Opinion
D076654
04-29-2020
In re N.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.F. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Joanne Willis Newton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant M.F. Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R.M. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. EJ4063) APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Gary M. Bubis, Judge. Affirmed. Joanne Willis Newton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant M.F. Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R.M. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
M.F. (Mother) and R.M. (Father) appeal from juvenile court orders concerning their minor son, N.M. Mother appeals from the order summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition to place N.M. in her care, contending she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Mother and Father both appeal from the order terminating their parental rights under section 366.26, and argue respectively that the court erred in construing the beneficial parent-child relationship exception and by determining that it did not apply. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) maintains the record does not show any abuse of discretion or lack of substantial evidence. We agree, and affirm the orders.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention, Removal, and Reunification
N.M. was born in July 2016, and tested positive for methamphetamine. The Agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), noting the test results, Mother's drug use during pregnancy, and Father's history of drug use. N.M. was released to the maternal grandmother, A.A. (Grandmother).
The Agency's detention report indicated that Mother reported she had a drinking problem, and both parents reported domestic violence. The jurisdiction and disposition report reflected Mother started drinking and using drugs as a teenager. The juvenile court removed N.M. from parental custody and ordered reunification services.
By the six-month review hearing, the Agency recommended termination of reunification services, noting the parents only started services toward the end of the review period. Despite the Agency's recommendation, the court continued services for the parents. During this period, Mother gave birth to another boy, J.M. Grandmother reported N.M. had fetal alcohol syndrome, was in occupational, physical, and behavioral therapy, and would begin speech therapy. The Agency reported both progress and setbacks by the parents, but ultimately recommended placement with them. In June 2018, the court placed N.M. with the parents. B. Post-Placement Events and Second Removal
The parents found a home with Mother's sponsor in Julian, but by late July, the sponsor asked Mother to leave.
Mother went to stay with the maternal great-aunt; Father was there at least part of the time. While they were moving, J.M. experienced a head fracture. After his discharge from the hospital, the great-aunt found a half bottle of whiskey in his car seat. Mother indicated she was stressed about J.M.'s injury and picked up the bottle while walking outside, but did not drink from it. Days later, Grandmother observed bruises on N.M.'s arm. Mother claimed she grabbed N.M.'s arm when she was about to fall, but did not mean to hurt him. The great-aunt would no longer let Mother stay there.
In mid-August, Mother told the social worker they were moving to Arkansas to live with the paternal aunt and uncle, noting she did not want to relapse. The Agency found that although moving without approval was unacceptable, the parents did so to maintain sobriety and a residence. The juvenile court ordered N.M. placed with the parents in Arkansas.
Initially, the Agency reported no major concerns. However, N.M.'s Medicaid approval was delayed because the parents did not have his birth certificate and Social Security card, and had to get copies from Grandmother. Ultimately, N.M. was approved for Medicaid in Arkansas, saw a doctor, and was waitlisted for therapy services in October.
The Agency set a special status hearing for October 2018 to address issues that had arisen in Arkansas. Because of these issues, the Agency believed the parents continued to show a "pattern of instability" and "high risk of relapse." Among the concerns were the following. The paternal aunt and uncle refused to submit fingerprints for the ICPC (Interstate Compact on the Placement of Child) process, in part due to the uncle's criminal history, and the ICPC request was denied. The aunt and uncle reported the parents drank on a few occasions and argued in front of the boys. The police also responded to a physical altercation between Mother and the aunt. The uncle reported they were trying to get the aunt mental health treatment. In addition, Mother tested positive for alcohol in two swab tests in late October; she disputed the results and agreed to a hair follicle test.
Independently, because of the problems that had arisen while the parents and N.M. were in Arkansas, N.M.'s counsel filed a section 388 petition, seeking removal of N.M. from his parents' custody.
At the special status hearing, the juvenile court detained N.M. and set a contested modification hearing.
