Opinion
D072008
08-28-2017
In re EDUARDO P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. E.P. JR., Defendant and Appellant.
Neil R. Trop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Lisa Maldonado, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CJ1182A) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura J. Birkmeyer, Judge. Affirmed. Neil R. Trop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Lisa Maldonado, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
E.P., Jr. (E.P.) appeals the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his son, Eduardo P. III (Eduardo), under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. E.P. contends that the evidence before the juvenile court was insufficient to support termination of his parental rights and that the court erred in sustaining the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency's (Agency) objections to questions posed to eight-year-old Eduardo about his understanding of adoption. We conclude E.P.'s contentions lack merit and affirm the juvenile court's order.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2014, the Agency received a referral concerning Eduardo and his half-sister, Ruby L. (together, minors). The referring party alleged that Eduardo's and Ruby's mother, M.J., and Ruby's father, Christian L., engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the minors and abused illegal substances, that the family's home was filthy, and that M.J. and Christian failed to follow care instructions for 10-month-old Ruby, who had a serious medical condition. On July 25, 2014, the Agency filed petitions under section 300 on behalf of the minors. With respect to five-year-old Eduardo, the Agency alleged he was exposed to violent confrontations between M.J. and Christian, including Christian grabbing M.J.'s hair, choking M.J., and breaking down a door. The petition stated that M.J. had called the police to intervene several times, but remained in contact with Christian. The petition also alleged that Christian used methamphetamine and marijuana in Eduardo's presence.
Eduardo's and Ruby's dependencies were adjudicated together, but Ruby is not a subject of E.P.'s appeal.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court made prima facie findings on the petitions. The court also appointed counsel for E.P., who was in prison in another state. Eduardo and Ruby, who were initially detained at Polinsky Children's Center, were placed with Eduardo's paternal great-aunt. At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing the following month, the court found E.P. was Eduardo's presumed father and at a subsequent hearing made true findings on the Agency's petition and declared Eduardo a dependent of the juvenile court. The court ordered reunification services and supervised visitation for M.J., but not for E.P., who was serving a nine-year prison term for murder.
During the initial six-month review period, M.J. actively engaged in reunification services, including visitation, therapy, and domestic violence and parenting education. Eduardo, who was in kindergarten, was described by his school's staff as bright, and he enjoyed school and his friends. The family's social worker referred Eduardo to a therapist for an evaluation because she was concerned he might have been traumatized by the domestic violence he witnessed. The evaluation, however, had not occurred by the time of the review hearing.
A month before the hearing, Eduardo's and Ruby's caregiver requested the children be placed in a new home. The minors were moved to the home of M.J.'s close friend, Jamie W., and M.J. visited regularly. At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court adopted the Agency's recommendation to continue M.J.'s reunification services and the court granted unsupervised visitation for M.J.
In the next review period, M.J. continued to progress with her reunification efforts. She maintained employment, moved into her own apartment, and continued regular visitation with the minors. Eduardo began regular therapy and was diagnosed with an unspecified adjustment disorder. His therapist reported that Eduardo was very protective of his mother and wanted to return to living with her and Ruby. Before the review hearing, M.J. admitted she had driven the minors without a valid driver's license and continued to spend time with Christian in the minors' presence despite having a restraining order in place against him.
In its initial report for the 12-month review hearing, the Agency recommended the court continue reunification services for M.J. and Christian for an additional six months, and that M.J. be approved for overnight visitation and a 60-day trial visit. At the initial hearing, the minors' counsel contested the Agency's recommendation. Then, before the contested hearing, M.J. was involved in a car accident that injured Christian and she was arrested for driving under the influence. In subsequent interviews with the Agency's social worker, M.J. admitted she and Christian had decided to reunite. She also admitted to driving under the influence and that she had been sentenced to house arrest and five years' probation. As a result of M.J.'s arrest and her continued relationship with Christian, the Agency changed its recommendation for the 12-month review hearing, instead asking the juvenile court to terminate services for M.J. and Christian, permit only supervised visitation, and set a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26,
The minors' counsel withdrew his request for a contested hearing and M.J.'s and E.P.'s attorneys set the matter for trial. Eduardo and Ruby continued to live with Jamie, but she was not interested in adopting them. In the Agency's final report before the contested hearing, the family's social worker stated her opinion that M.J. was not able to care for the minors. At the hearing, the court agreed and found M.J. had not made substantive progress on her reunification plan and there was not a substantial probability of returning Eduardo or Ruby to her care by the 18-month review date. The court terminated reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26.
M.J. filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition from the court's order. After counsel notified this court there were no viable issues for review we dismissed the petition.
