Opinion
E075891
05-19-2021
In re A.H. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.H. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.H. Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant E.G. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Glenn C. Moret, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.Nos. J277317 & J277319) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Christopher B. Marshall, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.H. Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant E.G. Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Glenn C. Moret, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A.H. (father) appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to C1, and E.G. (mother) appeals from orders terminating her parental rights to C1 and C3. Father's sole claim on appeal is that the juvenile court erred—when it terminated his family reunification services and set a hearing for termination of parental rights and selection of a permanent plan for C1—by finding San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) had offered and provided him with reasonable services. Mother joins in this argument but advances no additional grounds for reversal as to C1 or C3. Father acknowledges he did not challenge any of the orders made at the setting hearing by timely petitioning this court for extraordinary writ, which normally would preclude him from challenging them later on appeal from the order terminating parental rights. However, father argues his failure to seek writ relief was excused because the juvenile court did not mail the advisement of his appellate rights to the correct mailing address, which he had provided at the beginning of the proceedings.
Given the unusual nature of the children's names, we will refer to them as C1, C2, and C3 in the interests of protective nondisclosure. C2 is not a party in this appeal.
On the record before us, we find good cause exists to excuse father's failure to timely challenge the orders made at the setting hearing by petition for extraordinary writ. Moreover, we agree with father that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that he was offered and received reasonable reunification services. Therefore, we reverse the orders terminating parental rights to C1 and remand for the juvenile court to order that father receive reasonable services.
On March 18, 2021, CFS requested that we take judicial notice of records indicating father was offered and received reunification services for C2. Those records are irrelevant to the question presented here, whether father was offered and received reasonable reunification services for C1, and we may not take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of those records. Therefore, we deny the request. (In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1389, fn. 13.)
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As already noted, mother merely joins in father's claim of error as to C1 and provides no additional arguments in her brief. Additionally, she raises no argument for reversal as to C3. To the extent possible, we will limit our discussion to the facts as they pertain to father.
When mother gave birth to C3 in August 2018, they both tested positively for marijuana and amphetamines. Mother told a social worker that she had used methamphetamine about every other day to give her energy to take care of her two other young children (C1 & C2). Father, who was no longer residing with or in a relationship with mother, told the social worker he was disappointed to hear mother had tested positively for drugs when she gave birth to C3, but he had known about mother's drug use throughout their relationship, and he and mother had used marijuana and mushrooms together in the past. Father said he was willing and able to take custody of C2 and had provisions in place. He denied being the father of C1 and C3, but he told the social worker he had taken care of C1 all of his life.
The same month, CFS filed petitions in the juvenile court alleging C1 and C3 were dependents within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), because of mother and father's failure or inability to supervise or protect the children. CFS recommended the juvenile court detain the children from mother and father and place them in foster care under the custody and supervision of CFS, and that the court return C2 to father's care and custody. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found a prime facie case had been made that the children were dependents of the court, ordered C1 and C3 detained out of mother and father's care and custody, but it granted CFS authority to return C2 to father's custody under the supervision of CFS if he tested negatively for drugs. In addition, the court ordered that father be provided with services to safely maintain C2 in his care, with visitation in the meantime, and reunification services to facilitate his reunification with C1. The court granted CFS authority to provide father visits with C1 as appropriate.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
The petition regarding C1 also alleged he was left without any provisions for his support (§ 300, subd. (g)) because the whereabouts of his alleged biological father, J.Y., were unknown. Mother told a social worker that J.Y. was C1's biological father. J.Y. is not a party in this appeal.
Father filed a notification of mailing address (Judicial Council Forms, form JV-140) with the juvenile court, indicating his mailing address was "24561 1/2 Monterey Avenue."
