Opinion
No. C99-2010.
March 9, 2000.
ORDER
This matter comes before the court pursuant to defendant Dr. Thomas Bennett's January 20, 2000, motion for summary judgment (docket number 41). This court heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment on March 2, 2000. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
Background
The plaintiff, Melissa Gale Funte Sansgard, gave birth to Levi Sansgard on October 19, 1996, in Charles City (Floyd County), Iowa. Levi died at age 3-1/2 months on February 8, 1997, at the Floyd County Memorial Hospital in Charles City. The Floyd County Medical Examiner, Dr. Paul Royer, made a preliminary determination of the cause of death as Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), and defendant Deputy State Medical Examiner Stephen Betz, M.D., performed an autopsy February 8, 1997, at a Mason City hospital; his initial report indicated the cause of death was undetermined.
On February 10, 1997, State Medical Examiner Thomas Bennett, M.D., was contacted by the Floyd County sheriff's office. While there were no external signs of injury, Dr. Bennett found the child to have healing rib fractures, a hemorrhage to the left eye, and evidence of brain edema. On February 19, 1997, Doctors Bennett and Betz indicated that they thought the child had died from a head injury. On March 28, 1997, Dr. Bennett issued his opinion concluding that Levi Sansgard had died as a result of a violent slamming episode. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. Ultimately, charges were dismissed. Doctors Bennett and Betz were sued on the claim that they erroneously determined the cause of death to be the result of shaken baby syndrome. Plaintiff alleges a Fourth Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 3, 1999, this court granted defendant Betz's motion for summary judgment.
Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if, after examining all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kegel v. Runnels, 793 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1986). Once the movant has properly supported its motion, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the nonmovant must show that, on an element essential to [its] case and on which [it] will bear the burden of proof at trial, there are genuine issues of material fact." Noll v. Petrovsky, 828 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1014 (1988) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Although "direct proof is not required to create a jury question, . . . to avoid summary judgment, `the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.'" Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986) (quoting Impro Prod., Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984)). In applying these standards, the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Krause v. Perryman, 827 F.2d 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1987).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Color of Law
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,46, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55 (1988). A public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law. Id. at 49. In this case, defendant Bennett was empowered by the State of Iowa to perform his duties as medical examiner, and in doing so, he concluded the child had died as a result of being shaken or slammed by another person. The defendant was a state actor when he investigated the death of Levi Sansgard.
Qualified Immunity
This case is virtually identical to the case of Stephen Betz, M.D., previously decided by this court. In that case, as in this one, the defendant doctor owed no duty to the plaintiff under state law. Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1983). Defendant Bennett is also entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. A government official who performs discretionary functions is protected from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity as long as the official's conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or Constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); White v. Armentrout, 29 F.3d 357, 360-61 (8th Cir. 1994).
The qualified immunity inquiry involves a two-step process. First, this court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a Constitutional right. Second, this court must determine whether that Constitutional right was clearly established at the time the official acted. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1994). The law is not and was not clearly established in 1997 that a coroner or medical examiner violates the Fourth Amendment when he erroneously determines cause of death. Further, no case cited by the defendant supplies any clearly established authority for the proposition that a medical examiner's opinion can amount to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, in determining that the plaintiff's son had died of a violent slamming episode, "manufactured medical information" and "assumed the role of chief investigator for the state." There is no evidence to support a conclusion that the medical examiner "manufactured" information, or did anything more than report his medical findings. In examining a claim for qualified immunity, the court must be mindful of the need for public officials to be free from the constant fear of lawsuits being brought against them while performing their official duties. Qualified immunity is intended to protect officials from the disruption and expense of trial; this purpose is defeated if officials must endure a trial in order to avail themselves of the immunity. Pace v. City of Des Moines, 2000 WL 31713 (8th Cir. Jan. 13, 2000).
Qualified immunity provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1987) (If officers of reasonable competence could disagree, immunity should be recognized). The matter now before the court is a case with differing medical opinions. Even if the defendant's medical opinion was wrong, he is still protected by qualified immunity. The plaintiff suggested the defendant "manufactured evidence;" that Dr. Bennett knowingly violated the law. There is, however, no evidence that the defendant "planted" any evidence, no evidence that he made up facts. There is no evidence that Dr. Bennett lied. In fact, Dr. Bennett's medical opinion was corroborated by that of Dr. Betz. Physicians who opined that the child died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) have disagreed with Dr. Bennett's medical findings, but none of them accused Dr. Bennett or Dr. Betz of any wrongdoing. No case law finds liability for something short of fabricated evidence. See Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Riley v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 104 F.3d 1247, 1253 (11th Cir. 1997) (officer did not have qualified immunity from § 1983 malicious prosecution claim where question of fact existed regarding whether officer planted cocaine in plaintiff's car)); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1005 (6th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff sufficiently raised claims that alleged violations of constitutional rights; namely defendant fabricated evidence and manufactured probable cause).
The plaintiff in this case wants discovery. However, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court recognized an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1984). Harlow emphasizes that even such pre-trial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as "[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government." Id. Also, in this case, there are volumes of discovery materials connected to the criminal prosecution.
In this case, the plaintiff claims she was subjected to the criminal process solely because of the defendant's cause-of-death findings; that his conduct led to her prosecution. However, the plaintiff made statements to police officers which also supported a finding of probable cause. For example, agents Al Scholle, Division of Criminal Investigation in Cedar Falls, Iowa, and Mike Mrachek of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, interviewed the plaintiff twice at the Floyd County Attorney's office. The plaintiff told the agents she worked until 10 p.m. on February 7, 1997, and when she arrived home her son was sleeping in his crib. She admitted she was the only person to have physical contact with the child from 11 p.m. that night until 8 a.m. on February 8, 1997, having fed him twice during those hours. While she denied throwing the child on any hard surface, she admitted the child's head "hit the mattress" when he was laid down after a feeding, and that the plaintiff was "frustrated" with the child's continued crying that morning. She admitted shaking the baby "once or twice" while he was crying. The child's healing rib fractures also suggested abuse.
The defendant made his initial diagnosis February 19, 1997, based on the medical information available to him at that time, and a month later, with additional evidence, the defendant's medical opinion did not change. While the defendant's medical opinion regarding the child's cause of death differed from the opinions of other qualified physicians, this professional disagreement does not rise to the level of wrongdoing suggested by the plaintiff. Also, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference. However, she offers only evidence attempting to establish negligence. Negligence does not give rise to liability under § 1983. As a result, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED
That the January 20, 2000, motion for summary judgment of defendant Thomas Bennett, M.D., is granted. The Clerk of Court shall now enter judgment in favor of both defendants.