Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 02-0055
January 8, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is motion of defendant American Alternative Insurance Corporation to join Diana Aucoin as a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). The Court entered an Order and Reasons denying the motion on January 6, 2004 which the Court vacated on January 7, 2004. The Court now issues this order denying the motion for the following reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Debra Rice Safford asserts that the defendant St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 1 (the "Fire District") failed to promote her from volunteer to full-time firefighter because of her gender and age. Safford claims that in May 2000, the Fire District passed over her application for a full-time firefighter position in favor of four younger, less-qualified men. Safford further alleges that in August 2001, she was passed over in favor of three younger, less-qualified men.
On September 22, 2001, plaintiff filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On January 8, 2002, Safford filed a complaint against the Fire District and its insurer. Safford alleges that the Fire District discriminated against her on the basis of age and gender in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"); 29 U.S.C. § 623, at seq. ("ADEA"); and Louisiana anti-discrimination laws.
She received a right to sue letter from the EEOC dated January 11, 2002.
On July 21, 2003, Safford sought leave to file her fourth amended and supplemental complaint. Safford indicated that the purpose of the amendment was to: (1) incorporate all previous amendments into a single pleading, (2) add allegations regarding events that occurred since the filing of the last amendment, and (3) add Steve Farris and Milton Kennedy as defendants. Magistrate Judge Shushan granted in part and denied in part plaintiff's motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Shushan allowed Safford to amend her complaint but required her to limit her ADEA and state law claims to the Fire District. See Hearing On Motion, Rec. Doc. 113, at 3. After the magistrate's ruling, plaintiff filed her fourth amended complaint in which she clarified that her Title VII, ADEA, and state anti-discrimination law claims do not apply to the individual defendants. The Fire District moved the Court to review the magistrate judge's ruling. In an Order and Reasons dated January 5, 2004, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the magistrate judge's ruling. The Court affirmed the magistrate judge's determination that the plaintiff may amend her complaint to assert a claim against Fire Chief Kennedy but found that the claim must be based only on conduct that occurred within the one-year limitation period. The Court reversed the magistrate judge's ruling that granted plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to assert a claim against Fire Board Chairman Farris.
Plaintiff asserts that Farris was a Commissioner appointed to the Fire District by the City Counsel for the city of Slidell, Louisiana, and was Chairman of the Fire Board during the period of time in question. See Fourth Amended Complaint, Rec. Doc. 116, at ¶ I.
Plaintiff asserts that Kennedy was the Fire District's Fire Chief during the period of time in question. See Fourth Amended Complaint, Rec. Doc. 116, at ¶ I.
Plaintiff's complaint alludes to a consent decree that defendant entered into with the United States Department of Justice in 1980. The complaint states:
X-B.
Defendants were obligated to hire/promote certain percentages of women and minorities by a Consent Decree the Fire District entered into with the United States Department of Justice in approximately 1980. Defendants secured their release from the Consent Decree when they failed to inform the Justice Department that the Fire District had lost one of only two female firefighters, and that female firefighter had filed a discrimination claim against the Fire District with the EEOC due to the Fire District's discriminatory actions. Since that time, the only remaining female firefighter has also left the District. Defendant Farris was instrumental in securing the District's release from the Consent Decree.
X-C.
On information and belief, during the period while they were subject to the Consent Decree and thereafter, Defendants failed to institute sufficient policies, procedures and guidelines to prevent discrimination such as that practiced against Plaintiff and/or to affirmatively rectify past discrimination. Alternatively, Defendants breached whatever policies, procedures and guidelines were in effect in their hiring/promotion policies as they affected Plaintiff. In addition, Defendants' failure to institute sufficient anti-discrimination policies precludes their ability to assert a good faith defense in these proceedings.
(Fourth Amended And Supplemental Complaint, Rec. Doc. 116.) The Fire District obtained its release from the Consent Decree in May 2000, the same month that it rejected Safford's first employment application.
American Alternative now moves this Court to join Diana Aucoin as a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). During the relevant time period, Diana Aucoin was an administrative assistant for the Fire District. She conducted background checks on applicants for employment, including Safford. As a part of Safford's background check, Aucoin contacted one of Safford's previous employers and reported that the employer gave Safford a negative reference. Aucoin also sat on the Hiring Committee when the committee interviewed Safford and unanimously decided not hire her in May 2000. In addition, American Alternative contends that Aucoin was instrumental in securing the Fire District's release from the Consent Decree.
See Def.'s Mot. to Join Aucoin, Ex. A, Aucoin Affidavit.
See id.
See id.
See id.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
American Alternative argues that the Court should join Aucoin under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Proper joinder under Rule 19 is a two step process. First, the court must decide if the absent party is a necessary party to the action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). Second, if the absent party is a necessary party, but its joinder is not feasible, the court must decide whether the absent party is an "indispensable" party to the action under Rule 19(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
Under Rule 19(a), a party is "necessary" if:
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
If a party is "necessary," but cannot be joined in the action, the court must determine "whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). The rule provides a list of four factors for a court to consider when making its determination:
[F]irst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
B. Analysis
American Alternative asserts that as a Fire District employee, Diana Aucoin is an insured employee under the Fire District's insurance policy, absent any applicable exclusion. Defendant quotes a provision of the policy that states that Fire District employees are insured under the policy, but only for "acts within the scope of their employment by [the Fire District] or while performing duties related to the conduct of [the Fire District's] business." Defendant contends that it has a right to demand joinder of its alleged insured under Louisiana Revised Statute 22:655. Louisiana's Direct Action Statute, LA.R.S. 22:655(B), provides:
Def.'s Mot. to Join Aucoin, at p. 3.
(1) The injured person . . . at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy; and, such action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly and in solido. . . . However, such action may be brought against the insurer alone only when:
(a) The insured has been adjudged a bankrupt by a court of competent jurisdiction or when proceedings to adjudge an insured a bankrupt have been commenced before a court of competent jurisdiction;
(b) The insured is insolvent;
(c) Service of citation or other process cannot be made on the insured;
(d) When the cause of action is for damages as a result of an offense or quasi-offense between children and their parents or between married persons;
(e) When the insurer is an uninsured motorist carrier; or
(f The insured is deceased.
Defendant contends that Safford will seek to hold it liable for the actions of its alleged insured Aucoin and therefore the Court must join Aucoin under Louisiana Revised Statute 22:655.
In this case, however, the plaintiff is not seeking to hold American Alternative liable for the actions of its alleged insured Aucoin. Plaintiff clearly seeks to hold liable the Fire District, who is the named insured under the policy and already a party to this action. In her complaint, plaintiff asserts claims under Section 1983, Title VII, the ADEA, and Louisiana anti-discrimination laws. With regard to individual liability based on Aucoin's actions, the latter three provide no basis for such liability. See Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 650 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding that "[T]itle VII does not provide for liability against individual employees who do not otherwise qualify as employers[.]"); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding "that the ADEA provides no basis for individual liability for supervisory employees."); Spears v. Rountree Oldsmobile-Cadillac Co., 26, 810, 653 So.2d 182, 184 (La.App. 2 Cir., 4/5/95) (noting that Louisiana's anti-discrimination law is substantively similar to Title VII, making it appropriate to consider interpretations of the federal statute in construing the former and "[b]oth federal and Louisiana discrimination laws apply only to employers.") Thus plaintiff cannot seek to hold Aucoin, and thus American Alternative as her insurer, liable under Title VII, the ADEA, or the Louisiana anti-discrimination laws.
In her complaint, plaintiff seeks to hold the Fire District and Fire Chief Kennedy liable under Section 1983. As to the Fire District's liability, "[m]unicipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof of 1) a policymaker; 2) an official policy; 3) and a violation of constitutional rights whose 'moving force' is the policy or custom." Rivera v. Houston Independent School District, 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). To establish these elements of her claim against the Fire District, plaintiff may rely in part on the actions of Aucoin, but such reliance is not the same as asserting Aucoin's liability and seeking to hold American Alternative liable as her insurer. Under Section 1983, any claims alleging Aucoin's liability would be claims against her in her individual capacity. Establishing Aucoin's liability in her individual capacity would require plaintiff to set forth a theory of liability which she clearly does not assert in her complaint. See Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Allegations of constitutional violations must be pleaded with 'factual detail and particularity[.]'") (quoting Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (5th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff never even mentions Aucoin in her complaint. Moreover, when plaintiff sought leave to amend her complaint to allege Section 1983 claims against Fire Board Chairman Farris and Fire Chief Kennedy, she again did not attempt to assert a claim against Aucoin individually.
As the Fifth Circuit has noted, "[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil Service Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). As such, a claim against Aucoin in her official capacity would be duplicative of plaintiff's claim against the Fire District.
Plaintiff chose not to allege a claim against Aucoin in her individual capacity. She clearly does not seek to hold American Alternative liable based on the liability of Aucoin as an insured under its policy. The Court sees no reason why she should be compelled to add Aucoin. As a result, the Court concludes that Safford may obtain complete relief in spite of Aucoin's absence from the suit. Further, the Court finds that Aucoin does not have an interest relating to the subject of the action. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Aucoin is not a party necessary to this action under Rule 19(a).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendant's motion to join Diana Aucoin as a defendant in this action.