Opinion
E075882
02-16-2021
In re A.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES Plaintiff and Respondent v. C.S. Defendant and Appellant
Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel and Svetlana Kauper, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J279227) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G. Pace, Judge. Affirmed. Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel and Svetlana Kauper, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
C.S., mother of A.V. and his four older half siblings, appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to her youngest child, A.V., on the ground the minor's attorney had an actual conflict of interest because he represented all five siblings. In addition, mother argues that the older half siblings did not receive notice of the permanent plan hearing relating to A.V., which deprived them of their right to participate in the permanency planning hearing. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mother has five children: the youngest, A.V. ( age 1 when proceedings were initiated and who is the only child involved in this appeal), and A.V.'s half siblings, B.R. (age 14), R.R. (age 13), J.R. (age 9), and Y.D. (age 5).
The children were removed from mother following an incident in June 2018 in which mother was arrested at a motel after getting into an argument with her sister. She also had been in an argument with the father of the three R. children and had punched and choked that father. There were also allegations of physical abuse of J.R., as well as allegations that mother slapped B.R. and left B.R. alone at home for extended periods of time, although they proved to be unsubstantiated. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine.
At the time, three of the half siblings (the R. children, B.R., R.R., and J.R.) had been living with their biological father, while A.V. and Y.D. lived with mother. However, at the time of the report, the whereabouts of A.V., B.R., R.R., and J.R. were unknown. Y.D. was with her father. On December 27, 2018, a detention warrant was issued for the children whose whereabouts were unknown (along with mother).
A dependency petition was filed alleging various grounds under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b), (g), and (j), but true findings were only made as to the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations and the allegation that A.V.'s father, who was incarcerated, failed to provide for A.V. All five children were removed from mother. At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, all the children were found to come within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b). Y.D. was removed from mother but placed with her father, who was deemed her presumed father. A.V. and his other half siblings were removed from both parents and placed in the care of San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS). The father of B.R., R.R., and J.R. was also deemed to be a presumed father, but the father of A.V. was deemed to be an alleged father. Reunification services were ordered for mother and the R. father. No services were ordered for the father of A.V., who was incarcerated at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Over the course of the reunification period, mother did not engage in any reunification services. However, father R. did participate in the reunification plan, completing most of the services. For the first six-month period, mother visited consistently and interacted appropriately with the children. However, as the reunification period progressed, mother began arriving late (at times more than 40 minutes late) and began discussing the case with the children against court orders, among other things. By December 2019, when the social worker submitted the 12-month status review report, mother's visits were described as inconsistent, and she disregarded rules about approaching the foster parents. CFS recommended that services be terminated for mother as to all the children.
We do not need to go into detail about mother's participation in services or her interaction (or, more accurately, lack of interaction with CFS) because she raises no issues pertaining to the propriety of the adoptability finding as it pertains to her relationship with A.V.
At the hearing conducted pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (f), the court terminated mother's services and set a section 366.26 hearing for A.V. B.R. and J.R. were present at the hearing when the orders were made. The court extended services for the R. father for six more months, with the matter set for a hearing pursuant to section 366.22.
On January 6, 2020, after A.V.'s father, O.V., was confirmed to be his biological father, the minor was placed with his paternal grandmother, who had been approved on an emergency basis for placement. A.V. had been removed from his prior out-of-home placement based on allegations of abuse of A.V. while in foster care.
Marks on A.V.'s forehead and shoulder blade, which appeared to be bruises, turned out to be birthmarks. Nevertheless, the emergency placement had been effectuated by the time of the results of the forensic examination, and A.V. was adapting well to his new placement, which was his fifth.
On January 21, 2020, mother filed a section 388 petition (Judicial Council Form JV-180) to reinstate reunification services as to A.V. By way of changed circumstances or new evidence, mother alleged that the court should consider the gravity of the problem, and the strength of the minor's bond with her. As for how the proposed modification would serve the best interests of A.V., mother asserted that she had a bond with the child and reunification services had a likelihood of success. The juvenile court summarily denied the petition on the ground it did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances, and the proposed modification would not serve the minor's best interests.
Prior to the section 366.26 hearing, A.V.'s paternal grandmother, who lived in Bakersfield with the extended family, had been identified as a relative placement resource, and she was approved for placement for adoption after an initial emergency placement in December 2019. The section 366.26 report, submitted in May 2020, reflected that A.V. was doing well in his relative placement, and was forming a strong attachment to the paternal grandmother, who was committed to adopting A.V. The full approval of the grandmother's home as an adoptive placement came in June 2020, after having been delayed by COVID-19 related issues.
