Opinion
A152337
07-16-2018
In re LEILANI J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEVEN J., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco City and County Super. Ct. No. JD17-3143)
Leilani J. was declared a dependent child of the juvenile court. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 362.) Leilani's presumed father, Steven J. (Father), was bypassed for reunification services after a restraining order was entered forbidding him from having any contact with her. Father appeals only from a visitation order made at the dispositional hearing, arguing the juvenile court improperly delegated discretion over his visitation with Leilani to the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency). We disagree and affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Section 300 Petition
These proceedings primarily involve S.S. (Mother), Father, and Leilani, who was born in May 2017. Mother and Father had been dating for four or five years and lived together with Mother's four older children from a previous relationship. At the time of Leilani's birth, a separate dependency proceeding was pending for her maternal half-siblings. Father also had an older daughter from another relationship, A.T., with whom he failed to reunify during a previous dependency case.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
On April 30, 2017, while Mother was nine months pregnant with Leilani, Father and Mother had an argument after Mother found a methamphetamine pipe in Father's belongings. When Mother attempted to leave the room, Father grabbed her by the wrists, pushed her down, and slammed her into a wall. Father also kicked a plastic item into Mother's stomach. Mother contacted the police and an emergency protective order issued. Within a couple of days, Mother and the Agency agreed to a safety plan, whereby she agreed "to not allow [Father] near the children."
At a hearing involving Leilani's maternal half-siblings, Mother, Father, and newborn Leilani attended together. Father appeared disheveled and became agitated when talking to the social worker. He later left the courtroom, carrying Leilani, and did not return. On May 31, 2017, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on Leilani's behalf, alleging she was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm and abuse and neglect (§ 300, subds. (b)(1), (j)) as a result of the parents' unresolved domestic violence issues and "CPS history," Father's substance abuse and anger management problems, and Mother's failure to benefit from prior services and provide adequate medical care.
Neither Mother nor Father attended a detention hearing on June 1, 2017. The juvenile court detained Leilani from Father, placed her with Mother, and issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting Father from having any contact with Leilani. The court ordered no visitation for Father until he presented himself to the court. The Agency subsequently filed an addendum detention report, which recommended Leilani be removed from Mother's custody and detained in foster care. The report indicated that on June 2, the day after the temporary restraining order issued, law enforcement officers and the social worker saw Father and Leilani at Mother's house. Mother told the social worker she "signed over the custody of [Leilani] to [Father]" and had lied about the domestic violence allegations. The Agency determined Leilani was at risk and immediately took her into protective custody.
Leilani was discovered to have a blood shot eye. Christopher Stewart, M.D., evaluated Leilani and concluded she had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye. An initial x-ray also suggested Leilani might have a leg fracture, but more tests were needed to confirm. The Agency contacted Mother, who confirmed Leilani had a "red line in her eye" for approximately one week. The Agency recommended supervised visitation with Father, but only after he began drug testing and Leilani was medically cleared.
Based on the occurrence of Leilani's apparently nonaccidental injuries, while in Father and Mother's care, the Agency filed an amended dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (e), (g) and (j). Both parents were present at the June 7, 2017 detention hearing on the amended petition. The juvenile court temporarily detained Leilani, placed her in foster care, declared Father her presumed father, ordered no visitation for either Father or Mother (over Father's objection) until the medical findings were clarified, and continued the matter because the parents requested time to hire counsel. At the continued detention hearing, on June 9, Mother and Father again failed to appear. The court confirmed its detention orders and extended its "no visitation" order.
Jurisdiction/Disposition Report and Determination
By the time the combined jurisdiction and disposition report was filed on June 21, 2017, Father had still not presented himself to the Agency for assessment. However, the report documented several previous instances of domestic violence between Mother and Father and summarized Father's child welfare history. In 2015, Leilani's paternal half- sibling, A.T., was removed from Father's custody when he left her in the paternal grandmother's care and he failed to return or communicate. During the reunification period, Father failed to submit to random drug testing and had no contact with A.T. for a year and a half. As a result of Father's failure to engage in reunification services, the juvenile court ultimately terminated his reunification services and established legal guardianship as A.T.'s permanent plan. Leilani's paternal grandmother told the Agency Father "has struggled with methamphetamines for many years and . . . refused to go into treatment."
Although more information was not yet known about Leilani's possible fracture, Dr. Stewart reported her eye hemorrhage was itself "concerning because it could have [been caused] by someone pushing into [her] eye, someone poking [her] in the eye[,] or someone squeezing [her] chest."
