Opinion
E066407
02-16-2017
In re B.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. F.R., Defendant and Appellant.
Brent Riggs, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel and Adam E. Ebright, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J265461) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes, Judge. Affirmed. Brent Riggs, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel and Adam E. Ebright, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Eleven-year-old B.M. came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) in May 2016 after she disclosed her father, F.R., molested and raped her from the ages of five to nine. Father was arrested on charges of sexual molestation and confessed the abuse to the police and a social worker for CFS. At the disposition hearing in June 2016, the juvenile court placed B.M. with her mother who lives in Colorado, bypassed reunification services for father, dismissed the dependency case, and issued a family law exit order prohibiting visits with father. In October 2016, the Riverside County Superior Court sentenced father to 40 years in prison after he pled guilty to two counts of forcible sodomy with a child, one count of forcible oral copulation with a child, and one count of performing a lewd act with a child.
We take judicial notice of the abstract of judgment, dated October 19, 2016, and plea agreement, dated October 18, 2016, in father's Riverside County criminal case No. BAF1600629. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
On appeal, father contends the court's dispositional orders must be reversed due to a spate of procedural errors, and because there is insufficient evidence to support the determination B.M. fell under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (g) (no provision for support). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Reasons for the Dependency
On May 11, 2016, CFS received a referral alleging B.M. had been physically and sexually abused. According to CFS's detention report and an attached police report, shortly after B.M. told her school counselor father had been touching her "private part" and beating her, father was arrested and confessed. Father told the police he had forced B.M. to perform oral sex on him multiple times in the past and had tried to have vaginal and anal sex with her on multiple occasions. He said the abuse occurred when B.M. was six and seven years old and claimed he had done it to "make her strong like me." He also admitted having given B.M. a black eye by punching her in the face, but said it was an accident.
During the initial interview at her school, B.M. told her counselor and the police father physically and sexually abused her from when she was five until she was nine. On numerous occasions, he forced her to orally copulate him and have vaginal and anal sex, and when she did not comply, he would beat her. He often gave her the option of getting a spanking or giving him oral sex. One time, B.M. chose a spanking and he punched her in the face.
During a later forensic exam and interview, B.M. recounted various instances of vaginal and anal rape. She once said "ow" when father tried to put his penis in her anus, and he told her to go to the bathroom and put water on it. The next day in kindergarten, she was unable to sit down from the pain.
B.M. said father was often drunk and would hit her butt, arms, and legs with a belt. The time he punched her in the face, she went to school the next day with a black eye. When her teacher asked father about the injury, he denied having hit her. B.M. said her father abused her more than once a month and told her not to tell anyone. She said she was scared every time she went home because of father, but now that he was in jail he could no longer "kick or beat her."
On May 16, 2016, CFS filed a dependency petition alleging B.M. fell under section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (d) (sexual abuse), and (g) (no provision for support). At the detention hearing the next day, the juvenile court removed B.M. from father and placed her in a foster home. B.M. and father had been living with a paternal aunt and uncle, but B.M. could not remain in that home because the uncle was a registered sex offender.
Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
B.M.'s mother, M.H., lived in Colorado. At the time of the detention report, CFS did not have enough information about her to recommend placement, but the social worker noted she had a prior history with CFS. In 2007, B.M. was removed from mother's and father's care as a result of neglect and mother's substance abuse. Ultimately, the court dismissed the dependency in 2007, giving mother and father legal custody of B.M. but physical custody to father because mother was living in a treatment facility at the time.
The social worker interviewed father in jail on May 27, 2016, and he admitted he had sexually abused B.M. He denied he ever punched her in the face, but admitted he beat her with a wooden spoon. He said the sexual abuse was not a form of gratification for him but was actually a form of punishment for B.M. He wanted her to excel in school and came up with the idea of sexual abuse because it is "the worst thing a person could do to someone else." He said he had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and had barely graduated from high school, and as a result he "wanted more for his daughter." He realized the sexual abuse had become "obsessive behavior" and he felt he "was able to stop" if he put his mind to it—like quitting drugs and alcohol. He said he was glad B.M. contacted the authorities because he had taught her to do just that if anyone were to abuse her.
Regarding mother, father said he had not been allowing her to visit B.M. because he "didn't think [he] had to."
The social worker interviewed mother on the phone shortly after filing the detention report. Mother lived in Colorado with her boyfriend of 10 years and reported being clean and sober since she completed the treatment during B.M.'s prior dependency. She explained she had tried to remain in B.M.'s life after she completed treatment, but father disappeared and did not provide his new address. She was able to find father by speaking with his family members and arrived at his Banning residence for a visit along with her two other daughters. Father's then girlfriend was opposed to mother visiting but mother was "direct about the shared custody, so they let her and her daughters continue to visit." However, father soon moved again and left no forwarding address. "This continued on for a number of years. It became harder to get his new addresses through [father's] family because they were worried if they gave . . . mother the address . . . [father] would get mad and not let them see [B.M.]"