In its initial report for the permanency planning hearing, the Agency recommended that the court terminate parental rights and order adoption as the permanent plan for Eduardo. At that time, Eduardo and Ruby had been in Jamie's care for 11 months. Eduardo was doing well in his first grade class and was attending therapy weekly. His Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) described Eduardo as "well-rounded, extremely bright" and "wise beyond his years." The Agency reported that M.J. had stopped visitation with the minors. The social worker explained that Eduardo enjoyed spending time with M.J., but was not distressed upon her departure. In its assessment of Eduardo's relationship with M.J., the Agency concluded it was not one of a parent and child, and that the detriment that might be caused by severing the relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption. The Agency also concluded Eduardo did not have a parent-child relationship with E.P.
By the time of the Agency's initial report for the permanency planning hearing, Jamie changed her mind and told the family's social worker that she wanted to pursue adoption of Eduardo and Ruby. The social worker reported Jamie was committed to that plan, and Eduardo told the social worker and Jamie that he felt good about living with Jamie for a long time. However, just two weeks later the social worker filed an addendum report indicating Jamie had again changed her mind and was no longer willing to adopt the minors.
Simultaneously, Ruby's paternal relatives contacted the Agency and alleged that Jamie was not caring for the minors adequately, had taken the minors to Mexico without the court's permission, and was allowing unauthorized visitation with M.J. When interviewed by the social worker, M.J. admitted she had moved into Jamie's home and was helping care for the minors and Jamie's four children. M.J. was missing her scheduled visitation because she was seeing the minors every day. Jamie and M.J. told Eduardo not to tell the social worker the truth about M.J. living with the minors in Jamie's home, and he complied.
Shortly after, in early June 2016, Eduardo and Ruby transitioned into the home of Ruby's paternal great-aunt, M.M. The minors adapted quickly to their new environment. The Agency obtained several continuances of the permanency planning hearing to evaluate M.M.'s interest in adoption. M.M. initially indicated she wanted to provide a permanent plan of guardianship for Eduardo and Ruby. However, after additional time with the minors in her care, and several meetings with the social worker to explain the differences between guardianship and adoption, M.M. stated she wanted to adopt the minors to provide them with permanency and stability. Eduardo continued regular visitation with M.J., but also established a strong bond with M.M. Eduardo thrived in M.M.'s home, excelling in his second grade class and willingly participating in an active family life with M.M. and her three biological children.
In February 2017, Eduardo voluntarily reported to his social worker that during a visit with M.J. and his maternal grandmother, the two women encouraged him to lie by telling the social workers and court he was being mistreated in M.M.'s home and that he wanted to live with M.J. Eduardo told his social worker that he did not want to live with M.J. and that he felt good in M.M.'s home. He also told the social worker and M.M. that he wanted to be adopted by M.M. and that adoption meant that M.M. "will keep me here forever." The Agency's final report submitted before the permanency planning hearing stated Eduardo was both generally and specifically adoptable. M.M. continued to express her commitment to adoption. In addition, the Agency was aware of 38 families seeking to adopt a child with Eduardo's characteristics and 24 families seeking to adopt a sibling group matching Eduardo and Ruby's characteristics.
In March 2017, the social worker reported E.P. had called the Agency to check on Eduardo's well-being for the first time, and that E.P. had sent Eduardo a card and a letter.
The permanency planning hearing began in March 2017. M.J. and E.P. contested the Agency's recommendation that the court order a permanent plan of adoption for Eduardo. M.J. asserted that the parent-child exception to adoption applied. During the several day hearing, the court heard testimony from the family's social worker, Sandra Moreno; M.M., M.J.; Eduardo; and Dr. C. Barbara Meyer-Lee, who was hired by M.J.'s counsel to perform a bonding study to assess Eduardo's relationship with M.J.
Moreno testified that she had several conversations with M.M. about the differences between guardianship and adoption. Moreno also testified that Eduardo understood what adoption meant. She admitted she did not explain that under a legal guardianship M.M. "could keep him forever, and that he ... would be able to live and stay at her home" or that if adoption was selected as the permanent plan "his mother's parental rights would be terminated." Moreno did, however, explain to Eduardo that if he were adopted by M.M. it would be up to her to decide whether Eduardo could see his biological parents. Moreno also testified that the Agency had not yet completed an adoption home study for M.M.
During her testimony, M.M. reiterated her commitment to adopting Eduardo and Ruby and explained that she understood the differences between guardianship and adoption. She also testified that Eduardo told her he wanted to be her son.