Because of Mother's and Father's unresolved domestic violence, substance abuse, mental health issues, and concern Leilani had suffered nonaccidental trauma while in her parents' care, the Agency recommended the juvenile court sustain the amended dependency petition, order Leilani removed from parental custody, and provide Mother with reunification services. The Agency recommended Father receive no reunification services because he failed to reunify with A.T. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10), (13)).
On June 20, 2017, at a hearing regarding a permanent restraining order, Father requested visitation with Leilani. The juvenile court issued a permanent restraining order, prohibiting Father from having any contact with Leilani for a period of three years. The court explicitly refused to order an exception for visitation until it had "further medical information from [Leilani's] doctors."
The court held a settlement conference on July 6, 2017. Although Father initially failed to appear, his counsel was present. The Agency provided an update regarding Leilani's injuries, reporting that Dr. Stewart no longer believed Leilani suffered a fracture, but the subconjunctival hemorrhage still appeared nonaccidental. Recognizing Leilani's injuries were less serious than originally thought, the court ordered Father to meet with the social worker for assessment and drug test clean for a period of three weeks in order to begin supervised visits with Leilani. When Father later appeared, the juvenile court held an in camera Faretta hearing. When the proceedings resumed, the court informed the parties Father would represent himself and his prior attorney, Hong Chew, would act as Father's advisory counsel. The combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing was continued to August 11, 2017.
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.
In a July 28, 2017 supplemental report, the Agency reiterated its recommendation that the court sustain the amended dependency petition, remove Leilani from Father and Mother's custody, and deny Father reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (13). The social worker reported meeting with Father on June 27. At that time, the social worker provided Father referrals, including for therapy, drug testing, as well as substance abuse and domestic violence programs. Father was informed he needed to test clean for three weeks before he could visit Leilani. Nevertheless, during the following month, Father had not engaged in services, contacted the Agency to schedule visits with Leilani, or inquired about her well-being. Dr. Stewart had recently reviewed follow-up x-rays that were normal and revealed "the original x-ray did not likely represent a real fracture." However, he opined Leilani's subconjunctival hemorrhage could be the result of "maltreatment or child abuse" because neither health care professionals nor Mother had noted it at birth and it was otherwise unexplained.
When the matter came on for contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on August 28 and 29, 2017, Father was initially present and represented himself. However, on the first day of the contested hearing, Leilani's counsel questioned Father's competency to represent himself at the hearing. The juvenile court held a second in camera Faretta hearing. After the hearing, with all parties present, the court stated Father did not wish to participate in the proceedings or have Chew represent him. The court advised Father it intended to proceed regardless of whether he attended. Father and Mother then left the courtroom, and Chew did not actively participate further. Neither Father nor Mother were present at proceedings on August 29, 2017, but Father's advisory counsel appeared.
The testimony of two social workers and Dr. Stewart was received. One of the social workers stated she had no further contact with Father since providing him with referrals in June. The juvenile court also took judicial notice of records evidencing Father's failure to reunify with A.T. Thereafter, the juvenile court found the parents' failure to appear willful and sustained the amended petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). The juvenile court declared Leilani a dependent of the juvenile court, removed her from parental custody, and ordered family reunification services for Mother. The juvenile court denied reunification services to Father pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (13).
With respect to Father's visitation, the court allowed supervised visitation "[a]s previously ordered with [three] clean drug tests." In full, the court stated: "[A]lthough there are no reunification services that are being offered [to Father], the Court will allow the [Agency] in compliance with the previous court order that there be three [weeks of] clean drug tests prior to [Father] having supervised visits with his daughter. [¶] . . . [¶] The Court will ask that the [Agency] comply with that previous court order and allow [Father] visitation if he is able to comply with that order." (Italics added.) Father, acting in propria persona, filed a timely notice of appeal.
The court clarified on the record that Father must test clean for three weeks, rather than simply provide three clean tests.
Father's notice of appeal was filed on August 28, 2017, and specified he was appealing from findings and orders of the same date. The minutes from August 28, 2017, indicate no appealable findings or orders were made on that date. (See In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 196 ["dispositional order is the adjudication of dependency and is the first appealable order in the dependency process"].) Because jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders, including the challenged visitation order, were not made until August 29, 2017, we construe Father's notice of appeal as having been prematurely taken from the dispositional order. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(d) ["[a] notice of appeal is premature if filed before the judgment is rendered or the order is made, but the reviewing court may treat the notice as filed immediately after the rendition of judgment or the making of the order"].)
