Opinion
Case No. 02-CV-5153 (FB)
May 14, 2003
FRED M. SANOZKY, New Hyde Park, NY, for Plaintiff
JEFFREY A. BARTOS, Esq., Guerrieri, Edmond Clayman, P.C., Washington, DC, BARRY I. LEVY, Esq., Shapiro, Beilly, Rosenberg, Aronowitz, Levy Fox, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Fred M. Sanozky ("Sanozky"), brings this action alleging that his union, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers ("IAMAW") and former employer, Trans World Airlines ("TWA), violated the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between IAMAW and TWA. Specifically, Sanozky brings this action against IAMAW and several of its branches and officials alleging that after TWA violated the CBA by improperly terminating him, the IAMAW violated the CBA by breaching its duty of fair representation owed to Sanozky. The defendants move, pursuant to Fed. R, Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss Sanozky's complaint. The motion is denied in part and granted in part
BACKGROUND.
The following facts are taken from Sanozky's complaint and from documents, provided by defendants, from TWA's bankruptcy proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court in In re Trans World Airlines, et al., No. 01-00056 (Bankr. D, Del.), a matter in which Sanozky has been an active participant. These documents are public, neither their existence nor their contents are in dispute, and Sanozky had notice of them. Accordingly, the documents provided by defendants are appropriate for consideration on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Or.2000) (when adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, court may consider "documents that the plaintiffs either possessed or knew about and upon which they relied in bringing the suit."); Brass v. American Film Tech., Inc., 987 R2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993) (on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, court may consider "matters of which judicial notice may be taken, or . . . documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.").
Sanozky worked for TWA as an aircraft mechanic for 25 years. He was a member of District 142 of the IAMAW. On October 29, 1999, TWA terminated Sanozky's employment. The IAMAW represented Sanozky "through the grievance procedure and appeal to the Board for final disposition" of Sanozky's grievance regarding his termination. Compl. at 3. After "months of arguing and union stalling", Sanozky obtained an arbitration hearing date of October 4, 2000. The date was subsequently rescheduled for June 26, 2001, and later cancelled "because the Arbitrator recused herself from [the] matter." Compl. at 4. Sanozky sent a letter addressed to William O'Driscoll, President of IAMAW District 142, and others, in which he complained about his postponed arbitration hearing date and requested that the arbitration receive priority status. Sanozky subsequently sent other letters to other IAMAW officials requesting the union's assistance in obtaining an arbitration.
Unable to obtain assistance from his union, Sanozky engaged in self-help and took his demand for an arbitration hearing to the Bankruptcy Court in Delaware, where TWA bankruptcy proceedings were taking place. Sanozky filed a motion to compel TWA to give him an arbitration date. On November 5, 2001, the court granted his motion and ordered TWA to set a date for arbitration. Sanozky received a January 17, 2002 arbitration hearing date "after more arguing with [TWA and] no help from the union [.]" Compl. at 6. Sanozky "requested that the union bring Legal Counsel to this arbitration to make sure his rights would be protected and no further mistakes would occur [, but the] union decided that it was not necessary to bring their counsel." Id.
At the January 17, 2002 arbitration, the arbitrator ruled in Sanozky's favor, concluding that TWA "has failed to bear its burden of proving that the dismissal of Fred Sanozky for insubordination and failure to perform assigned work on October 29, 1999 was for just cause." Bartos Decl., Ex, 1 at 3 (Arbitration Opinion and Award). The arbitrator ordered TWA to revise its "personnel records . . . to reflect conversion of [Sanozky's] termination to an unpaid leave of absence" and to "promptly remove from his records" all "references to the discharge in dispute." Id. Beyond that relief, the arbitrator deferred to the ongoing proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court, stating:
All further rights, benefits and entitlements potentially available to [Sanozky] in consequence of this reward shall be as determined by the [CBA] in effect at time of [Sanozky's] discharge, subject to the interpretation and application (or non-application) of that Agreement by the Bankruptcy Court. Said another way, it is the Board's intention that [Sanozky] be treated in all respects as having remained in the continuous employ of [TWA] with his employment and seniority considered as having been uninterrupted by the discharge action, and to provide that all other rights and benefits to which [Sanozky] may be entitled . . . shall be as ultimately determined by the Bankruptcy Court, including, but not limited to, claims for back pay, accrued vacation and severance.Id.
After receiving the arbitrator's decision, Sanozky was told by the IAMAW
that [TWA] was still not going to comply with the Award. Norman Riker of District 142 [of IAMAW] said there was nothing further he could do and he told Plaintiff to contact Bob Bax, General Chairperson of District 142. Plaintiff then contacted Bob Bax [, who] said his hands were tied and there was nothing further he could do. . . . In a telephone conversation, Norman Riker said that maybe Plaintiff should go to the Bankruptcy Court on his own to file papers to enforce his Award. Plaintiff requested that the union [help him enforce the arbitration award but they said] they did everything they could for him and would not pursue the matter any further.
Compl. at 6. Sanozky subsequently filed several motions in the Bankruptcy Court seeking an order compelling TWA to comply with the arbitration award by compensating him on his monetary claims for severance, vacation pay and other benefits, and reinstating him. TWA argued that it had complied fully with the arbitration award because it had amended Sanozky's personnel records, and Sanozky's monetary claims were being processed through the bankruptcy claims procedure as required by the award. See Bartos Decl., Ex. 18 at 19 (Transcript of Hearing before Bankruptcy Court, May 21, 2002). The Bankruptcy Court denied the motions, explaining that the arbitration award required that Sanozky's monetary claims be determined through the claims procedure in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 22-24 (THE COURT: "You went to arbitration and the arbitrator said that you now have to come back to the bankruptcy court . . . to get whatever award you're entitled to, that's what you asked for and that's what you got."). The Bankruptcy Court also ruled that Sanozky was not entitled to reinstatement with TWA because "[y]ou can't be reinstated with an employer that doesn't exist." Id. at 25.