Notice of the selection and implementation hearing was sent to all parties, with written notice provided to counsel for all minors. The selection and implementation hearing took place on August 11, 2020, attended by mother who testified that she disagreed with the recommendation for adoption of A.V. She testified she provided daily care for A.V. prior to his removal and had a bond with him because she was his mother, carried him in her womb, and took care of him from the day of his birth until he was removed. When asked if A.V. knew who she was, mother responded he did know her because it is a natural instinct and because her oldest child told her that A.V. knew who she was. However, she acknowledged there was no indication A.V. wanted to see her more.
When asked why she thought termination of parental rights would not be in A.V.'s best interests, mother explained it was because she was his mother and it was her job; he needed his mother because he is a part of her.
After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence in the social worker's reports, the juvenile court terminated parental rights of both mother and A.V.'s father. In making its findings and orders, the court found that A.V. was both generally and specifically adoptable, and that there was no evidence to support the parent-bond exception. The court observed that while mother loves the child, the real test is whether termination of rights would be detrimental to the child, and that permanency outweighed any detriment to A.V.
On October 9, 2020, mother appealed the judgment terminating her parental rights to A.V.
DISCUSSION
1. There Was No Error in Failing to Appoint Separate Counsel for A.V. Where No Request Was Made in the Trial Court and No Actual Conflict of Interest Appears from the Record.
Mother argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to appoint separate counsel for the minors because counsel represented multiple siblings, creating an actual conflict of interest. We disagree; any error was forfeited and even if not forfeited, no actual conflict of interest appears on this record.
Mother has taken care to point out she does not assert ineffective assistance of counsel as to the minors' attorney, other than the existence of the alleged conflict of interests.
a. Forfeiture
At no time during the proceedings in the trial court did either the mother or the minors notify the trial court of an actual—or even a potential—conflict of interest involving minors' counsel. No objection was made at any stage of the dependency to minors' counsel representing all the minors. Further, in opposing the termination of her parental rights, mother did not rely on or produce evidence to support a finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to A.V. due to interference with a sibling relationship, for which the existence of a conflict of interests on the part of minors' counsel might impact mother's rights. Instead, she relied on the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship between herself and A.V. (§ 366.36, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
"Once the court determines a child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the . . . exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)." (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1345.) "[A] parent's failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from presenting the issue to the appellate court." (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1338-1339, and numerous cases cited therein.)
"If a parent fails to raise one of the exceptions at the hearing, not only does this deprive the juvenile court of the ability to evaluate the critical facts and make the necessary findings, but it also deprives this court of a sufficient factual record from which to conclude whether the trial court's determination is supported by substantial evidence." (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403.) Here, mother did not raise the sibling exception to termination of parental rights and did not object to minors' counsel's multiple party representation.
By failing to object or to request disqualification of minors' counsel on the ground an actual conflict of interest existed, mother has failed to preserve the issue on appeal. (In re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 501, citing People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 472-473; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 54.) The argument was forfeited.
However, because application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic (In re M.S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 568, 588-589, citing In re C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376, 385; Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157-1158), we exercise our discretion to reach the issue. (Melinda K. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 1157-1158.)
b. On the Merits, There was No Actual Conflict Requiring Disqualification of Minors' Counsel or Reversal of the Judgment.
Mother's contention that multiple representation of the minors by their attorney requires reversal is not supported where the record does not demonstrate that the minors' counsel had an "actual conflict of interest" which might give rise to a duty to disqualify minors' counsel, and case law does not support her premise.
Section 317, subdivision (c)(1) provides in part: "If a child or nonminor dependent is not represented by counsel, the court shall appoint counsel for the child or nonminor dependent, unless the court finds that the child or nonminor dependent would not benefit from the appointment of counsel." Nothing in section 317 requires separate counsel for each minor in a sibling group. The sole exception is where the district attorney has been appointed to represent a minor in a dependency case in addition to filing a delinquency petition respecting the same minor. (§ 318.)
In all other situations, appointment of separate counsel for minors in a sibling group is required only when an actual conflict exists. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 56, citing Carroll v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1423, 1428 ["If an appointed attorney is representing multiple minors in a dependency proceeding, and an actual conflict of interest between the minors arises, the attorney is obliged to withdraw from representing the clients [citation] and the court is required to relieve the attorney and appoint new counsel."].)
