Summary
In Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 66 Ohio St. 2d 290, 421 N.E.2d 522 (1981), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the type of service complained of by Lincoln Provision was proper and that the defendant corporation was not denied due process even though the summons and complaint apparently never reached the proper department or officer of the corporate entity.
Summary of this case from Protein Partners v. Lincoln ProvisionOpinion
No. 80-1169
Decided June 3, 1981.
Actions — Service of process — On corporations — Effected, how — Civ. R. 4, construed.
A corporation may be served within the meaning of Civ. R. 4 when the summons and complaint are delivered by certified mail to the usual place of business of the corporation, even though not specifically addressed to any officer or agent of that corporation.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.
On August 15, 1978, plaintiff-appellant, Samson Sales, Inc. (Samson), filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas against defendant-appellee, Honeywell, Inc. The complaint alleged negligence and breach of contract by Honeywell in connection with the failure on August 15, 1976, of a burglar alarm installed on Samson's premises, such failure resulting in the loss of merchandise worth approximately $68,000 from Samson's store. The burglar alarm was installed pursuant to a contract with Morse Signal Devices, Inc., the assets of which Honeywell subsequently purchased.
A copy of the summons and complaint were delivered by certified mail in an envelope addressed as follows: Honeywell, Inc., 6707 Carnegie Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio. While this address was Honeywell's "usual place of business" as prescribed in Civ. R. 4.2 (6), neither the envelope, the summons, the certified mail receipt nor the return receipt bore the name of any person as addressee.
The envelope containing the summons and complaint does not appear in the record. However, there is no dispute that the envelope was addressed as indicated herein.
Although the summons and complaint were delivered to Honeywell on August 23, 1978, as indicated by the return receipt signed by a Honeywell employee, Honeywell filed no answer to the complaint. On February 2, 1979, Samson filed a motion for default judgment, pursuant to Civ. R. 55, which was granted March 16, 1979. The common pleas court found the defendant in default of an answer or other pleading, "although duly served with process according to law," and entered default judgment for $68,000 plus interest thereon and costs.
On April 13, 1979, Honeywell filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B). As grounds for relief, Honeywell asserted that the attempted service of the summons and complaint did not comply with Civ. R. 4.2 (6), that it had not assumed any liability for the acts of Morse Signal Devices, and that in any event a liquidated damages provision in the contract limited liability to $50. Honeywell's motion to vacate judgment was granted by the trial court.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the action, holding the trial court had never obtained jurisdiction over Honeywell because service on the corporation was not made in accordance with Civ. R. 4. The Court of Appeals' reasoning for dismissal was that service of process upon a corporation by certified mail is invalid unless the clerk of courts is instructed to mail such service to a natural person of management rank within the corporation.
This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Mr. Seymour Gross, for appellant.
Mr. Michael A. Thomas, for appellee.
This case requires this court to interpret Civ. R. 4, governing methods of service of process in civil cases. The issue raised is whether service of summons and complaint by certified mail addressed only to a corporation and not an officer or agent of that corporation fulfills the requirements of service of process as outlined in Civ. R. 4. Contrary to the reasoning of the Court of Appeals below, we hold that a corporation may be served within the meaning of Civ. R. 4 when the summons and complaint are delivered by certified mail to the usual place of business of the corporation and not specifically addressed to an officer or agent of that corporation.
Civ. R. 4.1, before its amendment effective July 1, 1980, provided in pertinent part:
"(1) Service of any process shall be by certified mail unless otherwise permitted by these rules. The clerk shall place a copy of the process and complaint or other document to be served in an envelope. He shall address the envelope to the person to be served at the address set forth in the caption or at the address set forth in written instructions furnished to the clerk with instructions to forward. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Civ. R. 4.1 vests the clerk of court with the duty to address the envelope containing the process and mail it to "the person to be served." Civ. R. 4.2 defines who constitutes a proper "person to be served":
"Service of process* * *shall be made as follows:
"* * *
"(6) Upon a corporation either domestic or foreign: by serving the agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process; or by serving the corporation by certified mail at any of its usual places of business; or by serving an officer or a managing or general agent of the corporation." (Emphasis added.)
Civ. R. 4.2 (6) sets out three alternative definitions of who is a proper "person to be served" on a corporation. The second alternative method was the one employed in this case.
This court has already determined, in the context of Civ. R. 4.3(B)(1), that, upon return of the signed receipt, service of process is effective even if not delivered to the defendant or to a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process for defendant. Mitchell v. Mitchell (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 49, paragraph one of the syllabus. The relevant language of Civ. R. 4.3(B)(1) is almost identical to that of Civ. R. 4.1 (1). It follows, therefore, that service of process by certified mail upon a corporation is effective even though not addressed to an officer or agent of that corporation.
Civ. R. 4.3, before its amendment effective July 1, 1980, in part, provided:
"(B) Methods of service
"(1) Service by certified mail. Service of any process shall be by certified mail unless otherwise provided by this rule. The clerk shall place a copy of the process and complaint or other document to be served in an envelope and shall address the envelope to the person to be served at his last known address set forth in the caption or set forth in written instructions furnished to the clerk, with instructions to forward. He shall* * *place the sealed envelope in the United States mail as certified mail return receipt requested * * *.
"The clerk shall forthwith enter the fact of mailing on the appearance docket and make a similar entry when the return receipt is received by him. * * *"
Civ. R. 4.3(B)(1) and 4.1(1) were amended, effective July 1, 1980, to specify that service of process may be "[e]videnced by return receipt signed by any person." This recent clarification of the proper mode of service demonstrates the General Assembly's intent that service of process by certified mail may be made to anyone present "at the address set forth in the caption or at the address set forth in written instructions furnished to the clerk with instructions to forward."
Service of process made at the business address of an individual or a corporation pursuant to Civ. R. 4.1 (1), however, must comport with the requirements of due process. Regional Airport Authority v. Swinehart (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 403. The standard of due process, first enunciated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306, at page 314, is as follows:
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." (Emphasis added.)
See, also, Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra, at page 51; Regional Airport Authority v. Swinehart, supra, at page 406; In re Foreclosure of Liens (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 333.
In this case, use of Honeywell's business office address in Cleveland for service of process appears reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise Honeywell of the pendency of the action. Despite the fact that the summons and complaint apparently never reached the proper Honeywell department or officer, Honeywell was not denied due process of law. The problem was not with the address used by the clerk of court, but with Honeywell's own handling of its incoming mail.
Since the service of process in this case complied with Civ. R. 4 and fulfilled due process requirements, it follows that the Court of Appeals was in error to dismiss the case.
The record reveals that defendant Honeywell's motion to vacate was timely filed, that a meritorious defense could be presented, and, thus, that Honeywell was entitled to relief from the default judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B)(5) under the standards set forth in GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, P. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER and HOLMES, JJ., concur.