In a report for the jurisdiction hearing, the social worker reported father denied knowing mother was using drugs, and he said he had not had any contact with her for about seven months before C3 was born. But now that he was aware of mother's drug use, "he wants custody" of his child, C2. Although he also had a history of drug use and an arrest for driving under the influence, father said he no longer had a desire to use drugs or to jeopardize his ability to reunify with C2. Father tested negatively for drugs on the day of the detention hearing. The social worker reported that an assessment of father's home was to be scheduled. Although father was not C1's biological father, mother reported that father was present for C1's birth, the child was named after him, and the child referred to father as, "'dad.'" Father indicated he was "open to possibly being the presumed father" of C1, but father said he needed time to discuss it with his girlfriend. The social worker reported mother had only recently had her first visit with the children but did not report whether father had visited with the children. CFS recommended all three children remain detained outside mother and father's custody, and that mother and father receive reunification services.
In information updates, CFS reported father had completed three drug tests since the detention hearing and had tested negatively. Father's home had been assessed and found to meet "community standards." CFS indicated it wished to place C2 with father "immediately." The social worker indicated mother had been referred for services but made no mention of father having been so referred.
At the continued jurisdiction hearing in October 2018, counsel for CFS recommended the juvenile court find that J.Y. was the alleged father of C1. Because a paternity test for C2 was still pending, the court authorized the child be returned to father for a 29-day visit with authority to extend the visit as appropriate. Mother's attorney asked that father also be assessed for a nonrelative extended family member placement of C1, "as he does have placement for [C2] and is involved in [C1]'s life." The juvenile court declined to order such an assessment at that time but directed the social worker to "look into that." The court continued the hearing.
We note the reporter's transcript mistakenly refers to C3 instead of C2.
In an information update, the social worker reported that C2's 29-day visit with father was going very well, and the child was very bonded to father. The social worker indicated father had a support system, including his girlfriend and mother, and CFS recommended the proceedings be dismissed as to C2, with family law orders.
In addition, the social worker reported father had asked that C1 be placed in his care and custody and the court declare him the "presumed father" of C1. Father had been very involved in C1's life and considered him to be his child. In addition, the social worker reported father had been visiting C1 "since the beginning of the case." CFS now recommended father be declared the "presumed father" of C1; that the child be placed with father for a 29-day visit; and, if the visit was successful, the proceedings be dismissed as to C1. The juvenile court ordered a 29-day visit for C1 and father, continued C2's extended visits, and continued the jurisdiction hearing.
In an additional update, the social worker reported C2's extended visit with father continued to go very well. The social worker reported that father's mother cared for the child when father was at work. Father also continued to test negatively for drugs. However, the social worker indicated father had been unable to begin the 29-day visit with C1, "due to child care issues," specifically, that "his mother is not [able] to take care of both children."
At the continued hearing held in January 2019, counsel for CFS again recommended the juvenile court dismiss the petition with respect to C2 and order him returned to father's custody, with family law orders. Because father had not been able to take C1 into his care, CFS was not prepared to proceed with the similar recommendation for C1. As an alternative, counsel for CFS suggested the juvenile court declare C1 a dependent, order that father receive reunification services, and authorize CFS to provide extended visits and return C1 to father as appropriate. Mother and C1's attorneys agreed with the recommendation that CFS be given authority to place the child with father for an extended visit. Father submitted on the matter of reunification services, asked that CFS be given authority to place C1 with him on an extended visit and, if appropriate, to dismiss the petition by approval packet.
Relevant here, the juvenile court declared father to be the "presumed father" of C2, removed the child from mother's care and custody, returned the child to father under family law orders, and terminated jurisdiction over C2. The court also declared father to be the "presumed father" of C1, declared the child a dependent of the court, and ordered C1 detained from mother and father's care and custody. The court ordered that father be provided with reunification services for C1, ordered that father have unsupervised visits with the child at least once a week for eight hours, and authorized CFS to increase visitation and place the child with father by approval packet when appropriate.