II. DISCUSSION
Father does not challenge the juvenile court's determination to bypass him with respect to family reunification services. Instead, he contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in its visitation order by failing to specify the frequency and duration of his visits with Leilani. According to Father, this constitutes an improper delegation to the Agency of the determination of whether his visits would occur. We review a juvenile court's visitation order for abuse of discretion. (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 692, 699, fn. 6.)
Father did not object below to the court's conditional visitation order—either on July 6, 2017, when he was represented by counsel, or on August 29, 2017. Accordingly, the Agency contends Father forfeited his right to challenge the visitation order on appeal. " ' "An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been but was not presented to the [trial] court by some appropriate method . . . . The circumstances may involve such intentional acts or acquiescence as to be appropriately classified under the headings of estoppel or waiver . . . . Often, however, the explanation is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial." ' " (In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501, italics omitted.)
However, application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic. (In re Rebecca S. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1313 (Rebecca S.).) We have discretion to consider forfeited questions of law on undisputed facts. (Id. at pp. 1313-1314; In re M.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 269, 272 (M.R).) Our Supreme Court cautions that such "discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue." (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, superseded by statute on other grounds, as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) "This is especially true in juvenile dependency cases, which involve the well-being of children and in which 'considerations such as permanency and stability are of paramount importance.' " (In re T.G. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 976, 984.)
Father forfeited the issue by failing (on two separate occasions) to object or ask the juvenile court to specify frequency or duration. We agree with the Agency this is not the type of case warranting an exercise of our discretion to excuse the forfeiture. (See M.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 272 [excusing forfeiture "in order to clarify the effect of the most recent amendment to the pertinent statute"].) In any event, even if we were to exercise our discretion to decide the question of law, Father's argument would fail on its merits.
Father argues the juvenile court, by failing to set a minimum frequency and duration for his visits, improperly delegated the determination of whether his visits with Leilani would occur. "Visitation is a necessary and integral component of any reunification plan. [Citations.] 'An obvious prerequisite to family reunification is regular visits between the noncustodial parent or parents and the dependent children "as frequent[ly] as possible, consistent with the well-being of the minor." ' " (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317 (S.H.), italics added.) Thus, during the reunification period visitation is mandatory absent exceptional circumstances, and the court may not delegate its power to decide whether any visitation shall occur. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); S.H., at p. 317.) "[P]arental visitation may be denied during the reunification period if such visitation would be inconsistent with the physical or emotional well-being of the child." (In re Matthew C. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094.) After reunification services have been terminated, visitation is still mandatory absent detriment. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)
Subdivision (a) of section 362.1 provides, in pertinent part: "In order to maintain ties between the parent or guardian . . . , and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of his or her parent or guardian . . . , any order placing a child in foster care, and ordering reunification services, shall provide as follows: [¶] (1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for visitation between the parent or guardian and the child. Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. [¶] (B) No visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child." (Italics added.)
The above provisions do not apply to Father because the juvenile court did not order reunification services for Father, concluding he was subject to statutory bypass. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10), (13).) The statutory "bypass provisions represent the Legislature's recognition that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain circumstances." (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 597.) When reunification services are not provided to one parent because of the statutory bypass but are ordered for the other parent, "[t]he court may continue to permit the parent [not receiving services] to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child." (§ 361.5, subd. (f), italics added.) Section 361.5, subdivision (f) provides, "in substance, that when the court does not order reunification services under subdivision (b)(2) through (16) or subdivision (e)(1), it 'may,' pending the section 366.26 hearing, 'continue to permit the parent to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.' " (In re Korbin Z. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 511, 518, fn. 5.) The word "may" in the last sentence of subdivision (f) is permissive—it "giv[es] the juvenile court discretion to permit or deny visitation when reunification services are not ordered, unless of course it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child, in which case it must deny visitation." (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 458.) Subdivision (f)'s discretion reflects the reality that "visitation is not integral to the overall plan when the parent is not participating in the reunification efforts." (J.N., at pp. 458-459, fn. omitted.) Thus, we agree with the Agency that, "once the court ordered bypass of reunification services for [F]ather at the disposition hearing . . . it had no obligation to order visitation, particularly if it believed that such visitation would be unsafe for Leilani."
