Opinion
No.C01-20857 RMW
November 14, 2001
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff San Jose Christian College's motion for a preliminary injunction was heard on November 9, 2001. Defendants oppose the motion. The court has considered the papers submitted by the parties and the arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff San Jose Christian College ("SJCC") is a private college "ministering to the needs of the Christian community." Motion at 2. SJCC has purchased the former St. Louise Hospital property in Morgan Hill, intending to use the site for its college campus. SJCC has unsuccessfully applied to rezone the property for educational use. The site is not presently operating as a hospital, but it is the only site within the City of Morgan Hill presently zoned for hospital use. However, hospitals in nearby San Jose and Gilroy presently serve the needs of the Morgan Hill community, and evidence in the record suggests that there is an insufficient present demand for an acute care hospital facility within Morgan Hill and that the need for such a hospital is not likely to arise for 15-20 years. See Report on Medical Services Feasibility Study at D-1, Exh. D to Clayton Decl; see also Clayton Decl. Exh. C. (H.O.M. Group Study, Morgan Hill Medical Services: Options for Development with Demand Forecasts for Acute Care). When Morgan Hill denied the rezoning application, it asserted several bases for its decision, including the City's preference to retain the existing hospital zoning as well as the applicant's failure to comply with the City's CEQA-based application processes.
SJCC contends that Morgan Hill's process required for an application for rezoning and Title 18 of the Morgan Hill Municipal Code violate the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. Accordingly, SJCC seeks a preliminary injunction compelling Morgan Hill to grant the rezoning and permit SJCC to hold educational, religious and related services on the site.
II. ANALYSIS
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must establish either: 1) the combination of a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued, or 2) that plaintiff has raised serious questions on the merits an that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). A stronger showing is required where a plaintiff seeks mandatory injunctive relief,i.e. compelling a defendant to take action rather than precluding a defendant from acting, and injunctive relief will not be granted "unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party." Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1980); Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1993).
SJCC has failed to meet its burden. SJCC has not established the likelihood of success on the merits of its claims and has failed to establish a likelihood that it will suffer irreparable harm unless an injunction issues. Moreover, SJCC has failed to demonstrate that the facts and law clearly favor SJCC, and thus a mandatory injunction is not appropriate.
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
a. Whether the RLUIPA Has Been Violated
SJCC contends that the City's PUD zoning process and its municipal code violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Under the Act, "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that the imposition of the burden on that person, assembly or institution — (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). Among other things, the act requires equal treatment of religious institutions, prohibits discrimination against religious institutions, and prohibits exclusion of religious assemblies from, or unreasonable limitations on religious structures within, jurisdictions. § 2000cc(b)(1)-(3).
In order to establish a prima facie case that the RLUIPA has been violated, SJCC must present evidence that the City's denial of the re-zoning application "imposed a substantial burden" on the "religious exercise" of a person, institution or assembly. SJCC has failed to make this showing.
The RLUIPA does not define "substantial burden" but the legislative history evidences a Congressional intent that the standard under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 20000bb-1 (1994), should apply. Req. for Judicial Notice, Exh. B at 4. Under that standard, when a neutral, generally applicable law is claimed to burden the exercise of religion, the following analysis applies:
(1) The burden must fall on a religious belief rather than a philosophy or way of life. (2) The burdened religious belief must be sincerely held. (3) The plaintiff must prove the burden is substantial or, in other words, legally sufficient. (4) If all of the foregoing are line, the government must "demonstrate that application of the burden to the person [¶] . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and [¶] . . . is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interestSmith v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 12 Cal.4th 1143, 1166-67, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700, 913 P.2d 909 (1996). Under the Ninth Circuit standard,
[i]n order to show a free exercise violation using the "substantial burden" test, [¶] "the religious adherent . . . has the obligation to prove that a governmental [action] burdens the adherent's practice of his or her religion . . . by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith mandates. This interference must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine."Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987). As applied in the context of a free exercise challenge to a zoning law, the Ninth Circuit has followed a three factor test:
(1) the magnitude of the statute's impact upon the exercise of the religious belief
(2) the existence of a compelling state interest justifying the imposed burden upon the exercise of the religious belief; and,
(3) the extent to which recognition of an exemption from the statute would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the state.Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1990). significantly, in the course of holding that the city's denial of a conditional use pemilt to a church which sought approval for home worship, the Ninth Circuit held that "the burden on religious practice is not great when the government action, in the case of the denial of a use permit, does not restrict current religious practice but rather prevents a change in religious practice."Id. The court also recognized that the government has a strong interest in the maintenance of the integrity of its zoning schemes and the protection of neighborhoods and that "[a] zoning system `protects the zones' inhabitants from problems of traffic, noise and litter, avoids spot zoning, and preserves a coherent land use plan.'" Id. quoting Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 738 (11th Cir. 1983).