B.M. told the social worker she wanted to live with mother, and the social worker believed mother "sounded appropriately concerned for her daughter" during the phone interview, so the social worker traveled to Colorado to assess mother as a potential placement option. In her assessment, she observed mother and her boyfriend "both present as highly functional nurturing parents" and noted they had "spent a significant amount of time and effort preparing their five-bedroom house to welcome B.M., painting a bedroom, the kitchen, putting up ceiling fans, re-adjusting their budget, arranging for a therapist and talking to [B.M.'s] siblings about whether they were willing and able to be supportive of [B.M.] if she were to come and live with them." Mother's 14-year-old daughter Kayla told the social worker she was excited B.M. might be coming and that they could ride the bus to school together.
After the visit, the social worker's initial concerns about mother's ability to parent due to her past substance abuse issues had completely resolved. She reported: "After investigation, the concerns have been answered. The mother and her partner have been clean and sober without any relapses since they completed rehabilitation and lived in sober living homes. She has a solid job history and work ethic, providing for her children, as does her partner. . . . [Her partner's] income is significant and [mother] is presently a stay-at-home mother, but is capable of working if needed by the family. For example, she managed Starbucks stores in California and has been in the marketing field for home improvements." The social worker concluded: "Upon seeing the nicely appointed home environment, no signs of a drug lifestyle, the way the family interacted together, hearing the explanation as to why she did not have a continuous relationship with [B.M.], as well [as] a variety of responses to the psychological-social assessment of the mother, undersigned is confident recommending [B.M.] be placed in the care of mother . . . and closing the case with Family Law Orders. All family members support this recommendation, but most importantly, [B.M.] would like to be with her mother." Father's sister, with whom B.M. and father were living before the dependency, told the social worker B.M. should be placed with mother because that was what B.M. wanted.
Regarding B.M.'s placement, father told the social worker during his interview, "all he wants now is the best for [B.M.] and he has no objection for her to live with her mother." He said mother had visited B.M. last August and he "saw her being good to their daughter." He acknowledged he was facing a lengthy criminal sentence and did not expect he would "ever see [B.M.] again." The social worker concluded father was being as honest with her "as he was probably capable of," but was still minimizing the severity of the abuse he inflicted on B.M. She noted he had not sought counseling eight months prior when he decided he needed to stop molesting B.M., nor did he turn himself in to the police or have B.M. move back in with mother "as might be expected if he was truly protective and remorseful."
The social worker reported B.M. was adjusting well in foster care, but needed therapy to "address the severe abuse she suffered while living with her father." CFS recommended the court place B.M. with mother, dismiss the dependency, and issue a custody order.
B. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
At the beginning of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on June 7, 2016, the court continued the matter to June 28 to allow father's counsel to try to speak with father, who was in jail in Riverside. At the June 28 hearing, father's counsel informed the court he had sent father a letter advising him of CFS's recommendation but had not received a response. B.M.'s counsel stated B.M. was currently on an extended visit with mother and was "doing well and settling in."
The court indicated it had received the detention and jurisdiction/disposition reports; a declaration of due diligence showing proof of service of notice of the hearing on the petition to father; and CFS's revised disposition findings and proposed orders, which included a proposed family law order requesting no visits for father. All counsel submitted on CFS's recommendations, but father's counsel objected to the prohibition on visits.
The court found true the allegations father beat, punched, and hit B.M. with belts and wooden spoons (a-1); raped and sodomized her and forced her to orally copulate him (d-3); and was unable to arrange for her care (g-4). As a result, it found B.M. was a dependent as described under section 300, subdivisions (a), (d), and (g). It also found, on clear and convincing evidence, removing B.M. from father's care was necessary because father had sexually abused her and there was a substantial danger to her physical and emotional safety in his care. The court bypassed reunification services to father under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) based on its findings B.M. had been adjudicated a dependent under section 300, subdivision (d) as a result of his severe sexual abuse and services would not benefit her.
The court determined it would be in B.M.'s best interest to live with mother in Colorado and visits with father would be detrimental to B.M. The court placed B.M. with mother, terminated the dependency, and issued a family law order prohibiting father from visiting B.M.
II
DISCUSSION
Father asserts several grounds for reversing the court's disposition order. We take each in turn, but first address whether his appeal is moot.