Although visitation is not required for a parent not receiving reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b), if a court does order visitation, it "ha[s] the obligation to supervise that visitation" and cannot delegate "the decision whether visitation will occur to any third party, including the child, the social services agency, or the guardian." (In re Korbin Z., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 518; id. at p. 516.) "[T]he power to decide whether any visitation occurs belongs to the court alone." (S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317, italics omitted.) However, in making visitation orders, a juvenile court can properly delegate "the ministerial tasks of overseeing visitation . . . to the entity best able to perform them . . . .' [Citation.] 'Such matters as time, place and manner of visitation do not affect the defined right of a parent to see his or her child and thus do not infringe upon the judicial function.' " (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374 (Moriah T.).) Thus, case law distinguishes between the impermissible delegation of judicial responsibility to order or deny visitation to a third party and the permissible delegation of the management of visitation to the social services agency. (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123; In re James R. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 413, 435-436 [child's social worker may be given responsibility to manage visit details, including the authority to determine time, place, and manner in which visits should occur]; Moriah T., at pp. 1376-1377 ["juvenile court may grant to county the agency discretion to determine the frequency and length of visitation ordered by court"].) The juvenile court may also establish guidelines for when visitation may occur and delegate to a county welfare department social worker the discretion to determine whether those guidelines have been met, subject to judicial review by periodic review hearing or section 388 petition. (In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1237-1238; Moriah T., at p. 1377.) "Only when a visitation order delegates . . . the absolute discretion to determine whether any visitation occurs does the order violate the statutory scheme and separation of powers doctrine." (Moriah T., at p. 1374.)
A split of authority exists regarding whether frequency and length of visits are simply aspects of the time, place, and manner of visitation, or whether they are matters the juvenile court must always specify. (Compare S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 313 ["when the court orders visitation, it must also ensure that at least some visitation, at a minimum level determined by the court itself, will in fact occur"] and In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 755 ["the determination of the right to visitation and the frequency of visitation are a part of the judicial function and must be made by the court"] with Moriah T., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376 ["[r]equiring a disposition order to specify frequency and length of visitation compromises the ability of the county agency to fulfill its statutory mandate to supervise each case in a manner consistent with the child's best interests"] and In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1009 ["most courts . . . agree the visitation order need not specify the frequency and length of visits"].) However, none of the above cases reviewed orders granting visitation conditioned on certain protective actions being taken by an offending parent, after his reunification services had been denied.
The opinions Father relies on are distinguishable. Both Rebecca S. and M.R. involved visitation orders made at a section 366.26 hearing, where the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction, ordered guardianship as the permanent plan, and delegated discretion to the guardians to arrange visits. (Rebecca S., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313; M.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 272.) In such a situation, the juvenile court "was required to make a visitation order unless it found that visitation was not in the children's best interest." (Rebecca S., at p. 1313; accord, M.R., at p. 274.) Most importantly, the court was terminating jurisdiction and it was a third party, not the social services agency, who had discretion—making future monitoring by the court unfeasible.
In In re Kyle E. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1130 (Kyle E.), a reviewing court considered a visitation order, made at the combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, that called for "supervised" visits for a nonoffending, noncustodial father who was not receiving reunification services because he was not interested in placement. (Id. at pp. 1134-1136.) The reviewing court held that the order improperly delegated to the county's human services department "the responsibility to determine whether visitation with the minor would occur at all." (Id. at p. 1134.) The Kyle E. court distinguished its own prior decision in Moriah T., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, explaining, "the order articulated by the court at the hearing provides appellant with supervised visitation and nothing more. Second, the written order, unlike the order in Moriah T., provides for visitation 'as frequent as is consistent with the well-being of [the minor],' with all other conditions, including determinations regarding time, place and manner, and frequency and length of visits, left to the discretion of the Department." (Kyle E., at p. 1135.)
Although Kyle E. bears a superficial resemblance in its procedural posture, it is certainly distinguishable on its facts, as it did not involve a conditional visitation order made to protect a minor from an offending parent subject to a restraining order. Kyle E. also wholly fails to discuss section 361.5, subdivision (f).
The circumstances presented here are closer to those presented In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196 (Chantal S.) than those in Kyle E. In Chantal S., the juvenile court took jurisdiction based on the mother's inability to protect the child from an abusive father. (Id. at p. 201.) When the father was incarcerated and the mother completed her case plan, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction, granted legal and physical custody to the mother, and included in its exit order that the father's visitation would be "facilitated" by the child's therapist and begin only after the father's therapist determined he had made "satisfactory progress for a time." (Id. at pp. 201-202, 213.)