Subsequent Agency reports submitted to the court in advance of the modification hearing reflected the parents were attending AA/NA and therapy, were employed, and had housing. Mother did the hair follicle test and the results were negative. She had another negative test in January 2019. The Agency nonetheless recommended the setting of a 366.26 hearing, because the parents "continued to demonstrate patterns of instability." The juvenile court held the modification hearing, and found Mother "was evasive and [it] didn't believe a lot of what she was saying." The court removed N.M. from parental custody for the second time, terminated reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing. C. Mother's Section 388 Petition and Section 366 .26 Hearing
In June 2019, the Agency filed its section 366.26 report. N.M. was in behavioral, speech, and physical therapy, and would be starting occupational therapy. Grandmother wanted to adopt him, and was not interested in guardianship. When she was at work, the great-aunt watched N.M.
In the August 2019 addendum report, the Agency recommended adoption. Social worker Maggie Kube summarized visits between the parents and N.M. at the park and McDonald's. N.M. called the parents "Mom" and "Dad," he wanted to play with them, and they engaged appropriately. He did not cry upon leaving. The report stated there "appear[ed] to be a level of strength in the relationship," but it did not outweigh the benefits of adoption, as N.M. had lived with Grandmother most of his life; she provided security and met his needs; and he was thriving in her care. It also recognized the parents' progress, but noted the disruptions in housing and events before and after the parents went to Arkansas.
In late September 2019, Mother filed a section 388 petition, seeking return of N.M. She stated she had maintained housing, a "significant period of sobriety," employment, and custody of J.M., and could "provide N.M. a safe stable environment." She further stated N.M.'s best interests were better served in a home "with loving, stable, sober parents" willing to maintain family ties, which she could provide and Grandmother could not. She provided letters of support from, among others, the parents' SMART recovery facilitator, their pastor, J.M.'s daycare provider, and colleagues, as well as the negative results of a September 2019 hair follicle test.
The Agency's October 2019 addendum report opposed Mother's petition, and expressed concern that if N.M. were returned to Mother's care, she might "relapse due to the stress of having a second young child in the home," particularly given that N.M. is a "high needs child." The report also described additional visits between the parents and N.M. at parks and McDonald's. N.M. was excited to see the parents, but on at least one occasion he told the aunt that he wanted to come back afterwards. During the visits, N.M. was affectionate with the parents, and they encouraged and guided him appropriately. After one visit, he cried for 30 seconds, but stopped crying in the car and was excited to return home. Dr. Jonathan Dean, a visitation supervisor, oversaw two visits. We discuss his hearing testimony, post.
Dr. Dean prepared a declaration, but the version in the record is partly illegible. His hearing testimony appears consistent with Mother's description of his declaration, and we focus on his testimony.
In October 2019, the juvenile court heard and denied Mother's section 388 petition. It made a prima facie finding on change of circumstances, but could not do so for best interest. It noted N.M. had lived most of his life with Grandmother, and that when he was with the parents, they left without permission to live with a known felon and aunt with mental health issues, with whom Mother engaged in a violent incident. The court explained that once services are terminated, "all we care about now is . . . what is in the best interest of this child," noting the "courts use[] the term[s] 'stability' and 'consistency.' " The court had no doubt N.M. loved the parents, and liked to see them, but it also had no doubt Grandmother was his "psychological parent . . . ." It found that "[c]onsidering that overwhelming evidence, just the time element alone," it could not make a prima facie finding that return of N.M. to Mother would be in his best interest.
The juvenile court then held the section 366.26 hearing. It entered the section 366.26 report and the August and October 2019 addendum reports into evidence. We summarize the pertinent witness testimony.
Although only some reports were entered into evidence, the parties reference reports from throughout the case. We consider them as part of the case history, and, given the evidence at the hearing, the result would not differ if we declined to do so.
Social worker Kube testified that N.M. and the parents had a bond, and he was excited about visits and sad when some ended, but she also explained it was normal for him to seek reassurance that he would be returned to Grandmother or the aunt. Kube had also been conducting home visits to observe N.M. with Grandmother (i.e., for adoption assessment), and testified that N.M. did not ask for the parents during them. She described N.M.'s relationship with Mother and Father as like one with an aunt and uncle.