But in a status review report filed in late June 2019, the social worker recommended the juvenile court terminate reunification services and set a hearing under section 366.26 for selection of a permanent plan for C1 and C3. The social worker reported she had been unable to assess the parents' current circumstances "due to having limited/no contact with them." The report outlined mother's lack of progress in her reunification services and her inconsistent visits with the children. The report made no mention of whether father had been referred for or had received services, and it did not address whether he had visited C1 during the reporting period. At the status hearing, counsel for father informed the juvenile court that he had not been noticed for the hearing as it pertained to C1, and the social worker's report did not mention if father had received any services. The court continued the matter for proper notice.
At the continued status hearing held in August 2019, counsel for CFS requested an additional continuance. Counsel stated: "Ultimately I am trying to figure out whether [father] wishes to actually receive reunification services or if he wishes to waive further FR. The discussions the social worker has had with him have indicated that although he may desire to have [C1] in his care, ultimately he is not in a position nor does he believe he will be in a position to ever have him in his care." Therefore, counsel asked that the hearing be put over to allow him to follow-up with the social worker. The court noted the social worker's latest report "doesn't go into [father] in any details," to which counsel for CFS responded, "That's putting it mildly, I think." Counsel for CFS reminded the court that father had been declared C1's presumed father "and was given reunification services and unsupervised visitation at the disposition." But father's attorney said, "That's the issue. My client never received services [for] this child." The court continued the hearing to allow CFS to "find out what the status is with respect to [father]."
In an information update filed in September 2019, the social worker reported she had contacted father "in regards to participating in reunification services." Father responded by text message "that he was unaware that he needed to participate in services." Father said he would like for C1 to be around C2 "and asked where he would need to attend services." The social worker responded and advised father what services he would need to complete. She also asked father "if he had interest in having [C1] returned to him." Father did not respond. When the social worker was finally able to communicate with father, he said he had not been told by the juvenile court or by CFS that he needed to participate in reunification services, and "he assumed that he was finished with the process when [C2] was placed with him and the dependency was dismissed." Father referred to a conversation he had with the social worker about eight months earlier, when he indicated "he would not be able to reunify with [C1]," but "he still wanted [C1] and [C2] to visit with one another." Father said he was still unable to reunify with and assume custody over C1 and, although he was willing to participate in services if necessary to have visits with the child, "he does not have interest in reunification."
At the continued status review hearing conducted on September 10, 2019, the juvenile court received the social worker's reports, including the most recent information update, into evidence without objection. Father's counsel objected to the social worker's recommendation that the juvenile court terminate reunification services and set a hearing for termination of parental rights. However, counsel offered no affirmative evidence and did not otherwise contradict the statements attributed to father in the most recent information update. Counsel for CFS indicated the recommended findings submitted with the status review report did not include father, but counsel indicated father "was offered services," and he requested father "be added to the findings and orders terminating his services." The court found by clear and convincing evidence that mother and father had been provided with reasonable reunification services but had failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress. The court continued C1 and C3 as dependents of the court, terminated reunification services to mother and father, and set a hearing under section 366.26 for selection of adoption as the permanent plan.
Neither parent was present when the juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing, so the court directed the clerk to mail notice to them, at their last known address, of the right to challenge the orders by petition for extraordinary writ. A proof of service filed the next day indicated the clerk mailed notice to father at "2456 1/2 Monterey Avenue," and not to "24561 1/2," the address included in father's notification of mailing address he had filed at the start of the case. Father did not timely file a notice of intent to challenge, by writ petition, the orders terminating his reunification services and setting a hearing under section 366.26.
Because neither parent was present, the juvenile court did not provide oral notice of those rights pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b)(1). All additional references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
In a report for the section 366.26 hearing, the social worker opined C1 and C3 were appropriate for adoption. She also recommended the juvenile court terminate mother and father's parental rights and free the children for adoption.
Finally, at the continued permanency hearing held on October 9, 2020, counsel for father objected to the recommendation of termination of parental rights and asked that the court adopt a lesser plan of guardianship, but he offered no affirmative evidence. Counsel stated father loves his children very much and was "willing to do whatever it takes." In particular, counsel informed the court that father said his mother was willing to help him care for the children. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children were "generally and specifically adoptable," and terminated mother and father's parental rights.
