Opinion
Case No. 00CV 1467 JM (JFS)
December 26, 2001
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Plaintiffs Rocio Sanchez, Olga Castro, Myrna Martinez, Karen Bjorland, Cheryl MacLyman. Rhonda Kern and Aurora Arellano move to certify this action as a class action and to be named as class representatives. For the reasons set forth below the motion is granted in part.
BACKGROUND
This action is brought by plaintiffs to challenge a county program for investigating welfare applicants. Officially, that program has been referred to as the Early Fraud Prevention/Detection Home Call Project or, more recently, Project 100%, and will be referred to by the court as Project 100%. Pursuant to this program, certain welfare applicants — those whose applications do not appear factually inconsistent or fraudulent — receive a home visit before their application for benefits is granted
Plaintiffs allege violations of their federal constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and right to due process. Plaintiffs also allege various state law claims. Plaintiffs seek an injunction that would preclude defendants from continuing to operate Project 100%.
ANALYSIS
STANDING
Here, plaintiffs seek certification of two classes: "1) all present and future applicants and re-applicants for CalWORKS cash aid and food stamps in San Diego County who are subject to a search of their home under Project 100% (the "present and future applicants and re-applicants'lass) and (2) all persons who applied or reapplied for Cal Works cash aid and food stamps in San Diego County who, within the year prior to or any time subsequent to the filing of the first amended complaint in this action, withdrew their applications in the course of a search and/or interrogation conducted pursuant to Project 100% (the `withdrawal' class)." Motion 1:20-2:2. Defendants contends that plaintiffs do not have standing because all have received home visits and they are unable to demonstrate that they are likely to be subjected to future home visits.
"Standing `is a jurisdictional element that must be satisfied prior to class certification.'" Nelsen v. King County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1249 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985)). Generally, a "`litigant must be a member of the class he or she seeks to represent at the time the class action is certified by the district court.'" Nelsen, 895 F.2d at 1250 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 US. 393, 403 (1975). For example, in Nelsen, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the named plaintiffs, who sought injunctive relief and damages for alleged violations of their constitutional rights during their stays at an alcohol treatment center which they choose to attend rather than go to prison, did not have standing where neither was residing at the center at the time they became plaintiffs in the lawsuit, and thus their claims of standing were "predicated upon the supposition that they will at some point return to the center." Id. at 1249. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it was too speculative that the plaintiffs would return to the center
However, the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to this general rule and has allowed a class to be certified where the plaintiff, although not a member of the class at the time of certification, was a member of the class at the time the action was filed. For example, inCounty of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), arrestees brought a class action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1983 alleging that the county violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to provide prompt judicial determinations of probable cause to persons arrested without a warrant. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs, all of whom received probable cause hearings subsequent to the filing of the complaint and prior to certification of the class, lacked standing because it was to late for the plaintiffs to receive a prompt hearing and, under Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the plaintiffs could not show that they were likely to be subjected again to the alleged unconstitutional conduct. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that at the time the second amended complaint was filed, three of the named plaintiffs had been arrested and were being held in custody without having received a probable cause determination. The Supreme Court further noted that the plaintiffs alleged "that they were suffering a direct and current injury as a result of this detention, and would continue to suffer that injury until they received the probable cause determination to which they were entitled." Id. at 51. The Supreme Court concluded that it was plain that the "plaintiffs' injury was at that moment capable of being redressed through injunctive relief" Id. The Supreme Court found the case before it to be "easily distinguished from Lyons, in which the constitutionally objectionable practice ceased altogether before the plaintiff filed his complaint." EL The Supreme Court went on to explain that the fact "[t]hat the class was not certified until after the named plaintiffs' claims had become moot" did not deprive it of jurisdiction. Id. It explained that "`[s]ome claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative's individual interest expires.'" Id. (quotingUnited States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980). "In such cases, the `relationship back' doctrine' is properly invoked to preserve the merits of the case for judicial resolution.'" Id.
The court concludes that this case falls under the rule of McLaughlin, not of Nelsen and Lyons, and therefore plaintiff Kern has standing to pursue the class claims. First, at the time the First Amended Complaint was filed, plaintiff Rhonda Kern had applied for CalWORKS and food stamp benefits but had not yet received a home visit or interview. Thus, plaintiff Kern's claim was not based on the possibility that she would lose her benefits and have to reapply and at that time be subject to a search; rather, Ms. Kern was directly facing the prospect of being subjected to the conduct alleged to be unconstitutional. Thus, Nelsen andLyons are distinguishable because, unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, plaintiff Kern was subject to the conduct challenged in this lawsuit at the time she became a plaintiff to this lawsuit.