Dr. Dean had a doctorate of clinical psychology and was an addiction therapist for the federal government. He agreed the primary job for a visitation supervisor is to ensure the child's safety, not to assess the relationship between the child and parents. Here, he supervised two visits, for a total of four hours. He found N.M. had a strong and healthy bond with the parents, explaining N.M. seemed comfortable with them and that it appeared to be a reciprocal, loving relationship. He opined it would be detrimental to N.M. to sever his bond with the parents. Dean also opined that N.M. not being upset at the end of visits with the parents reflected a secure attachment. He conceded that prior to giving these opinions, he did not read the Agency reports or conduct a bonding study.
Mother testified it was in N.M's best interest to maintain his relationships with the family, and if he were returned, she would do so. She discussed her concerns about the frequency of phone visits and N.M.'s attention during them. When asked why she did not move back to San Diego, she said she had to "separate [herself] to build a different way for [her] sobriety and to teach [her] children a different way of life," explaining her family abuses alcohol.
Father testified they were able to speak with N.M. two to three times a week. He said it "hurt" to have the relationship described as that of an uncle, explaining "I am his father. . . . He calls me dad, 'I love you, Daddy.' "
Grandmother addressed the phone visits, explaining her work schedule is not set, the parents do not always call when planned, and N.M. sometimes does not want to talk. When asked why she chose adoption, she said N.M. was "already home and . . . settled," and this "just needs to end . . . ."
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was likely N.M. would be adopted if parental rights were terminated, none of the exceptions under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) existed, and adoption was in his best interest.
The court found visitation had "been regular and consistent, but it [was] phone visitation," noting it was hard to maintain a relationship by phone for a significant period. The court said the situation existed "[b]ecause the parents chose to move 1700 miles away to solve their problems, which maybe they did."
The court then addressed whether the parents "occup[ied] a parental relationship in the child's life resulting in a positive parental attachment." It stated "there is a loving relationship" between the parents and N.M., but it wanted to look at it "in terms of their parental relationship . . ." It found that when they were parenting, what happened was "[i]nstability, chaos, bad decisions," and although they "turned it around," you "can't say, okay, everything should be okay now." The court explained: "This case is all about . . . [N.M.'s] best interest. So when I look at . . . the way he was parented . . . while he was with the parents, I can't find that the parental relationship that they have outweighs the benefit of adoption." The court noted that being a parent "isn't playing" or "going to McDonald's," and is hard work. It also found guardianship would potentially "destabiliz[e]" his "permanence and stability," by providing "a hammer . . . to keep bringing [section] 388's. "
The court concluded by noting the parents could try to maintain a relationship with Grandmother, but stated "she has no legal obligation" to do so and it "did not make [its] ruling based on even the thought that she continue the relationship . . . ." Mother and Father timely appealed.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Modification Petition
Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her an evidentiary hearing on her modification petition. This contention lacks merit.
"A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388, if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child." (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 600.) A section 388 petition is "liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency." (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 461.) "Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability." (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 (Marilyn H.).)
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing on changed circumstances and best interests, he or she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (§ 388, subd. (d); In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806 (Zachary G.).) But " '[i]f the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition.' " (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445 (Daniel C.).) The prima facie requirement is " 'not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.' " (Ibid.) In deciding whether a prima facie showing has been made, the court "may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case." (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616.)
We "review[] a juvenile court's decision to deny a section 388 petition without a hearing for abuse of discretion." (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158; see In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 [" ' "The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." ' "].)
We conclude the juvenile court was within its discretion in concluding that there was no prima facie showing that returning N.M. to Mother was in his best interest, which would be necessary for Mother to obtain a hearing on her section 388 petition. As the juvenile court noted, at this stage, when a section 388 petition has been filed after reunification services have been terminated and a section 366.26 hearing has been set, the focus is on permanence and stability. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 (J.C.) ["after reunification services have terminated, a parent's petition for . . . an order returning custody . . . must establish how such a change will advance . . . permanency and stability"].) The court had concerns about Mother's credibility, as illustrated by its comment at the contested modification hearing. But even if everything Mother claimed in her petition about her progress, her bond with N.M., and ability to maintain his family relationships were substantiated, it would not establish she could provide N.M. with a permanent, stable home. (See J.C., at p. 526 ["long-term sobriety and renewed interest in parenting classes showed changed circumstances, but [mother] did not establish that an order giving her custody of [the child] would be in the child's best interests"].)
