Id. at p. 687.) However, the appellate court held that the mother had "met her burden of showing a beneficial relationship." (Id. at p. 689.) The children had been in the mother's care for substantial periods of their lives. A bonding study showed that the oldest child shared " 'a primary attachment' " to the mother and concluded that " '[i]t could be detrimental' to sever that relationship." (Ibid.) There was evidence that the middle child had difficulty separating from the mother. The oldest and middle child called the mother "mom," and even the youngest child was "very strongly attached" to the mother. (Id. at p. 690.) None of the factors present in Amber M. are present in this case.
In sum, while we commend the mother's efforts and progress, this is not a case in which "the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship." (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) Substantial evidence therefore supports the juvenile court's finding that the parent/child exception did not apply.
IV. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.
/s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
ELIA, ACTING P.J. /s/_________
MIHARA, J.