Father and mother timely appealed the order terminating their parental rights.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Father's Failure to Timely Challenge Orders Made at the Setting Hearing by Petition for Extraordinary Writ Does Not Preclude Him from Doing So on Appeal from the Termination of His Parental Rights.
As CFS contends in its brief, father did not timely file a notice of intent to challenge the orders made at the setting hearing. Normally, failure to do so would preclude father from arguing, on appeal from the termination of parental rights, that the juvenile court erred during the setting hearing by finding father had received reasonable reunification services and terminating them. Father responds that he was excused from timely making a writ challenge because the clerk of the juvenile court did not mail notice of father's writ rights to his correct address. We agree with father.
"'Section 366.26, subdivision (l), provides that an order setting a section 366.26 hearing "is not appealable at any time" unless "[a] petition for extraordinary writ review was filed in a timely manner," the petition raised the substantive issues and they were supported by an adequate record, and the writ petition "was summarily denied or otherwise not decided on the merits." (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1); see § 366.26, subd. (l)(2).) This writ requirement is implemented by the California Rules of Court. (See § 366.26, subd. (l)(3); rules 8.450, 8.452; see also rule 8.403(b)(1).)' [Citation.] 'Failure to file a petition for extraordinary writ review within the period specified by rule, to substantively address the specific issues challenged, or to support that challenge by an adequate record shall preclude subsequent review by appeal of the findings and orders made pursuant to this section.' (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(2).)" (In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1239.)
"[N]otwithstanding a parent's failure to file a petition for extraordinary writ after the setting hearing, the courts have found good cause to address the merits of a challenge to orders made at the setting hearing in an appeal from the order terminating parental rights when the juvenile court did not adequately inform the parent of their right to file a writ petition." (In re A.A., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1240.) "[I]n the published cases that have permitted a parent to challenge the merits of a referral order after failing to take a writ, it is clear that the court in fact failed to give the oral advisement (when the parent was present) or that the written advisement (when the parent was not present) was not sent or received by the parent." (In re T.W. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 723, 730.)
The mother in In re A.A. was not present for the setting hearing and, consequently, received no oral advisement. (In re A.A., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1231, 1240.) We held that the mother's failure to timely challenge the setting orders, by writ petition, was excused, in part, because the clerk of the juvenile court did not timely mail the notice. (Id. at pp. 1231-1232, 1241-1242.) More importantly, we held that the clerk did not mail the notice to an address where the mother was reasonably likely to receive it. The clerk mailed the notice to the mother's last known address on file, but the notice was returned as undelivered, so there was no dispute that she never received it. And the record amply demonstrated the juvenile court had been made aware almost seven months earlier that the mother was homeless, and the address on file for her was no longer good. (Id. at pp. 1242-1245.)
As indicated, ante, at the start of the proceedings, father filed a notification of mailing address with the juvenile court indicating his address was "24561 1/2 Monterey Avenue." After the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a hearing under section 366.26, the clerk served father by mail with notice of his writ rights. But, the proof of service filed by the clerk indicates father's address was not properly entered, and was missing one digit—"2456 1/2 Monterey," instead of "24561 1/2 Monterey." Unlike in In re A.A., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pages 1242-1243, there is no question the address on file for father was still good because it is the same address father listed in his notice of appeal.
As father correctly notes, throughout the proceedings, CFS and the juvenile court were inconsistent in where they mailed notices—sometimes notices were mailed to father's correct address, sometimes the notice omitted the "1/2" from the street number, and at other times the notices were mailed to a completely different residence.