Dr. Meyer-Lee, who had completed a total of eight bonding studies in her career as a psychologist, testified that Eduardo had a secure bond with M.J. The bonding study she performed lasted two hours and consisted primarily of her observing M.J. and Eduardo interact. She did not have any contact with Eduardo or M.J. outside of the study.
Eduardo, who was eight at the time of the hearing, testified that he was sad when he stopped living with his mother, but that M.M. and her children were his family. He testified that he told Moreno that he wanted to be adopted by M.M. He also testified that he understood that if he were adopted he would live with M.M. until he was 18 and it would be up to M.M. whether he could see M.J.
M.J. testified that she had a good relationship with the minors, visited them regularly and that they were always excited to see her and often wanted to extend their visits. She stated she did not want her parental rights terminated and, although she had a good relationship with M.M., she feared she might not be able to continue to see Eduardo and Ruby if they were adopted.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court announced its rulings, first finding that Eduardo was both generally and specifically adoptable. With respect to its finding of specific adoptability, the court described in great detail its finding that M.M. was devoted to adopting Eduardo and providing for his best interests. The court pointed to M.M.'s dedication to promoting his relationship with both birth parents as a sign of her commitment to Eduardo's well-being. The court rejected M.J.'s argument that Eduardo was not specifically adoptable because the adoptive home study for M.M. was not complete. The court noted that while the study would take time to complete, there was no evidence before the court to suggest that M.M.'s home would not be approved or that she would waiver in her decision to adopt the minors.
With respect to E.P.'s argument that the parent-child exception to adoption applied, the court considered the evidence in detail and concluded that E.P. had not shown that if his bond with Eduardo were severed it would cause detriment to Eduardo. With respect to M.J.'s argument that the parent-child exception applied, the juvenile court found that M.J. had shown regular visitation, satisfying the first prong of the exception. However, the court concluded M.J. had not shown that the benefit to Eduardo of maintaining a relationship with her outweighed the benefit to Eduardo of adoption.
In considering M.J.'s argument, the court pointed to the fact that Eduardo never wavered in his position that he wanted to be adopted. Eduardo repeatedly told social workers and caregivers that he understood adoption and wanted to be adopted despite many opportunities to change his mind, and pressure from M.J. and his maternal grandmother to state otherwise. The court also found M.J.'s statements of remorse for asking Eduardo to lie were not credible and that her actions over the course of the dependency showed she was more concerned with her own well-being than with Eduardo's. The court gave little weight to Dr. Meyer-Lee's testimony, concluding her methodology of interacting with M.J. and Eduardo for just two hours was skewed to find the existence of a secure bond and failed to take into account the history of Eduardo's relationship with M.J.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of adoption outweighed any detriment that could be caused by the termination of parental rights. The court terminated M.J. and E.P.'s parental rights to Eduardo and ordered a permanent plan of adoption. Only E.P. appeals the court's order.
DISCUSSION
E.P. asserts the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for Eduardo because (1) there was insufficient evidence of M.M.'s ability to adopt, (2) there was insufficient evidence concerning Eduardo's wishes, and (3) M.M. did not understand the differences between adoption and guardianship. In addition, E.P. contends the court erred in sustaining the Agency's evidentiary objections to questions M.J.'s attorney asked Eduardo about the possibility of not seeing M.J. if he were adopted.
I
Termination of Parental Rights and Selection of Adoption as Permanent Plan for
Eduardo
A
After reunification services are terminated, the focus of a dependency proceeding shifts from preserving the family to promoting the best interests of the child, including the child's interest in a stable, permanent placement that allows the caregiver to make a full emotional commitment to the child. (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.) At the permanency planning hearing, the court has three options: (1) terminate parental rights and order adoption as the permanent plan; (2) appoint a legal guardian for the child; or (3) order the child placed in long-term foster care. (Ibid.)
"Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the specified statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B)(i)-(vi); In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401.) "The parent has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstance that constitutes an exception to termination of parental rights." (In re T.S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039.) Because a selection and implementation hearing occurs "after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), provides an exception to the adoption preference if termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." Courts have interpreted the phrase " 'benefit from continuing the . . . relationship' " to refer to a parent-child relationship that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; accord, In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 936.)
The parent asserting the exception will not meet his or her burden by showing the existence of a "friendly and loving relationship," an emotional bond with the parent, or pleasant, even frequent, visits. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419; In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1200 ["To avoid termination of parental rights, it is not enough to show that a parent-child bond exists"].) Rather, there must be a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a significant, positive emotional attachment from the child to parent that if severed would result in harm to the child. (In re C.F., supra, at p. 555; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324; see also In re J.C., supra, at p. 529 [observing that interaction between a natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child and for the exception to apply, " 'a parental relationship is necessary' "].)