Sanozky now claims that the IAMAW breached its duty of fair representation by mishandling his grievance against TWA and failing to help him enforce the arbitration award against TWA. Sanozky claims that "hundreds of mechanics that were. . . . fired system wide collected their severance, vacation pay due, and any other benefits, etc, as per the [CBA]. Even though [TWA] was in bankruptcy, they were not told to wait or pursue these benefits on their own in Bankruptcy Court. Plaintiff on the other hand was discriminated against. . . ." Compl, at 4. Sanozky also claims that the IAMAW "maliciously[,] willful[ly] and wanton[ly] lied to [him when they] said that he was not entitled to an arbitration hearing and they couldn't get him one," id. at 5, and "discriminated and [failed to represent him] by not . . . enforcing . . . [the arbitration award], as per his [CBA]. . . ." Id. at 6. The IAMAW's inaction and delay, Sanozky alleges, caused him to miss out on his opportunity to recover on his monetary claims against TWA.
The IAMAW argues that it properly handled Sanozky's grievance, obtained a favorable arbitration award, and had no obligation to help Sanozky enforce the arbitration award because it was futile, given that TWA had no funds available with which to compensate Sanozky. See Defs' Br. at 16. Defendants also argue that Sanozky's claims against the individual defendants must be dismissed because there is no individual liability for breach of the duty of fair representation.
DISCUSSION
In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) the Court takes as true all of the allegations contained in a plaintiffs complaint and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1058 (2d Cir. 1993). A pro se complaint should not be dismissed unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 US. 41, 45-46 (1957). When considering a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint, "courts must construe [the complaint] broadly, and interpret [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may not dismiss a pro se complaint when a liberal reading of the complaint "gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated [.]" Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999). Recovery may appear remote and unlikely on the face of the pleading, but that is not the test for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1995). The issue before the Court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion `"is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims/" Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995).
Sanozky's suit against IAMAW is governed by two statutes: (1) Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 ILS.C § 185, governs Sanozky's allegation that TWA breached the CBA, and (2) the IAMAW's duty of fair representation to Sanozky is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. See Carrion v. Enterprise Assoc., 227 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983)), The Second Circuit explained the unique nature of a hybrid § 301 / duty of fair representation claim in White v. White Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 178-79 (2001)
To establish a hybrid § 301/[duty of fair representation] claim, a plaintiff must prove both (1) that the employer breached a [CBA] and (2) that the union breached its duty of fair reprentation vis-a-vis the union members. . . . The plaintiff may sue the union or the employer, or both, but must allege violations on the part of both.See also Livingstone v. Schnuck Market, Inc., 950 R2d 579, 582 (8th Or. 1991) ("The law is dear that regardless of whom the employee sues, a hybrid claim is one in which the employee has a cause of action against both the union and the employer, the two actions are `inextricably interdependent', and the case to be proven is the same whether the employee sues the employer, the union, or both.") This type of suit is `labelled a hybrid § 301/fair representation action because it combines a straight forward § 301 breach-of-contract suit against the employer with a suit against the union for breach of the union's duty of fair representation." Livingstone, 950 F.2d at 582.
The IAMAW does not dispute that TWA breached the CBA by terminating Sanozky; indeed, as noted, the arbitrator made such a finding in issuing the arbitration award. Accordingly, it remains for Sanozky to sufficiently allege that IAMAW breached its duty of fair representation.
A claim for breach of the duty of fair representation consists of two elements. First, a union breaches the duty of fair representation when its conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. . . .
Second, if plaintiffs establish the first element of a [duty of fair representation] claim, they must then also prove that there was a causal connection between the union's wrongful conduct and their injuries. . . .White, 237 F.3d at 179 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Pertinent to this case, the Eleventh Circuit has held that "the union's role as prosecutor of [an employee's] grievance implicitly extends to the stage of bringing an action to enforce a favorable arbitration award. . . . [A] union's failure to force the employer's compliance with an arbitration award already rendered would raise a strong question as to the adequacy of its representation." Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881, 886-87 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Carrion, 227 F.3d at 35 (adopting reasoning of Samples: "[I]n order to prevail in his hybrid claim, Carrion would have had to show that the Union breached its duty of fair representation to him by failing to enforce the terms of the arbitration award.").
Sanozky has alleged sufficient facts to survive IAMAW's motion. In sum, he alleges that the IAMAW's delay caused him to miss his window of opportunity to obtain a prompt arbitration and to collect on his monetary claims against TWA, and that the IAMAW's failure to assist him in the TWA bankruptcy proceedings reduced him to a pro se status to mine the internecine complexities of the bankruptcy laws in his effort to enforce his arbitration award. Given these allegations, at this early stage in the litigation, the Court cannot say that "it appears beyond doubt that [Sanozky] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Coriley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
Although his claim against the IAMAW survives, Sanozky's claims against the individual defendants, James T. Varsel, William O' Driscoll, and John and Jane Does 1 through 4 must be dismissed: individual union officers are "immune from unfair representation claims." Morris v. Local 819, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 169 F.3d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1999); Covello v. Depository Trust Co., 88 R Supp.2d 59, 62 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[T]he plaintiff does not have any recourse against [individual] defendants Thompson and Krippa or any other individual union official for her claims for breach of fair representation. The plaintiffs remedy lies only with a suit against the Union.").
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion is granted as to individual defendants James T. Varsel, William O'Driscoll, and John and Jane Does 1 through 4. The motion is denied as to the remaining defendants.