To the contrary, the record illustrates that Mother, along with Father, repeatedly introduced instability into N.M.'s life, through substance use, domestic violence, and changing living environments. Even when the parents sought stability, as they did in moving to Arkansas, it did not endure. The move to Arkansas also interrupted N.M.'s services, which was exacerbated by the parents' failure to bring his identification documents and the resulting delay in Medicaid approval that would permit him to get services. Meanwhile, removal would take N.M. from his stable living environment in Grandmother's home, where he spent most of his young life and was thriving, despite developmental issues resulting at least in part from Mother's actions. Even if Grandmother did not maintain N.M.'s relationship with the parents, as Mother alleged in her petition, the juvenile court could still reasonably conclude that Mother did not establish a prima facie case as to best interest. (See Daniel C., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445.)
Mother's arguments are unavailing. As an initial matter, we reject her contention that the juvenile court failed to liberally construe her section 388 petition. The court acknowledged the issues she wished to emphasize (including her changed circumstances and bond with N.M.), but properly focused on stability for N.M. in concluding Mother had not established a prima facie showing as to his best interest.
Her other arguments focus on the evidence, and likewise lack merit. First, Mother directs us to the letters supporting her petition. Even if the matters therein were deemed to be true, it would reflect only that the parents made commendable efforts to continue working on their sobriety and become good community members and employees. The letters do not address the instability to which the parents exposed N.M., and do not negate the risk of such further instability were N.M. returned to Mother. This evidence did not establish that Mother could provide the permanent, stable home environment N.M. needs, and which Grandmother already provided. (See J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 526; cf. Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 808 [affirming summary denial of § 388 petition; no evidence that parent "was immediately ready to take custody" or that "it was in [the minor's] best interests to be removed from the only home . . . he had ever known, and thereby be deprived of the stability of a permanent home" to be returned to parent at risk of rejoining abusive partner].) We reject Mother's reliance on the recent good visits, for similar reasons. (See J.C., at p. 526.)
Second, Mother cites the negative results of her September 2019 hair follicle test, contending it showed she "maintained her sobriety despite the stress of losing custody of N.M." We are not persuaded. The September 2019 negative test results did not mean Mother would continue to stay drug and alcohol free, such that she could keep N.M. safe going forward; she had been using drugs and alcohol for decades. Mother was not sober when N.M. was born, did not seek sobriety for months, and there were concerns she had relapsed. And return of N.M. to Mother's care would likely involve its own stress. Indeed, the Agency questioned her ability to remain sober with a second young child at home, given that N.M. is a "high-needs child."
Finally, Mother cites Dr. Dean's opinion that N.M. was bonded to the parents, arguing that although it was "not a formal bonding study," his experience and education meant his opinion was prima facie evidence of a "healthy bond." Dean acknowledged his role as a visitation supervisor was to ensure the child's safety, not to assess attachment. He also had not read the Agency's reports, so had little context for whether the relationship was healthy. Further, Mother had to establish a prima facie case that return of N.M. was in his best interests, not simply that a parent/child bond existed. (Daniel C., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445.) This she failed to do.
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. B. Termination of Parental Rights
We briefly address an additional point. Mother contended in her opening brief that the "constitutional nature" of her and N.M.'s rights "should be considered" in assessing her challenge to the order terminating parental rights, but did not allege any particular violation. We do not consider her belated point on reply regarding due process requirements for section 388 petitions, or other newly raised points. (American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453 [points raised for first time on reply "will ordinarily not be considered," because it "deprive[s] the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument"].)
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the beneficial parent-child exception to adoption inapplicable, by improperly focusing on the parents' prior instability in assessing the parental relationship. Father argues the exception was applicable, and requests we order a plan of guardianship. We reject these contentions.
1. Applicable Law
"At a section 366.26 hearing the juvenile court has three options: (1) to terminate parental rights and order adoption as a long-term plan; (2) to appoint a legal guardian for the dependent child; or (3) to order the child be placed in long-term foster care." (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 935-936 (Jason J.).) The Legislature has directed a "mandatory preference for adoption over legal guardianship . . . ." (San Diego County Dept. of Social Services v. Sup. Ct. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 882, 888; § 366.26, subd. (b).)