Second, McLaughlin is applicable because to hold otherwise would permit defendants to prevent a class from ever being certified simply by ensuring that a home visit was conducted of each purported class representative under Project 100% immediately upon the filing of a motion to certify the class. Although defendants contend that some applicants — those who are obvious denials or those 10 whose applications are suspected of being fraudulent — are not subject to home visits pursuant to Project 100%, the court concludes that at this stage of the litigation it appears that there was a sufficient likelihood at the time of the filing of the first amended complaint that plaintiff Kern would be subjected to a home visit pursuant to Project 100% to support a finding of standing.
The court rejects defendants' suggestion that standing could be established by an applicant refusing a home visit and thereby being denied benefits. The court finds that requiring an indigent individual to risk homelessness and hunger in order to vindicate constitutional rights is neither realistic nor warranted.
Finally, because the presence of one party with standing assures that the controversy before the court is justiciable, the court need not consider whether the other named parties have standing. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, and n. 9 (1977) ("For we have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated standing to assert these rights as his own . . . Because of the presence of this plaintiff, we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit."); see also Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999) (citing Arlington Heights andDirector, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 303-305 (1983)).
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 23
Plaintiffs seek certification of two different classes: "(1) all present and future applicants and re-applicants for CalWORKS cash aid and food stamps in San Diego County who are subject to a search of their home under Project 100% (the `present and future applicants and re-applicants' class) and (2) all persons who applied or reapplied for Cal Works cash aid and food stamps in San Diego County who, within the year prior to or any time subsequent to the filing of the first amended complaint in this action, withdrew their applications in the course of a search and/or interrogation conducted pursuant to Project 100% (the `withdrawal' class)." Motion 1:20-2:2.
In order for class certification to be appropriate, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b). Fed.R.Civ.P.23 provides in relevant part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
The court will consider each factor in turn.
Rule 23(a)
Numerosity
Plaintiffs have presented evidence that 36,858 Project 100% referrals were completed between June 1997 and May 2001, with approximately 9000 referrals being completed each year. See Plaintiffs Exhibit A. The court finds that the numerosity requirement has been met with respect to the first proposed class — the "present and future applicants and re-applicants" class.
In support of their argument that the numerosity requirement is met with respect to the second class, the "withdrawal"class, plaintiffs present a report indicating that in March 2001, 249 applications for benefits were either canceled or withdrawn. However, plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence suggesting that any of these 249 were the result of the methods used to implement Project 100% rather than the result of the applicant moving, getting a job, or otherwise becoming ineligible for the benefits sought. Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden with respect to this proposed class.
Common Questions of Law and Fact
As this Ninth Circuit has explained, this requirement "has been construed permissively." Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). "All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule." Id. Rather, "[tlhe existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class."Id. With respect to the "present and future applicants and re-applicants" class, the commonality requirement is met given that all of the plaintiff's claims are based on the same legal theory: that Project 100% is unconstitutional. See LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1332 ("Plainly, the constitutionality of the INS ranch check technique as it affects the defined class is a "question of law or fact common to the class.'"). Typicality
Defendants' citation to out-of-circuit and district court authority for the proposition that the commonality requirement is only satisfied if there is no need for a separate inquiry into the facts surrounding each individual's claim is unavailing in light of Ninth Circuit case law.
"The test of typicality "is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.'" Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D.Cal. 1985)). See also Jones v. Shalala, 64 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The test of typicality refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought."). Thus, "representative claims are `typical' if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical." Haiku, 150 F.3d at 1020. Here, the named plaintiffs allege the same injury — violation of their constitutional rights — as the result of the same conduct — home visits and questioning in connection with Project 100%. This is sufficient to meet the typicality requirement.
Adequacy of the Class Representatives
"Resolution of two questions determines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?" Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. It does not appear that the named plaintiffs or their counsel have a conflict of interest with the other class members. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the plaintiffs or their counsel will not vigorously prosecute the action on behalf of the class. Therefore, this requirement is met.
Rule 23(b)
Rule 23(b) is satisfied where, inter alia, "the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class. . . ." If this action was not certified as a class, there is a risk that many of the individual plaintiffs would each bring an action to be heard by different courts, with the prospect of different conclusions being reached regarding the constitutionality of Project 100%. Thus, this requirement has been met.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for class certification is granted with respect to the "present and future applicants and re-applicants" class but denied with respect to the "withdrawal" class.
IT IS SO ORDERED.