Applying these standards to the present circumstances, plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of establishing that Morgan Hill's zoning ordinance or practices impose a substantial burden on SJCC's exercise of religion.
SJCC begins with the undisputed premise that "[w]orship in churches and preaching from the pulpit occupy a high estate under the First Amendment and enjoy the guarantees of religious speech." Motion at 13. However, worship in churches and preaching from the pulpit are not at issue here. SJCC's zoning application sought approval for a school, not a church.
SJCC argues that:
SJCC, its leaders, administrators, and representatives genuinely believe that God's will brought them this property for the continuation of their religious mission, and have publicly proclaimed that belief prior to the enactment of the RLUIPA and long before the CITY's denial of their application. This is not a legally convenient revelation but a sincere and deeply felt religious belief. Their search for the appropriate place to continue the education and ministering of Christians has gone on for years. The Subject Property is truly the answer to these prayers. It is these religious beliefs that are being restricted and violated by the action of the CITY.
Motion at 13 (emphasis added); see also Edrington Del. ¶ 30 ("If the College is not allowed to use this property, it will be a violation of its belief that to do so is the will of God").
In other words, plaintiff contends that it has a sincerely held religious belief that the St Louise property should be used as its college campus and the City's denial of the re-zoning application imposed a substantial burden on that belief. SJCC has not met its burden of establishing that the identified religious belief — that SJCC should be permitted to use the property for its campus — is a tenet or belief central to their religious doctrine. Bryant, 46 F.3d at 949.
Moreover, this very argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit inChristian Gospel Church. There, a church sought zoning approval to permit worship services in a neighborhood home. The city denied the application, and the court found that there was no violation of the Free Exercise clause. Even assuming that the operation of a Christian college falls within the parameters of the "exercise of religion" the circumstances are not meaningfully distinguishable from Christian Gospel Church. Here, as in Christian Gospel Church, the plaintiff has an existing facility which it uses for its asserted religious activities. Here, as in Christian Gospel Church, the plaintiff is seeking a conditional use permit to change the zoning and allow the asserted religious activity to occur in a specific building and the city has denied the permit. Under Christian Gospel College, SJCC has failed to establish the existence of a substantial burden: because "the burden on religious practice is not great when the government action, in the case of the denial of a use permit, does not restrict current religious practice but rather prevents a change in religious practice." Id.
Pointing to language in the Act that "the use, building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that purpose," SJCC also argues that its "desire to use and convert the Subject Property to provide a Christian education to students and to hold their religious services therefore constitutes `religious exercise."' Motion at 14. The court is not convinced that using the property as a Christian college is necessarily a "religious use" of the property under the Act. The application did not seek a re-zoning to permit the operation of a church or other house of worship, however. Based on the plain text of the statute, it appears doubtful that there is an "exercise of religion" at issue here by SJCC's effort to obtain zoning approval to operate its college campus on the property.
At oral argument, SJCC asserted that its proposed college was not comparable to secular colleges, even those with religious studies programs. Instead, SJCC educates its students in the ministry and is an educational Christian institution teaching how to minister. Thus, the proposed college is more like a seminary than a secular college, or even an educational institution owned and operated by a religious institution, such as Santa Clara University. However, SJCC's zoning application does not disclose this "seminary-like" proposed use. Instead, both the initial application and cover letter described the proposed use merely as a "private college." AR 00001; AR 00006. SJCC has pointed to no evidence in the record whereby its intended "religious use" was disclosed to the City.
As noted by the City, the legislative history substantiates the conclusion that the RLUIPA does not automatically apply to all activities by religious organizations. The Senate Legislative History states:
In many cases, real property is used by religious institutions for purposes that are comparable to those carried out by other institutions. While recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, sponsored or operated by a religious institution, or may permit a religious institution to obtain additional funds to further its religious activities, this alone does not automatically bring these activities or facilities within the bill's definition of "religious exercise." For example, a burden on a commercial building, which is connected to a religious exercise primarily by the fact that the proceeds from the building's operation would be used to support religious exercise, is not a substantial burden on "religious exercise."
