Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-1688.
November 23, 2005
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Now pending before this court is a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by a petitioner currently incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy, Pennsylvania. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the petition be denied and dismissed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 8, 1997, following a jury trial presided over by the Honorable John Poserina of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possessing an instrument of crime. Specifically, petitioner was found guilty of fatally shooting a police officer in civilian cloths while attempting to rob him. Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment, and an aggregate term of thirteen to twenty-six years on the remaining counts.
The petitioner filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court, which affirmed petitioner's judgment of sentence on May 26, 2000.Commonwealth v. Sanders, 759 A.2d 24 (Pa.Super. 2000). On June 26, 2001, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 781 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2001). On November 26, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for a writ of certiorari. Sanders v. Pennsylvania, 534 U.S. 1047 (2001).
On May 28, 2002, petitioner filed a pro se petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition. On July 9, 2003, The PCRA court denied relief. On April 12, 2004, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the decision. On October 20, 2004, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied petitioner's request for allocatur. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 862 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2004). On April 12, 2005, petitioner filed the instant timely petition seeking habeas corpus relief, claiming:
(1) that the admission of his co-defendant's redacted statement violated both Gray v. Maryland and Bruton v. United States;
(2) that the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during its summation; and
(3) ineffective assistance of counsel to the extent the above claims were not adequately preserved.
We find that petitioner's claims were exhausted in state court, and as such, we will address the merits.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the current version of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), an application for Writ of Habeas Corpus from a state court judgment bears a significant burden. Section104 of the AEDPA imparts a presumption of correctness to the state court's determination of factual issues — a presumption that petitioner can only rebut by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1994). The statute also grants significant deference to legal conclusions announced by the state court as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The United States Supreme Court, in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), interpreted the standards established by the AEDPA regarding the deference to be accorded state court legal decisions, and more clearly defined the two-part analysis set forth in the statute. Under the first part of the review, the federal habeas court must determine whether the state court decision was "contrary to" the "clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." As defined by Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority of the Court on this issue, a state court decision can be contrary to Supreme Court precedent in two ways: (1) "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] court on a question of law," or (2) "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court]." Id. Justice O'Connor explained, however, that this "contrary to" clause does not encompass the run-of-the-mill state court decisions "applying the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 406.
To reach such "run-of-the-mill" cases, the Court turned to an interpretation of the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1). It found that a state court decision can involve an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent: (1) "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case," or (2) "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply."Id. At 407-08. The Court specified, however, that under this clause, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. At 410.
III. DISCUSSION OF MERITS
Petitioner's first claim is that the admission of his co-defendant's redacted statement violated both Gray v. Maryland and Bruton v. United States, thus rendering petitioner's convictions invalid.
At petitioner's trial, a redacted statement made by petitioner's co-defendant, Royce Turnipseed, to Turnipseeds's girlfriend, Yaisha Ruffin, was read into evidence. The redacted portions substituted petitioner's name with the words "other guy" or "other guys". Petitioner argues that when the statements were considered in combination with the other evidence at trial it was obvious it was the petitioner's name that had been redacted.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the admission of the confession of a non-testifying co-defendant which implicated Bruton by name violated Bruton's rights under the confrontation clause. Even though the jury was instructed not to consider the confession as evidence against Bruton, there was a substantial risk that it would do so nevertheless. In the case at bar, petitioner was not implicated by name, and thus the redacted statement did not violated Bruton.
In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-08 (1987), the Supreme Court rejected the argument to expand Bruton's reach, noting that Bruton was but a "narrow exception" to the "almost inevitable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions." The Richardson Court drew a line between confessions from co-defendants which act to inculpate the defendant, and those confessions which are only incriminating when pieced together with other admissible evidence at trial. In the case of the latter, the Court held that there was no violation of the confrontation clause. See id. Thus, the fact that a confession could be considered inculpatory when linked with other evidence does not amount to a constitutional violation.
In the case at bar, the fact that the jury may have pieced together petitioner's confession, the redacted statement of petitioner's co-defendant, and other evidence from trial is of no matter. As noted above, such linking of evidence in the minds of the jurors is permissible under Richardson. See also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (holding that an impermissible redacted statement is one which refers directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involves inferences that a jury could make immediately, even if the statement were the first item introduced at trial). The form of redaction used in the instant case, replacing petitioner's name with "other guy" or "other guys", was specifically noted as an acceptable form inGray: "Question: Who was in the group that beat Stacey? Answer: Me and a few other guys." 523 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, even if the redactions had been unconstitutional, petitioner still would not be entitled to federal relief. Petitioner's claim would not have survived harmless error analysis, due to the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. This evidence included an eyewitness statement, and petitioner's own statement, that supported his guilt in the crimes charged. As such, we must dismiss the habeas petition as to this claim.
Petitioner's second claim is that the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during its summation. Specifically, petitioner claims that the prosecutor improperly "highlighted" Turnipseed's out-of-court statement and "surreptitiously" invited the jury to infer that the "other guy" mentioned in Turnipseed's statement — in the context of the other evidence-was petitioner.
The Superior Court rejected this claim, finding that the prosecutor never explicitly stated that one of the `other guys' in the out-of-court statement was petitioner. Alternatively, the Superior Court stated that even if the prosecutor's comments were improper, any error was harmless, given the judge's repeated limiting instructions, the eyewitness testimony, and the petitioner's own statement, that supported his guilt in the crimes charged.
The issue in analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is "whether the prosecutor's comments `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'" Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (citing Donnelly v. Dechristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). It is not sufficient to show that the prosecutor's action "is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned," Cupp v. Naughton, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973); rather, petitioner must show that he was deprived of a fair trial. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982); see also Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1239 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1992) (court must distinguish between ordinary trial error and egregious conduct that amounts to a denial of due process);Todaro v. Fulcomer, 944 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 1991). Thus, the touchstone of due process analysis is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor, Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982). In evaluating whether alleged misconduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation, the court must examine the prosecutor's conduct in the context of the trial as a whole. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 (1987); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527 (3d Cir. 1991). See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (although comments in prosecutor's closing argument may have suggested unwarranted inference and thus may have misled jury, conduct constituted ordinary trial error and did not amount to a denial of constitutional due process); Cobb v. Wainwright, 609 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980) (although prosecutor's argument was inflammatory and in federal district court would have provided more than adequate grounds for a mistrial, narrow scope of federal habeas review precluded relief).
We find that the prosecutor reasonably reiterated the evidence in the record, which included, co-defendant Turnipseed's out-of-court statement, during the prosecutor's summation. The Pennsylvania Superior Court's rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. Therefore, we dismiss the habeas petition as to this claim, and in its entirety.
Therefore, I make the following:
Petitioner's third claim that, "To the extent that these issues were not adequately preserved by trial or appellate counsel, petitioner avers that the representation provided by counsel was objectively unreasonable . . ." is dismissed because the first two issues petitioner raised had been adequately preserved.
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, this ____ day of November, 2005, IT IS RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED AND DISMISSED. It is also RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability not be granted.