"We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child." (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.) " 'We uphold judgments if they are correct for any reason, "regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which the court reached its conclusion." [Citation.] "It is judicial action and not judicial reasoning which is the subject of review. . . ." ' " (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 876.)
B
E.P. first asserts that because M.M.'s home study was not complete at the time of the permanency planning hearing, the Agency failed to comply with section 366.21, subdivision (i)(1)(D). That provision states that "[w]henever a court orders that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 . . . shall be held, it shall direct the agency supervising the child and the county adoption agency . . . to prepare an assessment that shall include: [¶] . . . [¶] (D) A preliminary assessment of the eligibility and commitment of any identified prospective adoptive parent or legal guardian . . . to include a social history including screening for criminal records and prior referrals for child abuse or neglect, the capability to meet the child's needs, and the understanding of the legal and financial rights and responsibilities of adoption and guardianship." (§366.21, subd. (i)(1)(D).) E.P. argues, in turn, that the lack of a completed home study for M.M. resulted in insufficient evidence for the court to determine whether Eduardo was specifically adoptable.
As the Agency points out, E.P. did not object to the assessment's failure to include a completed home study at the time of the hearing. His failure to raise this alleged legal error below precludes our review of the sufficiency of the Agency's assessment reports. (See In re G.M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 552, 563-564 ["Having not raised the legal impediment question in the trial court, mother failed to properly preserve for appellate purposes her claim of trial court error."].) Even if we were to reach E.P.'s argument on the merits, however, the fact that the home study was not complete did not preclude the juvenile court from terminating parental rights. (See In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 166 ["there is no requirement that an adoptive home study be completed before a court can terminate parental rights"].) The minors lived with M.M. for close to a year at the time of the permanency planning hearing. She was approved by the Agency for placement, and there was no indication of anything in her background that would disqualify her as an adoptive parent to Eduardo. This evidence sufficiently supported the court's finding that Eduardo was specifically adoptable.
Additionally, E.P. does not challenge the juvenile court's finding that Eduardo was generally adoptable. "For a minor . . . who is adoptable based on factors in addition to a caregiver's willingness to adopt, the suitability or availability of the caregiver to adopt is not a relevant inquiry. [Citations.] Rather, a caregiver's willingness to adopt serves as further evidence the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the caregiver 'or by some other family.' [Citation.] A selection and implementation hearing does not provide a forum for a parent to contest the 'suitability' of a prospective adoptive family as long as the minor is generally adoptable." (In re R.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 486, 493-494.) That question " 'is reserved for the subsequent adoption proceeding.' " (Ibid.) The court found Eduardo was both generally and specifically adoptable. Thus, even if M.M. were disqualified as an adoptive parent, reversal would not be appropriate since E.P. does not argue the court's finding Eduardo was generally adoptable was made in error.
With respect to the evidence of Eduardo's wishes, E.P. asserts that "[t]he finding Eduardo was adoptable lacked the statutorily required evidence of Eduardo's informed view of adoption." In support, he cites section 366.21, subdivision (i)(1)(E), which provides that the Agency's assessment shall include "a statement from the child concerning placement and the adoption or guardianship, and whether the child, if over 12 years of age, has been consulted about the proposed relative guardianship arrangements, unless the child's age or physical, emotional, or other condition precludes his or her meaningful response, and if so, a description of the condition." E.P. contends this provision was not satisfied because Eduardo was not "informed that if he were to be adopted his relationship with his parents would be completely and forever legally severed and that there was necessarily a realistic prospect that he would never see his parents again, at least for the remainder of his minority."
E.P.'s representation that section 366.21, subdivision (i)(1)(E), required the Agency and the juvenile court to inform Eduardo explicitly that a future adoptive parent might prevent him from seeing E.P. and M.J. is not accurate. "While there is some disagreement whether evidence of the child's wishes must reflect his or her awareness that termination of parental rights is at issue [citations], it is clear that a direct statement from the child is not required where this is contrary to the child's best interest." (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 687.) Here, there was direct testimony from Eduardo concerning his adoption, including his understanding that his adoptive parents would control his ability to see M.J. and E.P. Additionally, the Agency's reports contained Eduardo's repeated statements that he wanted to be adopted. E.P.'s assertion that Eduardo needed to be told explicitly that there was a chance he would never see his biological parents again were he adopted is without merit. It is also clear from the record that Eduardo, who was eight at the time of the hearing, had an age-appropriate understanding of adoption and what it would mean for his relationship with M.J. and E.P. Indeed, Eduardo testified that he had been explicitly told that once he was adopted, only his adoptive parent could decide whether or not he could see M.J.