An actual conflict does not arise just because a different permanency plan is ordered for one or more siblings in a sibling group. "When first appointing counsel in a dependency matter, the court may generally appoint a single attorney to represent all the siblings. It would have to appoint separate attorneys if, but only if, there is an actual conflict among the siblings or if circumstances specific to the case—not just the potential for conflict that inheres in all multi sibling dependency cases—present a reasonable likelihood an actual conflict will arise." (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 58.)
This policy is also reflected in the Rules of Court: "The following circumstances, standing alone, do not necessarily demonstrate an actual conflict of interest: [¶] (i) The siblings are of different ages; [¶] (ii) The siblings have different parents; [¶] (iii) There is a purely theoretical or abstract conflict of interest among the siblings; [¶] (iv) Some of the siblings are more likely to be adopted than others; [¶] (v) The siblings have different permanent plans; [¶] (vi) The siblings express conflicting desires or objectives, but the issues involved are not material to the case; or [¶] (vii) The siblings give different or contradictory accounts of the events, but the issues involved are not material to the case." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.660(c)(2)(B).)
Thus, a court must relieve counsel from multiple representation of siblings "if, but only if, there is an actual conflict among the siblings or if circumstances specific to the case . . . present a reasonable likelihood an actual conflict will arise." (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 58; see also, In re T.C. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1390-1391.)
"For an actual conflict to arise at the permanency planning stage, there must be a showing that the siblings have different interests that would require their attorney to advocate a course of action for one child which has adverse consequences to the other." (In re T.C., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.) "Standing alone, the fact that siblings have different permanent plans does not necessarily demonstrate an actual conflict of interest." (Ibid., citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.660(c)(1)(C)(v); In re Zamer G. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1268.)
Mother argues (a) she has standing to raise the issue of conflict of interest of minors' counsel, and (b) that multiple party representation creates a conflict of interest. (In re Patricia E. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7.) We have no quarrel with the first proposition: A parent whose parental rights will be terminated has standing to assert the sibling exception to termination of parental rights (see In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 948-951), as does the minor who is being considered for adoption. (In re Hector A. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 783, 791.) The flaws in mother's argument are that she did not litigate the sibling exception at trial, and she has not established an actual conflict of interest in the representation of A.V. that would impact her interrelated issues.
This case bears no similarity to that of In re Patricia E., supra, where, under the former version of section 318, the court appointed agency's county attorney to also represent the minor, creating an actual conflict of interest. That statute was amended in 1986 to permit dual representation so long as there is no conflict of interests. (In re Patricia E., supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at pp. 5-6.) Such a situation might arise where a district attorney represents a minor in a dependency but represents the People of the State of California in pursuing a wardship petition pursuant to section 602 vis-à-vis the minor. (See § 318.)
Additionally, mother's argument focuses on the effect A.V.'s adoption would have on his half siblings, ignoring the requirement that the sibling relationship exception allows consideration only of whether severing the sibling relationship would cause detriment to the child being considered for adoption and not whether it would cause detriment to the child's siblings. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 54.)
Mother's reliance on other authorities does not aid her position where case law affirms that non-adoptive minors who wish to participate in the permanency planning of the adoptive minors are required to seek leave to do so by way of a section 388 petition. (In re Hector A., supra,125 Cal.App.4th at p. 792.) This demonstrates even if mother has standing to argue that minors' counsel had a conflict of interest, raising the issue for the first time on appeal—sans evidence of a significant sibling bond or prejudice—is not likely to be successful, where the minors did not seek an order permitting them to participate in the section 366.26 hearing, although two of the non-adoptive minors were in attendance at the hearing in which mother's services were terminated and A.V.'s case was set for a 366.26 hearing.
Finally, mother has not established that the failure to disqualify minors' counsel would have resulted in a different outcome. "A court should set aside a judgment due to error in not appointing separate counsel for a child or relieving conflicted counsel only if it finds a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different but for the error." (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 60, disapproving of any language to the contrary in In re Patricia E., supra.) There is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that severing the sibling relationship with A.V. would be detrimental to A.V. or to his half siblings or that the court would have adopted a less drastic alternative to severance of the parent-child relationship due to any sibling relationship.
