Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-10939.
October 6, 2004.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Sigurd E. Murphy, Judge pro tem, Superior Court No. 3AN-97-2224 CI.
John Sandidge, pro se, Duncanville, Texas.
Roger B. Rom, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, and Carpeneti, Justices. [Fabe, Justice, not participating.]
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
1. While traveling for a meeting as a principal for the Lake and Peninsula School District in 1992, John Sandidge offered one of his students, his stepdaughter, money to engage in an ongoing sexual relationship with him. She refused and reported his conduct. After holding a hearing on the incident, the Alaska Professional Teaching Practices Commission issued a decision in 1997 revoking Sandidge's Alaska teaching certificates. Sandidge appealed this ruling to the superior court and moved for a de novo hearing. The court denied Sandidge's motion and eventually dismissed his appeal for failure to file a timely brief. In Sandidge I, we affirmed the superior court's denial of a de novo hearing but reversed its order dismissing his appeal, holding that Sandidge's lack of diligence in submitting a brief was excused by the state's failure to provide an accurate transcript of the administrative hearing. We remanded to the superior court with directions to reconstruct the transcript before requiring Sandidge to brief his appeal.
Sandidge v. Alaska Prof'l Teaching Practices Comm'n, Mem. Op. J. No. 966 at 5-6 (Alaska, May 3, 2000) ( Sandidge I).
Id. at 7-8, 12-13.
Id. at 11, 13.
2. On remand, the parties agreed to hold a full new hearing before the commission instead of a limited hearing on matters omitted from the original hearing transcript. Following the new hearing, the commission again decided to revoke Sandidge's teaching certificates. Sandidge filed a new appeal with the superior court but was told that, under Alaska Appellate Rule 604, he needed to pay in advance for preparation of a transcript of the second hearing, unless he established good cause to relax this requirement. Sandidge declined to pay, contending that he should be exempted from paying because the commission had caused the situation by purposely destroying the transcript of the original hearing. The superior court found Sandidge's claim of deliberate destruction to be unsupported and directed him to pay the preparation costs as required by Rule 604. Despite receiving two extensions of time to pay, Sandidge failed to submit the payment. The superior court dismissed his appeal for failing to comply with Rule 604. Sandidge then filed this appeal.
The factual and procedural background of Sandidge's case are more fully summarized in Sandidge I at 2-8.
3. On appeal Sandidge advances numerous points of error, many of which present variations on a common theme: Sandidge's insistence that he has been the victim of fabricated evidence, false testimony, and ongoing hostility by the school district, the commission, and the superior court. His claims can be summarized as follows: the superior court erred in (a) requiring him to pay the cost of preparing the transcript of the second hearing even though the commission destroyed the original transcript; (b) allowing his case to be remanded to the commission for further "hostile actions and fabrications"; (c) refusing his request to issue subpoenas before remanding the case to the commission for rehearing; (d) remanding to the commission without providing adequate safeguards to protect his right to due process; (e) accepting or tolerating the acceptance of fabricated documents and false testimony throughout the course of Sandidge's proceedings; (f) failing to inform Sandidge of the proper way to file charges against various participants so that he could initiate an investigation to prevent their "hostile actions of fabrications, deletions, suborned testimony, bought evaluations, and lies"; (g) failing to conduct a trial de novo in order to overcome the commission's hostile and improper actions; (h) retaining jurisdiction over Sandidge's case despite being politically motivated and hostile toward him; and (i) failing to "actively prepar[e] a neutral and objective hearing environment," thereby allowing the commission to reach "the same predetermined results" on rehearing.
4. Several of these points can be resolved without a transcript of the commission's hearing on remand We will address them first, and then turn to the remaining points.
5. Sandidge contends that the superior court erred in requiring him to prepay the cost of preparing the agency record and in dismissing his appeal when he failed to submit the payment. Appellate Rule 604 covers record preparation costs in appeals to the superior court from decisions of administrative agencies, providing:
In the absence of an agreement between the parties or an order of the court to the contrary, all reasonable costs incurred in connection with preparing the transcript and the court's copy of the agency file shall be borne by the appellant. The preparing agency may require advance payment of the costs as reasonably estimated by the agency.
Although this rule gives the superior court broad discretion to alter or waive the advance payment requirement in appropriate circumstances, the only ground Sandidge asserted to justify his refusal to pay was that the state had deliberately destroyed the record of the first hearing, and should thus be required to bear the cost of the second transcript. But the superior court rejected Sandidge's claim of deliberate destruction, expressly finding it to be unsupported. Our review of the superior court proceedings convinces us that this finding is not clearly erroneous. After the superior court made this finding, it granted Sandidge two extensions of time to make the required payment. Sandidge nevertheless chose not to pay. His briefing on appeal establishes that this choice was deliberate and strategic. Given these circumstances, we hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Sandidge's appeal for failure to comply with Appellate Rule 604.
Bustamante v. Alaska Workers' Comp. Bd., 59 P.3d 270, 273 (Alaska 2002).
We note that Sandidge at no time alleged economic hardship or inability to pay. See Baker v. University of Alaska, 22 P.3d 440, 443 (Alaska 2001) (holding that appellant established economic hardship warranting relief from Rule 604's prepayment requirement). Nor did he claim unfairness because of record preparation costs that he may have incurred in connection with his appeal from the commission's original revocation order. Ordinarily, any such costs should have been reimbursed to Sandidge as a matter of course after he prevailed in his earlier appeal to this court. Since Sandidge has made no claim to the contrary, we have no reason to suspect that compliance with Rule 604 in the present appeal would have amounted to an unfair double payment. And in any event, given Sandidge's failure to raise this ground before the superior court as a basis for withholding payment, even if he incurred record preparation costs in the first case that remained unreimbursed, his remedy now would be to seek reimbursement for the original expenses, not to seek reinstatement of his second appeal.