Senate Legislative History at 10, attached as Exh. B to defendant's request for judicial notice. Thus, the mere ownership of a college by a religious organization does not trigger the automatic application of the § RLUIPA. Here, SJCC has proposed a re-zoning to allow a educational facility. Even with religious overtones, the proposed use is still comparable to other higher education institutions. SJCC has failed to establish a likelihood that the RLUIPA applies to the City's denial of the re-zoning application.
Finally, SJCC asserts several additional arguments, none of which are persuasive:
First, SJCC contends that there is no zone within the City's jurisdiction where a Christian educational institution can open and conduct religious services and educational programs without a PUD or conditional use permit. Motion at 9. In opposition, Morgan Hill offers evidence that the City's zoning code allows schools and churches to be located in a variety of zoning districts as a matter of right. The City's Central Commercial/Residential and Administrative Office districts permits both schools and educational services as of right. MHMC § 18.24.020(g)(schools); § 18.34.020(d) (educational services). Regarding churches, there are several zoning districts in which churches may be permitted as a matter of right, or as a conditional use. Specifically, the code permits churches to locate within the General Industrial District as a matter of right and within the Light Industrial District as a conditional use. MHMC § 18.36.030(A); § 18.38.020. Morgan Hill also offers evidence that it does not discriminate against religious institutions or assemblies. There are 15 churches located within the city, of various faiths. Rowe Del. ¶ 3. Several of these churches operate educational institutions, such as grade schools. Id. ¶ 4. The City also recognizes that educational institutions play a vital role in serving the needs of the citizens of Morgan Hill, and that the educational institutions located within the City include a satellite campus of a local community college. Id., ¶ 5. Accordingly, SJCC's argument that the City's zoning ordinance discriminates against religious organizations on its face is unpersuasive.
Second, SJCC argues that the City's land use regulation procedures and practices have the effect of discriminating against religious institutions on the basis of religion in violation of § 2000cc(b)(2). The argument is that the City's denial of SJCC's re-zoning application in favor of the existing hospital zoning "blocks the exercise of religion, but not medical affiliated services and as such is discriminatory in its application." Motion at 10. Once again, however, SJCC's argument is not persuasive. SJCC has failed to establish that the City denied the re-zoning application on the basis of SJCC's religious orientation. SJCC applied for a re-zoning in order to relocate its campus to the St. Louise site, but did not apply for a re-zoning so that it could operate a church on the property. As such, the City's decision to prefer to maintain the existing zoning for hospital use instead of allowing a re-zoning for educational use does not on its face trigger the RLUIPA merely because the educational services were to be provided by a religious organization.
Finally, SJCC also argues that the City's land use practices and procedures unreasonably limit religious assemblies, institutions and structures, in violation of § 2000cc(b)(3). The City correctly notes, however, that the PUD zoning laws on their face permit all uses, and hence there can be no facial attack on the PUD zoning as discriminating against religious institutions or assemblies. MHMC § 18.30.020.
b. Compelling Governmental Intrests
In addition, defendants contend, and plaintiff has not disputed, that the RLUIPA does not apply outside of zoning laws to other regulatory schemes, such as environmental laws. Morgan Hill denied the re-zoning application in part because SJCC had failed to comply with the zoning application requirements mandated by the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"). AR 941-44. Defendants argue that CEQA prohibits the "piecemealing" of single projects into separate components. See Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of CA, 47 Cal.3d 376 (1988) (discussing prohibited "piecemealing" of projects into separate components). Thus, an accurate and complete project description that accounts for all reasonably foreseeable expansion of a project is required in order to enable comprehensive and effective public scrutiny of the potential environmental impacts, as contemplated by CEQA. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal.3d at 396 (holding that an EIR must include an analysis of the environmental effects of future expansion if it is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the initial project and the future expansion will be significant in that it will likely change the scope or nature of the initial project or its environmental effects).
From the record, it appears that SJCC's initial application disclosed substantial anticipated future uses, including proposed 554, 500 square feet of building space, which included a central college building, a future office and arts center, relocatable office space, a gymnasium, residence halls, a field house, classrooms and a chapel/theater. AR 1061-62. When the City notified SJCC of the need to comply with the zoning code's requirement for a preliminary plan indicating the location and dimensions of all existing and proposed buildings and a development scheme indicating all phases of construction, SJCC amended its application so as to seek approval to use only the existing structures. AR 64-68, 71-80. SJCC was notified that the City's practice was to require a development plan that describes the new overall or ultimate use of the property. AR 800-801. Nevertheless, SJCC did not provide the requested information, but continued to publish its plans for the future development and use of the site. AR 142, 300. During the hearing before the City Council on the re-zoning application, the city counsel expressed concerns over SJCC's decision not to disclose the full nature of the project, which along with the City Council's desire to maintain the hospital zoning on the site, resulted in a proposed denial of the zoning amendment. AR 675. The hearing was continued to give SJCC more time to address the issues raised. AR 677. SJCC did not come forward with any new information, however, and on February 21, 2001, the City denied the zoning amendment application. AR 876 The formal resolution stating all of the reasons for denial was prepared by staff and adopted by the City Council on March 21, 2001. AR 941-44. One of the recited reasons for denying the application was the applicant's failure to submit a full and complete application disclosing the reasonably anticipated future uses.