In fact, the only reference to the siblings' relationships that can be found in the record occurred at the January 9, 2020 twelve-month review hearing. At that hearing, at which both B.R. and J.R. were present, the juvenile court terminated mother's reunification services and set A.V.'s matter for a 366.26 hearing. On behalf of the minors, their counsel represented to the court that minors B.R. and J.R. wanted to maintain contact with their half sibling Y.D., who was moving to Mexico with her father, which would require arrangements for international telephone communication. Counsel also informed the court that B.R. and J.R. also requested sibling visits with their other siblings, including A.V., because they were all in different placements at that point.
Nevertheless, B.R. and J.R. were present and heard the court order a 366.26 hearing to select and implement A.V.'s permanent plan of adoption, but they did not object to the referral of A.V.'s case for termination of parental rights, did not mention the strength of the sibling bond in requesting visits, and did not seek court approval, by means of a section 388 order, to participate in A.V.'s selection and implementation hearing.
In other words, while there is some evidence that J.R. and B.R. desired sibling visits, there is no showing that severing the sibling relationship would be detrimental to A.V. In light of these facts, mother has demonstrated no more than a potential or hypothetical conflict of interest, which did not warrant disqualification of minors' counsel or reversal of the judgment. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 60 [decision of the juvenile court is not to be reversed as a result of conflict of interest affecting minors' counsel unless there is "a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different" but for the failure to appoint separate counsel as a result of the conflict].)
On this record, there is no reasonable probability that the court would have selected a different permanent plan but for the error. (In re T.C., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1392, citing In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Absent a showing of an actual conflict of interest on the part of minors' counsel affecting mother's parental rights, there was no error in not disqualifying counsel.
2. Mother Has Not Demonstrated Error in Failing to Serve A.V.'s Half Siblings With Notice of A.V.'s Section 366.26 Hearing, and Forfeited Any Claim of Error by Not Objecting in the Trial Court.
Mother argues reversal is required because A.V.'s half siblings were not personally served with notice of A.V.'s section 366.26 hearing and were thus deprived of an opportunity to establish the sibling exception to the termination of parental rights. There are three problems with this argument: (1) There was no objection to the lack of notice in the trial court; (2) two of the minors were present at the hearing at which the section 366.26 hearing was set so they had actual notice, and (3) the record shows notice to minors' counsel was properly served on their behalf.
Mother appears to acknowledge that the non-adoptive minors do not have an automatic right to participate in a section 366.26 hearing involving another minor, and, in citing section 388, subdivision (b), she appears to recognize that there is a prerequisite to the participation by the non-adoptive minors that was not met here. Notwithstanding these obstacles, mother argues that the non-adoptive minors were entitled to be served with written notice of A.V.'s section 366.26 hearing pursuant to section 294 and that the failure to serve them with notice requires reversal of the termination of mother's parental rights to A.V.
Section 294, subdivision (a)(6), provides that notice of a section 366.26 hearing be given to any known sibling of the child who is the subject of the hearing. (In re Hector A., supra,125 Cal.App.4th at p. 796.) It also requires notice to the siblings' caretaker and counsel. (§ 294, subd. (a)(6).) However, minors' counsel is listed on the proof of service and there was no objection in the lower court to the finding that notice had been given as provided by law. On this record, the failure to object to any alleged lack of notice forfeits the issue. (See In re Z.S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 754, 771 [father's failure to object to defective notice forfeited issue on appeal].)
Additionally, two of the non-adoptive minors were present at the review hearing at which mother's services were terminated and A.V.'s case was set for a section 366.26 hearing, so they had actual notice of the hearing. While the statute requires that parents be notified by specific means (§ 294, subd. (f)), and requires that the minors be notified, it does not require any specific form or type of notice to siblings. (§ 294, subd. (a)(6).) And assuming mother has standing to challenge the lack of written notice, the record demonstrates that J.R. and B.R. received actual notice of the upcoming section 366.26 hearing because they were present in court when the order setting the section 366.26 hearing was made. Moreover, the record includes proof of service on the counsel for all the minors, and a finding by the court that notice was provided as required by law.
Further, even if we assume the non-adoptive siblings were not properly served with notice of A.V.'s selection and implementation hearing, there could be no prejudice: they could not have participated in the hearing without first requesting and obtaining an order permitting their participation pursuant to section 388, subdivision (b)(1), which they did not. (See In re Hector A., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 796 ["There is nothing in the notice provision, however, dispensing with the need to gain permission to participate in the section 366.26 hearing by obtaining an order under section 388, subdivision (b)."].)