Our Supreme Court rejected the father's argument that the conditional visitation order constituted improper delegation to the therapists. (Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 202, 214.) The court recognized "the order vests some discretion in a therapist of his choice, to determine when 'satisfactory progress' has been made and the ordered visitation may begin." (Id. at p. 213.) Even if the visitation order delegated too much authority, the father was not prejudiced because the juvenile court could have denied him visitation altogether. "The juvenile court apparently concluded that to protect Chantal, visitation should not begin until father makes sufficient progress in his own therapy. A juvenile court faced with this situation has two options. First, if circumstances warrant, it could deny father visitation, which in effect would require him to later move the family court to amend the order if he wished to secure visitation. . . . Alternatively, the juvenile court could issue the order it did, specifying that visitation commence in a carefully restricted setting when father's chosen therapist determines that father has progressed satisfactorily." (Id. at pp. 213-214.) That the court did not deny visitation altogether, "amounts to a windfall to father, not a violation of his rights." (Id. at p. 214.) Even as to the minor, who did stand to be prejudiced by the conditional order, the order was not improper "because it contemplates that all persons subject thereto would remain under the control of the family court and that any party who wished to contest the conduct of a therapist (or the continued propriety of the order based on changed circumstances) would be able to raise that issue in the family court." (Ibid.)
In this case, the juvenile court did not delegate its responsibility to determine whether visitation should begin to the Agency or to any other party. To the contrary, it is Father, not the Agency, who had the power to decide when visitation began. Father does not assert that the court abused its discretion by conditioning his right to visitation upon clean drug tests. And, even if the issue was before us, we would find no abuse of discretion in requiring a parent with a serious substance abuse problem to drug test before being allowed to visit an infant who previously suffered nonaccidental injuries while in his care. (See Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1006, 1018 [such a condition is reasonable to protect children's well-being].)
On the facts of this case, we are not particularly troubled by the court's failure to explicitly set a minimum frequency or duration of visits. First, the Agency represents that, because the juvenile court essentially continued a visitation order made before disposition, Father would be entitled to a default minimum of six hours per week if he satisfies the conditions. The Agency relies on rule 12.10 of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco Local Rules, which mandates six hours per week for parental visitation, between detention and disposition, absent a showing of good cause. Although Father's reply brief raises a panoply of reasons this local rule should not be considered, he ultimately states he "does not object to this Court adopting [the Agency's] argument and entering an order allowing [him] six hours of unsupervised visitation with Leilani every week." (Italics added.) We need not decide whether rule 12.10 governs because we believe the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion for other reasons.
The issue of frequency and duration is not ripe for consideration on this record. The order, especially when viewed in conjunction with the unmodified restraining order, is more akin to a denial of visitation than a grant. Before any of the conditional visitation orders were made in this case, the juvenile court entered a restraining order, which prevented Father from having any contact with Leilani for three years, with no exception made for court ordered visitation. That order was not modified by the visitation order made at disposition, which makes clear Father is not entitled to any visitation in the event he does not first test clean for a period of three weeks. As Chantal S. explains, Father is in no place to complain that the court allowed for visitation if certain protective conditions were met.
Despite the original imposition of a testing condition for visitation in July 2017, and the provision of referrals in June and July 2017, Father made no effort to test or contact the social worker by the end of August. At this point, when Father demonstrated little interest in cooperating with the social worker and participating in dependency proceedings, much less rehabilitating the substance abuse and violence issues underlying them, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in leaving the details regarding frequency and duration to the Agency. (Cf. S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 317 [visitation orders must provide for "flexibility in response to the changing needs of the child and to dynamic family circumstances"]; Moriah T., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376 [visitations orders specifying a rigid schedule are "not in the best interests of either the child or the parent . . . because it fails to allow the flexibility necessary to rapidly accommodate the evolving needs of the dependent child and his or her parent"].)
The juvenile court's order for "supervised visitation" after the submission of three weeks of clean drug tests provided the Agency with "broad 'guidelines as to the prerequisites of visitation or any limitations or required circumstances.' " (Moriah T., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.) The juvenile court continues to supervise this dependency case and visitation developments or problems may be brought to the juvenile court's attention at a future periodic review hearing or via a section 388 petition. (See In re Danielle W., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1238 [a parent may "bring to the attention of the juvenile court any difficulties encountered with the Department's administration of the visitation order or inform the court of matters which would justify a change in the order"].) We need not and do not decide whether juvenile courts should ordinarily specify the frequency and duration of visitation in cases presenting fewer hurdles. The juvenile court did not improperly delegate discretion over Father's visitation in this case.
III. DISPOSITION
The August 29, 2017 visitation order is affirmed.
/s/_________
BRUINIERS, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
JONES, P. J. /s/_________
SIMONS, J.