Finally, in support of his assertion that the juvenile court should have selected guardianship rather than adoption as the permanent plan for Eduardo, E.P. argues M.M. was not given a satisfactory description of legal guardianship. This argument also lacks merit. As discussed, it is clear from M.M.'s testimony that she understood the differences between guardianship and adoption, and was committed to adopting the minors. It is not this court's role to reweigh the juvenile court's determination that M.M. understood and was sincere in the commitment required for adoption. (See In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1140 [" 'Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court.' [Citations.] It is not an appellate court's function, in short, to redetermine the facts."].) Accordingly, we reject E.P.'s argument that the court erred by ordering adoption, and not guardianship, as Eduardo's permanent plan.
II
Claimed Evidentiary Error
During his testimony in chambers, Eduardo was asked a series of questions by M.J.'s attorney about his understanding of adoption and how it might affect his relationship with his biological parents. Over the Agency's objection, Eduardo testified that he was told that if he was adopted, his adoptive parents would control whether he would continue to see M.J. and E.P. M.J.'s counsel then asked, "how would you feel if you didn't get to see your mom anymore?" The court sustained the Agency's objection to the question. M.J.'s counsel followed with: "Has anyone ever told you that once you get adopted, it will be only up to your Tia [M.M.]?" "She's the only one that will get to decide whether or not you'll get to see your mom anymore?" The Agency's counsel again objected and the court sustained the objection. M.J.'s counsel then asked "when your Tia adopts you, if you're not allowed to see your mom anymore, would that change your mind about whether you wanted to be adopted or not?" The court again sustained the Agency's objection.
On appeal, E.P. challenges the juvenile court's evidentiary rulings on the last two questions. He contends that Eduardo was improperly prevented from testifying about "what his feelings might be should adoption be ordered," which frustrated the purpose of the juvenile dependency law to protect Eduardo's best interests. In response, the Agency asserts that because E.P. did not challenge the evidentiary rulings in the trial court he has forfeited the issue on appeal. The Agency alternatively contends that the rulings did not constitute an abuse of the juvenile court's wide discretion.
We reject the Agency's argument that E.P. lacks standing to challenge the evidentiary rulings, but agree that those rulings did not constitute an abuse of the court's discretion. The Agency cites In re D.S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 671 in support of its argument that E.P. lacks standing to assert the evidentiary error. In that case, the court of appeal dismissed the father's appeal of the juvenile court's denial of a mother's request for visitation under section 388. In its order dismissing the appeal, the court stated the father lacked standing because he had no stake in the mother's visitation request. (D.S., supra, at p. 674.) Here, E.P. has an interest in the issue of Eduardo's wishes concerning his future adoption, which is relevant to the court's decision to terminate E.P.'s parental rights. (See In re Frank L. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 700, 704 [noting "a father had standing to contest the performance of the county counsel who represented both the welfare department and the minor, because the child's welfare and the parent-child relationship were at stake in the dependency proceeding"].)
The juvenile court, however, "is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence" and its rulings " 'will be upset only if there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.' " (In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 121.) This court will not disturb the juvenile court's exercise of discretion unless the court has made "an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination." (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) Further, "[t]o the extent an alleged error violates state evidentiary law, 'even where evidence is improperly excluded, the error is not reversible unless " 'it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached absent the error.' " ' " (In re Jordan R., supra, at p. 134.)
Eduardo's responses to the questions asked by M.J.'s counsel were potentially relevant to the court's ruling. However, despite the exclusion of the testimony, the record is clear that Eduardo had an age-appropriate understanding that whether or not he would continue to see M.J. and communicate with E.P. after adoption would be determined by his adoptive parent. There is nothing in the record to suggest that had Eduardo been permitted to answer the questions, those answers would have changed the outcome of the proceeding.
We also note that at the time of the hearing, M.M. was very supportive of Eduardo's relationship with M.J. and E.P. and had fostered communication and contact between Eduardo and both of his biological parents. Although M.M.'s commitment to fostering these relationships is not legally enforceable, the court was entitled to consider it in assessing potential detriment to Eduardo. --------
In sum, in rendering its decision the juvenile court carefully and appropriately weighed the strength and quality of the parent-child relationship, and the detriment involved in terminating it, against the potential benefits of an adoptive home for Eduardo. E.P. has not shown that permitting Eduardo to answer the two potentially traumatic and speculative questions posed by M.J.'s attorney would have changed the decision reached by the juvenile court.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
IRION, J. WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.