A. Mootness
CFS argues father's appeal is moot because the juvenile court dismissed the dependency and as a result "any order we enter will have no practical impact on the pending dependency proceeding." (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491.) Citing to In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544 (Joshua C.), father asserts his appeal is not moot because the court's order prohibiting visits with B.M. will have a continuing impact on him in the family law case. We agree.
In Joshua C., the juvenile court's dispositional orders awarded sole physical and legal custody of the children to their mother and restricted visitation for the father in a continuing family law order. (Joshua C., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1547-1548.) On appeal, the parties argued over whether the father's claims of error were moot. The appellate court held the fact the dependency action had been dismissed did not preclude review of the basis for the juvenile court's jurisdiction because "exercise of that jurisdiction has resulted in orders which continue to adversely affect appellant." (Id. at p. 1548.) "[W]here a judgment dismissing the dependency action is challenged on appeal the case 'is not moot if the purported error is of such magnitude as to infect the outcome of [subsequent proceedings].'" (Id. at p. 1547.) The appellate court concluded the juvenile court's visitation order continued to adversely affect the father because he could not relitigate the jurisdictional issues supporting the order and would have to demonstrate changed circumstances to the family law court to secure its modification. (Id. at p. 1548.) Because the same is true here—father cannot challenge the jurisdictional issues supporting the juvenile court's visitation order and would have to face the evidentiary hurdle of demonstrating changed circumstances to convince the family law court to modify it—we conclude his appeal is not moot.
B. Bypass of Reunification Services
1. Declaration of dependency
Father claims the juvenile court had no authority to bypass reunification services because it never declared B.M. a dependent of the court. To the contrary, the record clearly reflects the court adjudged B.M. a dependent.
A juvenile court "adjudg[es] a minor to be a dependent of the court" when it finds by a preponderance of evidence that any of the definitions in section 300, subdivisions (a) through (j) describe the child. (In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 624-625.) Here, the court found B.M. came within section 300, subdivisions (a), (d), and (g), thereby adjudging her a dependent. Even if father were correct that a juvenile court must state the precise phrase that it is declaring or adjudging the child a dependent (and there is no such magic-word rule), the court did so here. The disposition findings the court adopted during the disposition hearing state: "[B.M.] has been adjudicated a dependent."
2. Failure to state factual basis on record
Next, father contends the bypass determination is improper because the court failed to read into the record the factual basis for its decision.
"Section 361.5, subdivision (b) provides exceptions to the general entitlement to reunification services set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (a). 'Reunification services need not be provided to a parent . . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence'. . . 'the child has been adjudicated a dependent . . . as a result of severe sexual abuse . . . [of] the child . . . by a parent . . . , and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent. . . ." (In re A.G. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 276, 280 (A.G.), citing § 361.5, subd. (b)(6).)
"'In determining whether reunification services will benefit the child pursuant to [section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7)], the court shall consider any information it deems relevant, including the following factors: [¶] (1) The specific act or omission comprising the severe sexual abuse . . .[;] [¶] (2) The circumstances under which the abuse or harm was inflicted . . .[;] [¶] (3) The severity of the emotional trauma suffered by the child . . .[;] [¶] (4) Any history of abuse of other children by the offending parent . . . [;] [¶] (5) The likelihood that the child may be safely returned to the care of the offending parent . . . within 12 months with no continuing supervision[;] [¶] (6) Whether or not the child desires to be reunified with the offending parent. . . .'" (A.G., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 280-281, citing § 361.5, subd. (i).) If the court decides to bypass services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), it must "read into the record the basis for a finding of severe sexual abuse . . . under paragraph (6) of subdivision (b), and shall also specify the factual findings used to determine that the provision of reunification services to the offending parent or guardian would not benefit the child." (§ 361.5, subd. (k).)
Father contends the court's bypass determination must be reversed because the court did not follow section 361.5, subdivision (k). Notably, he does not—and cannot, given the guilty plea he entered in his criminal case before he filed the reply brief in this appeal—contend there was insufficient evidence to support the court's denial of services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). Indeed, he concedes in his reply brief the agency "arguably" produced sufficient evidence to support bypass based on severe sexual abuse. For this reason, father's argument strikes us as disingenuous. His sole claim of prejudice from the court's procedural errors is that the only way we can "evaluat[e] . . . whether the juvenile court abused its discretion depends on that court's disclosure of the evidence it accepted as clear-and-convincing proof." Not so.