As Sandidge puts it in his opening brief,
Sandidge thought it better to start his assault on the PTCP in the Court of the Supreme without the transcript because of the possibility of the PTCP taking advantage of missing testimony from the new transcript and presenting it as never happening. This because the PTCP controlled the testimony and complaints. Sandidge will proceed with what transpired in the hearing without a transcript.
6. Sandidge next claims that the superior court erred in failing to issue subpoenas before remanding his case to the commission for a new hearing. But Sandidge fails to show any resulting prejudice: after his case was remanded to the commission, the commission's hearing officer issued subpoenas at Sandidge's request. Moreover, Sandidge cites no authority for the proposition that the superior court was obliged to issue subpoenas before remanding his case. The superior court did not err in declining to issue subpoenas.
7. Sandidge further challenges the superior court's (and this court's) denials of his repeated requests for a trial de novo. But our decision in Sandidge I expressly held that Sandidge had failed to establish grounds for de novo judicial review. That decision is binding and precludes Sandidge from arguing that circumstances occurring before Sandidge I entitled him to a de novo hearing. Although Sandidge did renew his request for a de novo trial after we remanded his case to the superior court for further proceedings, he made this motion after he had already agreed to a further remand for a full new hearing before the commission. Given Sandidge's agreement to a new hearing before the commission, there is no merit to his claim that the superior court erred by failing to hold a de novo hearing itself instead of remanding his case to the commission. After filing his appeal from the commission's decision on remand, Sandidge again moved for a trial de novo. Although Sandidge further contends that pervasive error during the commission's second hearing required the superior court to conduct a de novo trial after he appealed the commission's decision on rehearing, his failure to provide a full transcript of the commission's second hearing precludes meaningful appellate review of his due process claim, so this aspect of Sandidge's claim of error must be treated as waived.
Sandidge I at 11.
8. After Sandidge I remanded his case to the superior court, Sandidge filed a "motion requesting guidance in filing charges against the Lake and Peninsula School District." In his motion, Sandidge accused various participants in his case of "hostilities," including "fabrications," "lies," "unfair acts," and "stealing." Alleging that courts owe a special duty to pro se litigants, Sandidge asked the superior court to "direct him to an authority that will investigate these matters and fabrications that steal Appellant's right to a fair trial." Sandidge argues here that the superior court erred in failing to give him the guidance he sought.
We have previously recognized that courts must give pro se litigants guidance to ensure that they understand how to correct technical or procedural flaws that prevent them from meeting formal requirements that apply to actions they attempt to take in the ordinary course of their cases. But we have never suggested that this limited duty to help correct technical defects in steps already taken would ever require courts to advise pro se litigants of available ways to initiate separate proceedings against their opponents. A duty of this kind would effectively force judges to abandon their traditional neutrality and actively promote the pro se litigant's cause. We hold that the superior court had no duty to give Sandidge the guidance he requested here.
See, e.g., Sopko v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc., 21 P.3d 1265, 1273 (Alaska 2001) (holding that superior court has limited duty to advise pro se litigants of procedural defects in pleadings and necessity to oppose summary judgment); Collins v. Arctic Builders, 957 P.2d 980, 982 (Alaska 1998) (holding that superior court had duty to inform pro se litigant of defect in notice of appeal and to give him opportunity to remedy defect).
Id.
9. Sandidge accuses the judge who handled his appeal, pro tem Superior Court Judge Sigurd E. Murphy, of being "politically motivated" and "hostil[e]." But Sandidge identifies no specific incidents showing impropriety on Judge Murphy's part, and our review of the superior court proceedings reveals none. While Sandidge may well be unhappy with the superior court's adverse rulings, a judge's rulings do not demonstrate bias, hostility, or improper motivation merely because they reject a party's claims.
10. All of Sandidge's remaining points on appeal presume the truth of his factual defenses to the merits of the accusations against him. Sandidge argues that the commission's decisions to revoke his certification were not supported by the evidence. He insists that his accusers have unfairly "rob[bed] Sandidge of his civil rights, due process, and his family" by conspiring to press charges based on "fabrications, deletions, suborned testimony, bought evaluations, and lies." Sandidge blames the superior court for tolerating the fabricated documents and false testimony and for failing to protect his right to due process. But the state disputes Sandidge's factual assertions, denying that the evidence against him was weak or false, and insisting that he received a fair hearing. Without having a complete record of the hearing on remand, we have no dependable way to resolve this dispute.
By agreeing to submit his case to a new hearing before the commission and then declining to pay for a transcript of the second hearing, Sandidge caused his superior court appeal to be dismissed before a proper appellate record was certified and before the superior court could reach the merits of his claims on appeal. Sandidge's failure to comply with Rule 604's prepayment requirement has similarly left this court without a sufficient basis for meaningful appellate review of the issues addressing the merits of the commission's decision. As we have already determined above, the superior court properly dismissed Sandidge's appeal for failing to provide a transcript. Because the order of dismissal was proper and prevents us from reviewing Sandidge's arguments challenging the merits of the commission's findings, we decline to address these remaining claims.
11. We AFFIRM the commission's order revoking Sandidge's certifications.