"In juvenile dependency proceedings, due process requires parents be given notice that is reasonably calculated to advise them an action is pending and afford them an opportunity to defend." (In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114.) Notwithstanding the clerk's failure to enter the correct mailing address on the proof of service (and, presumably, on the actual envelope), was there a "reasonable chance" father would have actually received the notice? (In re A.A., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244.) CFS contends the technical defect in the clerk's notice is not fatal, father has not claimed he did not receive actual notice, and the record does not contain an undelivered envelope indicating it was not actually received by father. Had the proof of service demonstrated the clerk mailed the notice to father's correct address, father would have had the burden of proving he did not receive actual notice. But the presumption that father received the notice did not attach because the address used was indisputably incorrect. Nor does CFS point to anything in the record indicating father did receive actual notice of his writ rights such that the notice error was harmless. (See, e.g., In re Hannah D. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 662, 678-683 [parent was present at hearing and personally served with written notice of writ rights, but court did not orally provide notice as required by rule].)
CFS's citation to In re T.W., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th 723, is misplaced. The court there found no good cause to excuse a parent's failure to timely take a writ, notwithstanding the clerk omitted the ZIP Code to the parent's address. The court noted the "address to which the written advisement was sent was correct; it simply contained no ZIP Code." (Id. at p. 730, italics added.) In addition, the parent's attorney was present for the hearing and heard the juvenile court's oral advisement of writ rights, and the clerk served the attorney by mail with written notice. (Ibid.) In contrast, the clerk in this case did not mail the notice to the correct street address for father, and the court gave no oral advisement whatsoever.
On these facts, we find good cause exists to excuse father's failure to timely challenge, by writ, the orders made at the setting hearing.
B. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the Juvenile Court's Finding that Father Had Been Offered Reasonable Reunification Services.
"As a general rule, when a child is removed from parental custody under the dependency statutes, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services pursuant to section 361.5 to 'the child and the child's mother and statutorily presumed father.' (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The purpose of these reunification services is 'to facilitate the return of a dependent child to parental custody.' (In re Jodi B. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1322, 1326 . . . , italics omitted; see In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478 . . . [purpose of reunification efforts is to 'eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child' thereby furthering the 'goal of preservation of family, whenever possible'].)" (In re Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1281.)
"At each review hearing, the court is required to determine the 'extent of the agency's compliance with the case plan' in making reasonable efforts to return the child to a safe home." (In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1000-1001, quoting § 366, subd. (a)(1)(B).) "To support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent, 'the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .'" (In re A.G., at p. 1001.) The reunification plan must have addressed the specific conditions that led to the child's removal, and it must have been "based on the particular family's 'unique facts.'" (In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 696.) In other words, reasonableness of services is judged according to the specific circumstances of each case. (Id. at p. 697; Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1159.) Likewise, the juvenile court's authority to terminate services is dictated by "the circumstances presented." (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242.)
A juvenile court may not terminate reunification services and set a hearing under section 366.26 unless the court finds by "clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian." (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C)(ii).) "'Clear and convincing evidence requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial doubt.'" (In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) The court's finding that reasonable services have been offered is reviewed for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
"[A]n appellate court must account for the clear and convincing standard of proof when addressing a claim that the evidence does not support a finding made under this standard. When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence." (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.)
Even before the jurisdiction hearing, father indicated he was open to being declared C1's "presumed father." Sometime later, father told the social worker he wished to have C1 placed with him, and CFS recommended the juvenile court declare him the presumed father, grant him reunification services, and grant him a 29-day visit with C1. Father was unable to start such a visit because his mother, who cared for C2 while father was at work, could not also care for C1. The juvenile court thereafter declared father to be the presumed father and ordered that he receive services to facilitate reunification with C1. But there is simply no evidence CFS ever actually offered services to father for C1. For instance, the social worker's reports detail mother's lack of progress in the services to which she was referred. But those same reports omit any mention whatsoever about what services were offered to father or what referrals were made, let alone whether he had received any. In fact, the social worker's failure to mention father in the reports prompted the juvenile court to remark, "Let's just say he has been omitted so far."
In sum, the record simply does not support the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services had been offered to father for C1.
We reject CFS's assertion that, by not objecting to the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services had been offered to him, father forfeited his claim of error on appeal. (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 464 [A substantial evidence challenge "'is an obvious exception to the rule'" that issues not raised in the juvenile court are forfeited on appeal.].)