Where a juvenile court fails to state on the record the basis for its 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) bypass finding, "we will infer a necessary finding provided the implicit finding is supported by substantial evidence." (In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260 (S.G.) [refusing to reverse court's section 361.5, subd. (b)(6) bypass determination for failure to state factual basis on record because record contained substantial evidence to infer the necessary findings]; see also In re Corienna G. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 73, 83-84 [refusing to reverse and remand matter based on juvenile court's failure to make the express finding required in section 366.25 because substantial evidence in record allowed the appellate court to imply the necessary finding].)
Here, we find ample evidence in the record to infer the findings necessary to support the court's bypass determination. B.M. described suffering severe physical abuse at father's hands over a period of several years, starting at the very young age of five. She reported being raped and sodomized to the point where it was painful for her to sit down in her kindergarten class the next day. As soon as she disclosed the abuse to her school counselor and the police, father confessed he repeatedly sexually abused her and admitted it was "obsessive behavior."
As to whether reunification services would benefit B.M., several of the factors in section 361.5, subdivision (i) weigh in favor of bypass. The type of abuse and the manner in which it was performed is particularly egregious. B.M. was very young and, at the time, father was the only parental figure in her life. Father himself acknowledged the severity of the sexual abuse when he described it to the social worker as "the worst thing a person could do to someone else." B.M. reported she experienced emotional trauma from the abuse. She was afraid to be around father, was relieved he was in prison because he could no longer hurt her, and required therapy to process her experience. Finally, because father had not taken any steps to confess or seek counseling after he allegedly stopped abusing B.M. and because he was incarcerated, there was absolutely no likelihood B.M. could have been returned to his care within 12 months with no continuing supervision.
Once a court determines a bypass situation in section 361.5, subdivision (b) applies, it must order bypass "unless [it] finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child." (§ 361.5, subd. (c).) The burden is on the parent to show reunification would serve the best interests of the child. (A.G., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.) Father made no such showing to the juvenile court and has identified no such evidence on appeal. We therefore find substantial evidence to infer the necessary findings under section 361.5, subdivision (k) that father severely sexually abused B.M. and services would not benefit her. (S.G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261.)
C. Absence from the Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
Father contends the court violated Penal Code section 2625 when it held the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in his absence without obtaining a knowing waiver of presence. He argues this error violated his due process rights and requires reversal. We disagree.
Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d) states in relevant part: "Upon receipt by the court of a statement from the prisoner or his or her attorney indicating the prisoner's desire to be present during the court's proceedings, the court shall issue an order for the temporary removal of the prisoner from the institution, and for the prisoner's production before the court . . . [N]o petition to adjudge the child of a prisoner a dependent child of the court pursuant to subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (i), or (j) of Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code may be adjudicated without the physical presence of the prisoner or the prisoner's attorney, unless the court has before it a knowing waiver of the right of physical presence signed by the prisoner or an affidavit signed by the warden, superintendent, or other person in charge of the institution, or his or her designated representative stating that the prisoner has, by express statement or action, indicated an intent not to appear at the proceeding." (Italics added.) The California Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to require the presence of both the prisoner and the prisoner's attorney, unless the court receives a waiver from the prisoner. (In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 622-624 (Jesusa V.).)
Here, the record indicates the court did not follow the requirements of Penal Code section 2625 by obtaining a waiver of father's right to be present before proceeding with the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. However, as our high court has explained, this statutory violation does not infringe on a parent's due process rights and warrants reversal only if there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the hearing would have been different if the court had satisfied Penal Code section 2625. (Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 602, 622, 625 [applying the harmless-error standard from People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 to violation of Penal Code section 2625, subd. (d)].)
In Jesusa V., the father was not present at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing because he was incarcerated on charges of raping the minor's mother. (Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 598.) The California Supreme Court concluded it was error to conduct the hearing in his absence without a waiver, even though his appointed counsel was present at the hearing. (Id. at p. 622.) The court further concluded: "We disagree, however, that the violation here deprived the juvenile court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition. We instead apply our familiar harmless-error analysis and find that [the father], who had already been convicted of the rape at the time of the hearing, was not prejudiced." (Ibid.) The court held the father suffered no prejudice from not attending the hearing because he "never identified—whether by way of a petition for modification (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388, subd. (a)) in the juvenile court or in this appeal—the evidence he claims he would have offered had he been present." (Id. at pp. 625-626.) The court found this omission "unsurprising," given the fact he "had raped the child's mother while the child was present in the motor home, and he was in prison at the time the petition was adjudicated." The court concluded "with confidence" that "'[n]o other result was possible'" even if the father had been present. (Id. at p. 626.)