If the court finds the child likely will be adopted, the court "shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption," absent certain exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c).) The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies where "[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)), because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship" (id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).).
The juvenile court found the parents met the visitation requirements. Accordingly, the only issue here is whether the court erred in determining the parents' relationship with N.M. did not outweigh the benefits of adoption.
A beneficial relationship is one that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.).) "[T]o establish the exception a parent must prove that the benefit of continuing a parental relationship outweighs the child's interest in the stability and permanence of adoption." (In re Logan B. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1012.) "[T]he court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (Autumn H., at p. 575.) "The age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond." (Id. at p. 576; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315 (Bailey J.) [accord].) The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies only in exceptional circumstances. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
"We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child." (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.)
Mother argues de novo review applies because she is asserting the juvenile court erroneously construed the factors for the exception, citing In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166. In re D.O. reflects that de novo review would apply to the claim of legal error, not the ultimate determination. (Id. at p. 174 [to extent one contends juvenile court "erroneously construed" factors for sibling relationship exception, Court of Appeal "review[s] the claim de novo"]; ibid. [for challenge to "juvenile court's ultimate determination," Court of Appeal applies "the substantial evidence standard to the . . . underlying factual determinations, and the abuse of discretion standard to the court's weighing of competing interests"].) As we explain next, Mother does not establish legal error here.
2. Mother Does Not Establish Legal Error
We begin with Mother's legal error argument, which she succinctly summarizes on reply: she contends that "it was an error of law for the court to expressly base its finding . . . that the parental relationship did not outweigh the benefit of adoption on the parenting problems that occurred from May 2018 through October 2018, when the child was in the parent's care, rather than assessing the current relationship between the parents and child." We disagree.
The juvenile court did not ignore current circumstances, much less expressly indicate that it was relying solely on events during the parents' custodial period. The court acknowledged the parents "turned it around," as well as the existence of a loving relationship, and referenced McDonald's, where recent visits took place. It also properly considered other factors, including N.M.'s time in the parents' care and his needs, and impliedly found there was no beneficial parental relationship. (See Autumn H., 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 [describing factors for consideration]; Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315 [accord].)
The court did not expressly find there was no beneficial parental relationship. Viewing its ruling as a whole, however, we infer it impliedly made this finding. Further, even if there were such a relationship, it still would have been reasonable to hold that its benefits were outweighed by those of adoption. (See Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
Mother's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, she contends it is "undisputed that the parents had overcome their history of instability" by the section 366.26 hearing, citing their progress and positive visits. This was not undisputed. The juvenile court remained concerned about instability, and that concern is supported by the record.
Second, she argues a court cannot focus solely on periods of instability, as the exception would never be found, and this case is consistent with those in which parents overcame instability. The court did not focus solely on the parents' instability, and the cases are distinguishable for other reasons. (See, e.g., In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1535 (Brandon C.) [affirming order finding exception applied]; In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1203, 1206-1207 [child lived with mother for first six and a half years, and was "odd child out" in placement with her former boyfriend; he expressed a desire to live with her again; and there was no one else with whom he had a maternal beneficial relationship]; In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 689-691 [children spent significant time in Mother's custody; two older children had strong primary bond, and youngest child was strongly attached]; In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 74, 77 [mother promptly reported relapse to social worker, she was credible, and the children were "very tied" to her; juvenile court improperly found they were not so bonded they could not be happy with godparents].)
We briefly focus on In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 (S.B.), a case from this court, as Father also contends it supports the exception. We have stated that S.B. "must be viewed in light of its particular facts" (Jason J., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 937), and those facts are distinguishable. There, the father was the primary caregiver for three years, he promptly acknowledged the protective issues, and the child was upset when visits ended, but the juvenile court found the exception inapplicable. (S.B., at pp. 293-295, 298.) We reversed, explaining the court found the child would benefit from the relationship and erroneously terminated parental rights based on the grandparent caretakers' willingness to allow visits. (Id. at p. 300.) Here, in contrast, the parents had custody of N.M. for only six months, they did not start addressing the protective issues until the end of the first review period, and N.M. was fine when visits with the parents ended. Further, the juvenile court stated Grandmother had no legal obligation to permit visits and it did not rely on any thought that she would do so.
