Opinion
Case No. 20041024-CA.
Filed April 7, 2005. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Ann Boyden.
Clark C. Robinson, Manti, Appellant Pro Se.
Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Clark Robinson appeals his convictions of two counts of Assault Against a Police Officer, a class A misdemeanor, and one count of Theft of Services, a class B misdemeanor.
There is no record support for Robinson's claim that the case was dismissed in December of 2003. Accordingly, there is no record support for his claim that the prosecution was barred by double jeopardy.
Robinson next claims that he was denied his right to a speedy trial because the charges were not tried within 180 days of December 6, 2003, which is the date of the offenses. This appears to be a reference to the statutory provisions on the disposition of detainers against prisoners. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-29-1 to -11 (2003). The date of the offense does not trigger the time limits for bringing a case to trial. Based upon the record, Robinson did not take the necessary steps to initiate the running of the statutory time limits.
The 180-day time period is contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, which pertains to prisoners incarcerated in other jurisdictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (2003). Even if Robinson filed a request for disposition, the time line would be 120 days for pending charges against a Utah prisoner.See id. § 77-29-1 (2003).
Utah Code section 77-29-1(1) states, in part:
Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or other penal institution of this state, and there is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff, or custodial officer in authority . . . a written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (2003) (emphasis added). Upon receipt of the written demand, the sheriff, warden, or custodial officer "shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk." Id. § 77-29-1(2) (emphasis added). If "the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding." Id. § 77-29-1(3).
The time limit does not begin to run until the delivery of a written demand in the manner required by section 77-29-1. In addition, the district court is not required to review the proceedings unless defendant or his counsel makes a motion to dismiss. See id. Nothing in the pleadings or docket reflects that either statutory prerequisite was satisfied. Furthermore, we note that the case went to trial within 120 days of Robinson's initial appearance on June 30, 2004.
Finally, Robinson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict. We reverse a jury verdict only when the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt."State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ¶ 65, 27 P.3d 1115. "So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." Id. at ¶ 67. An appellant's "burden on appeal when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence after a jury trial is to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292, ¶ 40, 13 P.3d 604. In the absence of a transcript, the court is unable to review a claim that the verdict was not adequately supported by the evidence presented at trial. "[W]hen an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, we presume the regularity of the proceedings below." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ¶ 13, 69 P.3d 1278. "When crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). We must presume that the evidence adequately supports the jury verdict.
We affirm the convictions.
James Z. Davis, Judge, Norman H. Jackson, Judge, William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.