In this case, father admitted sexually abusing B.M. to the police and to the social worker, and even told the social worker he never expected to see B.M. again based on the atrocity of his actions and the criminal sentence he was facing. He told the social worker mother was a good parent to B.M. and he had no objection to B.M. being placed with her. And, like the father in Jesusa V., he has not identified on appeal any evidence or argument he would have offered had he attended the hearing. In fact, after he filed his opening brief, but before he filed his reply brief, he pled guilty to four counts of sexual abuse and agreed to a prison term of 40 years. In light of his admissions and statements about B.M.'s best interest, coupled with B.M.'s own statements about being terrified of him, there is no likelihood he could have convinced the court that severe sexual abuse bypass did not apply, that B.M. should not be placed with mother, and that visits with him would not be detrimental to B.M. As a result, we can confidently conclude the court's disposition order would have been the same even if father had attended the jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
D. Notice Arguments
Father makes several notice-based arguments. He argues the court: (1) violated rule 5.530(f)(1)(B) of the California Rules of Court by failing to ensure he was informed of his "options for requesting physical or telephonic appearance at and participation in the [detention] hearing"; (2) violated rule 5.530(f)(1)(A) by failing to ensure he was informed of his "right to be physically present at the [jurisdiction and disposition] hearing" and explain how to secure his presence or, "if he . . . waive[d] the right to be physically present," how to secure "appearance and participation"; and (3) violated section 358, subdivision (a)(3) by failing to continue the disposition hearing for up to 30 days for the social worker to notify him of the bypass recommendation "and . . . inform [him] that if the court does not order reunification a permanency planning hearing will be held, and that his or her parental rights may be terminated within the timeframes specified by law." Father asserts these failures resulted in an "ill-conceived rush to judgment" because he was "never given the hearing to which due process and the dependency statutes entitled him."
Unlabeled rule citations refer to the California Rules of Court.
Again, these arguments strike us as disingenuous given that the court's disposition order was based on father's admission of severe sexual abuse and he has failed to explain on appeal how the outcome of the hearing would have been any different had he been in attendance. Just as with the court's failure to follow the requirements of Penal Code section 2625, the notice defects father alleges here have not prejudiced him in any way.
Further, we seriously doubt father (a) did not know about the bypass recommendation and (b) wanted to attend the hearing but did not know how to secure his presence. As noted above, the social worker visited him in prison to discuss the petition allegations. Not only did he not dispute the sexual abuse allegations or express a desire to attend a hearing, but he also acknowledged the fact he would likely never see B.M. again. He expressed no desire to see her but instead stated he wanted the best for her, which, considering the rest of his statements to the social worker, meant living with mother in Colorado.
The alleged errors in notice do not warrant reversing the disposition order. Given the nature of father's transgressions against his daughter, his venue for obtaining visitation rights is not in this court but in family law court. If father desires to visit B.M. in the future, he must demonstrate to the family law court he has taken steps while incarcerated to warrant visitation, and most importantly, B.M. must be open to the idea of seeing father again. (§ 302, subd. (d) [custody or visitation orders issued by a juvenile court after it terminates jurisdiction may be modified if the family law court "finds that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order and modification of the order is in the best interests of the child"].)
E. The Section 300 , Subdivision (g) Finding
Lastly, father contends there is insufficient evidence to support the section 300, subdivision (g) jurisdictional finding. We disagree.
"On appeal from an order making jurisdictional findings, we must uphold the court's findings unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support the findings." (In re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 185.) "[S]ection 300, subdivision (g) applies when, at the time of the [jurisdictional] hearing, a parent has been incarcerated and does not know how to make, or is physically or mentally incapable of making, preparations or plans for the care of his or her child." (In re Aaron S. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 202, 208.)
Here, father was incarcerated during B.M.'s dependency and B.M. could not remain in the home where she and father had been living because one of the residents was a registered sex offender. When the social worker interviewed father in jail, he did not suggest living arrangements for B.M. Instead, he said he did not expect to ever see her again and had no objection to her going to live with mother.
Contrary to father's assertion, this is not a case where the sole basis for the court's section 300, subdivision (g) finding is his incarceration. (See In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077 ["There is no 'Go to jail, lose your child' rule in California"].) Rather, the court's finding is based on the fact he showed no interest in arranging for B.M.'s care and had no concerns about her living with mother. (See, e.g., In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 484 [upholding jurisdiction under § 300, subd. (g), finding lack of evidence incarcerated father ever showed interest in or attempted to care for children sufficient to infer he was "either unable or unwilling" to arrange for care].) His statements to the social worker constitute substantial evidence he was either unable or unwilling to arrange for B.M.'s care and therefore support the jurisdictional finding.
III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH
J. We concur: HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J. MILLER
J.