In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, another case cited by Mother, is distinguishable for similar reasons. (Id. at pp. 128-129 [parental rights could not be terminated based upon expectation that adoptive parents would permit contact].) --------
3. Father Does Not Establish The Court Erred in Finding The Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception Did Not Apply
We now proceed to Father's argument that the juvenile court erred in determining the exception did not apply. Viewing the record favorably to the court's decision, and drawing all reasonable inferences, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the court's implied finding that the parents did not have a beneficial parental relationship with N.M. The social worker opined their relationship with N.M. was like that of an aunt and uncle, and the juvenile court reasonably could credit her testimony. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53 (Casey D.).) Although the parents had a loving relationship with N.M. and pleasant visits, that was not enough. "[T]he parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits—the parent must show that he or she occupies a parental role in the life of the child." (See In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527.) N.M. did not ask for the parents between visits, was not upset when visits ended, and sought reassurance he would return to Grandmother or the aunt after visits. Although Dr. Dean viewed N.M.'s lack of distress as a sign of attachment and opined N.M. should be with his parents, the juvenile court could reasonably accord his views little weight, given the limited scope of his evaluation. Further, the parents attended to their own needs, rather than N.M.'s, as illustrated by their delays in resolving the problems that led to removal, their move to Arkansas away from family and N.M.'s services, and Mother's unwillingness to return to San Diego, even while aware N.M.'s relationship with the family was important. The parents may have their reasons, but they do not reflect a parental focus on N.M. (See In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1200 [no error in finding beneficial parental relationship inapplicable, where, among other things, "overall relationship" was "marked by parental indifference to the minors' core needs for structure and stability"].)
Even if the court had found there was a beneficial parental relationship between the parents and N.M., it reasonably could still have determined the benefits of that relationship did not outweigh those of adoption. (See Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The parents related to N.M. as loved ones, not parents, and focused on their needs rather than his. They exhibited a pattern of instability that put N.M. at risk. In contrast, Grandmother had provided N.M. with a stable home since birth, he was thriving there, and she wanted to adopt him. There is no evidence N.M. had "needs only [the parents] can satisfy," or "the type of emotional attachment" to them that would cause him "to be greatly harmed if parental rights were terminated." (Jason J., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 938.)
Father's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, he contends there is evidence to support the exception, focusing on the positive phone and in-person visits and Dr. Dean's testimony. He essentially wants us to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. (Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.)
Second, Father argues "the exception must be considered in the context of the amount of time" the parent could spend with the child. We recognize that principle (Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1537-1538), but the context here does not aid him. N.M. was removed the second time due to the parents' failure to provide a stable environment for him, and subsequent visitation was limited because they moved to Arkansas. Father also contends that the focus should not be on whether the parent is a worthy person. He identifies nothing to suggest the juvenile court focused on the parents' worthiness, rather than N.M.'s best interest.
Third, Father's reliance on the case law is misplaced. He cites S.B., but it is distinguishable for the reasons discussed above. He also tries to distinguish J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 503. That case, like here, involved a child who relied on the caretaker for most of the dependency period; had limited, pleasant, visits; and who separated easily. (Id. at pp. 532-533.) Father contends that, unlike in J.C., N.M. "generally had every day telephone contact with his father and viewed him as an essential part of his life," and he did not cry and want to return home during visits. The evidence reflects there was difficulty with the phone visits, due in part to N.M.'s lack of desire to talk; the testimony cited by Father does not indicate N.M. viewed him as essential; and the record reflects N.M. sought reassurances he would be returned home after visits.
Finally, Father contends we should reverse the order terminating parental rights and order guardianship. We have concluded the juvenile court did not err in finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception inapplicable. Accordingly, it did not err in ordering adoption rather than guardianship, and we will not direct such action. (Jones T. v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 240, 244, 251-252 [court "not required to consider guardianship once it found the minors were adoptable"; it "falls short of the secure and permanent placement intended by the Legislature"].) We note the juvenile court did address and reject guardianship, finding it could lead to further section 388 petitions and instability for N.M.
We conclude the juvenile court did not err in finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception inapplicable.
III.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
IRION, J. WE CONCUR: AARON, Acting P. J. DATO, J.