SJCC did not file any reply papers in response to defendants' opposition briefs and evidence and therefore has not disputed the defendants' argument. Thus, it appears undisputed that the City denied SJCC's zoning application in part on the basis of the applicant's failure to submit a full and complete application which disclosed the applicant's reasonably foreseeable future development plans. Accordingly, the City's refusal to approve SJCC's re-zoning application based upon SJCC's failure to file a complete application as required by CEQA. A zoning denial based on a failure to comply with environmental regulations does not on its face violate the RLUIPA. Moreover, plaintiff has pointed to no evidence in the record that the City's action was in any regard pretextual, or motivated by an animus against religion, or the religious practices of SJCC. Even assuming that the RLUIPA was otherwise applicable to review the City's denial of SJCC's zoning application, requiring the applicant to comply with the disclosure requirements mandated by the state environmental laws is a compelling governmental interest outweighing whatever modest burden has been imposed on SJCC's religious exercise. Thus, plaintiff has failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.
Morgan Hill also argues that there are other compelling governmental interests which justifies the denial of the zoning application. Specifically, in addition to the failure to adhere to CEQA's requirements, the City argues that it has a compelling interest in maintaining the existing hospital zoning on the site because the site is the only site zoned for hospital use and is the only site within the City presently developed as a hospital and ready for hospital use. In view of the evidence in the record of the economic failure of St. Louise Hospital due to the lack of demand for hospital services, the presence of other hospitals in nearby and adjacent communities, and the likelihood that the need for hospital services will not arise for another 15-20 years, it is not clear that the City's interest in maintaining the present hospital zoning is a compelling interest. However, the court does not decide this issue, because, as stated above, plaintiff has failed to establish that the defendants' action has imposed a substantial burden on plaintiffs exercise of religion, and requiring the applicant to comply with the CEQA disclosure requirements is a governmental interests sufficient to outweigh the identified burden on plaintiff's religious exercise.
2. Irreparable Harm
As noted above, plaintiff has also failed to establish the likelihood that it will suffer any irreparable harm pending trial on the merits. The first purported harm identified by plaintiff are purported injuries to plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because plaintiffs will not be permitted to use the St. Louise site for their intended religious/educational purpose. SJCC complains that it faces a substantial predicament: after it announced the purchase of the property and the anticipated opening of the new college campus in the fall of 2001, it received a flood of applications. As a result of the City's action in denying SJCC's zoning application, however, "many students who have been called by God to be educated at SJCC will have to be turned away as the present facilities are insufficient." Motion at 6, Edrington Del. at 11:7-17. However, SJCC has not demonstrated that its religious practices will be harmed by denial of the use of the Morgan Hill property until a trial on the merits. SJCC has an existing facility which it is presently using. Preventing a change in existing religious practice, rather than restricting a present religious practice does not impose a substantial burden. Christian Gospel Church, 896 F.2d at 1224. Moreover, SJCC's enrollment predicament is largely of its own making, having prematurely announced its plans for the new college campus prior to securing the necessary approval to use the site. Finally, there is no showing that the harm suffered by SJCC is remediably by the sought for injunction: the school year has already commenced, and even if the court commanded the City to approve the zoning application, it would take some amount of time to conduct the necessary refurbishment of the present hospital structures to render them suitable for educational use.
The only other harm identified by plaintiff is that it has incurred expenses in the application process, and that it will continue to incur expenses relating to maintaining the vacant buildings on the property while being precluded from using them. Monetary expenses, however, do not constitute an irreparable harm and are insufficient to support an injunction. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n 12 Cal.4th at 1172 (economic cost is not a substantial burden for purposes of the free exercise clause).
Therefore, not only has plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiff has also failed to establish the possibility that it would suffer irreparable harm if the requested injunction is not issued. Moreover, based on the analysis set forth above, plaintiff has also failed to both raise substantial questions on the merits and establish that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. Accordingly, the motion for a preliminary injunction to compel the defendants to grant the rezoning application is denied.
III. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.