Nor are we persuaded by CFS's argument that father's "indifference" to receiving reunification services and reunifying with C1 supports the juvenile court's finding. True, when the social worker contacted father and inquired whether he still wished to receive reunification services for C1, father reportedly said he had been unaware he needed to complete services, and he thought the matter was completed once C2 was placed with him. Father told the social worker that he still wanted C1 to visit with C2, and he was willing to participate in services if necessary to receive such visitation. And he repeated to the social worker what he had apparently told her some eight months earlier—"that he would not be able to reunify with [C1] [and] assume custody," and "he does not have [any] interest in reunification with [C1]."
As noted, father's attorney did not object to the juvenile court admitting into evidence the social worker's information update containing father's statements to the social worker or otherwise inform the juvenile court that, to the contrary, father still wished to reunify with C1. But, even if we accept for the purposes of this appeal that the social worker accurately reported father's wishes at that time, that report was not a proper basis for concluding father had been offered and received reasonable services, and it does not support the juvenile court's order terminating those services.
The parent in In re A.G., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 994, was deported to Mexico and, at one point, informed the social worker he believed it was in his children's best interests that they stay in the United States, and that he did not need reunification services. He subsequently changed his mind, and the juvenile court granted him reunification services, but the record demonstrated he never received any. (Id. at p. 1002.) The juvenile court relied in part on the parent's statement that he did not need services when it found that, under the circumstances, the services he did not receive were reasonable. (Ibid.) Because the parent had "cleared up" any confusion about his desires for services, the appellate court ruled the parent's initial statement did not support the juvenile court's finding. (Ibid.)
More importantly for our purposes, the appellate court in In re A.G. held the juvenile court could not make a finding that reasonable services had been offered and then terminate those services, based solely on the parent's statement to the social worker that he did not need them. (In re A.G., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1002.) "[S]tatutory protections apply when a parent expresses a wish not to participate in reunification services. The court may bypass services if the parent has advised the court that he or she is not interested in receiving services or having the child returned to his or her custody and does not wish to receive services. The parent must be represented by counsel and must execute a waiver of services form. The court is required to advise the parent of any right to services and of the possible consequences of a waiver of services. The court is prohibited from accepting the waiver of services unless it finds on the record that the parent has knowingly and intelligently waived the right to services. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(14).) Thus, as applicable here, a court may not rely on a parent's uninformed statement about not wishing to receive reunification services to curtail the parent's right to such services." (Ibid.)
As in In re A.G., the record in this case does not reflect that the juvenile court followed the procedure set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(14), and took a knowing waiver from father of his right to receive reunification services. (In re A.G., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1002.) At the review hearing, counsel for CFS asked the juvenile court for a continuance so the social worker could find out whether father wished to receive services or whether "he wishes to waive further FR." But no such knowing waiver was ever taken from father. Therefore, to the extent the juvenile court based its finding that reasonable services had been offered on father's statements to the social worker, we conclude the court erred, and the finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
Because we conclude substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that father had been offered and received reasonable reunification services for C1, and it does not support the court's order terminating those services and setting a hearing under section 366.26, we reverse the subsequent order terminating father's parental rights to C1. On remand, the juvenile court shall enter a new order finding reasonable services were not provided and shall order CFS to provide father with reasonable services. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 975.)
Father's successful claim of reversible error will inure to the benefit of mother, so we reverse the order terminating her parental rights to C1 as well. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(a)(1), (f).)
In the unlikely event father indicates he does not, in fact, wish to reunify with C1 and participate in reunification services, the juvenile court shall take a knowing waiver from him as provided in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(14), and proceed as appropriate.
III.
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating father and mother's parental rights to C1 are reversed. The juvenile court shall enter a new order finding father was not offered reasonable reunification services for C1, and the court shall order CFS to provide him with reasonable services.
The order terminating mother's parental rights to C3 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
Acting P. J. We concur: FIELDS
J. MENETREZ
J.