Opinion
No. 634 M.D. 2009
08-29-2012
Richard Sanders, Petitioner v. PA Board of Probation and Parole, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEAVITT
Before this Court are two motions for judgment on the pleadings, one filed by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) and the other filed by Richard Sanders, in an action for fraud brought by Sanders, pro se, against the Board in this Court's original jurisdiction. Sanders alleges the Board fraudulently altered the notices of charges and hearings it submitted to this Court in Sanders' prior appeal of the Board's decision to recommit him as a convicted parole violator. Because we conclude that this Court lacks original jurisdiction in this matter, we grant the Board's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismiss Sanders' complaint.
Richard Sanders is also known as Darren Scott.
The relevant facts are undisputed. Sanders was paroled on March 7, 2005, while serving a term of four to ten years imprisonment for his conviction on burglary and related charges. On January 8, 2007, while still a parolee, Sanders was arrested and charged with new criminal offenses. On February 16, 2007, the Board lodged a detainer. On March 28, 2007, Sanders pled guilty to attempted burglary and attempted theft from a motor vehicle and was sentenced to a term of two to four years.
The Board scheduled a hearing before a panel for June 22, 2007, to consider the revocation of Sanders' parole. The hearing was continued to the next available hearing date because Sanders was being transferred to another institution, SCI-Houtzdale, on the date of the scheduled hearing. A second hearing was scheduled for August 9, 2007, which was continued at the request of Sanders. A third hearing was scheduled for September 7, 2007, but it was continued because Sanders had been transferred on August 30, 2007, to the Delaware County Prison. Sanders was returned to SCI-Houtzdale on September 19, 2007, and a fourth hearing was scheduled for October 25, 2007. The fourth hearing was also continued, this time at the request of Sanders' counsel. Sanders' revocation hearing was finally held on October 29, 2007.
The record of the parole revocation hearing included the notices of the various hearing dates that were rescheduled. Sanders did not challenge the validity of the notices at his hearing on October 29, 2007. Instead, he argued that his hearing was untimely. The panel denied Sanders' objection and recommitted him as a convicted parole violator to serve 1,353 days backtime. Sanders sought the Board's review. Before the Board, Sanders once again argued that his parole revocation hearing had been untimely held. The Board denied Sanders' request for relief, and Sanders appealed to this Court.
Before this Court, Sanders again argued that his parole revocation hearing was untimely. However, in his petition for review and brief, he also challenged the validity of the hearing notices, contending that these documents were fraudulent. We declined to address Sanders' claims of fraud, finding them to be waived because they had not been raised to the Board. Ultimately, we found Sanders' parole revocation hearing to be timely and affirmed the Board's decision. See Sanders v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 464 C.D. 2008, filed August 12, 2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 737, 963 A.2d 472 (2009) (Sanders I).
On December 2, 2009, Sanders commenced the instant action by filing a petition for review in our original jurisdiction. The petition for review alleges that the Board committed a fraud upon this Court because the hearing notices it submitted as part of the record in Sanders I were altered and fraudulent.
The alleged fraud is not clear from the pleading. The hearing notices in question are attached to the petition for review; each is signed on the bottom by parole agent Gregory Kelchner and Supervisor Christopher Swatski and dated May 21, 2007. Each of four hearing notices is identical, except to note a different date for the scheduled parole revocation hearing. Sanders claims that the signatures of Kelchner and Swatski were signed on May 21, 2007, in advance of the subsequent hearing date changes. In other words, the Board appeared to photocopy the original notice and then changed the hearing date in the body of the notice. Sanders claims this was fraud, and he requests this Court rescind its order in Sanders I and reinstate his parole.
On March 21, 2012, the Board filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Board contends that: (1) Sanders' fraud action is an improper collateral attack on a prior decision of this Court issued in our appellate jurisdiction; (2) Sanders' action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and (3) Sanders has failed to plead facts to support a cause of action in fraud. Accordingly, the Board contends that Sanders' suit should be dismissed. Sanders responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment which simply alleges, once again, that this Court's order in Sanders I was based upon fraud and should be rescinded.
The scope of our review on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is narrow. Piehl v. City of Philadelphia, 604 Pa. 658, 671, 987 A.2d 146, 154 (2009). "A motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted only where, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty no recovery is possible." Id. Our review is confined to the pleadings and relevant documents, and judgment will not be entered where there are unknown or disputed issues of fact. Id.
Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §761(a), vests this Court with "original jurisdiction" over all actions involving the Commonwealth. Conversely, Section 763(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §763(a), vests this Court with "appellate jurisdiction" over all appeals from final determinations of government agencies. In interpreting these provisions, our Supreme Court has stated that
It provides, in relevant part, that:
a) General Rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:
42 Pa. C.S. §761(a). Section 761(a)(1) provides for several exceptions, none of which are relevant in this case.(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity...
(2) By the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, except eminent domain proceedings.
In relevant part, Section 763(a) provides:
(a) General rule.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of government agencies in the following cases:
42 Pa. C.S. §763(a).(1) All appeals from Commonwealth agencies under Subchapter A of Chapter 7 of Title 2 (relating to judicial review of Commonwealth agency action) or otherwise and including appeals from the Board of Claims, the Environmental Hearing Board, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and from any other Commonwealth agency having Statewide jurisdiction.
(2) All appeals jurisdiction of which is vested in the Commonwealth Court by any statute hereafter enacted.
those matters our legislature has placed within [the] Commonwealth Court's appellate jurisdiction under Section 763 are excluded from its original jurisdiction under Section 761(a)(1). In short, the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction of actions against the Commonwealth is limited to those not within its Section 763 appellate jurisdiction over appeals from Commonwealth agencies ....Pennsylvania Department of Aging v. Lindberg, 503 Pa. 423, 429, 469 A.2d 1012, 1015 (1983) (emphasis added). See also Pennsylvania School Boards Association, Inc. v. Zogby, 802 A.2d 6, 8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (noting matters within our appellate jurisdiction are excluded from our original jurisdiction).
Sanders' petition for review, cross-motion for summary judgment and brief demonstrate, without question, that Sanders seeks to reverse the holding in Sanders I. He challenges the Board's conduct in rendering its adjudication on his parole revocation, which was considered and decided in Sanders I. Matters committed to our appellate jurisdiction are excluded from our original jurisdiction. Simply, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Sanders' claim, which is nothing more than a collateral and improper challenge to our prior determination.
Because this Court lacks original jurisdiction over this matter, we need not address the remaining issues raised by the Board in its motion for judgment on the pleadings. We also need not address Sanders' amended new matter, filed with this Court on August 3, 2012, in which he claims retaliation and challenges new decisions of the Board denying parole. A plaintiff cannot file new matter, which is the vehicle by which a defendant raises affirmative defenses. Pleadings can be amended but only with permission of the Court, which he has not sought. In any case, amendments are not to be used to raise facts that occurred after the initial pleading was filed. --------
Accordingly, Sanders' petition for review is dismissed.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 29th day of August, 2012, the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole in the above captioned matter is GRANTED. The cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Richard Sanders is DENIED and the petition for review filed by Sanders is DISMISSED.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge