Summary
In Saini, an initial foreclosure action was commenced against the defendant in 1990 and dismissed in 1997, the defendant filed for bankruptcy in 1997 and then a subsequent foreclosure action was commenced against it in 1999, which was already time-barred, and the 1997 bankruptcy did not revive it (id. at 770–772, 733 N.Y.S.2d 824).
Summary of this case from Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. DegiorgioOpinion
89803
December 13, 2001.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Kramer, J.), entered August 24, 2000 in Schenectady County, which denied a motion by defendant Cinelli Enterprises Inc. to dismiss the complaint against it as barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Law Office of Wayne P. Smith (Wayne P. Smith of counsel), Schenectady, for appellant.
Harris, Beach Wilcox (Brendan F. Chudy of counsel), Albany, for respondents.
Before: Cardona, P.J., Peters, Spain, Carpinello and, Mugglin, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs commenced this foreclosure action against defendant Cinelli Enterprises Inc. (hereinafter defendant) and others on October 6, 1999 seeking to recover on a note executed by defendant on February 5, 1979 evidencing a loan of $225,000 secured by a mortgage in the same amount on property located in the Town of Rotterdam, Schenectady County. Plaintiffs are the assignees of the note and mortgage. A previous foreclosure action (hereinafter the first action) commenced by plaintiffs' predecessor in interest had been dismissed by order of Supreme Court (Viscardi, J.) dated January 5, 1997, on consent of all parties. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint in this action asserting, among other defenses, that it is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to mortgage foreclosure actions as set forth in CPLR 213 (4), which began to run on the date that plaintiffs' predecessor in interest commenced the first action in 1990.
Supreme Court denied defendant's motion, orally ruling that the Statute of Limitations had been renewed or extended by payments made by the court-appointed receiver to plaintiffs' predecessors, as well as by defendant's 1997 consent to the discontinuance of the first action and listing of the mortgage debt in its 1997 bankruptcy petition. On defendant's appeal we reverse, finding that plaintiffs' action is barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213).
The Statute of Limitations in a mortgage foreclosure action begins to run six years from the due date for each unpaid installment or the time the mortgagee is entitled to demand full payment, or when the mortgage has been accelerated by a demand or an action is brought (see, Serapilio v. Staszak, 255 A.D.2d 824; Loiacono v. Goldberg, 240 A.D.2d 476, 477;Pagano v. Smith, 201 A.D.2d 632, 633). Here, defendant claims — and plaintiffs have not disputed — that the six-year Statute of Limitations began to run no later than May 22, 1990, the date plaintiffs' predecessors filed the notice of pendency and commenced the first action.
Contrary to plaintiffs' contentions which Supreme Court adopted, the partial payments made by the court-appointed receiver to plaintiffs' predecessors in 1993 and 1994 did not renew the Statute of Limitations pursuant to General Obligations Law § 17-107. In order for a partial payment to extend or renew the Statute of Limitations, the creditor must show that there was a payment by the debtor or the debtor's agent of an admitted debt, made and accepted as such, "accompanied by circumstances amounting to an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment by the debtor of more being due, from which a promise may be inferred to pay the [remaining balance]" (Crow v. Gleason, 141 N.Y. 489, 493 [emphasis supplied]; see, Petito v. Piffath, 85 N.Y.2d 1, 8, cert denied 516 U.S. 864; Roth v. Michelson, 55 N.Y.2d 278, 281; Morris Demolition Co. v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 40 N.Y.2d 516, 521; Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Warner, 156 A.D.2d 131; New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Muson, 117 A.D.2d 947, 947-948; see also, 78 N Y Jur 2d, Mortgages and Deeds of Trust, § 446; 75A N Y Jur 2d, Limitations and Laches, § 349).
Plaintiffs do not allege a default date in their complaint, although defendant's last payment appears to have been in 1989.
Here, the two payments to plaintiffs' predecessor were made by the receiver in 1993 and 1994 during the pendency of the first action; they were not made by defendant or its authorized agent (see, Security Bank of N Y v. Finkelstein, 160 App. Div. 315, 320, affd 217 N.Y. 707; see also, Brooklyn Bank v. Barnaby, 197 N.Y. 210; cf., New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Muson, supra). Clearly, these payments did not constitute any kind of acknowledgment by defendant of a remaining debt nor did they support inferring a promise by defendant to pay any balance (see,Morris Demolition Co. v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., supra, at 521-522; Flynn v. Flynn, 175 A.D.2d 51, 51-52, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 863;cf., Skaneateles Sav. Bank v. Modi Assocs., 239 A.D.2d 40, 43, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 803; National Heritage Life Ins. Co. in Liquidation v. Hill St. Assocs., 262 A.D.2d 378; Lorenzo v. Bussin, 7 A.D.2d 731, affd 7 N.Y.2d 1039). Thus, these payments by the receiver did not revive or extend the Statute of Limitations.
Likewise, the payment by the receiver of $51,841.53 to plaintiffs' predecessor pursuant to the order of Supreme Court dated November 15, 1997 which discontinued the first action did not constitute a partial paymentby defendant or its authorized agent that had the effect of renewing or extending the Statute of Limitations (see, General Obligations Law § 17-1707). The 1997 court order discontinuing the first action directed the receiver to pay the balance of the proceeds collected to the holder of the mortgage at that time. While defendant consented to this provision of the discontinuance, thereby acknowledging that the mortgagee and not defendant was entitled to the rents collected, this consent was not "accompanied by circumstances amounting to an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment of more being due, from which a promise may be inferred to pay the remainder" (Morris Demolition Co. v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 40 N.Y.2d 516, 521, supra [emphasis supplied];see, Crow v. Gleason, supra, 141 N.Y. 489, 493, supra).
With regard to the claimed effect of defendant's bankruptcy filing on the Statute of Limitations, we find that it neither renewed nor tolled the six-year Statute of Limitations. The first action had been discontinued prior to the time that defendant filed its bankruptcy petition in December 1997 and the bankruptcy petition was dismissed in December 1998, long before this second foreclosure action was commenced and, thus, the bankruptcy proceeding never operated to toll a pending foreclosure action (see, Zuckerman v. 234-6 W. 22 St. Corp., 167 Misc.2d 198; 11 U.S.C. § 362; cf., Zuckerman v. 234-6 W. 22 St. Corp., 267 A.D.2d 130, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 764). Also, the fact that defendant listed this mortgage on its schedule of secured claims on its disclosure statement to its bankruptcy petition did not constitute a promise to pay the mortgage so as to renew or extend the Statute of Limitations but, rather, signified defendant's intent not to pay it (see, Filigree Films Pension Plan v. CBC Realty Corp., 229 A.D.2d 862, 863; Petito v. Piffath, 85 N.Y.2d 1, 9, supra; Morris Demolition Co. v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., supra, at 521; Crow v. Gleason, supra, at 493; see also, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cardona, 723 F.2d 132, 137; Matter of Povill, 105 F.2d 157, 160; cf., Albin v. Dallacqua, 254 A.D.2d 444, 445). Bankruptcy Court dismissed defendant's petition without endorsing any inconsistent position that the note or mortgage were defendant's valid debts and, thus, principles of judicial estoppel do not preclude defendant's reliance on the Statute of Limitations defense in this action (see, McIntosh Bldrs. v. Ball, 264 A.D.2d 869, 870; Koch v. National Basketball Assn., 245 A.D.2d 230, 231; Prudential Home Mtge. Co. v. Neildan Constr. Corp., 209 A.D.2d 394, 395; see also,Bates v. Long Is. R. R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1038, cert denied 510 U.S. 992).
Accordingly, since neither the court-appointed receiver's payment of rents and profits to plaintiffs' predecessors in interest nor the listing of the debt in the bankruptcy proceeding extended or renewed the Statute of Limitations, plaintiffs' foreclosure action — commenced in October 1999 — should have been dismissed as untimely (see, CPLR 213).
Cardona, P.J., Peters, Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed against defendant Cinelli Enterprises Inc.