Opinion
No. 831SC120
Filed 7 February 1984
Contracts 6.1 — general contractor with a limited license — ability to collect only amount of limited license Plaintiff, who held a limited license as a general contractor for a single project "of a value [not to exceed] one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars ($125,000)" under G.S. 87-10, could not collect more than $125,000.00 on his contract with defendant even though plaintiff calculated the total cost of the house as $139,998.90 under a formula orally agreed to by the parties.
APPEAL by plaintiff from Allsbrook Judge. Judgment entered 24 September 1982 in Superior Court, CURRITUCK County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 January 1984.
O. C. Abbott for plaintiff, appellant.
Trimpi, Thompson Nash, by C. Everett Thompson, for defendants, appellee.
Judge EAGLES dissenting.
This is a civil action wherein plaintiff seeks to recover from defendants $19,667.08 plus interest pursuant to a contract to build a house on defendants' property. The evidence introduced at trial shows the following: plaintiff and defendants entered into an oral contract whereby plaintiff agreed to build a house on defendants' lot at a price of "cost of materials and labor plus loss." Plaintiff held a limited license as a general contractor for single projects "of a value [not to exceed] one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars ($125,000) . . ." under N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 87-10. At the time plaintiff was first approached by defendants about building the house, plaintiff estimated the cost at $130,000.00. Defendants felt that this was "too much" and the plans were substantially revised, yielding a new estimate of $115,000.00. When the house was completed, the plaintiff calculated the total cost of the house as $139,998.90 under the formula orally agreed to by the parties.
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence and again at the close of all the evidence defendants made motions "for a dismissal" "pursuant to Rule 50 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure." The court "reserved" ruling on the motions and submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $11,000.00. The defendants then made a motion "for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, renewing . . . previous motions filed pursuant to Rule 50," which motion was granted. From a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendants, plaintiff appealed.
Plaintiff first contends "the trial court committed reversible error in granting defendants' motion to amend their answer." Plaintiff recognizes the well-established rule that a motion to amend "is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge," Smith v. McRary, 306 N.C. 664, 671, 295 S.E.2d 444, 448 (1982) (citation omitted), but contends that the court's action in the instant case constitutes an abuse of discretion. We disagree, noting that plaintiff has failed to identify any prejudice resulting from the court's ruling in this regard. This assignment of error is overruled.
Plaintiff next contends that "the trial court committed reversible error in setting aside the verdict and granting defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The uncontroverted evidence discloses that plaintiff, a contractor, seeks to recover on a contract for construction of defendants' house an amount in excess of the statutory limitations of his contractor's license. The rule is clear that a contractor who violates statutory licensing requirements may not enforce a construction contract against an owner. Builders Supply v. Midyette, 274 N.C. 264, 162 S.E.2d 507 (1968). Plaintiff seeks to escape imposition of this rule, however, by invoking the doctrine of "substantial compliance" most recently recognized in Barrett, Robert Woods v. Armi, 59 N.C. App. 134, 296 S.E.2d 10, disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 269, 299 S.E.2d 214 (1982). The theory of "substantial compliance" relied on by plaintiff has been specifically and emphatically rejected by our Supreme Court in Brady v. Fulghum, 309 N.C. 580, 308 S.E.2d 327 (1983). On this record plaintiff cannot collect more than $125,000.00 on his contract with defendants.
Affirmed.
Judge BRASWELL concurs.
Judge EAGLES dissents.