The thrust of mother's argument is that the minors and their caretaker were not personally served with written notice of the section 366.26 hearing, depriving them of the opportunity to provide information to the court regarding the sibling relationship between themselves and A.V. This may be true. However, as we have pointed out previously, they were notified of the date of the hearing when they appeared at the 12-month review hearing, with their counsel, who was served with written notice of the section 366.26 hearing. They received notice.
We say "may" because no request appears to have been made to determine if notice of A.V.'s section 366.26 hearing was served on siblings. We assume the assertion is correct because it does not affect the outcome.
Mother has not established any prejudice from any lack of notice to the non-adoptive minors or their caretakers. Because two of them were personally present along with counsel when the referral was made, they were aware of the date, time, and subject of the hearing, so no prejudice can be attributed to lack of notice. (See In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 624-625 [rejecting contention defective notice was jurisdictional error; harmless error standard applies to statutory notice violations]; see also, In re A.D. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1325 [failure to give notice in dependency proceedings is subject to a harmless error analysis];.) And because mother did not show a more favorable result was likely absent the error, reversal is not required. (In re Jesusa V., supra; In re Isabella M., supra.)
Finally, the absence of an order authorizing the non-adoptive half siblings to participate in A.V.'s selection and implementation hearing undermines mother's contention that lack of notice requires reversal. Section 388 provides in relevant part, "Any person, including a child or a nonminor dependent who is a dependent of the juvenile court, may petition the court to assert a relationship as a sibling related by blood, adoption, or affinity through a common legal or biological parent to a child who is, or is the subject of a petition for adjudication as, a dependent of the juvenile court, and may request visitation with the dependent child, placement with or near the dependent child, or consideration when determining or implementing a case plan or permanent plan for the dependent child or make any other request for an order which may be shown to be in the best interest of the dependent child." (§ 388, subd. (b).)
The minors did not seek to assert their sibling relationship at A.V.'s permanency hearing by means of a section 388 petition, so they were unable to participate in the hearing.
Further, there is no record of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to A.V., so there is no prejudice. "'To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent [or sibling granted standing] must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child.'" (In re Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 781.) "The parent has the burden of proving the statutory exception applies." (Ibid., citing In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826.)
No evidence was presented concerning the nature or quality of the minors' relationship with A.V. as of the date of the selection and implementation hearing. Thus, even if the issue had not been forfeited, mother has not shown any prejudice from the alleged failure to serve notice upon the minors and their caretakers.
Here, at the 12-month review/referral hearing, the non-adoptive minors were present with their counsel, and received oral notice of the date and time of the section 366.26 hearing pertaining to A.V. Had they desired to participate in the section 366.26 hearing in order to assert the sibling exception to the termination of parental rights, they could have done so. The record does not show they made a request to participate in the selection and implementation hearing respecting A.V., and without such evidence, or evidence of a section 388 petition, or any information in the social worker's reports regarding the strength of the sibling relationships, there is no error flowing from any alleged lack of written notice.
3. There Were No Errors, the Cumulative Effect of Which Require Reversal.
Mother argues that the cumulative effect of the alleged conflict of interests of minors' counsel and the alleged lack of notice to the half siblings of A.V.'s section 366.26 hearing requires reversal. Mother cites no decisional authority for the application of the cumulative error doctrine in juvenile dependency cases, although it has been applied on review of criminal convictions.
For example, the Supreme Court has noted that in a close criminal case, the cumulative effect of multiple errors may constitute a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1236 [disapproved on a different ground in People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190]; People v. Holt (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 458-459.) Generally speaking, an appellate court (1) reviews each allegation; (2) assesses the cumulative effect of any errors; and (3) determines whether it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant in their absence. (Holt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 459..)
Here, mother received due process and makes no claim that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. We have found no errors in the various claims she has posited. There is therefore no cumulative error. "The zero effect of errors, even if multiplied, remains zero." (People v. Calderon (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 80, 93 citing People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 129.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. I concur: MILLER
J.
MENETREZ, J., Concurring.
I concur in the judgment. Minors' counsel did not have a conflict. There appears to have been at least one statutory notice violation but no due process violation, and any statutory violation was both forfeited and harmless.
MENETREZ
J.